



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND**  
**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE**  
**FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995**

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

DEC 02 2009

Mr. John Young  
CRYPTOMI  
251 West 89th Street  
Suite 6E  
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for a variety of files, and supplements our letter of September 13, 2002.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that their information has been sanitized from the records and two pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. To aid you in identifying CIA information we have bracketed it in red.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Delores M. Nelson, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505, Cite CIA F-2002-01610 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized as it is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2 (a)(2), 1.2 (a)(3) and 1.4 (e) of EO 12958, as amended. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2 (a) (2) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2 (a) (3) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.4 (e) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Since the release of the information deleted from these records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, the information is exempt from public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Mary A. Legere, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis of your disagreement with the response and provide justification for a reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office, for forwarding, as appropriate to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651 (Press 2/Press 6), or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: [INSCOM\\_FOIA\\_ServiceCenter@mi.army.mil](mailto:INSCOM_FOIA_ServiceCenter@mi.army.mil) and refer to case #341F-08.

Sincerely,



Joanne Benear

Chief

Freedom of Information/Privacy Office

Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 December 1953

Region III, 66th CIC Group

Activities of the [b1] GIESSEN

III-17528

1. [b6] has been working for [ ]

[ ] - [b1] at the GIESSEN (UTM) 32UMA7704 Refugee Center since 16 November 1953. He undoubtedly has much experience in interrogating, but he lacks the absolutely necessary knowledge of developments and organizations within the Soviet Zone. He is also insufficiently skeptical toward the persons being interrogated. These two (2) deficiencies make it impossible for him to judge how much of the stories told to him is credible or possible, and how much is of significance. The overall impression is good; he is industrious and conscientious.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

2. Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER\*, Chief of the [b1] at the GIESSEN Refugee Center, will begin his leave on either 11 or 12 December 1953 and will not return until the end of January 1954. During this period, he intends to take a health cure at BAD WIMPFEN (UTM) (nca). OELSNER-WOLLER intends to retain his position at least until 30 June 1954, because he would be sixty-five (65) years of age in July and then entitled to a pension.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

3. On 30 November 1953, OELSNER-WOLLER was in COLOGNE (UTM) 32ULB5745 in order to discuss his leave, his retirement from the [b1] and the appointment of his successor. In his discussion with [b6] and Albert RADKE\*, OELSNER-WOLLER recommended [b6] as his successor. Both of these officials, particularly RADKE, then allegedly raised the question whether the connection with the Gehlen Group could be maintained if [b6] were to be appointed. RADKE even raised the question of [b6] reliability. Apparently RADKE had received a report from an unknown person, hereinafter called "Z", to the effect that "Z" overheard a conversation between [b6] and a man not belonging to the [b1] who asked [b6] for a report on a certain matter, adding that it was important. "Z" could only have been someone from the Gehlen Group. It is not known if RADKE gave OELSNER-WOLLER any indication as to the exact direction of his suspicions concerning [b6]

Page 1 of 1 pages  
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4. - Hqs, 66th CIC Group; 1 - CIC Central File; 1 - Region III File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 December 1953

Region III, 66th CIC Group

Activities of the [b1] GIESSEN

III-17528

unreliability. However, OELSNER-WOLLER feels certain that [b6] will become his successor, unless something unexpected should happen. Should [b6] receive OELSNER-WOLLER's position, [b6] [b6], wife of [b6] who is also employed by the [b1] at the GIESSEN Refugee Center, must resign her position immediately. This stipulation was made by [b6].

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

4. [b6] former Bundesnachrichtsstelle (Federal Information Office - BUNAST) representative in the GIESSEN Refugee Center, presently on sick leave, was transferred to a hospital in HAMBURG (UTM) 32UNE6553, and was scheduled to be operated upon approximately on 27 November 1953. Presumably he is suffering from cancer of the lung or some other kind of tumor. The results of the operation are not known. During the absence of [b6] his place is being taken by [b6] (cover name for [b6]), the former Resident Agent of BUNAST in BAD HERSFELD (UTM) 32UNB5036 or in HUENFELD (UTM) 32UNB5414. [b6] expects to work in the GIESSEN Refugee Center three (3) or four (4) days a week, and the rest of the week at the headquarters in KASSEL (UTM) 32UNB3586. As far as could be ascertained, BUNAST has only one (1) informant in the Soviet Zone at the present time. This information does not have any important position but is merely a Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth - FDJ) member.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

5. Contacts between the Gehlen Group office located in DARMSTADT (UTM) 32UMA7525 known as the "H" office, and OELSNER-WOLLER have not yet been resumed. OELSNER-WOLLER complained about this to RADKE while visiting the latter in COLOGNE. OELSNER-WOLLER also wrote a letter of complaint to [b6] of the STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203 office of the Gehlen Group, requesting him to report the matter to MUNICH (UTM) 32UPU9134. [b6] is expected to be in GIESSEN during the first part of December 1953; the purpose of this visit is not known.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

6. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

a/a

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SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

D-166471; IV-1471

9 December 1953

SUBJECT: [b6]

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. The attached Agent Report, Region IV, MUNICH, Subject and File as above, dated 9 December 1953, is forwarded as additional information on SUBJECT's contact, [b6]. An examination of the files of Region IV, MUNICH, failed previously to disclose information on BUSCH or Tarramar GMBH. This firm, however, is listed in the MUNICH address book.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

Source "A" is O-0152-IV who obtained the information from [b6] [b6] head of the SPD Information Service for Bavaria. [b6] are not known to Region IV, MUNICH.

3. [b6] also reported that the Firma Feichtel und Co., GMBH, MUNICH, Landwehrstr. 44, is another cover organization of the Gehlen Group. An examination of the files of Region IV, MUNICH, revealed no information relative to the Feichtel Firm. The Feichtel Firm is also listed in the MUNICH address book. This firm is listed as an export-import firm.

4. As previously stated, if the information contained above and also in the attached Agent Report, is correct, it is an indication that the SPD is fairly well informed regarding Gehlen Group cover organizations. It is requested that Region IV, Munich, be informed of the investigative techniques to be followed where information pertaining to 6966 SDU has been encountered.

5. It is requested that [b6] be informed of the information contained in the attached Agent Report and this cover letter.

OPS  
Isol: a/s

[b6] /AM 7246-006/rmc

Distribution:

2 - w/5 cyps AR  
Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
1 - w/1 cpy AR  
File

b6

Commanding

DEC 1953

LOG Nr.  
IV 6036

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# AGENT REPORT

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

b6

2. DATE SUBMITTED

9 December 1953

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

D-166471; IV-1471

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 2 December 1953, Source "A" stated that b6 <sup>CU</sup> head of the Tarramar GmbH, MUNICH, Friedrich-Horschelestr. 12, a sugar and chocolate export firm, is a good friend of SUBJECT's and continues to be in contact with him. b6 was formerly in the Eastern Affairs Department of the German Foreign Office. b6 is alleged to be again attempting to secure a position in the Foreign Office and he may have already received his appointment. The Tarramar firm alleged to be a cover organization of the Gehlen Group, has its headquarters in HAMBURG. (B-6)

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by USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6  
GROUP, MUNICH

REG IV, 66TH CIC

6. SIGNATURE

b6

WD-480 FORM 1 JUN 47 341

AGL O) 1-83-100M-26036

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
10 November 1953

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th OIC Group

SUBJECT

Activities of the [b1] GIESSEN

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-17528

1. On 23 October 1953, [b6] chief of Department III of the [b1] at COLOGNE (UTM) 32ULB5745, visited Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER\*, Chief of the [b1] at the GIESSEN (UTM) 32UMA7704 Refugee Center. [b6] informed OELSNER-WOLLER that [b6] was interested in his (OELSNER-WOLLER) state of health and wanted to discuss the current amount of work at the GIESSEN Refugee Center. [b6] asked [b6] to go to GIESSEN in order to have OELSNER-WOLLER the trip to COLOGNE. It was decided that OELSNER-WOLLER should go on leave by the middle of December 1953 at the latest. In response to a specific question from OELSNER-WOLLER, [b6] said that he agreed that [b6] Deputy Chief of the [b1] at the GIESSEN Refugee Center, should succeed OELSNER-WOLLER when the latter retires. However, [b6] drew OELSNER-WOLLER's attention to the fact that it was Albert RADKE\* who was chiefly responsible for the appointment, and that [b6] might want to appoint an old Gehlen Group man. Security at the [b1] office in the GIESSEN Refugee Center was also discussed, as that office will receive stool cabinets in the near future. The above meeting took place at the GIESSEN Railroad Station, as [b6] did not visit the [b1] office in the GIESSEN Refugee Center.

SOURCE: "A"

27 APR 1955

Esfy  
ELE CF

B-2

2. The additional interrogator promised for the [b1] at the GIESSEN Refugee Center has not yet arrived; nothing more has been revealed about him or about the date of his arrival.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

3. On 21 October 1953, [b6] from the STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203 office of the Gehlen Group, visited OELSNER-WOLLER in order to discuss welfare matters in connection with OELSNER-WOLLER's sickness and pending retirement. No further details are known at this time.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

4. On 22 October 1953, OELSNER-WOLLER was visited by [b6] from the DARMSTADT (UTM) 32UMA7525 office of the Gehlen Group, (telephone number 4648). [b6] is the new contact man for OELSNER-WOLLER from the Gehlen Group. The conversation between OELSNER-WOLLER and [b6] lasted an hour. OELSNER-WOLLER raised a series of questions on the subject of collaboration. Among other things, OELSNER-WOLLER suggested that [b6] should be initiated into the

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4 - Hqs, 66th OIC Group, 1 - OIC Central File, 1 - Region III File

WD-568

ACD FORM  
1 JUN 47

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34057 11488

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

10 November 1953

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group

SUBJECT

Activities of the **b1** GIESSEN

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . F

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DUBIOUSLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

111-17528

connection between OELSNER-WOLLER and the Gehlen Group, because of the fact that OELSNER-WOLLER would often be absent. On most of the questions raised, **b6** did not arrive at any decision as he said he was not authorized to do so. This also applied to the question of entering into contact with **b6** **b6** stated that he wanted to obtain a decision or rather an authorization from his headquarters. OELSNER-WOLLER was not satisfied with this conversation. He did not even receive an address to which to send carbon copies of **b1** reports. However, when he makes his next trip home, he will visit DARMSTADT on the return journey to attend a conference there. OELSNER-WOLLER was also instructed not to put through a telephone call to DARMSTADT, but to wait until he received instructions as to when to attend this conference.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

5. On 29 October 1953, **b6** of the Gehlen Group paid a visit to GIESSEN and brought the news that **b6** will not be used for operational purposes. Inquiries and investigations have revealed that **b6** is almost certainly a homosexual, and that this was presumably the reason for his flight from the Soviet Zone. In view of the homosexuality factor, the danger is too great that **b6** might work for both sides. Contact with him has therefore been completely severed.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

6. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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WD -ASO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Confidential~~

CO, Hq 66th CIC Group, USARLUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: [b6] CS Office

*file in*  
D-320529  
9 November 1953

D. Purcell, OCA

[b6]

Reference is made to Minute 1, IRS, your Headquarters, Subject as above, file: D-339816, dated 14 July 1953.

SUBJECT is known to the [b1] as an associate of the GEHLEN (OTTO) Organization.

COPY TO:

[b6] CS Office,  
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, USARLUR

G

2-2-2f

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14754  
Confidential - Security Information

[b1]

9/11/53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(Classification)  
SECURITY INFORMATION

# INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

FILE No: G - 34/53

SUBJECT: The GEHLEN Organization.

DATE: 26 October 1953

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Post to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	b1 L/O, GIE- SEN	See Diot.	26Oct53	<p>1. On 21 October 1953, the undersigned was informed by Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER, Chief of the GIESSEN b1 of a change in the organization of the GEHLEN organization.</p> <p>2. OELSNER-WOLLER stated that, until lately, the GEHLEN representative to whom he was reporting was situated in STUTTGART. The office with which OELSNER-WOLLER was dealing has been discontinued and its functions have been taken over by the GEHLEN office located in DARMSTADT. OELSNER-WOLLER stated that he would now make periodic trips to DARMSTADT to report but that, owing to the state of his health, the chief of the DARMSTADT office would for the present travel to GIESSEN to contact him. OELSNER-WOLLER stated that he expected a visit from DARMSTADT on 22 October 1953.</p> <p>3. On 26 October 1953, b6 Deputy Chief of the GIESSEN b1 informed the undersigned that OELSNER-WOLLER had been visited on 22 or 23 October 1953 by b6, Chief of the DARMSTADT office of the GEHLEN organization. b6 did not state whether he knew what was discussed but he did volunteer the following information concerning the GEHLEN organization. Formerly, the STUTTGART office was subordinated to DARMSTADT, of which b6 has been and still is chief. The former chief of the section with which OELSNER-WOLLER has been dealing was b6 b6 office, in turn, was subordinated to b6 as was an office held by former German General b6. As a result of re-organization that occurred in the late summer of 1953, the work of b6 office has been taken over by b6 in DARMSTADT and b6 has been dropped from the organization. b6 in turn, has been advanced and has become b6 superior. These last two (2) persons continue to maintain an office in STUTTGART. b6 also located in STUTTGART, interests himself mainly with informants. When a source in the Soviet zone is compromised or is about to be compromised, it is b6 responsibility to effect his clearance through the GIESSEN Refugee Center and to secure him residence in the Federal Republic.</p>

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Classified by C/S Section  
Date 25 MAY 1955 File 169

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

SECURITY INFORMATION

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

FILE No: G - 34/53

SUBJECT: The GEHLEN Organization.

DATE: 26 October 1953

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
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(Continued)

4. [b6] stated that the GEHLEN organization is interested in maintaining a connection to the [b1] for the following reasons:

1. To obtain information.
2. To be advised of persons under suspicion by the [b1] in order that they may initiate investigations of these persons when it is considered that the [b1] either has not the facilities to investigate the person or does not evidence interest in initiating an investigation.
3. To obtain information sources who are capable of entering and leaving the Soviet zone and in whom the [b1] is not interested in this respect.

5. The information concerning the GEHLEN organization was volunteered by OELSNER-WOLLER [b6] and was not solicited.

Distribution:

- 3 - Hq, 66th CIC Gp (Attn: [b6])
- 2 - Reg III, CIC (Attn: Opns Officer)
- 1 - File

b6

b1 L/O GIESSEN

4 NOV 1953

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
AGL (I) 11-51-2004-20343

GID103 1010

350.09 (CID:CI:CS)

Collection of Information Concerning the Gehlen Group

20 October 1953

1 G-2 OPS Br 20 Oct  
CI-CS

1. Reference is made to the memo of General Phillips, dated 9 October 1953, which assigns to Operations Branch the responsibility for planning, coordinating and directing all field intelligence operations.

2. This branch considers that a definite need exists for information concerning the future foreign positive intelligence agency of West Germany, i.e., the agency now known as SDE or the Gehlen Group. This need is based upon the following three requirements:

- a. The normal counter-intelligence mission of US military intelligence.
- b. The expressed request of D/A for information concerning West German intelligence agencies.
- c. The immediate and future security of this command.

3. It is considered that the requirements outlined above can not be satisfactorily met through the acquisition of such information concerning the Gehlen Group as may become available either through liaison channels or by requests placed upon another agency. It is therefore strongly recommended that appropriate steps be taken to establish a CIC penetration operation of the Gehlen Group which would produce the necessary information.

4. Consideration must be given to the fact that a penetration of the Gehlen Group will undoubtedly become more difficult once it has been officially integrated into the Federal Government. It would appear probable, due to recent political developments, that such an integration may be expected shortly following ratification of the Contractual Agreements or in terms of time, within the next few months. It is therefore clear that for facility of operation and maximum efficiency, such a penetration operation, if undertaken, should be initiated as soon as possible.

5. Allowing that such a penetration is to be undertaken, it is requested that a meeting be held among representatives of Operations Branch, this Branch, CIO and DAD in order to establish the concurrence of DAD and (apart from the question of further operational contact) to arrange for the acquisition by this Branch of basic data from DAD concerning the Gehlen Group upon which to base a complete ICM.

DHK/jw Heid Mil 8008

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b6

Chief, CI Branch

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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SECURITY INFORMATION

8 October 1953

Region III, 66th CIG Group

Activities of the [b1] GIKSEN

*file in*  
*D-320 529*

III-17528

1. During May 1953, [b6] a former agent of the East German Ministerium fuer Staats Sicherheit (Ministry of State Security - MSS) was proceeding through the GIKSEN (UTM) 320087704 Refugee Center, and was subsequently interrogated by [b6] of the [b1]. [b6] asked [b6] if he would consider the possibility of contacting an employee of the MSS, and [b6] replied in the affirmative. [b6] thereupon deferred establishment of this contact, or rather he deferred the attempt to establish contact until after [b6], a former stenographer for the MSS who fled to the West, came to the GIKSEN Refugee Center from BERLIN (UTM) 3200878050. [b6] intended first of all to check [b6] story by comparing it with that of [b6].

SOURCE: "A"

[b6]

B-2

2. On 18 August 1953, [b6] and [b6] of the [b1] in COLOGNE (UTM) 320085745 came to GIKSEN to discuss the matter once again with [b6]. [b6] was not in the least prepared for this discussion and was not equaled with either the [b6] report or the [b6] report. Furthermore, he knew nothing about the agreement reached between [b6] and [b6] connected the interview with [b6] very clumsily, and when he asked [b6] if he was willing to establish the contact, [b6] replied that he was not. [b6], Acting Chief of the [b1] at the GIKSEN Refugee Center who was present at this meeting, saw clearly that [b6] negative answer was due to the clumsy manner in which [b6] had conducted the conversation. [b6] asked [b6] to think the matter over and let him know should he [b6] decide to make the contact.

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

3. On 25 August 1953, [b6] contacted [b6] by telephone and informed him that he was again willing to make the contact. [b6] informed [b6] of this latest development and was told that [b6] would come to GIKSEN on or about 14 September 1953 and speak with [b6] at that time.

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

4. On 10 September 1953, [b6] was visited by two (2) members of the Gehlen Group, [b6] and [b6]. They had heard of [b6] stay at the GIKSEN Refugee Center and knew of the report that [b6] wrote for the [b1]. They wanted [b6] to arrange an interview for them with [b6] so that they could persuade him to establish contact with the [b6].

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4 - Hqs, 66th CIG Group, 1 - CIG Central File, 1 - Region III File

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

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8/10/53

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

8 October 1953

Region III, 66th CIC Group

Activities of the [b1] GIESSEN

III-17528

NSS. [b6] explained that this would be impossible as the [b1] was interested in using [b6] and that [b6] was coming in a few days to discuss the matter with [b6]. [b6] then asked [b6] to put them in touch with [b6] the event that the [b1] decided not to use [b6] which [b6] promised to do.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

5. On 15 September 1953, [b6] arrived in GIESSEN and began the discussion about [b6] with [b6]. [b6] informed [b6] that he did not have faith in [b6] story and that he believed it to be a fairy tale based on [b6] imagination. [b6] then decided that he would not see [b6] after all, adding that as far as he was concerned, the case was closed.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

6. On 17 September 1953, [b6] called [b6] by telephone and inquired about the [b6] case. [b6] informed [b6] that [b6] was available. The following day [b6] came to GIESSEN with his wife, also a Gehlen employee, and [b6] introduced [b6] to [b6]. [b6] was not made aware that [b6] belonged to the Gehlen Group. [b6] was instead led to believe that [b6] belonged to an intelligence organization of the West German Government. When [b6] asked [b6] if he would like to establish a contact with the NSS, [b6] replied in the affirmative.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

7. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP**

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

DAD-1974

FILE No: D-3/2928

SUBJECT: b6

DATE: 29 September 1953

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1.	DAD LO  (Attn: b6)	Hq 66th CIC Group S-2, S-3 b6	29Sep53	<p>1. Reference is made to IRS Headquarters 66th CIC Group dated 28 August 1953, Subject and file as above.</p> <p>2. Although this office has received no information from Special Detachment USAREUR on b6 we have been informed that SDU is officially represented at the moment in Berlin only by b6 and does not conduct liaison business through any but American personnel.</p> <p>3. We appreciate having been informed of b6 b1 information on b6 will be passed to CIC as soon as it is received by this office.</p> <p>b3 Per CIA</p> <p>DAD LO</p>

Tel. Ext. 7467

This Document Has Been  
Cleared By C/3 Section  
Date 1 Oct 53 init WY.

52

70  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(Classification)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Q - 20/53

b6

18 September 1953

D-320529

1 [b1] See 18Sep53  
L/O, Diet.  
GIX-  
SEN

1. Reference is made to IRS, this office, Subject: [b1] Liaison Officer's Report, GIESSEN, dated 11 August 1953, which concerned itself with the installation in the office of the [b1] in the GIESSEN Refugee Center of SUBJECT, who is a member of the OEHLER organization.

2. On 14 September 1953, SUBJECT again appeared at the [b1] GIESSEN, and resumed the interrogation of former VOPO members. He remained until the evening of 16 September 1953, when he returned to his home in DUESSELDORF. During a conversation on 16 September 1953, SUBJECT informed the undersigned that he is known in the Refugee Center by his cover name, [b6]. He explained that he is fully documented under his correct name and also under the name of [b6]. He showed the undersigned both of his German identity documents.

3. SUBJECT stated that there had been a slight misunderstanding concerning his activities in the Refugee Center but that everything has been adjusted and he will, in future, be coming to GIESSEN regularly. He mentioned that, from DUESSELDORF, he will travel to MUNICH for a short stay in the interests of the OEHLER organization. He expects to return to GIESSEN on or about 1 October 1953 for a stay of approximately ten (10) days. He currently plans to spend about fourteen (14) days of each month in the [b1] offices in GIESSEN.

4. [b6], deputy chief of the [b1] in GIESSEN, stated on 14 September 1953 that SUBJECT's presence had come as a surprise to him. He stated that he had made it clear to SUBJECT that, should he wish to remain, he must accomplish his work faster than he did in the past.

Distribution:

- 3 - Hq, 66th GIC Group (Attn: [b6])
- 2 - Region III, GIC (Attn: Operations Officer)
- 1 - File

b6

[b1] L/O GIESSEN

53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

69

18/9/53

12282

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

9 - 21/53  
OELSNER-WOLLER, Fritz

18 September 1953

*file in*  
*D-320527*

1. [b1] See 18Sep53 1. On 18 September 1953, the undersigned was informed by [b6] deputy chief of the [b1] in GIESSEN, that a strong possibility exists that SUBJECT will return to his post of chief of the GIESSEN [b1] on or about 1 October 1953. Although it is not contemplated that SUBJECT will be able to carry out the duties of his office, as it is not believed he has sufficiently recovered from his heart attack, he must either return to duty before 15 October 1953 or be struck from the [b1] payroll. It is believed that SUBJECT will remain long enough, if possible, in GIESSEN to ensure that he will continue to be paid for another three (3) month period and that he will then return to his home.

2. [b6] also stated that there is a possibility that SUBJECT might lose some of his influence in the GEHLEN organization, since [b6] his contact in the STUTTGART office of that organization, has been replaced by former German General (fnu) FROELICH, who uses the cover name "FRICKE". [b6] has no duties in the GEHLEN office in STUTTGART, at present, and FROELICH has volunteered no information to [b6] as to [b6] future status.

3. The information concerning the GEHLEN organization was volunteered by [b6] and not solicited.

Distribution:

3 - Hq, 66th CIC Group (Attn: [b6])  
2 - Region III: OIO (Attn: Operations Officer)  
1 - File

b6

[b1] L/O GIESSEN

12309

54  
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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

*68*  
*18/9/53*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

b6

FILE No: D-320529/G - 15/53

SUBJECT: b6

DATE: 8 September 1953

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1.	b1 L/O, Dist. GIE* SSEN		8Sep53	<p>1. Refereca ia made to IRS, your headquertare, subject and filo aa above, dated 26 August 1953. On 3 September 1953, the contants of your IRS were discussad with b6, daputy chiaf of the b1 in tha GIESSEN Refugaa Center. An opportunity to do so praasntad itself when b6 stated that ha had receivad a telephona esll on 2 Saptambar 1953 from b6 who is connacted with tha GEHLEN organization in STUTTGART. b6 aaked b6 if he could visit b6 on 11 September 1953. b6 asked if it ware possible for the undareigned to ascartain b6 trua atetus in tha GEHLEN organization.</p> <p>2. Tha undareigned informed b6 that CIC has littla or no intarest in tha GEHLEN organization and asked him, out of curiosity, why ha was so concernad about b6 atatus. b6 state that, approximatly nine (9) montha ago, ha was approechad by (fnu) b6 from GEHLEN on ona day and eagain by b6 on the succaading dey. Both man attempted to recruit b6 for GEHLEN. Thie was forastalled by Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER, chief of the GIESSEN b1 and also a GEHLEN man. On 22 July 1953, b6 wrota b6 a letter in which ha steted that ha wished to discusa tha casa of b6, formar MSS Kommiasar whom GEHLEN plans to taka ovar from tha b1. b6 callad the GEHLEN org-anization in STUTTGART to inform tham that ha must first aacure claeranca from the b1 bafore ho discusaaa the b6 caso. As it happened, b6 was not preasnt in tha office in STUTTGART end b6 epoke to (fnu) b6 warnad b6 that re-organization was underwey and that b6 would possibly be given other dutias end b6 should have nothing to do with b6 until he was given approval to do so by b6. When b6 callad on 2 September 1953, b6 informed him of b6 atatumnt end receivad tha enswar that tha reorganization had bean eaccomplished end b6 need have no quelms at allowing b6 to visit him on 11 Saptambar 1953. b6 posed the quastion ea to whether tha undareigned could consider ea posabile the fact that b6 might have baan expellad from the GEHLEN organization end could hava joined tha HEINZ organization of tha b1 offica. The undaraigned enswared that ha knaw very littla concerning either the HEINZ or GEHLEN organizations since they do not coma within the scope of intarest of e liaison officar. b6 than again asked if it ware not possibla for tha undaraigned to request information concernig tha trua statuaas of b6. Stating that ha felt that the CIC could offar littla, if any, information on GEHLEN personalities, ainea tha CIC was not invastigating that org-anization, the undareigned finally agreed to request tha information, although thare was littla doubt that tha request could not be answered.</p>

This Document has been  
Carded by C/S Section  
Date 9 Feb 54 Init W1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

AGL (1) 11-61-307M-2243

55 8797-67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

FILE No: D-320529/G @ 15/53

SUBJECT: b6

DATE: 9 September 1953

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Paid to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
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(Continued)

3. Turning the conversation to b6 evident interest in the GEHLEN organization, the undersigned queried him as to how he could possibly believe that CIC might be interested in securing penetration of that organization. b6 answered that each individual agent from the CIC with whom he has had connections in the past has expressed interest in GEHLEN in one way or another. He specifically named b6 in this connection. Especial interest was attached by these agents to the connection existing between GEHLEN and OELSNER-WOLLER. b6 stated that it had been only a natural supposition on his part that CIC was interested in the organization. He further stated that he had thought that, should he join GEHLEN, he should do so with the thought in mind that he could serve CIC while a GEHLEN member. b6 was told that CIC has currently no interest in investigating GEHLEN and that, should he join, it would be for his own interests and not with any influence from CIC.

4. b6 went on to state that the actual reason for his considering joining GEHLEN was that he has lately noticed the increasing influence that GEHLEN representatives appear to be exerting in the affairs of the b1 and BUNAST. He cited the fact that (fnu) RADKE of the b1 in COLOGNE is a GEHLEN man and also cited the instilling of b6 another GEHLEN man, in the GIESSEN Refugee Center by b6 a deputy chief of Abteilung III of the b1 who had received instructions from b6 of the b1 to accomplish this. He further stated that it appeared to him that, in order to secure his own position and future in the b1 it would be almost mandatory for him to join GEHLEN. Being aware of the fact that GEHLEN has been operating informant nets in the Soviet zone for years, b6 also feels that if, in the course of events, he is given the position of chief of the BUNAST in KASSEL, he might profit by a connection to GEHLEN in that he might be able to secure informant sources in the Soviet zone from GEHLEN.

5. b6 was again informed that mine is strictly a liaison mission and that I can neither request, influence, recommend or obstruct any action he might take regarding his joining GEHLEN or any other organization. He was also again informed that the scope of my activities does not include the judgment or recommendation of any official of the b1 or BUNAST. He was told that the only reason that information would be requested concerning b6 was the fact that he, as a b1 official, requested it. No hope was expressed for a favorable answer to the request.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

SECURITY INFORMATION

FILE No: D-320529/G - 15/S3

SUBJECT: b6

DATE: 8 September 1953

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
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(Continued)

6. During an ordinary liaison visit on 7 September 1953, b6 again brought up the subject of b6 and the GEHLEN organization. He showed the undersigned a letter he had received from b6 on 5 September 1953, in which b6 stated that he was continuing in information gathering activities but that b6 has been assigned other duties. b6 again stated in his letter that he will visit b6 on 11 September 1953.

7. It must be emphasized and remembered that none of the information contained in this report was solicited from b6 but was rather volunteered. No effort was made to enlarge on information volunteered and only passing interest was shown. It still appears strange to the undersigned that GEHLEN came into knowledge of b6 of the MSS as this case was handled jointly by the b1 and the CIC, F/O GIESSEN. It is quite evident that GEHLEN was informed of the existence of b6 either by the b1 in the GIESSEN Refugee Center or in COLOGNE. It is becoming more and more evident that a very strong tie exists between b6 GEHLEN, whether such a tie is to be condoned by CIC or not. It appears impossible for the undersigned to ask b6 to refrain from mentioning the organization as the undersigned does not wish to discuss GEHLEN in any manner or form. Should no further reports concerning b6 activities in behalf of the organization be wished, it is requested that the undersigned be so informed. There has been no suggestions or influence on the part of the undersigned in connection with b6 interest in GEHLEN.

Distribution:

- 3 - Bq, 66th CIC Group (Attn: b6)
- 2 - Region III, CIC (Attn: Gpne Officer)
- 1 - File

b6

b1 L/G GIESSEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~file in  
D-320529

D-310020

b6

31 August 1953

1. Hq, [b1] 31 Aug  
66th [b1] 1953  
CIC (Mr. HUNTER)  
Group THREE  
Region  
VIT

1. Reference is made to your office Memorandum, file

b1

b1 Distribution of which was made to your Region.

2. It is desired that you never contact with [b6]

since the German element of [b1] must be regarded as completely unofficial and any coordination of [b1] matters involving

SDC operations or personnel should be conducted with [b6] who has been identified to you as a representative of [b1] American element. Should [b6] continue his efforts to contact your office, the matter should be referred to [b6] for correction. It is not desired that [b6] be brought into contact with Region VII.

3. This headquarters will institute a further check on [b6] through the liaison officer in this headquarters. Under no circumstances will the liaison officer with the [b1] [b1] [b6] be used to confirm or check out suspected or known GEMLEN representatives.

BY [b6]

b6

b6

Copy: [b6] 93-2-2352  
Copies: [b6] 93, CIE Region VIII

Chief, Operations Section

H/R: [b6] has introduced himself to the BERLIN [b1] liaison officer as a representative of the GEMLEN organization in BERLIN. [b6] indicated that he wanted to cooperate with the [b1] IO. Since the GEMLEN organization is regarded as an unofficial German intelligence organization, [b6] necessary contact is made through DAD and GOU American element. [b6]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51/8/53



(over)  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

- (a) he is aware of CIC interest in GEHLN and wants to move in as a CIC source; (b) he is already a GEHLN member and was prompted to make this offer; or (c) he is attempting to satisfy an outrageous personal ambition by affiliating himself in one manner or another with the 3 most prominent intelligence organizations in the area: CIC, the [b1] and GEHLN. Region III will be directed in a separate IRS to conduct an extensive investigation of [b6]

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SECURITY INFORMATION

# INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

FILE No:

SUBJECT: **b1** Liaison Officer's Report, GIESSEN.

DATE: 10 August 1953.

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Poss to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1.	<b>b1</b> Hq, 66th I/O, CIC Gp, GIESS-Attn: EN Opns Officer, Reg III.		10 Aug 53	<p>1. Reference is made to IRS, this office, Subject as above, dated 5 August 1953, which concerned itself with the possibility that a connection either exists or is being fostered between <b>b6</b> deputy chief of the <b>b1</b> in the GIESSEN Refugee Center, and the GEHLEN organization.</p> <p>2. On 5 August 1953, <b>b6</b> travelled from GIESSEN to COLOGNE for the expressed purpose of meeting with <b>b6</b> <b>b6</b> deputy chief of Abteilung III of the <b>b1</b>. On 8 August 1953, <b>b6</b> stated to the undersigned that he had actually made the trip in the interests of Abteilung II of the <b>b1</b> COLOGNE, but had stayed at <b>b6</b> home and had spent much time in his company. He then went on to ask the undersigned if there could possibly be any objections to his joining the <b>b1</b> organization. He said he was positive that an attempt would be made by that organization to recruit him and that Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER, chief of the <b>b1</b> in the GIESSEN Refugee Center and GEHLEN member, already had made overtures to that effect. He said, "I am positive that you are interested in penetration of the GEHLEN organization and I now see an opportunity to accomplish such for you. I am sure that I could do much for you in the organization." He also stated that he was convinced that, should he join GEHLEN, he could justifiably accept the position of chief of the BUNAST in KASSEL without fearing that he might not be able to fulfill the duties of the office, since he would then have the support of the GEHLEN organization and might possibly even be given an established net in the Soviet zone for handling. He reiterated his wish that he and the undersigned pay a visit to OELSNER-WOLLER at the earliest opportunity, stressing the importance of the visit in view of his impending joining of the GEHLEN organization.</p> <p>3. Since it was the opinion of the undersigned that nothing much could be done to prevent <b>b6</b> joining GEHLEN should he see fit to do so and, since it was felt that, should he join, a better working arrangement would exist if he did so with the knowledge of this office, he was told that he could hardly lose anything through joining and that he could always leave the organization should he not agree with the policies and operational procedure of the organization.</p> <p>4. Since <b>b6</b> spent much of his time with <b>b6</b> while in COLOGNE and put his question regarding his joining GEHLEN at the first opportunity after his return, it is felt that he is being influenced by <b>b6</b> to join. To further bear this conjecture out, it must be remembered that <b>b6</b> was instrumental in installing in the Refugee Center the person formerly referred to as <b>b6</b> and who actually is <b>b6</b> GEHLEN member. From this arises the possibility that <b>b6</b> is a GEHLEN member or is considering joining. Although the contention may be</p>

REGRADED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY AUTHORITY OF

**b6**  
HQ 66TH C...

**b6**

1/A, W.

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

FILE No:

SUBJECT:

b1 Liaison Officer's Report, GIESSEN.

DATE: 16 August 1953

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly, draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
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(Continued)

far-fetched, it is the opinion of the undersigned that b1 officials are aware of the growing influence GEHLEN appears to be exerting in the affairs of the b1 and that, more and more, b1 officials will join his organization in order to obtain security of their positions in the Federal German intelligence system. Should Hq, 66th CIC Gp, desire penetration of the GEHLEN organization at this level, the necessity of a visit by b6 and the undersigned appears almost apparent. b6 stressed his desire that, should he join GEHLEN, no one from this Field Office except the undersigned, and possibly the OIC, be advised of the connection.

by this office.

5. A separate report concerning b6 is being prepared

Distribution:

- 3 - Hq, 66th CIC Gp (Attn: b6)
- 2 - Reg III, CIC
- 1 - File

b6

b1 D/O GIESSEN

*LO was informed verbally to get OUT  
of this situation — and stay OUT.*

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

[b1] Liaison Officer's Report, GIESSEN.

5 August 1953

1. [b1] Hq, 66th 5Aug53  
I/O, CIC Gp,  
GIESSEN- Reg III,  
EN Attn:  
Opne  
Officer

1. In the opinion of the undersigned, several incidents that have occurred tend to point to a possibility that a connection either exists or is being fostered between [b6] [b6] deputy chief of the [b1] in the GIESSEN Refugee Center, and the GEHLEN organization.

2. As a result of a visit to the GIESSEN Refugee Center by [b6] of the [b1], COLOGNE, on 17 July 1953, [b6] of the GEHLEN organization was installed in the [b1] offices in the Refugee Center ostensibly for the purpose of processing former VOPO members going through the Refugee Center as refugees. [b6] afforded [b6] every cooperation, establishing him in the office usually occupied by Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER, chief of the [b1] in the GIESSEN Refugee Center, who has been absent from his duties for an extended period of time because of illness. [b6] was allowed every opportunity to move at will among the offices occupied by the [b1] and BUNAST. On the occasion of the undersigned's arrival at the [b1] offices in the afternoon of 23 July 1953, [b6] was discovered in the office occupied by [b6], BUNAST representative in the GIESSEN Refugee Center, where he was in earnest conversation with [b6] chief of the BUNAST in KASSEL. When the undersigned entered the room, [b6] was in the act of advising and cautioning [b6] on the handling of the recruiting of a source for penetration of the Soviet zone. It appeared to the undersigned that [b6] was being allowed entirely too much liaison in the discussion and direction of the case. At this meeting, [b6] was extremely friendly toward the undersigned.

3. Several days later, during a routine liaison visit to the GIESSEN Refugee Center, [b6] told the undersigned that he had called the GEHLEN headquarters in or near STUTTGART and had discussed the health of OELSNER-WOLLER. He remarked that he saw no possibility of OELSNER-WOLLER ever returning to his duties and felt it his duty to acquaint the GEHLEN headquarters of the situation. On 29 July 1953, [b6] asked the undersigned if it were not possible to make an automobile trip to OELSNER-WOLLER's home near STUTTGART, ostensibly for the purpose of ascertaining the true state of OELSNER-WOLLER's health. [b6] was told that the current work load in this office does not allow for unwarranted absences by the undersigned. [b6] answered that the trip would be made on a Sunday and was told that permission for such a trip must first be sought.

REGRADUATED  
[b6]  
[b6]

[b6]

[b6]

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

[b1] Liaison Officer's Report, GIESSEN.

5 August 1953

(Continued)

4. During a liaison party on 1 August 1953, [b6] let fall the remark that [b6] had been soundly criticized by GEHLEN officials for having been so friendly with the undersigned.

5. While there may be little actual reason for suspicion that a [b6] GEHLEN connection exists, it seems strange that, first, [b6] allowed [b6] so much freedom about [b1] and BUNAST offices when he was fully aware of the fact the [b6] is a member of the GEHLEN organization, second, that he felt it his duty to advise the GEHLEN headquarters of OELSNER-WOLLER's apparently true condition, and third, that he should have been advised that [b6] had been criticized for his friendliness to the undersigned. To the best of the knowledge of the undersigned, [b6] has not been present in the GIESSEN Refugee Center since 24 July 1953. It appears strange that the GEHLEN organization was advised of [b6] friendliness to the undersigned, in the first place, and, secondly, it also seems strange that [b6] should have been advised of his having been criticized by any other source but [b6] himself. [b6] expressed desire to visit OELSNER-WOLLER at his home could reflect a desire on [b6] part to cement relations between himself and the GEHLEN organization, since it is fairly common knowledge that OELSNER-WOLLER enjoys close connections to that organization. The fact that [b6] was installed in the GIESSEN Refugee Center by [b6] may have acted in a way to convince [b6] that the GEHLEN organization might, in future, play an important role in the German intelligence system and he may be preparing himself for such an eventuality. It is to be stressed that all of the above are merely conjectures on the part of the undersigned, even though the above does represent a chain of incidents that appear to produce a picture that might well bear watching. It is the opinion of the undersigned that the trip to OELSNER-WOLLER's home could be fruitful, indeed, should permission be granted for it.

Distribution:

3 - Hq. 66th CIC Cp ( [b6] )  
2 - Reg III, OIC  
1 - File

b6

[b1] L/O GIESSEN

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

[b1] Liaison Officer's Report, GIESSEN.

4 August 1953

1. [b1] Hq, 66th 4Aug53  
I/O, CIO Gp,  
GIESSEN- Reg III,  
EN Attn:  
Opns  
Officer

1. This report will concern itself with the outcome of a liaison visit paid to the undersigned by [b6] on 28 July 1953 and also with remarks made by [b6] during a liaison party held during the afternoon and evening of 1 August 1953.

2. During the visit on 28 July 1953, [b6] complained bitterly about working conditions in his office. He stated that [b6] his deputy in the BUNAST in KASSEL, having been a colonel during the war, feels he knows much more than [b6] and is therefore continually attempting to interject his ideas into the workings of the office. Because [b6] was a colonel in the Gross Deutschland division, with duties pertaining in the main to the administration and leading of troops, [b6] feels that [b6] has little or no reason to be conversant with proper procedure in gaining information of intelligence interest and therefore considers most of [b6] suggestions to be at least silly. [b6] stated that he, personally, had spent many years in intelligence work, had been transferred during World War II from the Army to a Military Government unit and had at one time served as a Landrot in Russia. He stated that, after the war, he had once been visited on his small farm near BERLIN by a Soviet officer who apparently knew all particulars concerning his former activities and had offered him a position with Soviet intelligence. He claimed to have worked for American intelligence at the same time and to have offered much intelligence to the Americans because of his close associations with Soviet intelligence. He stated to have gone to the Western zones in either 1951 or 1952, to having been approached by [b1] to have turned down an offer to work for them when he was offered a position with the [b1] in 1952. He complained bitterly because he had been given the post in KASSEL, an area entirely foreign to him, when a position had been open in the LUNDECK area, where he was entirely familiar with the area surrounding and adjacent to the border. He stated that, if the opportunity were offered to him today, he would immediately return to the service of American intelligence, claiming to have been afforded much better treatment than he is now receiving. He stated that his superior office is forever demanding that his office become more productive, saying, "How can they expect me to accomplish miracles? I've only had the office for a little over six (6) months and in an area entirely foreign to me, at that."

REGRABED

[b6]

b6

b5

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~



~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

[b1] Liasion Officer's Report, GIESSEN.

4 August 1953

(Continued)

3. [b6] then asked what the opinion of the undersigned was as concerns [b6] GEHLEN organization member who recently began appearing at the GIESSEN Refugee Center. He was told that [b6] appeared to be a capable and hard worker and a likeable person. [b6] stated that he believed that [b6] had lied when, during the visit by [b6] in the Refugee Center on 23 July 1953, [b6] claimed to have been a colonel in the Gross Deutschland division. [b6] claimed to have later checked [b6] claim with [b6] and with one other close friend who was also a high ranking officer in that division and that neither of these men remembered anybody named [b6] who had held such a rank in the division. [b6] claimed that both of these persons were well informed as to the names of former colonels in the Gross Deutschland division. He stated that, if [b6] would lie about such a thing, surely he was capable of lying about other things as well. He then asked, "Don't you think that it is meant that [b6] will become the new chief of the [b1] in the GIESSEN Refugee Center?"

4. During a liaison party held on 1 August 1953, [b6] asked what arrangements had been made by the undersigned toward making a tour of the border areas in the company of [b6]. The undersigned stated that, as yet, the work load in the GIESSEN office has been such as to preclude such a tour but that it would be made at the earliest opportunity. [b6] stated that he would like to have [b6] BUNAST representative in the GIESSEN Refugee Center, also take the trip. Since [b6] was present at the time, it was impossible to do anything but agree. [b6] then stated that he would show the undersigned his strong points on the border but that the undersigned could hardly expect him to show the points being used by his office in smuggling persons across the border. The undersigned turned to [b6] [b6] deputy chief of the [b1] in the GIESSEN Refugee Center, who was also present, and asked [b6] to kindly explain to [b6] that the only interest the undersigned had in making the trip was to point out discrepancies in the manner in which [b6] was conducting his border coverage and that [b6] should feel free to entrust the knowledge of such points to the undersigned since it is not the intention of the undersigned to go into the business of smuggling people across the border. [b6] assured [b6] that the only way in which he could expect cooperation from the Americans was to show the Americans that he was also ready to cooperate. [b6] then brought up the recent offer his office had received from a current GIC source and was again thanked by the undersigned for having handled himself in such an open manner. He then stated he could find at least six (6) more GIC sources who are working on the border and are giving information not only to GIC but also to Soviet and Soviet zone authorities. Because of the persons present, this point was not pressed by the undersigned. During the liaison party, [b6] made it evident that he holds [b6] in contempt. Tentative arrangements have been made for the tour to take place the latter part of this week.

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[b1] Liaison Officer's Report, GIESSEN.

4 August 1953

(Continued)

5. It appears evident that [b6] is aware of the fact that attempts are possibly being made toward his removal from office. There is little question that he is still smarting from having been recently called to account for having accomplished little in the way of gathering information of an intelligence nature, nor has he experienced much success in building informant nets in the Soviet zone. There is little explanation as to the reason for his remarks concerning [b6] since [b6] as yet enjoys only a semi-official status in the GIESSEN Refugee Center and it has not yet appeared that he will be anything but that. It may well be that [b6] is in fear that the GERLEN organization will assume leading positions in all [b1] offices within the future. His statements concerning the possibility of being able to find six (6) more CIC sources who are doubling could be those of a braggart and could have been meant to impress on others present the fact that he is cognizant of all that transpires within his area of responsibility. There need be little truth in his statement but, in future meetings, the subject will, at times, be casually brought into the conversation to try to ascertain whether such a situation actually exists. At present, his statements mean little more to the undersigned than a possible attempt at belittling CIC efforts in front of other [b1] and BUMAST officials in an effort to enhance his own importance.

Distribution:

3 - Hq, 66th CIC Gp, [b6]  
2 - Reg III, CIC  
1 - File

b6

[b1] L/O GIESSEN

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51

4 August 1953

Region III, 66th CIC Group

Activities of the [b1] COLOGNE

III-17528

1. In the past two (2) months, many new persons have been added to the payroll of the [b1] in COLOGNE (UTM) 32ULB5745, particularly in Department II. Some of the new employees are as follows:

a. Department II.

- (1) [b6] as an assistant to [b6] of the Radical Rightist Team.
- (2) [b6] (possibly a cover name) as a leg man handled by [b6]
- (3) [b6] as a leg man for [b6]
- (4) [b6] Report Reviewer, Soviet Zone Team.

b. Department III.

- (1) [b6] as assistant to [b6]
- (2) [b6] who previously worked for [b6] of the Radical Leftist Team, and up to February 1953 was Chief of the UELERN Refugee Center, is now employed with the Radical Rightist Team.
- (3) [b6] assistant to the Chief of the Radical Leftist Team.
- (4) [b6], clerk attached to the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) and SSD (Staatsicherheitsdienst - State Security Service) Team.
- (5) [b6] Background Investigation Section.
- (6) [b6] Radical Rightist Team.
- (7) [b6] Eastern Intelligence Organization Section.
- (8) [b6] Radical Rightist Team.

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[b6]

Page 1 of 4 pages  
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3 - Hqs, 66th CIC Group, 1 - CIC Central File, 1 - Region III File

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SECURITY INFORMATION

4 August 1968

Region III, 66th CIG Group

Activities of the [b1] COLOGNE

III-17528

c. It is intended to increase the staff of the Radical Leftist Team by three (3) or four (4) men in the near future. The sections will then be staffed as follows:

(1) Leftist in the Federal Republic	Six (6) or seven (7) men
(2) Rightist in the Federal Republic	Four (4) men
(3) Soviet Zone affairs	Three (3) men

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

2. The preferential treatment accorded to the Radical Leftist and the Rightist Team in comparison with the Soviet Zone Team has led to a protest, because this personnel policy cannot be reconciled with the exigencies of the work which is done by the Soviet Zone Team. The neglect of the Soviet Zone makes itself felt not only in Department III but also in the procurement of information, where it is much more serious. The number of really useful sources is so small that it is no longer possible to guarantee even a nearly adequate coverage on what is going on in the Soviet Zone. This was revealed very clearly during the course of the recent disturbance in East BERLIN (UTM) 33UR25050 and the Soviet Zone. The West German Government ought to have been informed of developments by objective and detailed reports; but it proved absolutely impossible to provide these. The bulk of the reports actually submitted consisted of reproductions of broadcasts by Radio RIAS in BERLIN. Even this method of reporting was hampered by a serious handicap in that the [b1] does not even possess a radio set with which it is possible to hear the RIAS broadcasts, and it was compelled to request the transmission of the information by teletype. So far, the [b1] has not obtained any really valuable reports on such matters as the reaction of the VP, the use of the VP units to suppress the riots, and so on.

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

3. One of the reasons for this situation is that the Pre-Screening Group at the BERLIN Refugee Center does not possess a staff large enough to cope with the work load, and it does not receive VP deserters for interrogation until it is too late to exploit any information they may have. To begin with, these deserters are held for weeks by Department V of the Polos Headquarters. Then they are sent to the Allied agencies for screening, and finally they reach the Pre-Screening Group B.1. At that stage, it is hardly worth while to interrogate them.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

4 August 1953

Region III, 66th CIC Group

Activities of the [b1] COLOGNE

III-17528

At the [b1] more and more people are coming to the conclusion that matters relating to the VP belong to the field of military intelligence, and that the [b1] ought not to bother about the VP any longer. A final decision on the subject has not been reached. At a conference attended by persons chiefly concerned, it was decided to regard only the SSD and the political situation in the Soviet Zone as the main targets of the [b1] on the grounds that these are the only fields of real interest to the agency. This tendency is rather serious because in the event of Germany's reunification, it would be impossible for the [b1] to issue statements concerning the reliability and loyalty of members of the VP. On the other hand, lack of personnel makes it impossible to ensure the proper exploitation and registration of the material already available. This means that an improvement in the procurement of information would actually defeat its own purpose.

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

4. The shortage of office space, which has been making itself felt since the end of 1952, has led to further decentralization of the [b1]. At the present time, the physical location of the [b1] in COLOGNE has Department I & III still located in the same building, while Department II moved on 23/24 June 1953 to a floor of the May Furniture Store building in COLOGNE, Zeppelinstrasse. The SSD and the VP Section will remain at their present location in COLOGNE, Untersahnenhausen 33. This arrangement is only temporary, however, as in the near future, it is intended to start work on a new office building for the [b1] in COLOGNE, Kanalstrasse. The building will have enough office space to accommodate 600 people and it is hoped to have it completed by the end of 1954. The present physical separation of the three (3) offices entails a number of disadvantages which are effecting the overall efficiency of the organization. Some of the recent hiring of employees to compensate for this disadvantage did not show any improvements worth mentioning. The work of the [b1] is bound to suffer in cases where close cooperation between two (2) separated departments is absolutely essential, as it not only effects the efficiency but has an important effect on the spirit of discontent caused among the majority of the employees.

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

5. No evidence has been discovered of any attempts by Eastern Intelligence organizations to penetrate the [b1]

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

6. (Enu) RADKE Deputy Chief of the [b1] said that it would be much better if all VP information would be taken care of by the Gehlen Group as it was

a/s

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SECURITY INFORMATION

4 August 1953

Region III, 66th CIC Group

Activities of the [b1] COLOGNE

b6

III-17528

actually no concern of the [b1]. The Gehlen Group allegedly has the [b1] thoroughly penetrated. A Gehlen representative visits RAIKE once a week, and a copy of all [b1] reports about East Zone conditions is turned over to the GEFHLEN Group. (Fau) [b6] the [b1] representative, supplies the Gehlen Group with sources from the East Zone, and Fritz OKLSENER-WOLLER\* of the Giessen Refugee Center is cooperating with the Group to the fullest extent. The Gehlen Group now has 1,500 people on their payroll and are now operating with 50,000,000 DM a year as compared with the [b1] which has 150 people on the payroll and is operating with 3,500,000 DM a year. As to the source of the 50,000,000 DM a year, it is certain that the German Government did not have any appropriation for the Gehlen Group for 1953.

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

7. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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a/s

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b6

IV-31861; D-320529

Arbeiten GmbH

Studiengesellschaft zur Förderung Wissenschaftlicher/

29 July 1953

REGRADED

b6

FEB 2 1959

1 00 (D. C. Event) 29 July  
Reg 10 66th 53  
CIC  
Group  
Attn:  
b6

1. Reference is made to paragraphs 5 and 7, Summary of Information, Subject and File as above, dated 26 June 1953, wherein Anna b6, mother of b6, was listed as proprietor of a clothing shop at b6. Examination of the records of the MUNICH Einwohnermeldeamt (Inhabitants Registration Office) and the MUNICH/Pasing Einwohnermeldeamt has revealed that the actual proprietor of this shop is Anna RICHTER, nee BOHM, born 24 May 1898 in MUNICH. The records reveal no relationship between Anna RICHTER, nee BOHM, and b6. Since the examination of the Einwohnermeldeamt files has revealed no record of Anna RICHTER, nee WUELFER, it is believed possible that she is still residing in BERLIN 33UUU92, Germany.

2. Attention is invited to paragraph 9 of the above referenced Summary of Information, wherein certain unidentified automobiles were mentioned as having been seen near Walhallastrasse 7.

a. The owner of the vehicle bearing license plate b6 is listed with the MUNICH Criminal Police as b6 residing at b6. He was married on 18 June 1938 to b6 and since 1 November 1946 has been employed at APO 757, US Army. On 26 March 1953, he was issued a travel pass for a trip to Austria. He has no criminal record other than one arrest for a traffic violation while driving an automobile.

b. The owner of the vehicle bearing b6 is listed with the MUNICH Criminal Police as Emma Maria b6 born 10 March 1905 in MUNICH. Her husband is b6. She resides at b6 and has lived in MUNICH since her birth. She formerly resided at Georgenstrasse 120/IV, MUNICH. Her occupation is listed as stenographer and her employment record is as follows: From 1 April 1940 until 1 November 1943, stenographer for a government silk research board; from 15 December 1943 until 3 December 1945, employee of b6 and since early 1946, employed as a home worker (Heim-Arbeiter) for the Bayrische Spielzeugvertrieb (Bavarian Toy Retailers).

c. The owner of the vehicle bearing b6 is listed with the FUERSTENFELDERBRUCK Landratsamt (County Commissioner's Office) as Wolf von KANLDEN, born 2 September 1901 in NEUSTADT/Pinne 32UPA57, Germany, and residing at Sandbergstrasse 10, MUNICH/Puchheim.

3. The sources of the above information are as indicated and are evaluated as "Usually Reliable."

OPS

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b6

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b6

/bf/mk 7246-006

Commanding

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ON 17 MAY 1988  
BY USAINSCOM POL/PA  
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SECURITY INFORMATION

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b6

IV-31861; D-320529

Arbeiten GmbH

Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung Wissenschaftlicher/

370529/2  
S: 29 June 1953  
28 May 1953

2 CO CO 26 June  
Reg IV 66th 53

CIC  
Group  
Attn:

b6

1. The attached Summary of Information, Subject and File as above, dated 26 June 1953, is forwarded for your information.

2. Reference is made to paragraph 4 of Minute 1. Certain phases of the information in the attached report are incomplete since, in the opinion of Region IV, MUNICH,

further exploitation might possibly have exposed this investigation to SUBJECT.

3. Since the [redacted] b1

[redacted] b1 Liaison Officer has direct access to the American Consulate files, it was possible to extract the information therefrom without leaving CIC channels. The [redacted] b1 Liaison Officer also reported that the [redacted] b1 [redacted] b1 files contain no information on SUBJECT or [redacted] b6

4. The license numbers mentioned in paragraph 9 of the attached report are being checked to determine ownership of the cars. As soon as this information is available to Region IV, MUNICH, it will be forwarded.

5. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source "A" is X-0155-IV, who submitted the information to Region IV, MUNICH, on 9 June 1953. Source "B" is [redacted] b1, who submitted the information to X-0150-IV, who relayed it to Region IV, MUNICH, on 11 June 1953. Source "C" is the [redacted] b1 who obtained the information in paragraph 5 from the [redacted] b1 and reported it to Region IV, MUNICH, on 5 June 1953. Source "D" is Technical Coverage. Source "E" is a neighborhood check among shops in the Parkstrasse 9, MUNICH, area made by X-0150-IV and reported to Region IV, MUNICH, on 11 June 1953. Source "F" is [redacted] b1 [redacted] b1, who submitted the information to X-0150-IV, who then reported it to Region IV, MUNICH, on 9 June 1953. Source "G" is X-0150-IV, who submitted the information to Region IV, MUNICH, on 11 June 1953. Source "H" is O-0181-IV, who submitted the information to Region IV, MUNICH, on 24 June 1953. Contributions to this report were made by [redacted] b6 and [redacted] b6

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SECURITY INFORMATION



# SECURITY INFORMATION

DDE, BA/3f

26 June 1953

REGION IV, 66th CIC GROUP, APO 103, US ARMY

FILE: IV-31861;D-320529

Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung  
Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten GmbH

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1. SUBJECT organization has been in existence since 2 January 1952. SUBJECT was located at MUNICH 32UPU93, Germany, Weinstrasse 8, until 29 April 1952. At this time, SUBJECT rented and moved into Walhallastrasse 7, a private home in MUNICH. SUBJECT's sole representative and business manager is Hans RICHTER of MUNICH/Pasing, born 21 March 1901 in LEIPZIG 33UUS19, Germany. The partners of SUBJECT are [b6] and RICHTER. A former partner, [b6] a mathematician, left the company and was replaced by [b6] on 6 October 1952. The employees of SUBJECT are [b6] born [b6], hired as a clerk on 1 February 1952, and [b6] born [b6] hired as a clerk on 1 July 1952. A second firm, Richter und Co. - Industrieabteilung GmbH (Industrial Section) was located at MUNICH, Walhallastrasse 7, from 26 October 1950 until its dissolution on 16 December 1952. RICHTER was also sole representative and business manager of this firm and at the time of its disbanding, he was named liquidator. The partners in this firm were [b6] of MUNICH/Pasing, and RICHTER. The employees were Alfred STASCH, born 5 April 1903 in FAUSLAU nca, Germany, hired as a chauffeur on 1 January 1951, and [b6] born [b6] employed on 1 February 1952.
  
2. The owner of the house at Walhallastrasse 7 is Helene [b6] nee [b6] divorced, [b6] born 28 March 1889 in OBERAMMERGAU 32PT57, Germany. On 14 October 1921, she married Maximilian [b6], an artist, born 29 September 1878 in MUNICH. Frau [b6] has one child, [b6], born [b6] MUNICH. She resided in OBERAMMERGAU from her birth until 1913, at which time she moved to [b6]. In 1943 she returned to [b6] and remained there until 1949, then she again moved to [b6]. Since 15 December 1928, with the exception of the period from 1943 to 1949, she has been registered as living at Walhallastrasse 7. Since 1 December 1949, however, she has been registered as living at both MUNICH, Walhallastrasse 7, and [b6] the latter is a residence owned by her husband. (It has been determined that Frau [b6] is residing at Lessingstrasse 9/I. See paragraph "4" of this report.) On 3 August 1951, she was issued Travel Pass No. A 22483 for a recuperation trip to Switzerland. On 16 April 1953, she was given an extension until 30 July 1956 on the above Travel Pass. This extension permits her to travel in Austria and Italy. The files of the [b1] and the Denazification Court contain no derogatory information concerning Frau [b6].

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FEB 2 1959

5 - HQ, 66th CIC Group, USAEUR  
1 - File

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

26 June 1953

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE: IV-31861;D-320529

Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung  
Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten GmbH

3. The tenants at Walhallastrasse 7 are listed as Horst [b6] born 31 July 1893 in HANNOVER 320ND50, Germany; his wife, Rosemarie, [b6] [b6] born 25 February 1908 in BERLIN nca, Germany; [b6]; Alfred STASCH and his wife Martha, [b6] born 19 September 1900 in LUPSLAU nca, Germany, and [b6] a chauffeur, born [b6]. The apartment occupied by RICHTER at Walhallastrasse 7 until March 1952 has not been reoccupied; therefore, it is believed that this apartment is being used as offices by SUBJECT.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

4. The rent for Walhallastrasse 7 is not paid directly to PPSL, but is delivered to her by an unidentified third party.

SOURCE: "D"

EVALUATION: F-6

5. RICHTER was born 21 March 1901 in LEIPZIG, Germany. He is described as being 5'11" tall with blond hair and blue eyes. He speaks fluent English and French. His former addresses are: 1909-1933, BERLIN; 1933-1937, SIDNEY, Australia; 1938-1945, BERLIN; 1945-1950, WINTEN nca, Nordrhein/Westfalen, Germany; January 1951 - March 1952, MUNICH, Walhallastrasse 7; March 1952-July 1952, OBERGLEIS nca, Germany, Dollendorferstrasse 33; July 1952 to date, MUNICH/Pullach, Klosterstrasse 34. His father, Felix RICHTER, is deceased and his mother, Anna RICHTER, nee MUELLER, now operates a men's clothing store at MUNICH, Traupentreu-strasse 38. His wife is [b6] in [b6]. He has two children, [b6]. In an application made with the American Consulate for a non-preference immigration visa to the United States, RICHTER listed the following as his references: [b6]. [b6] was named as sponsor for this trip and he paid RICHTER's passage. On 7 August 1951, [b6] signed a notarized statement wherein she agreed that her husband could immigrate alone to the United States. On 13 August 1951, the MUNICH City Council issued RICHTER German Passport No. A26198/51, valid until 12 August 1953. On 5 September 1951, the American Consulate in MUNICH issued RICHTER Immigration Visa No. 5105. Some time after this date, RICHTER departed by plane for NEW YORK from the MUNICH/Riem Airport. The purpose of the visit was listed as business. RICHTER stated that he intended to remain in NEW YORK. (Note: It is assumed that this statement by RICHTER meant that he would visit no other area in the United States other than NEW YORK.) The exact dates of his departure for NEW YORK and of his

- 2 -

5 - HQ, 66th CIC Group, USARMC  
1 - File

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4 February 2009

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SECURITY INFORMATION

26 June 1953

REGION IV, 66th CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE: IV-31861;D-320529

Studiengesellschaft zur Forderung  
Wissenschaftlicher Arbeitsiten GmbH

return to MUNICH are not recorded. Since 1945, RICHTER has also been in LONDON, England, on business and in BERLIN to visit his mother. The American Consulate in SIDNEY and the LEIPZIG and MUNICH City Councils files contain no derogatory information on RICHTER. He possesses Kennkarte (Identity Card) No. AR 807948 and has been cleared by the Denazification Court. According to a statement made in his own handwriting, RICHTER was a member of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront — DAF (German Labor Front) from 1940 to 1945. RICHTER has an uncle, Willi MUELLER, a manufacturer, residing in the Eastern Zone of Germany at ANNABERG near, Erzgebirgs, Germany.

SOURCE: "A" and "C"

EVALUATION: B-2

6. On 1 March 1951, the MUNICH telephone number 60500 was assigned to Richter und Co., GmbH, Walhallastrasse 7. This number had an extension to the firm Arthur Richter, Kommanditgesellschaft Stapp- und Daunendeckenfabrikation (a bedding manufacturer) at Parkstrasse 9, MUNICH. (Note: This later became a men's clothing store and the bedding manufacturing ceased; the exact date of the change is unknown.) Through resubscription in February 1953, the telephone number 60500 remains assigned to Richter und Co., GmbH, Walhallastrasse 7, but the extension has been cancelled.

SOURCE: "D"

EVALUATION: B-2

7. Until January or February 1953, Parkstrasse 9, MUNICH, was a men's clothing store. At this time the shop moved to Trappentreustraße 38, MUNICH. The shop is owned and operated by Anna RICHTER, mother of Hans b6 and an unidentified man, who Anna RICHTER states is her cousin.

SOURCE: "E" and "H"

EVALUATION: F-3

8. Each weekday morning, two women and one man enter Walhallastrasse 7 and leave in the evening. They are apparently employees of the firm. The house is very often visited by automobiles. At 1100 hours on weekdays, a certain vehicle invariably stops at the above address. Since there is no loading or unloading of materials other than papers, it is assumed by Source that only information is being delivered and picked up.

SOURCE: "P"

EVALUATION: F-6

9. Walhallastrasse 7 is a fourteen room house, of which seven rooms have been set aside for conducting business. It has a large lawn encircled with an iron fence. The gates are usually locked and when not locked, someone is in attendance.

- 3 -

5 - HQ, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
1 - File

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

26 June 1953

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE: IV-31861;D-320529

Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung  
Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten GmbH

At 1100 hours on 10 June 1953, a green Volkswagen, b6  
parked at Walhallastrasse 7. At 1120 hours, three men came out of the house,  
entered the car and drove away. Other cars which have been in the driveway  
or in front of Walhallastrasse 7 have borne the b6

b6

SOURCE: "A" and "Q"

EVALUATION: B-2

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- 4 -

5 - Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
1 - File

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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ON 17 MAY 1999  
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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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D-320529

Arbeiten m. b. H.  
Studiengesellschaft zur Foederung Wissenschaftlicher/

S; 29 June 1953  
28 May 1953

30 FILE

*[Handwritten signature]*

1. Hq CO 28 May  
66th Region 1953  
CIC IV  
Group

1. It has been reported that the Studiengesellschaft zur Foederung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiter m. b. H., located at MUNICH 38, Walhallastrasse 7, telephone 60500, is a recently organized cover agency of the so-called Gehlen Gruppe. Head of the cover firm is said to be Herr RICHTER, no identifying data available.

2. There is no previous record of the SFPA: RICHTER cannot be identified in Central Registry.

3. It is desired that German agency checks be made to determine the truth of the above report. If the SFPA is in existence, it is desired that the following information be obtained:

a. Type of agency.

b. Who owns the property and/or dwelling in which the SFPA is situated? Is it rented? To whom?

c. Under what name is the telephone number listed?

d. How long has the SFPA been in existence? How long has the telephone been listed?

e. Personalities connected with the SFPA? (Simple identification is sufficient at this time; there is no need for background investigations.)

4. No US agency, particularly SDU, is to be approached in obtaining this information. Coordination with DAD/SDU will be accomplished by this headquarters based on the results of your findings.

5. Your report is desired on or before 29 June 1953.

BY ORDER OF

b6

REGRADED

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18/8/53

FEB 2 1959  
(Date of Expiry)

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Genl/Stgt 9342-282

Chief, Operations Section

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by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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28/5/53

May 28, 1953

Federal Chancellery~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Attached herewith as Exhibit "I" are copies of the German newspaper "Die Zeit", dated 14 May 1953, with reference to an editorial titled "Der Koelner Vulkan", in which Dr. Otto JOHN, President of the [b1] came under heavy attack. This editorial was of sufficient interest to be called to the attention of [b6] who forwarded one copy of the paper to his colleague [b6]. The copy was accompanied by an endorsement stating "Please give attention to controversy JOHN-TUENGEN".

2. A new personality has appeared in [b6] office on frequent occasions during the recent past. He is suspected by the staff of being an informant for the Federal Government within the opposition parties. This visitor uses the name [b6]. He is described as a man of medium height, slender build, approximately 40 years old, and wears glasses. He is always immediately ushered into [b6] office, where [b6] usually joins them to participate in the conference. [b6] has tentatively been identified as the chief editor of the "Bundeslaenderdienst" in WEIDENHEIM, and the legal department information service, "Die dritte Gewalt" (The Third Force).

3. In the Federal Chancellery's information circular number 89, dated 11 May 1953, General GEHLEN is mentioned as a possible candidate for the position of NATO intelligence chief. GEHLEN is sponsored for this position by the US elements in the NATO. The small and obscure newspaper "Schleswig-Holsteinische Tages-Post" published an article on 20 May 1953, which explained the reason behind GEHLEN's candidacy for this position. The article, titled "Spionage und Gegenespionage in Westdeutschland", points out that of all the existing German intelligence agencies, GEHLEN has shown the best qualifications by past performances and his liaison with allied counterparts, plus West Germany's strategic position, puts him already in an effective operational position.

b6

SPECIAL HANDLING. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
This information contains information which is not to be  
disclosed to anyone other than authorized personnel  
of the Department of Defense. It is to be controlled  
and handled in accordance with the provisions of the  
Executive Order of 12958, dated 12/1/50, and the  
Executive Order of 12812, dated 8/1/50.  
For [b6] Control, Release, Copying, etc.  
104th SIG. Det. (Ingram)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Security Information

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CO, Hqs, 66th CIC Det, USAFEMR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: b8 Thru: Region X

13 Nov 1952

b1 Liaison D r e m o n - b6

IRS, Hqs, 66th CIC, File: D-283133/4, subject: FOERTMANN, Dr., dtd 29.10.52  
FOERTMANN, Erich, Dr.

Personal information concerning Subject is listed herewith as follows:

Name: FOERTMANN, Erich, Dr.  
Date of Birth: 14 December 1897  
Place of Birth: HANNOVER  
Present Address: BREMEN, Franz Schutte Allee 9  
Former Residence: GOETTINGEN  
Occupation: Geo-Physicist

As a result of investigations conducted by the Bremen b1, after it had been informed that Dr. FOERTMANN had approached the president of the AEG, b6 that he was a member of a newly established "German Secret Service", the points were determined:

1. The newly established "Secret Service" is a part of the Geilen organization and operating under the cover name of "NIAG" (Nord-deutsche Interessen und Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer wirtschaftspolitische Planung G.m.b.H.).

2. NIAG was entered in the trade register under paragraph B., HGB 1054, on 14 March 1952. The purpose given for the enterprise was the establishment of a scientific basis for economic-political planning, especially in the field of mining and basic industries.

3. Dr. FOERTMANN and the following listed personalities are joint-owners of NIAG.

Name: WORGITZKY, Hans-Heinrich  
Date of Birth: 9 July 1907  
Place of Birth: MUELLHAUSEN/Alsace  
Present Address: BREMEN, Marcus-Allee 45  
Occupation: Merchant

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12/11/52

9 October 1952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Region I, 66th CIC Detachment, STUTTGART (L49/S02), Germany, APO 154, US Army

LORENZ, Herbert Richard

1. On 1 October 1952, Source "A" reported that Herbert Richard LORENZ, born on 26 December 1895 in HALLE/Saale (M52/D92), residing in TUEBINGEN (L49/W99), Albrechtstrasse 19, is an informant of the French Surete. He is also believed to be an informant of an intelligence organization operated by a (FNU) CEHLEN, residing in MUNICH (M49/Y85), no additional identifying data available, which is allegedly supported and financed by an American intelligence organization, the exact identity of which is unknown. The contact man between LORENZ and CEHLEN is [b6], born on [b6], presently residing in [b6].

[b6] LORENZ's other contacts include Swiss counter-intelligence; [b6] no identifying data available, of the Sozialistische Reichs Partei (SRP - Socialist Reichs Party) in AUGSBURG (M49/Y37); and Alexander WAAG, born on 12 February 1895 in STUTTGART (L49/S02), presently residing in ROTTENBERG (L49/W88), Jahnstrasse 20, Chief of Department II (Intelligence) of the [b1].

[b1] LORENZ is employed as a traveling reporter for the weekly newspaper Christ und Welt (Christ and the World), which is edited and published by Klaus MEHNERT, born on 10 October 1906 in MOSCOW, presently residing in STUTTGART, Richard Wagnerstrasse 11. LORENZ travels primarily in Italy and Switzerland. He was allegedly responsible for the appearance in the weekly news magazine Der Spiegel (The Mirror) of an article concerning secret talks in Geneva between representatives of France and the Soviet Union. (B-6)

2. Concerning the Franco-Soviet talks mentioned in paragraph 1 above, reports of which have been recently publicized in the newspapers and in Der Spiegel, Johann Caspar LIEBE-HARKORT, born on 21 April 1906 in HAGEN/Haese (K52/A70), Westphalia, presently residing in STUTTGART, Im Kaiserer 15 II, Chairman of the Gesellschaft fuer Neue Staatspolitik (Association for a New National Policy) and the Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wirtschaft (Association for the Advancement of the Economy), was informed on 8 September 1952 by [b6], date and place of birth unknown, residing at [b6], that the discussions had expanded to include [b6], through whom the Soviets hoped to undermine and destroy the present French Government. (F-6)

99

4 - Rq 66th, ATTN: [b6]  
1 - CIC Central File

1 - File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/10/52



\_\_\_\_\_

240

\_\_\_\_\_

1. Comments:

- a. The information was obtained by source during casual conversation with C-48.
- b. Investigation continues.

CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

EVALUATION: B-3

Source: X-933

Sub-source: C-48

Date developed: 1 September 1952

Date submitted: 5 September 1952

**Н.В.**

III 13974

For Demand A Turnkey, National Military Commanding  
65th CIC Detachment

12 September 1952

Bundesnachrichtendienst

1. During the last week of August and the first week of September 1952 negotiations took place in the office of Ministerialrat GUMPEL between members of the Federal Chancellery, members of the GEHLEN Group, and representatives of the Finance Ministry. The negotiations were confidential and participating members were either not introduced or announced or gave cover names. Nevertheless the following members of the GEHLEN Group were identified as participants; GEHLEN, von LOSSOW, WENDLANDT, and REPENNING.

2. GEHLEN has been using the cover name of Dr. SCHNEIDER during his business transactions in the Chancellery and has been familiar as such for quite some time whereas his true identity was not discovered until very recently. REPENNING recently moved from MUNICH to OBERPLEIS where he is now functioning as area representative for the GEHLEN Group. His family is still residing in MUNICH. WENDLANDT is believed to be at present a resident of MUNICH since he arrived at the meeting together with von LOSSOW.

3. During these negotiations budget and financial matters for a new Federal intelligence service tentatively called "Bundesnachrichtendienst" were discussed. These discussions were of a preliminary nature and no protocols or other written records were maintained. At one time during the meeting Ministerialdirektor GLOBKE who also participated in the meeting approached GEHLEN with the request to furnish him with the personality file and all other permanent data maintained by him as former Kriminalrat Karl SCHUETZ, presently a GEHLEN agent in the ESSEN area. GLOBKE based his request on Dr. ADENAUER's immediate personal interest in the man. GEHLEN replied that he was unable to furnish this information since all personality data on SCHUETZ were held by the British in LONDON.

This Document Has Been  
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Section

Date 29/9/52 EA

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
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FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 100-101

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

INFO FY FOR D-329529

D-252722

b1 - GEMLEN Relations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19 May 1953

1. To: b1 19 May  
66th b1 1953  
CIO LO  
Group b6  
THRU:  
Region  
IV

1. Reference is made to your letter, file b1

2. In paragraphs 3a and 7 of the above referenced report, mention is made of informal records checks made by the b1 with the GEMLEN Gruppe on personalities of b1 employment or target interest.

3. It is desired that this headquarters be fully informed on all details of b1 GEMLEN Gruppe relations, how maintained, to what extent, by whom and with what authority. Finally, it is desired that this headquarters be advised in writing of the number of times your office has been utilized by Special Detachment USAFEB to arrange contact with or request information from the b1 and whether or not your office has ever been briefed by SDU on its desired relations with the b1

4. In replying to these requirements, there is no need for any elaboration on b6 b6 relations with the GEMLEN Gruppe, which have previously been described by your office.

BY ORDER OF b6

b6

b6

/s/ mk/ Stgt 242-252

Chief, Operations Section

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
b6

FEB 2 1959  
(Date of Event)

105  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

19/5/53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

May 7, 1953

file in  
D-320529

The b1 and the GHELEN Group

1. Shortly before the Easter holidays, Dr. Otto JOHN, Chief of the b1 invited General GHELEN to a conference in BOLEN. The conference took place in an unidentified hotel, and was attended by representatives from the b1 of North Rhine Westphalia (FJESST), BRUNNEN (KLEINE), HAMBURG (PFEIFFER), Lower Saxony (HOFMANN), and Schleswig-Holstein (unidentified).

2. The purpose of the meeting was to acquaint GHELEN with the respective representatives of the Land Security Branches, and provide a basis for future mutual cooperation. It was agreed that GHELEN should appoint liaison officers to each Land office. These liaison officers would then facilitate a smooth exchange of information and working arrangements.

3. The initiative for this action had been taken by Dr. JOHN who thereby hoped to tie GHELEN closer to the b1 and gain his support. Dr. JOHN appointed MUELLENWEISTER as his deputy in this particular phase of operations and furthermore as his mouth-piece to government agencies. It is felt that the choice for this appointment was possibly influenced by MUELLENWEISTER's personal friendship with Ministerial Direktor GLOCKE of the Federal Chancellery. Both MUELLENWEISTER and GLOCKE belong to the same fraternity.

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FEB 2 1959

(Date of Event)

b6

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Per b6 Colonel, Artillery Commanding  
66th CIC Detachment.

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Security Information

7/5/53

83/53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ April 30, 1953

JTR 83/53

The GEHLEN Group

**COMMENTS:** The information pertaining to the GEHLEN Group's operational activities was obtained from a land representative from Hesse, [b6]. His information pertaining to GEHLEN's conversation with ADENAUER, concerning Dr. JOHN, was corroborated by an employee of the Federal Chancellery who also reported on the meeting. This employee furthermore stated, that during Dr. ADENAUER's absence, Dr. JOHN had a long secluded conference with [b6]. The information on [b6] was obtained by [b6] through [b6] assistant described in this report. The assistant is utilized as a regular source.

**SOURCE:** X-899  
X-933

**EVALUATION:** B-3

**SUB-SOURCE:** C-43

**Dtd information was developed:** 2 April 1953

**Dtd information was submitted:** 18 April 1953

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Per [b6] Colonel, Artillery Commanding  
66th CIC Detachment.

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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[b6]  
FEB 2 1959  
(Date or Event)

109

~~SECRET~~

Security Information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STR 93/53

April 30, 1953

The GEHLEN Group

1. During conversations with a representative of the GEHLEN Group, the following information pertaining to the organization's operations and activities could be obtained:

a. An investigation has been initiated, classified URGENT and SECRET, concerning the establishment of a new US intelligence organization operating under the cover name of "NUMA". It is believed to be a parallel to the GEHLEN Group, for the event of the latter's removal from the sphere of US influence. The "NUMA" is believed to have six sub-divisions or groups, with three to four sources available to each. The organization is managed in BERLIN by a former Officer, [b6] who travels consistently to West Germany for meetings and consultations. The GEHLEN Group learned of the existence of this new organization through the indiscretions of its operational personnel.

b. A new organization "Bund der Schaffenden" is being investigated to determine; organization, personnel, leading functionaries, financial assets, possible affiliations with the SHP, areas of greatest popularity.

c. The GVP (Gesamtddeutsch Volkspartei) is being scrutinized to determine the following:

- (1) Which organizations have already been incorporated into the GVP, i.e., do exist no longer independently?
- (2) Which organizations maintain a close working relationship with the GVP?
- (3) Are in the near future additional annexations to be anticipated, if so, which ones?
- (4) Has [b6] "Darmstädter Action" carried out the resolution of its leader for incorporation into the GVP? How much influence does [b6] wield in the GVP?
- (5) How big is the "Partei der Frauen", sponsored by [b6] who according to press reports has joined the GVP? What is known about its leadership and tendencies?

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Security Information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Document Not to be  
Carded by CIA  
Date 25 May 1961

- (6) What is the latest organizational status of the GVP, with a breakdown into Lands and Districts?
- (7) How have the financial aspects of the party developed? Has the party received financial support from the Banking concern WARBURG?
- (8) Is it possible to obtain a copy of the "WARBURG Plan"?
- (9) What is the party's attitude toward the election alliance with PSU and Reichs Partei?
- (10) What are the internal expectations concerning elections results? Which coalition possibilities are anticipated? Have there been any discussions along those lines?

2. Prior to Chancellor ADENAUER's departure for the United States he received GEHLEN for an audience, for the purpose of discussing future aspects of German intelligence activities. One of the subjects touched by GEHLEN was the continued services of Dr. Otto JOHN as head of the [b1] GEHLEN protested that a man with such a dubious background as [b1] should not continue in such a responsible position. GEHLEN made allegations that by now everyone concerned must be aware who Dr. JOHN really is, and whose interests he represents. ADENAUER replied that this in itself would be sufficient reason to maintain Dr. JOHN in his position for the present since it was better to know how to deal with him, than to exchange him for a stranger. In ADENAUER's opinion it would not be advisable to make any changes in the [b1] top level prior the coming elections.

3. The GEHLEN Group is giving some attention to the SPD functionary [b6] a Sudeten German who served for years in the Czechoslovakian Parliament as a SPD delegate. [b6] is considered for the Post of Refugee Minister in case of a favorable outcome of the new elections. One of [b6] present assistants is a former Sudeten German NSDAP member who claims that [b6] favors a conciliatory attitude of the SPD toward former National Socialist in order to gain their votes. On orders of the PY, [b6] has recently negotiated with British Labor Party representatives concerning the [b6] affair where- by he advised them to use every influence and pressure at their disposal in Parliament to avoid further antagonizing of the National Socialist elements in West Germany.

~~SECRET~~

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~~Security Information~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 16



~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. The GEHLEN Group has opened a new cover organization in MUNICH under the name of "Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten m.b.H.", located in MUNICH 38, Walhalla Str 7, Tel 60500. The head of the cover firm is [b6] RICHTER. Another member of the GEHLEN Group, [b6] [b6] residing in [b6] has recently adopted the catholic faith. This may be an indication of the GEHLEN Group's anticipated legalization as an official agency, since [b6] hopes to obtain a more favorable civil service position by belonging to the "right clique."

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Per [b6] Colonel, Artillery Commanding  
66th CIC Detachment.

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~~SECRET~~

~~Security Information~~

15

47/53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

1 April 1953

The GEHLEN Organization

1. Comment:

The information was obtained from an area representative of the GEHLEN Group for Land Hessen, b6 during visits made by source for the purpose of enlisting the resources of the GEHLEN Group in investigations of this team.

CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

EVALUATION: B-3

Source: X-899

Information developed: February 1953

Information submitted: February 1953

*Card for  
CIC Personnel  
ONLY*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**b6**  
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**FEB 2 1959**  
(Date or Event)

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Section  
Date 7 May 53

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
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47/53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 April 1953

b6

The GEHLEN OrganizationDECLASSIFIED  
FEB 2 1959

(Date or Event)

1. The following is a list of targets under investigation by agents of the GEHLEN organization:

a. [b6] divorced, [b6]  
[b6] in [b6]

b. [b6] at one time managing member of [b6] organization.

c. [b6] functionary in SPD PRESS Staff.

d. [b6], after 1945 chief of "Institut fuer Strahlungsquellen" closely allied with the "OSRAM" electric concern, ardent supporter of the SED with influential contacts in the West.

e. [b6] VVN secretary in FRANKFURT/M.

f. [b6] former Lt. Colonel, born 1910 in [b6]  
[b6] Soviet captive in CRANKI Camp, then "Vopo" officer and now in West Germany. His exact present whereabouts are desired.

g. [b6] residing [b6]  
[b6] (?), Technician, allegedly an air force technical specialist, in Soviet Service after 1945, since 1948 in West Germany as a political refugee.

h. [b6] born 1917, residing illegally in GOETTINGEN, maintains a voluminous correspondence with numerous contacts and agencies. Was working as an intelligence agent for a German agency, probably [b1] during the last few years, is believed to have offered his services to the Swiss Army, suspected of contacts with the East.

i. Josef ELO, former public school teacher, now employed by internal revenue collectors office, residing BAD GOESBERG, Brunnendallee 11a, born 6 December 1904, returned from Soviet captivity in 1949 as a trained propagandist and has been active as such.

j. [b6] formerly BEFLIN-KAROLINENHOF, Radnacherweg now in TUEBINGEN and vicinity as active MVD agent. Was employed during WWII in RSHA, considered as one of most effective agents in West Germany.

2. Attached herewith as Exhibit I is a copy of a list of names lost by a Soviet agent in West Germany while boarding a train. This agent, whose identity was not disclosed, was under surveillance at that time by a member of the GEHLEN organization. The list of names does not offer any clues as to the nature and disposition intended for it. In addition to the names, occupation and, in some cases, a number is listed which is believed to correspond to the postal district.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Document has been  
added by  
Section  
Date 7 May 53

12.1.53  
 Ein Angehöriger der Organisation Gehlen, der die Überwachung eines Sowjetagenten in der Bundesrepublik durchführte, nahm ein Blatt Papier an sich, welches der Agent beim Bedienen eines Zuges verlor.

Es folgen die auf dem Blatt befindlichen Notizen in Abschrift:

Dr. med. Arthur Kühn, prakt. Arzt und Geburtshelfer (16)

b6



Card 5:

"MENTIONED ON A LIST OF NAMES LOST BY A SOVIET AGENT IN WEST GERMANY WHILE BOARDING A TRAIN. THIS AGENT, WHOSE IDENTITY WAS NOT DISCLOSED, WAS UNDER SURVEILLANCE AT THAT TIME BY A MEMBER OF THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION. THE LIST OF NAMES DOES NOT OFFER ANY CLUES AS TO THE NATURE AND DISPOSITION INTENDED FOR IT. IN ADDITION TO THE NAMES, OCCUPATION, IN SOME CASES A NUMBER IS LISTED WHICH IS BELIEVED TO CORRESPOND TO THE POSTAL DISTRICT"

REF: D-320529 SECRET ST REPORT 47/53  
 DATED 1 APRIL 1953  
 SUB: THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

44/53

31 March 1953

The Federal Chancellery

file in  
D-320529

1. The following are a number of items of current interest with the personnel of the Federal Chancellery:

a. The private telephone number of GÄHLEN's liaison agent to the Chancellery von LOESOW is MUNICH 51682.

b. A complaint against [b6] a staff consultant to the BLANK Office's PARIS delegation, has been received to the effect that a brother of [b6] is a high ranking communist functionary in the DDR. An interrogation of [b6] confirmed this accusation, whereby he stated that he had broken all contacts with his brother because of the latter's political activities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
b6  
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FEB 2 1959

(Date of Event)

120

~~SECRET~~

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

SECURITY INFORMATION

31/3/53

27 March 1953

Region I, 66th CIC Group, STUTTGART (L49/S02), Germany, APO 154, US Army

b1

file in  
D-320524

1. Alexander WAAG, born 12 February 1895 in STUTTGART (L49/S02), present STUTTGART address unknown, has been appointed chief of the Reports Section (Division II) of the [b1]

[b1], Baden-Wuerttemberg. [b6] Chief of the [b1] Baden-Wuerttemberg, is responsible for WAAG's appointment. This move is in direct disregard of the Tri-partite agreement concluded by the Allies in regard to the employment of any former member of the German Abwehr (Intelligence) by the [b1] WAAG has actually been in the employ of the [b1] on a non-official basis for quite some time; however, this fact had not previously been admitted by [b6] (B-2)

2. [b6] formerly residing at [b6] who is presently residing at STUTTGART, address unknown, was formerly the Technical Intelligence Branch (TIB) leader of Team 4711 (code number for those individuals employed as agents in Organization II of TIB), 7821 Composite Group in ULM. He is presently employed by the GEHLEN Group, MUNICH (M49/Y85), which is engaged in gathering information of an intelligence nature both in Western Germany and in several of the Iron-curtain countries. He is employed in Division III (Spionage Abwehr - Counter Espionage, Defensive) of the GEHLEN network, his area of activity being STUTTGART and possibly Land Baden-Wuerttemberg. Another important employee of the GEHLEN Group is [b6], date and place of birth unknown, presently residing at [b6]. He is employed in Division III-F (Spionage Abwehr - Counter Espionage, Offensive) of the GEHLEN Group, his area of activity being STUTTGART and ULM. His office is located at STUTTGART, Reichenbergstrasse, number unknown. This is merely a cover address for his various intelligence-gathering activities. [b6] was formerly an employee in the German Embassy in MADRID, Spain; however his former official capacity in the Embassy is unknown. An outstanding characteristic of [b6] is that he is blind in his right eye, and often wears a smoke-colored monocle over his afflicted eye. WAAG is also in contact with an unknown individual within the GEHLEN Group. [b6] is fully aware of this contact and permits the continuance of such activity by WAAG simply for the purpose of using him as a penetration-type informant of the activities and/or personalities of the GEHLEN Group. Also, the information thus obtained serves as a security measure for the [b1] however the actual reason for this penetration of the GEHLEN Group is based upon the fact that they offer the only actual competition to the [b1] and to the [b1]

[b1] in obtaining information of an intelligence nature which is frequently requested by the German Federal Government. On several occasions, the [b1] has been embarrassed at being incapable of fulfilling such requests from the government, whereas the GEHLEN Group was in a position to furnish the needed information. With the exception of WAAG, [b6] has forbidden all members of the [b1] Baden-Wuerttemberg, to contact representatives of the group. (B-2)

5 - Hq 66th CIC Group, ATTN: [b6]

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SECURITY INFORMATION  
27/3/53

**REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED**  
b6

**FEB 2 1959**  
(Date or Event)

## TRANSMITTAL SLIP

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

Date

Office Chief

P &amp; O Branch

D-2029

Date 29 March 1959

FROM: Counter Subversion Office (XX) b6

Counter Espionage Office ( )

Positive Office ( )

Security Office ( )

Other ( )

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, For:

(XX) Operations Branch, Attention: Collection Section

( ) Analysis Branch, Attention:

( ) Other:

## REMARKS:

1. Sources of this report are X-933-Hq, X-899-Hq, S-48-Hq and P-1-Hq. The information was reported in February 1959.

2. The WELLENHIN mentioned in paragraph 1 is believed to be Ernst von WELLENHIN. There are no Central Registry records on Georg LANGE, Johann WIKLER, SYMBATAS and Jonas GUKAUSKAS. Central Registry records on the other mentioned personalities do not indicate that they are affiliated with any US sponsored agency, but they do confirm the other information reported on each individual.

3. Due to sensitivity of sources, particularly X-933, it is reported that any dissemination of this information to any interested party is to be on a piecemeal basis and without indication as to source.

4. No other dissemination of this information to any individual agency has been made or is contemplated.

1 (encl)

STR # 29/59, dated 17 Mar 59, sub: The WELLENHIN Organization (2 pages)

W/ask/STOR 73-1-82

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REGRADED

b6

FEB 2 1959  
(Date or Event)

The GEHLEN Organization

The following background information on persons presently employed by the GEHLEN intelligence organization is forwarded for your information:

Honor von

a. MELLENTHIN - 51848

Staff officer working directly with GEHLEN out of MUNICH headquarters. Has participated in staff talks with members of the Federal Chancellery. Entered military service on 1 January 1915 as officer candidate with Field Artillery Regiment # 6 in BRESLAU. Commissioned on 1 February 1916, promoted to 1st Lt on 1 April 1925, to Captain on 1 April 1932, to Major on 1 April 1936, to Lt Col on 1 August 1937, to Colonel in 1940 and to Brig. General on 1 December 1943. Served from 1925 to 1926 as Adjutant in FRANKFURT/Oder and from 1927 until 1929 as Detachment Adjutant with Artillery Regiment # 3 in POTSDAM. Attended War College from 1929 until 1932, subsequently assigned as Adjutant to CG Ground Forces, General von HAMMERSTEIN-EQUORD (as of 1 October 1932). In 1936 made Chief of Military Attache Group in OKH; continued in this capacity throughout the World War II period.

b. b6

Residing in b6 working as an informant agent on DDR, Poland and Baltic targets. Was recently instructed to concentrate on possibility of inducing members of the Soviet armed forces to desert to the Federal Republic. Had concentrated his information gathering activities primarily on inmates of DP camps.

b6 is a Baltic German, raised and educated (including German high school) in KOVNO, Lithuania. His father was manager of local electric power plant there. After completion of his schooling he worked for an automobile club in KOVNO and at the same time became active as an agent of the German "Abwehr." b6 age today is approximately 40, and he is described as a man of honesty and sincerity. During conversations, he disclosed that another former Abwehr agent, b6 residing in b6 with alternate residence in b6

b6 is presently working as an b6 of the b6 intelligence. A Baltic German, b6 residing in b6

b6 is working as an agent for b6 office in the b6 area near LUBECK. A Lithuanian, b6 Chief of the Lithuanian emigrant intelligence activities, is maintaining from his headquarters in LONDON, England, as one of his primary contacts b6 Germany a deputy by the name of b6 in HANNOVER. b6

Under the cover name b6 and is being financed by b6

b6 furthermore identified another Lith b6 presently residing in AUGSBURG as a possible Soviet agent.

acquainted with b6 from associations during World War II in Lithuania, at which time the latter was already under surveillance by occupation sources as a Soviet intelligence suspect. b6 is

working directly for b6 in MARBURG



29/53

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
17 March 1953

The GEHLEN Organization

1. Comments:

- a. WELLENTHIN was first called to source's attention through an employee of the Federal Chancellery. Military background information was furnished by a former German Army personnel expert.
- b. The information in paragraph b was obtained by source through direct conversation with [b6]. The latter had contacted source via mail requesting an interview for the purpose of discussing possible assistance. Source obtained approval for rendezvous and learned from [b6] that he was seeking help in establishing contacts behind the Iron Curtain. Source informed [b6] that he was not in any position to assist him.
- c. The [b6] is identical with a former source maintained by Region XII in a KEMPTEN or MEMMINGEN DP camp and who was later on investigated by Region XII for the same allegations.

CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

EVALUATION: B-3

Sources: I-933-Hq  
I-899-Hq  
C-48-Hq  
O-1-Hq

*Card  
for CIC Personnel Only*

Information developed: February 1953

Information submitted: February 1953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
b6  
REGRADED  
FEB 2 1959  
(Date of Event)

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on

FEB 04 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
7

Translation

16 March 1953

Dear

b6

gag

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file in  
D-320529

b6

???

I am writing today in reference to our discussion on Saturday in Cologne and am happy to be able to report some results. Herr H. is very well known to us. Unfortunately a joint business undertaking with him cannot be considered, for he is regarded as an "enemy." He is the most important and most influential man of the O. competition firm. I hoped to have been of service to you with this information.

At the end of the week, I am travelling with my family to the Ruhr-area to spend the Easter holidays there, as I have already mentioned. I will inform our friend b6 of the dates when I can be found there and how. I would be very pleased if I were to meet you at this occasion.

That is all for today. I wish you all the best.

Yours truly,

b6

b6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

+ - gag - HA

Revised UNCLASSIFIED on  
FEB 04 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

125

6

16/3/53

16. März 1953

Lieber [b6]

Ich komme heute zurück auf unsere Unterhaltung am Samstag in Köln und freue mich, bereits ein Ergebnis melden zu können. Der Herr H. ist bei uns sehr gut bekannt, leider kann aus einer Geschäftsverbindung zu ihm nichts werden, denn er wird als "Feind" angesehen. Es ist nämlich der wichtigste und maßgebendste Mann der Konkurrenzfirma O. Ich hoffe, Ihnen mit dieser Auskunft gedient zu haben.

Ende der Woche fahre ich, wie bereits gesagt, mit meiner Familie ins Ruhrgebiet, um dort die Osterfeiertage zu verbringen. Die Termine, wo bzw. wie ich dort zu finden bin, werde ich unserem Freund [b6] mitteilen. Ich würde mich sehr freuen, bei dieser Gelegenheit mich mit Ihnen wieder treffen zu können.

Für heute Schluß. Wünsche Ihnen alles Gute und verbleibe mit besten Grüßen

Ihr

b6

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

- file in  
D-320529

C-4-53; D-307650; X-3855

Letter No. 4, L/O b1 GIESSEN Refugee Center

7 January 1953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. L/O CO, 66th 7 Jan.

b1 CIC Gp 1953

Giss.

Hef.

Otr.

1. Reference is made to Letter No. 14, L/O b1 GIESSEN  
Refuge Center, File: b1

2. In order to supplement the information contained in  
the above referenced communication and in compliance with  
verbal instructions from b6 CS Section, your

Headquarters, the following information is submitted relative to addresses in STUTTGART  
to which copies of b1 GIESSEN reports are forwarded and the dates on which such reports  
were dispatched:

a. 11 July 1952 - Alfred SIMBERT, STUTTGART-  
SILLENBUCH (Like transmittals were made to this address on 17 July, 18 July, 31 July,  
7 August, 26 August, 25 September, 4 October, 22 October, 23 October, 28 October, 6  
November, 21 November, 28 November, 4 December, 10 December, and 20 December 1952);

b. 13 August 1952 - Firma Schwabische-Industrie-  
Beratungs O. n. b. H., to b6 personally, STUTTGART-O (Like transmittals were  
made to this address on 18 August and 25 September 1952);

c. 1 October 1952 - b6

b6

3. All such correspondence was logged in a special  
book in the b1 GIESSEN Office until 22 October 1952, when Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER, Chief  
of b1 GIESSEN, evidently decided this was no longer necessary and authorized the  
logging of the material in the normal register of incoming and outgoing material.

4. The following additional information is submitted  
because of its possible bearing on the connections of OELSNER-WOLLER to the GEHELEN  
Organisation and SOE:

a. OELSNER-WOLLER's main contact to the GEHELEN  
Organization is through a b6 b6  
is evidently involved in the SOE and GEHELEN resettlement program for compromised in-  
formants, since all processing of such cases through the GIESSEN Refugee Center by  
OELSNER-WOLLER is cleared through and under the direction of b6

b. OELSNER-WOLLER carries on correspondence with  
one Hans Von FICHTE, ORITAU, Upper Bavaria. Von FICHTE is a former German army general.  
He is possibly in some sort of contact with a FRANKFURT/M telephone number; 36703.

129

REGRADED

FEB 2 1959  
(Date of Event)

b6

~~SECRET~~  
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

7/1/53

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~

C-4-53; D-307650; X-3855

Letter No. 4, L/O b1 GIESSEN Refugee Center

7 January 1953

(Continued)

OKLSNER-WOLLER is aware of this telephone number and apparently regards it with a certain air of secrecy, thus conveying the impression that a possible connection to GEMLEN may exist here.

b6

USAREUR/CIC Liaison Officer

b1 GIESSEN Refugee Center

Telephone: Gieszen 6581

Distribution: 2 - Hq., 66th CIC Gp., USAREUR

Attn: b6

1 - OCA MENLEM,

Attn: Mr. HUGHES

1 - CO, Region I

1 - File

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130

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

# OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Office of the Coordinator & Special Adviser

CO, Hq, 66th CIC Det. USAREUR, APO 154, US Army

Attn: b6

Date: 21 Nov 52

To:

T. C. Hughes, OCA

From:

List of SDE Personnel.

Subject:

Attached, herewith, are two copies of a list of alleged personnel of the SDE which has been confidentially provided by b6 of the b1 with the admonition that it should not be discussed with other members of the b1

The list has been compiled by the b1 from that information coming to its attention re SDE personnel and the information concerning the past military position of those listed was extracted from a listing of former General Staff officers.

I have not discussed the operations of SDE with b6 or any member of the b1. The OSI representative in this office recently informed me that b6 had told him he was in possession of such a list, but that he had not asked b6 for it in view of the fact that the DAD representative here might regard this, in the event it came to his attention, as OSI meddling in affairs with which it was not concerned. I told the OSI representative that I saw no objection to asking for the list if b6 wanted to give it out confidentially and that I saw no necessity for discussing the matter with DAD. As a result, the OSI representative secured the list and passed it on to me quite confidentially. Inasmuch as the DAD representative here always plays cozy when GEHLEN or his personnel are mentioned, I have not and will not discuss the list with him.

1 incl a/s (2 cys)

JCA

24 NOV 1952

This Document Has Been  
Carded By CIC Carding  
Section  
Date 22/12/52 Amk

431

A.780

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AGE IN  
1952

NAME

HIGHEST RANK  
IN GERMAN  
GENERAL STAFF

LAST  
MILITARY  
ASSIGNMENT

DATE OF  
ENTRY IN  
GENERAL STAFF

b6

SUSKNER, Ulrich  
BUNTROCK, Georg

b6

DIACAMANN, Hans

b6

GLEN, Reinhard  
GLOCKEN, Guenther

b6

HASRTAL, Johannes  
HELMDACH  
HEPP, Leo

b6

HEUSINGER, Adolf (now with  
BLANK Office)

b6

(now with  
BLANK Office)

b6

KAHLEN v. Wolf

b6

KAULBACH, Bernardt-Karl  
(now with BLANK Office)

KEIKAMP, Helmut

38  
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Major  
Major  
Captain  
Major  
Colonel  
Captain  
Colonel  
Colonel  
Lt. Col.  
Major  
Colonel  
Major  
Lt. Col.

Brig. General  
Colonel  
Lt. Col.  
Lt. Col.  
Colonel  
Colonel  
Colonel  
Colonel

Maj. General

Lt. Col.  
Major  
Major  
Lt. Col.  
Colonel  
Major  
Lt. Col.

Colonel  
Brig. General

Qu 1 4.Pz.A.  
III Gtb Wn  
KA  
Ia 14.Pz.  
198.I.D.  
16.KA  
Ch 1.Pz.A.  
Ch FA MilA  
ChIbPTRW  
Ia 905.  
CHST ANA  
Id 25.A.  
Ia 71.  
Ia Brandbg.  
CH Fm Out  
Kdt Venedig  
IaSkid.  
Ia 116.  
ChPl Trw  
VO Lfl Reich  
Ch NW  
VO 600.r.D.

Ch HKuVn

Org.  
IIaPrt Out  
Ia 16.Vlks  
Ch LXVIII  
Ch 15.Arme  
Ia III K  
Ia PmrBalt

IIIatt Lissabl.  
36.Vlks

20.4.43  
1.8.44  
  
1.6.43  
20.7.40  
  
6.4.38  
1.10.39  
24.12.42  
1.6.44  
1.4.39  
1.8.43  
1.8.42  
20.4.43  
15.1.37  
20.1.40  
20.4.43  
20.4.43  
20.10.43  
6.4.38  
20.4.40  
20.4.40  
15.11.44  
20.4.43  
1.4.44  
1.6.43  
24.10.41  
6.4.38  
1.4.44  
1.8.42  
1.10.38  
1.4.37

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
23 April 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## NAME

AGE IN  
1952IN GERMAN  
GENERAL STAFFLAST  
MILITARY  
ASSIGNMENTDATE OF  
ENTRY IN  
GENERAL STAFF

KLEIST v. Hans-Swald (Hannsbeer)

48

Lt. Col.

CnLXXIII

20.4.40

b6

43

Colonel

laOpkFst

30.1.41

KLOSTERMANN, Karl-Geert

47

Colonel

Cn KdtSO

1.5.40

b6

39

Colonel

MILabt BSHA

20.4.43

KRETSCHMER, Alfred

58

Maj. General

MILatt Tokio

20.11.34

b6

41

Lt. Col.

TrW 1.Arm

20.4.43

LANGHANSER, Rudolf

52

Colonel

Cn KXII.

24.10.41

b6

38

Brig. General

HuD-Meister

1.4.37

43

Lt. Col.

Ic Afrika

30.1.41

37

Lt. Col.

Ic 245.

1.12.43

34

Major

Ic F3

1.4.44

46

Colonel

Cn XLVI.

20.4.40

34

Captain

16.KA

32

LUTZ, Hans-Helmut

54

Gen. of Artillery

VIII

1.4.44

b6

37

Major

Cul AOK 1c

20.4.40

MELLENTHIN v. Horst

44

Lt. Col.

16.KA

20.4.40

b6

MEYER, Lothar

45

Lt. Col.

IcAOK 15

1.6.42

MEYER, Helmut

53

Captain

16.KA

24.10.41

b6

44

Lt. Col.

IcSuedv

1.4.44

MOLL, Josef

44

Lt. Col.

IcS. PzArm

30.1.45

NECKELMANN, Herbert

36

Lt. Col.

VO WYST

20.4.40

b6

46

Major

15.KA

30.4.43

NESTOTZ Graf, Eberhard

38

Lt. Col.

Cn 2.PzA

1.11.39

b6

47

Colonel

Ic 140.

30.1.41

NOLCK, Fritz

41

Lt. Col.

Qu Wfst

15.4.36

b6

53

Colonel

CnStNastHeer

1.12.43

RADKE, Albert (now with b1)

41

Major

Ic 190.

1.11.44

b6

38

Major

Ic F3

20.4.43

b6

39

Lt. Col.

CnStAusb.

1.6.43

40

Lt. Col.

IcFHOst

1.6.44

SCHON-ANGERER v.

48

Colonel

VO s.Russ. Verb.

1.4.39

b6

47

Major

Ic AGR F

1.6.44

SCHMAYR, Josef

41

Major

Ic ALXII.

20.7.40

b6

SIEBERT, Alfred

39

Colonel

Cn LXVI.

133



NAME

AGE IN  
1952HIGHEST  
IN USAR  
GENERAL STAFF  
MILITARY  
ASSIGNMENTDATE OF  
ENTRY IN  
GENERAL STAFF

STERNHARDT, Conrad

b6

VARNBULDER v., Alfred Fritz

b6

WUNSA, Werner Kurt

b6

WELTERHARDT, Fritz v. Georg

WENDLAND, Horst

b6

WINTERS, August

b6

WURSTHAY, Hans-Helmut

b6

WOLLING, Ernst

Colonel	ic Mitte	20.7.40
Major	USA RSHA	1.4.44
Major	ic 617.	30.1.45
Captain	16.44	
lt. Col.	14.40.6	1.8.42
Colonel	Ch 21. Armee	1.11.39
Major	14.41.4 RSHA	1.8.44
Major	ic 14.41.4	1.2.43
Major	ic 14.41.4	1.8.44
Colonel	Ch. 11	32
Major	ic 14.41.4	1.8.44
Colonel	Ch 14.41.4	30.1.41
Colonel	Ch Org	1.8.42
lt. Col.	14.41.4	1.8.42
Major	ic 14.41.4	1.6.44
Gen. Mountain Troops	Ch. 11	1.8.37
lt. Col.	ic 353.	1.8.43
Colonel	ic 14.41.4	1.11.39
Major	Org.	1.6.44
Colonel	ic 14.41.4	20.7.40

Best Copy Available

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23 April 2009  
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

415/52

14 November 1952 *LD*

The Federal Chancellery

1. Comments:

- a. The information was obtained by sub-source during routine activities in her present position and was submitted to source during conversations on the progress and status quo of the GEHLEN organization.
- b. Source motivated his interest in this organization by stating that he was qualified to perform such duties as were carried out by the GEHLEN group and was contemplating applying for work with same.
- c. Investigation continues.

CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

EVALUATION: B-3

Source: X-933

Sub-source: C-48

Date developed: September-November 1952

Date submitted: September-November 1952

H.B.

III 13974

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The information contained in this document will not be disclosed to any person without the approval of the Director, Intelligence Section, Command. Approval is required for this document or specific information contained therein.

Per Bernard A. Tenney, Colonel, Military Commanding  
66th CIC Detachment.

This Document Has Been  
Carded By CIC Carding  
Section  
Date 23-12-52

*Security Information*

*Campus 62 (1)*  
*ID Usareu (3)*

*19/11/52*

*fact*

*-135*

415/52

14 November 1952

The Federal Chancellery

1. During September and October 1952 discussions continued in the Federal Chancellery on the establishment of a new intelligence agency out of the old GEHLEN organization.

2. These discussions continued to be conducted behind closed doors and included invariably such persons as General GEHLEN, von LOSSEN, Ministerialrat GUNDEL, Ministerialdirektor GLOBKE, Ministerialrat Dr. Wilhelm GRAU, and as of late another GEHLEN representative identified as Herr ECK. At the present time no written statements have been formulated on the progress or outcome of these meetings. However, the date of 1 April 1953 was named as the beginning of the fiscal year for the new organization. As of this date the organization will be subsidized by Federal funds alone.

---

SPECIAL HANDLING. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.  
The information contained in this document will not be distributed to foreign personnel, including personnel of the United States Armed Forces in Germany.  
Approved for Release by NSA on 07-16-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526  
Per Bernard A. Tenney, Colonel, Military Commanding  
66th CIC Detachment.

136

Security Information

341/52

320529  
22 August 1952

The Federal Chancellory

1. An agent believed to be sponsored by the American State Department has frequently attempted to contact personnel of the Federal Chancellory for inquiries on Federal German employees. This agent has been identified tentatively as Frau Traute HOFFEDITZ (phonetic), a German national, allegedly a native of BERLIN, approximately 50 years old, who is maintaining a photo studio in the vicinity of the Bundeshaus. The photo studio is known under the name of "Atelier Sandau". HOFFEDITZ is attempting to recruit her sources by making generous offers of Lucky Strike cigarettes. She explains that she obtains these cigarettes through her fiance, a British national with whom she expects to leave for South Africa in the near future. In the meantime, however, it has been learned by the Federal Chancellory that HOFFEDITZ's associate in connection with her information gathering activities is a female Allied national identified only as ATTLES who likes to represent herself as a journalist. HOFFEDITZ's inquiries were primarily on the background of a BARTH recently transferred from the Ministry of Transportation to the BLANK Office and other personalities connected with that agency. Her questions in regards to these items were so specific that they left no doubt as to their true nature. During the conversation HOFFEDITZ disclosed that she had close contacts with the US State Department and that she was counting on its aid in the transfer of her physical effects from BERLIN to West Germany. She claims to have an extensive photo archive in BERLIN-SCHNACHTENBERG. As for her background she disclosed that she is from Silesia, a long time resident of BERLIN, and that her father had been a clergyman. A physical description of HOFFEDITZ reads as follows: Medium height and build, blond hair, well dressed, and of elegant appearance. Very talkative.

2. Notification was received recently by the Federal Chancellory which emanated from an as yet unidentified source in Switzerland that the FDP Bundestag representative, Arthur STEINER, had been a member of the SS and an agent of the SD during the Third Reich. As a result of this notification the FGA was requested to initiate an investigation on STEINER. Two conferences took place during the early part of August between Ministerialrat GUMPEL and General Reinhard GEHLEN. On both occasions GEHLEN was accompanied by von LOSSOW. After these negotiations LOSSOW and GEHLEN proceeded to ESSEN for further consultations. In this connection it is noteworthy to add that the GEHLEN organization recently established a new branch office in ESSEN hitherto identified only as Org which for the time being is under the direction of former Kriminalrat and SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Karl SCHUETZ. It is believed that this branch of the GEHLEN Organization will concern itself only with industrial counterintelligence. SCHUETZ started his career during the Third Reich

Security Information

137

22/8/52

[REDACTED]

as a protege of the Nazi regime and attained rank and position after conclusion of a condensed training cycle designed for a political civil servant aspirant. On the basis of this preliminary training he entered the police career in 1935. According to SCHUSTZ the only qualification for a police investigator was a low number on an NSDAP membership book. During WW II he served on assignments at SAARBRUECKEN, TRIER, and ROME, Italy. SCHUSTZ was chosen for his present position on the basis of a number of articles which appeared recently in the publication "Fortschritt" concerning partisan warfare in Italy during WW II which are believed to have been written by SCHUSTZ or at least based on his experiences.

3. In the meantime GSHIEN continues to supply the Federal Chancellery with information which arrives through LOBSON in sealed envelopes delivered into the hands of GUMPEL. After perusal by GUMPEL these reports are submitted to GLOBKE and IENZ and on occasion selected items are forwarded to the attention of Dr. ADENAUER.

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The information contained in this document will not be disclosed to foreign nationals without express approval of the Director of Intelligence, European Command. Approval shall refer specifically to this document or material herein contained therein.  
Gen Edward A. Tamm, Colonel, Artillery Commanding  
65th CIC Detachment.

139

[REDACTED]

Security Information

415/52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
The Federal Chancellery

14 November 1952 *AD*

1. Comments:

- a. The information was obtained by sub-source during routine activities in her present position and was submitted to source during conversations on the progress and status quo of the GEHLEN organization.
- b. Source motivated his interest in this organization by stating that he was qualified to perform such duties as were carried out by the GEHLEN group and was contemplating applying for work with same.
- c. Investigation continues.

CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

EVALUATION: B-3

Source: X-933

Sub-source: C-48

Date developed: September-November 1952

Date submitted: September-November 1952

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

III 13974

H.B.

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of the Director of Intelligence, Department Command.  
Approval for release of this document or  
specific information contained therein.

For ☐ b6 ☐ Colonel, Artillery Commanding  
66th CIC Detachment.

This Document Has Been  
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Section

Date 23-12-52

*Security Information*

*Campus 6R (1)*  
*ID Usareum (3)*

*19/11/52*  
*fact*

*-135.1*

415/52

14 November 1952

The Federal Chancellery

1. During September and October 1952 discussions continued in the Federal Chancellery on the establishment of a new intelligence agency out of the old GEHLEN organization.

2. These discussions continued to be conducted behind closed doors and included invariably such persons as General GEHLEN, von LOSSEN, Ministerialrat GUMPEL, Ministerialdirektor GLOBKE, Ministerialrat Dr. Wilhelm GRAU, and as of late another GEHLEN representative identified as [b6]. At the present time no written statements have been formulated on the progress or outcome of these meetings. However, the date of 1 April 1953 was named as the beginning of the fiscal year for the new organization. As of this date the organization will be subsidized by Federal funds alone.

SPECIAL HANDLING, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

The information contained in this document will not be disclosed to foreign nationals without the approval of the Director of Intelligence and Security Command. Approval shall be given only to this document or specific information contained therein.

Per [b6] Colonel, Artillery Commanding  
66th CIC Detachment.

136

Security Information

341/52

320529  
22 August 1952

The Federal Chancellory

1. An agent believed to be sponsored by the American State Department has frequently attempted to contact personnel of the Federal Chancellory for inquiries on Federal German employees. This agent has been identified tentatively as Frau Traute HOFFEDITZ (phonetic), a German national, allegedly a native of BERLIN, approximately 50 years old, who is maintaining a photo studio in the vicinity of the Bundeshaus. The photo studio is known under the name of "Atelier Sandau". HOFFEDITZ is attempting to recruit her sources by making generous offers of Lucky Strike cigarettes. She explains that she obtains these cigarettes through her fiance, a British national with whom she expects to leave for South Africa in the near future. In the meantime, however, it has been learned by the Federal Chancellory that HOFFEDITZ's associate in connection with her information gathering activities is a female Allied national identified only as [b6] who likes to represent herself as a journalist. HOFFEDITZ's inquiries were primarily on the background of a [b6] recently transferred from the Ministry of Transportation to the BLANK Office and other personalities connected with that agency. Her questions in regards to these items were so specific that they left no doubt as to their true nature. During the conversation HOFFEDITZ disclosed that she had close contacts with the US State Department and that she was counting on its aid in the transfer of her physical effects from BERLIN to West Germany. She claims to have an extensive photo archive in BERLIN-SCHLACHTENSEE. As for her background she disclosed that she is from Silsbee, a long time resident of BERLIN, and that her father had been a clergyman. A physical description of HOFFEDITZ reads as follows: Medium height and build, blond hair, well dressed, and of elegant appearance. Very talkative.

2. Notification was received recently by the Federal Chancellory which emanated from an as yet unidentified source in Switzerland that the FDP Bundestag representative, Arthur STEGMER, had been a member of the SS and an agent of the SD during the Third Reich. As a result of this notification the PSA was requested to initiate an investigation on STEGMER. Two conferences took place during the early part of August between Ministerialrat GUMPEL and General Reinhard GEBLEN. On both occasions GEBLEN was accompanied by von LOSSOW. After these negotiations [b6] and GEBLEN proceeded to KESSEN for further consultations. In this connection it is noteworthy to add that the GEBLEN organization recently established a new branch office in [b6] hitherto identified only as Org. which for the time being is under the direction of former Kriminalrat and SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Karl SCHUETZ. It is believed that this branch of the GEBLEN Organization will concern itself only with industrial counterintelligence. SCHUETZ started his career during the Third Reich

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as a protégé of the Nazi regime and attained rank and position after conclusion of a condensed training cycle designed for a political civil servant aspirant. On the basis of this preliminary training he entered the police career in 1935. According to SCHUSTZ the only qualification for a police investigator was a low number on an NSDAP membership book. During WW II he served on assignments at SAARENHUECKEN, TRIER, and ROME, Italy. SCHUSTZ was chosen for his present position on the basis of a number of articles which appeared recently in the publication "Fortschritt" concerning partisan warfare in Italy during WW II which are believed to have been written by SCHUSTZ or at least based on his experiences.

3. In the meantime GERIEN continues to supply the Federal Chancellery with information which arrives through LOSSOW in sealed envelopes delivered into the hands of GUMPEL. After perusal by GUMPEL these reports are submitted to b6 and b6 and on occasion selected items are forwarded to the attention of Dr. ADENAUER.

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Per b6 Colonel, Artillery Commanding  
66th CIC Detachment.

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22.7.1952

**Public:**

den Hinblick auf den Umstand, daß man auch hier wiederum auf der Basis "Sieger - Besiegter" vorgehen zu können glaubte, glaubte GEHLEN hart bleiben zu müssen und lehnte nochmals kurz und bündig ab.

7. Hauptbedingung war, Zuerkennung der vollen Gleichberechtigung, die Möglichkeit, völlig freier Auswahl seiner Mitarbeiter und deren sofortige Entlassung aus den Gefangenen- bzw. Interniertenlagern und schließlich das Versprechen ihm gegenüber, daß der zu errichtende Apparat ein rein deutscher und auch sämtliche Führungsstellen ausschließlich mit deutschen Fach-  
men besetzt werden müssten.

sofort Freilassung GEBLEN's und seine Rückführung nach  
Deutschland, der sofort mit dem Aufbau der Organisation

1946.

9b. Zum Zweck der kontinuierlichen Arbeit und der dadurch notwendigen Freigabe der Freistellung weiterer als Mitarbeiter in Erwägung gekommener Teile einer Offiziere und sonstiger Abwehrspezialisten wurde JUCOM kontaktiert, das in der Folgezeit die notwendigen Maßnahmen im vollen Umfang gerecht zu werden sich bemühte.

to [USState@hawaii.gov](mailto:USState@hawaii.gov). 3

Im Sommer 1941, als er nach Deutschland zurückkehrte, begann er mit dem ersten Vorarbeiten zur Aufstellung seines Geheim-

Tatbestand, dass er als einer der wenigen Germanen von persönlichen  
Bekannten, die im Herbst 1940 nach Deutschland gekommen waren, in STAMFORD an Main als

**BOOK REVIEW**

1991

... ..

1. Herr **WERTHEIM**, Obstlt., ehem. Kommandeur des Führer

Obstlt., ehem. Adjutant d. Feldmar-

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Ätti: vara 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

04-72-10: 11.1.3.

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22.7.1952

July 10, 1990

8. a- und Abwehr-Apparaten aufzuoktroieren.

...Hinsicht auf den Umstand, daß man auch hier wiederum auf  
der Basis "Sieger - Besiegter" vorgehen zu können glaubte,  
glaubte GEHLER hart bleiben zu müssen und lehnte nochmals  
kurz und bündig ab.

6. Es folgten dann Wochen und Monate, ohne daß man nochmals an GELLEN herangetreten wäre. Dann aber kam die entscheidende Wendung, denn bei der ersten nach dieser längeren Ruhezeit folgenden Linvernahme GELLEN's war erstmals eine Änderung der Taktik des Vorgehens auf amerikanischer Seite wahrzunehmen. Man versuchte nicht mehr, mit Zwang etwas zu erreichen, sondern machte ein reguläres Angebot zur Mitarbeit. Trotzdem ging GELLEN auch hierauf noch nicht ein, sondern erbat sich eine Bedenkzeit, die ihm auch ohne weiteres gewährt wurde. In dieser Zeit formulierte er seine Bedingungen, von deren Anerkennung durch die Amerikaner er die Annahme des Angebotes abhängig zu machen gewillt war.

7. Hauptbedingung war, Zuerkennung der vollen Gleichberechtigung, die Möglichkeit völlig freier Auswahl seiner Mitarbeiter und deren sofortige Entlassung aus den Gefangenen- bzw. Interniertenlagern und schließlich das Versprechen ihm gegenüber, daß der zu errichtende Apparat ein rein deutscher und auch sämtliche Führungsstellen ausschließlich mit deutschen Fach-  
leuten besetzt werden müßten.

... nach kurzer Bedenkzeit der Amerikaner willigten diese in die  
... GEHLEN's in vollen Umfang ein und verfügten die  
... GEHLEN'n und keine Rückführung nach  
... sofort mit dem Aufbau der Organisation  
... 1946.

2. Zum Zweck seiner kontinuierlichen Arbeit und der dadurch notwendigen Erleichterung der Ausübung weiterer als Mitarbeiter in Erwägung gebrachter Lehrgänge Offiziere und sonstiger Abwehrspezialisten wurde GHELM mit JUCOM kontaktiert, das in der Folgezeit mit GHELM schon GHELM in welchem Umfang gereicht zu werden schon konnte.

### **10. 52809-1:2006**

Im Sommer 1946 kehrte GEHLEN nach Deutschland zurück und begann  
er mit den ersten Vorbereitungen zur Aufstellung seines Geheim-

Ich wurde als Student eines kleinen Pension von persönlichen Bekannten, seine Art, das, was sich in FRANKFURT an Main als vorläufiger Maßstab.

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General

Obstlt., ehem. Kommandeur des Führer-  
begleitbataillons;  
Obstlt., ehem. Adjutant d. Feldmar-



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Betrifft: T.I.

Blatt 6

22.7.1952

Quelle: II/1

10. Hinzu kam eine Anzahl von ehemaligen SS-Führern die damals noch illegal lebten und das Geheimnis um ihre wirklichen Namen stets zu hüten wussten.
11. Die Aufgabe, die es zunächst zu realisieren galt bestand darin, in den verschiedensten Städten der amerikanischen Zone sogenannte Werbetüros einzurichten, die sich mit der Gewinnung von geeigneten Mitarbeitern zu befassen hatten. Allein in MÜNCHEN befanden sich im Winter 1946 bereits vier solcher Büros, die entgegen der ursprünglichen Vereinbarung zunächst noch von SIC kontrolliert wurden. Auf Intervention GEBLERS wurde diese Kontrolle sehr bald wieder eingestellt mit der Begründung, daß die SIC lediglich die Funktion einer Art Rückendeckung für den Geheimischen Apparat wahrzunehmen hatte. Die Aufgabe dieser Werbetüros wurde in vielen Fällen zunächst damit beauftragt, daß man die Mitarbeiter einfach von der Strasse abholte, ein System, das man angesichts der Mißerfolge die mit diesem so gewonnenen Mitarbeitern gewacht wurden, sehr bald wieder fallen ließ.
12. Inzwischen war die Existenz dieses Apparates vor allem zu den Kreisen gedrungen, die damals angesichts ihrer politischen Vergangenheit in der Illegalität zu leben gezwungen waren. Diese Leute waren denn auch sofort bereit, sich dem Apparat zur Verfügung zu stellen, da hierdurch nicht nur ihre Existenz gesichert schien, sondern auch die Frage der Illegalität durch den Erhalt von falschen Legitimationspapieren legal gelöst und sanktioniert wurde. Darüber hinaus standen einer Mitarbeit gewissenhafter Bedenken nicht entgegen, da die zu lösende primäre Aufgabe sich ausschließlich auf anti-bolschewistische Basis bewegte, also nichts anderes als eine Fortsetzung der ehemaligen Arbeit war. Schließlich aber spielte nicht zuletzt die Überlegung eine gewichtige Rolle, daß man auf diese Weise, wenn auch im Hintergrund, wieder Politik machen könne.
13. Wie richtig diese Überlegung war, erwies sich in der Augenblick als der Apparat seine Arbeit auch auf die militärische Ebene in den Westzone ausdehnte und sich mit der Erstellung von Personal-Rapporten über in der Öffentlichkeit stehende Personen befaßte. Eine Gefahr für die Enttarnung der Illegalen bestand wohl darin, als man von einer Namens-Registrierung innerhalb des Apparates grundsätzlich ab sah und statt dessen die einzelnen Mitarbeiter nur unter ihrer Nummer geführt wurden. All diesen Umständen war es zu verdanken, daß im Winter 1946 die einzelnen Büros über ausgezeichnete und einflussreiche Mitarbeiter verfügte, die zum Teil ausserdem über außerordentliche fachliche Qualitäten verfügten.
14. Was die Arbeit selbst betraf, so bestand diese zunächst in jedemfalls in der militärischen Fernaufklärung und war zunächst im Gebiet der Ostzone. Es galt dabei, die in der Ostzone gelegenen Verbände der Roten Armee zu ermitteln und nach Einheiten, Stärken und Aufstellungen



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Quelle: II/1

14. zu identifizieren, Truppenübungs- und Flugplätze zu erkunden und ihre Belagung festzustellen, die Sitze der Stäbe in Erfahrung zu bringen und deren höhere Offiziere namentlich festzustellen und schließlich Originaldokumente der roten Armee zu beschaffen usw. Zu diesem Zweck beriefte in steten Wechsel eine Vielzahl von Mitarbeitern die einzelnen Länder der Ostzone und stellten dort zunächst Eigenbeobachtungen an, um sich im Lauf der Zeit ortsansässige Dauerbeobachter zu engagieren.

15. Erst ein gutes Jahr später wurde die Arbeit auch auf Gebiete die jenseits des militärischen Enges, ausgedehnt. Als weitere Aufklärungs-Objekte kamen hinzu: Ostzonale Polizei; Politische Parteien und Massenorganisationen, vor allem der Kulturbund als hervorragendstes Element bolschewistischer Infiltrations-Politik und schließlich Wirtschaft und Industrie der Ostzone mit ihren S.A.G. und V.E.B., deren Personal und Produktionsziffern. Kurze Zeit später wurde die Arbeit auch auf das Gebiet der Westzonen ausgedehnt, wo das Hauptinteresse neben der Gegen-espionage vor allem den politischen Parteien und sonstigen Organisationen und einzelnen hinter den Kulissen Handelnden galt.

16. Ein finanzielles Problem hatte weder beim Start noch während der ganzen Periode des beginnens jemals bestanden. Die Finanzierung seitens der Amerikaner erfolgte damals fast ausschließlich durch die Hingabe von Naturalien aller Art, von Nylonstrümpfen angefangen über Seife und Care-Pakete bis zu den Millionen von Zigaretten und Konserven, die die Organisation ihrerseits zum größten Teil auf den schwarzen Markt verfilberte und immense Erlöse zu erzielen vermochte. Für die enormen Mittel die damals dem Apparat zur Verfügung standen, mag zum Beweise dienen, daß jeder Mann der damals in der Ostzone Aufklärungsarbeit trieb, für eine Reise RM.1500.—, 2-3 Stangen Zigaretten und ein Care-Paket erhielt. Auch kamen die Mittel für die in der Ostzone lebenden Mitarbeiter, sowie Prämien für besonders gute Aufklärungs-Ergebnisse. Jeder in die Ostzone fahrende Mitarbeiter wurde von RM. 100'000.— versichert, die im Falle der Nicht-Rückkehr aus der Zone den Angehörigen auszuzahlen waren.

17. Die Garantie der in der Ostzone arbeitenden Westzonen-Mitarbeiter auf ein Mindestmaß zu beschränken, war man von Anfang an bestrebt, diese mit allen in der Ostzone damals erforderlichen Papieren auszurüsten. Zu diesem Zwecke ging man bereits im Jahre 1947 daran, in der Ostzone eine eigene Fälscher-Abteilung ins Leben zu rufen, die von ehemaligen Ostzonen-Fälscher-Abteilung im Reichssicherheitshauptamt und seinen besten Mitarbeitern eingerichtet und geleitet wurde.

14. Sie rekonstruierte die Vielzahl der in den einzelnen Kreisen der Ostzone damals geltenden verschiedenen Kennkarten, Parteimitgliedsbücher, FDGB-Ausweise und Dauerreisegenehmigungen, sowie die hierzu erforderlichen Stempel mit einer derartigen Virtuosität, daß bei den vielen Kontrollen, wie sie in der

Betrifft: T.I.B.

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Quelle: II/1

17. Ostzone stets an der Tagesordnung waren, kein einziger Fall bekannt wurde, in dem irgend ein Papler als gefälscht festgestellt werden konnte.  
Diese Fälscher-Abteilung besteht auch heute noch und gilt als die größte aller bedeutenden Geheimdienste.  
Ihr Sitz ist nunmehr in LULLACH bei MÜNCHEN.

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T-B-I-E-S-L-A-T-I-O-N

22/7/52

Subject: T.I.B.

Source: II/1

Nature of findings: Through contacts

Date of findings: From 1945 through to-day

Rating of sources: Serious-minded and reliable

Findings:

1. Origin and history of T.I.B. (Technical Intelligence Branch).  
The origin of T.I.B., one might say one of the major and, primarily, the most efficacious intelligence service in the world, dates back to the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities of World War II and it is an achievement of the former chief of the department "Foreign Affairs East" of the German Supreme Command, general Gehlen, who, by virtue of his knowledge of the East, of the staff of his fellow workers, virtually intact by the end of the war, and, last but not least, by virtue of his human qualities and his diplomatic aptitude, appeared to be most eligible for a task of this nature, a task which proved more and more correct in the course of the recent years.
2. When Gehlen, upon the surrender of the German Wehrmacht in May 1945, became an American POW, it is likely that he himself did not yet have an inkling that he would become one of the few German generals who would subsequently become the subject of a very special interest on the part of the American military.
3. Nevertheless, in the beginning, he was treated at the POW camp with the same lack of chivalry and arrogance as were the rest of the German soldiers at that time.  
This was reflected primarily in the first interrogations, oftentimes lasting for a number of consecutive days, by CIC officers, who, at that time, were still in charge of the overall supervision of German POW's.
4. Although CIC knew the identity of the man before then, they did not shrink from treating Gehlen, during his interrogations, like a common war criminal, at the same time with undecipherable brazenness, bringing pressure to bear upon Gehlen to make his experience and knowledge stemming from his former activities available to the American secret intelligence service. Gehlen, at that time, summarily turned down such a proposition, encumbered with the mortgage of a lost war, by laconically telling the interrogating officers: "Oh no, gentlemen, not that way!"
5. Whatever the reason might have been, either that the CIC officers realized that their efforts to induce Gehlen to place his person at their disposal ended in failure, or that they surmised that Gehlen was backed by contacts of the first magnitude to high-ranking American

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military personages, which however did not or rather no longer existed, in any event they saw to it that Gehlen was separated, with extraordinary dispatch, from his comrades of equal rank, and that he was isolated as fast as possible and that he was "huddled" to the USA, being one of the first and one of the few German generals to whom it happened, and there he again landed, for the time being, in a POW camp. Here, too, right from the first day, interrogations around the clock were of the daily order, with the objective to force upon him the construction and organization of an espionage and counter-intelligence apparatus, working for the American General Staff.

In view of the fact that here, too, it was believed one might proceed on the basis of a "victor-vanquished" relationship, Gehlen felt he must remain adamant and again refused to comply in no uncertain terms.

6. There followed several weeks and months where Gehlen was not approached. Then, however, came the decisive turn, when, in the course of the first interrogation of Gehlen following this respite, a change became noticeable for the first time in the tactics of the American procedure. They did no longer attempt to get results by the application of duress, but rather made a bona fide offer of co-operation. Nevertheless, Gehlen did not yet agree right then and there but requested to be given some time to think it over, which was granted forthwith. During that time he framed his condition, intending to make his acceptance of the proposition subject to their acceptance by the Americans.
7. The main condition was the granting of full equality, the possibility of a completely free selection of his fellow workers and their immediate release from the POW and internment camps and, last of all, that he be promised that the organization which he would set up would be strictly German and that all top positions would be filled exclusively with German experts.
8. After a brief time for appraisal on the part of the Americans, they approved Gehlen's PROPOSALS to their fullest extent and ordered the immediate release of Gehlen and his transportation back to Germany, where he forthwith set about setting up the organization. This happened in 1946.
9. For the purpose of a continuous operation and the release of further captured officers and other CI specialists necessitated by it, Gehlen contacted EUCOM, which subsequently endeavored to meet Gehlen's wishes to their full extent.
10. Initial status of T.I.B.  
In the summer 1946, when Gehlen returned to Germany, he started the first preparatory operations for the purpose of organizing his secret service.  
He was aided by a small colloquy of personal acquaintances, a sort of staff, which took up residence at Frankfurt/Main. The following individuals, amongst others, belonged to it:

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*Conclusion: F-6*

Blumentritt, general  
von Glasensapp, general  
Baron von Wertheim, Lt. Col., former commander of the escort

batallion of Hitler

Maecker, Lt. Col., former aid-de-camp of Field Marshal Model.

In addition there was a number of former SS-leaders, who, at that time, were still living in illegality and who, at all times, knew how to keep the secret of their real names.

11. The task, which was first to be accomplished, was to set up so-called recruiting offices in various cities of the US Zone, which were supposed to concern themselves with the recruiting of suitable fellow workers. In Munich alone, in the winter 1946, there were already four such offices, which were, at that time, in contravention of the initial terms, still controlled by CIC. Upon Gehlen's intervention this control was very soon discontinued with the result that CIC was merely assigned the function of serving as a sort of rear cover for the Gehlen organization. The task of these recruiting offices was, in many instances, at first accomplished by simply picking fellow workers off the streets, a system which was abandoned before long due to the failures of these operatives recruited in that manner.
12. Meanwhile, word of the existence of this organization had reached primarily those circles which at that time, due to their political antecedents, were forced to live in illegality. These people, as a matter of fact, were immediately ready to place themselves at the disposition of the organization, in as much as it appeared that, in so doing, their livelihood would not only be secured but that the illegality issue would be resolved and even excused by the issuance of false identifications. Moreover, they had no compunctions about engaging in such activities, inasmuch as the task was primarily one which was predicated exclusively on an anti-Bolshevik basis, thus, in fact, being nothing but merely a continuance of their former tasks. Last but not least, the idea that this was a way in which they could again, even though only in the background, engage in politics, also played a momentous role.
13. How true this rationalization was turned out right when the organization extended its operations to the non-military level in the western zones and when it started concerning itself with the preparation of personal reports regarding persons taking part in public affairs. There was little danger of discovery of the illegal persons, due to the fact that it was the policy of the organization to refrain from registering the names within the organization and instead to carry the individual operatives merely under their number. It was due to all of these circumstances that, before long, the individual offices disposed of excellent and ready operatives, who partly also possessed extraordinary expert qualifications.

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14. In regards to the work itself, it consisted at that time primarily of military long-range reconnaissance, to begin with the Russian Zone territory.  
The point was, to reconnoiter the Red Army units, stationed within the Russian Zone and to identify their units, strength and equipment, to reconnoiter troop training grounds and airbase and to determine their billets, to learn the headquarters of the staffs and to identify by name their senior officers and, lastly, to procure original documents of the Red Army, etc. For this purpose, a vast number of constantly rotating operatives kept travelling in the individual Länder of the Russian Zone and, for the time being, confined themselves to personal observations, with the objective of recruiting, in the course of time, local observers.
15. It was only a good year later that the operations were extended to extra-military objectives. Further objects for reconnaissance were: Police of the Russian Zone; political parties and mass organizations, primarily the Kulturbund, its most prominent element in the way of Bolshevik infiltration policy and, eventually, the economy and industry of the Russian Zone with all their Soviet Ltd. Corporations and the People's Own Works, and their personnel and production figures. Shortly thereafter, the operations were extended to the western zones also. The principal interest there being directed, apart from counter-espionage, primarily toward the political parties and organizations and individuals acting behind the curtain.
16. At no time was there a financial problem, neither at the start nor at any time during all the period of its operations. At that time all of the financing on the part of the Americans was done by the surrender of commodities of all kinds, beginning with nylon hose, soap, and CARE packages, up to the untold millions of cigarettes and canned food, which the organization then for the most part, sold on the black market, thus gaining immense sums of money. An example, proving what enormous means were available for the organization at that time, is the fact that every man on reconnaissance mission in the Russian Zone was given for each trip RM 1,500, 2 to 3 cartons of cigarettes and a CARE package. In addition there were the funds for the operatives residing within the Russian Zone, as well as bonuses for especially good reconnaissance results.  
In addition, every operative sent on a mission to the Russian Zone, had been insured in the amount of RM 100,000, the beneficiary of the policy being his relatives, in case he did not return from the Zone.
17. In order to reduce the jeopardy of the West-Zone operatives, operating in the Russian Zone, to a minimum it had been endeavored right from the outset to provide them with all papers requisite in the Russian Zone at that time.  
In order to meet this purpose, they set about in 1947 to set up at Frankfurt/Main a counterfeiting section. The former chief of the counterfeiting department of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt and his

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best workers were placed in charge of the section. They reconstructed the manifold identifications, valid at that time in the diverse Russian Zone districts, party membership books, FDGB identifications and permanent travel permits, as well as all the requisite rubber stamps therefore, and with such a high degree of consummate skill, that despite the numerous checks, which were a daily occurrence in the Russian Zone, not a single case became known where any papers had been found to be counterfeit. This counterfeiting section is still in existence to date and is considered the biggest of all of the important secret services. Their present seat is at Pullach near Munich.

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APCS/Div. X

X - The Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs and the Federal Foreign Office  
and their personalities

Schwer dafür bezahlen

Unter diesem Titel bringt "Der Spiegel" eine mehr als interessante Meldung  
des Abwehr-Büros GEHLEN. Darin heisst es:

Wenige Tage vor Unterzeichnung des Vertragswerkes in BONN fand in der Schweiz  
eine Geheimsprechung statt. Teilnehmer: Ein französischer General, ein  
sowjetischer Oberst, zwei Beamte des Quai d'Orsay und zwei rote Diplomaten.  
Ergebnis: der französisch-russische Beistandspakt zum Schutz gegen eine deutsche  
Aggression soll auch nach Inkrafttreten von EVG- und Generalvertrag unverändert  
bestehen bleiben."

("Der Spiegel", Hannover, # 25, 18-6-1952)

(Näheres unter dem obigen Titel in "Der Spiegel" Seite 5)

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18/6/52

APCS/Div. I

I - All espionage incidents

Buero GEHLEN

Nach neuestem Bonner "on dit" wird das "Buero Gehlen" den durch den Generalvertrag verbrieften alliierten Exodns aus Deutschland unbeschadet ueberstehen.

282-212?  
C) General GEHLEN, einst Chef der Abteilung "Fremde Heere Ost" des deutschen Generalstabes und heute Chef eines Spionageabwehrdienstes, den er mit Hilfe der Amerikaner aus nur deutschen Experten aufbaute, hat sich in den letzten Jahren als unentbehrlich erwiesen.

Auch das juengst gemeldete Auffliegen des polnisch-sowjetischen Spionageringes in BERLIN, KOELN und Frankreich geht auf sein Konto: monatelang hatte er sich mit erheblichen Summen in das Netz der Chefagentin KNUTH eingeschaltet.

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In McCLOY's Amtseitz "Deichmanns Aue" und in ADENAUER's Palais Schaumburg werden die Berichte des eigenen CIC und der "Verfassungsschutz-Aemter" der Bundesrepublik beiseite geschoben, wenn "Gehlen-Berichte" kommen.

CIC und Verfassungsschutz verweisen zu ihrer Verteidigung auf General GEHLEN's Jahres-Etats: 50 bis 55 Millionen DM.

Ihnen steht nur ein Bruchteil zur Verfuegung. Nach dem Generalvertrag moechte die Bundesregierung mit geringen Etats-Beihilfen Teilhaber im Buero GEHLEN werden. Die amerikanische Nachkommission hat zugestimmt,

("Der Spiegel", Hannover, #22, 28 May 1952)

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According to the latest Boon bearing the "Gehlen Office" will survive the allied exodus out of Germany--set down to the General Agreement--without damage. General GEHLEN, one-time Chief of the department "Foreign Armies of the East" in the German General Staff, and today head of a counter-espionage service which he established from German experts only, with the aid of the Americans, has proved himself indispensable in the last years.

The recently reported expose of the Polish-Soviet espionage ring in BERLIN, KOELN and France is also charged to his credit. For a period of months, at the expense of considerable sums of money, he had infiltrated Chief Agent KNUTH's spy network. Reports from CIC and the Constitutional Security Offices of the Federal Republic are set aside when "Gehlen-reports" come into McCloy's office "Deichmanns Aue" and into Adenauer's Palais Schaumburg.

CIC and

b1

refer

to

of 50 to 55 million DM

~~Genaral~~ General GEHLEN's yearly budget for their defense.

They have only a fraction at their disposal. After the General Agreement the Federal Government would like to become a partner to Gehlen's Office with slight budgetary assistance. The American High Commission has approved.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

b1 X-3855

Letter No. 14, L/O b1 GIESSEN Refugee Center 26 May 1952

1. b1 See 26 May 52 1. Reference is made to conversation b6  
Dist. b6 your Headquarters, and the undersigned,  
b1 20 May 1952.

2. The following is a list of the addressees to which Fritz OELSNER-KOLLER dispatches reports for the GEMLEN Apparat and the dates on which reports were dispatched to those addressees:

- a. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (16 January 1952).  
h. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (15 January 1952).  
o. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (25 January 1952).  
d. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (31 January 1952).  
e. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (6 February 1952).  
f. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (8 February 1952).  
g. Schwaebische Handelsgesellschaft, STUTTGART/DEGERLOCH (16 February 1952).  
h. Schwaebische Handelsgesellschaft, STUTTGART/DEGERLOCH (21 February 1952).  
i. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (1 March 1952).  
j. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (6 March 1952).  
k. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (20 March 1952).  
l. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (4 April 1952).  
m. b6 STUTTGART/SILLENBUCH (20 May 1952).

3. The above addressees were taken from the outgoing mail registry in the GIESSEN Refugee Center. This will account for the lack of exact address, since the requirements of this registry are only the name of the addressee and the city of residence. In the event that more specific information is required for any checks anticipated by your Headquarters, it is believed that the exact addressees can be obtained but through a medium which will be somewhat more "touchy".

4. b6 has made no mention to the undersigned of the fact that he is aware that this organization is possibly checking his connections with SDE, however, an air of coolness has been noticed. He is presently on leave until the end of May and further contact will have to be made before it can be definitely determined what the basis is for this aloof attitude.

b6

Tel: GiesSEN 4230/ b6

EUCOS/CIC Liaison Officer  
b1 Refugee Center

Dist: 2 - 66th GIG Det., Attn: b6  
1 - Mr. HUGHES, OCA MEHLEM  
1 - Region X  
1 - File

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26/5/52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

GID 22-1710

HEADQUARTERS  
EUROPEAN COMMAND  
Intelligence Division

350.09 (GID/CPS/211)

AFD 403  
12 February 1952

SUBJECT: West Germany Intelligence Agencies

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Detachment  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to your letter, subject as above, dated 29 January 1952. The referenced letter, particularly the points covered in paragraph 5, were discussed recently with the Chief, DAD. It was jointly agreed that DAD should be in a position to provide most information concerning the activities of the RHEIN and GELDEN groups upon request.

2. In reply to your queries raised in paragraph 5, it is felt that:

a. CIC coverage of the intelligence activities of the GELDEN Group is desired only on a casual basis. It is felt that DAD is capable of protecting US intelligence interests involved with this organization. Until otherwise directed, CIC should report GELDEN Group activities only when these activities come to your attention in connection with coverage of other assigned targets.

b. CIC coverage of the RHEIN organization and its intelligence activities is desired in connection with this Division's interests in the BLANK Office and/or any future Ministry of Defense. These interests, including intelligence factors, are at present in the process of consideration and will be forwarded to your headquarters, on or about 1 March 1952, as part of a formal Intelligence Collection Memorandum outlining in detail desired coverage of the Government of the Federal Republic.

c. In the event that it comes to the attention of your organization that either of these groups is attempting to penetrate other US intelligence agencies, proselyting, actively discouraging informants of your organization from continuing their employment or are assigned to targets within the US military establishments, it is requested that this Division be notified immediately.

d. Coverage of the GELDEN Group, as discussed above should not be allowed to interfere with CIC coverage of any assigned target.

SECURITY INFORMATION

Page 1 of 1 S. 22-1710

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SECURITY INFORMATION

350.09 (GEO/OPS/COLL)

SUBJECT: West Germany Intelligence Agencies

3. The Chief, DAD was informed of your request contained in paragraph 6. It is requested that you obtain such briefings and orientations as you may require during your periodic CIG-DAD coordination panel meetings. DAD is in full accord with this procedure.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

KFB/hold KIL 8556

b6

Chief, Collection Section

13. 1957

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

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"BUREAU GEHLEN"

*file in*  
*0-282212*

The Bonn correspondent of the "Braunschweiger Zeitung" reports on the activity of the "Bureau Gehlen". Under the heading of "Intermezzo in the Bonn Espionage Jungle" he points out that Gehlen's illegal intelligence service is being criticized by the Americans. This is an impossible situation, he said, because counterintelligence as well as the protection of the constitution are responsibilities which must be left entirely to the future Ministry of Defence and to the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution. (Braunschweigische Zeitung as of May 1, 1952)

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] se Of. mit  
[redacted] Security Information [redacted] Chief

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

P & O Br

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
US ARMY, EUROPE

D-262212

Date: 16 November 1981

FROM: Counter Subversion Office (☒) b6  
Counter Espionage Office (☐  
Positive Office (☐  
Security Office (☐  
Other (☐

TO: Intelligence Division, For:  
(☒) Operations Branch, Attention Collections Section  
(☐) Analysis Branch, Attention -  
(☐) Other -

REMARKS:

No other dissemination of this information to any outside agency has been made or is contemplated.

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15?

Attention is invited to para 4, AR 600-10, which prescribes that disclosures of intelligence information to any other agency or to the public are prohibited. It is the policy of the Department of Defense that such a report or information shall not be made available to any other agency or to the public. The Department of Defense is not authorized to make a disclosure of such information to any other agency or to the public. Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered to be a violation of AR 600-10.

INCLOSURES: A/R III-15974, Subj: Future Federal Military Security and Intelligence Agencies, dtd 12 Nov 81 (2 copies)

[redacted]

16/11/81

12 November 1951 <sup>ya</sup>

Future Federal Military Security and Intelligence Agencies

1. Several Bundestag deputies of the government coalition stated that now or in the very near future the question will be raised by Chancellor ADENAUER and the High Commissioners as to which security service will be at the disposal of the Federal Republic following the expected abolition of the occupation statute. It is almost certain that Ministerial Direktor GLOBKE will be the government's expert to deal with these problems since it is known that b6 is in very close contact with General GEHLEN'S intelligence apparatus. Eyebrows were raised over the news that these problems will not be handled by the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the existing Federal Security Agency which, these Bundestag deputies feel, would be the logical agencies; also these same deputies would like to see that a decisive voice should be given to the Bundestag in this important project.


2. At the present time it is said that the GEHLEN organization will be declared a part of the over-all German military contribution to the European defense and that it will consequently be built into the structure of the European army. It would thus function as a combined Allied-German liaison to the BLANK office. Interior security, however, will be kept separated from such a military intelligence organization and will be handled exclusively by the Federal Security Agency which would be enabled and permitted closer cooperation with its land security agencies. These Bundestag deputies realize that the Allies cannot waive their claims for supervising external German security and intelligence if it were only to safeguard the security of their own occupation troops. On the other hand one would like to avoid the possibility that the GEHLEN group may at the same time be charged by the Allies with the interior security of Germany. These deputies have been suspicious of the GEHLEN apparatus and its semi-official status within the American occupation forces for some time in the past. They claim, should the GEHLEN organization be given a free hand under the general title of "German Military Intelligence" or similar that that organization would strive to take over any and all security matters within the German Federal Republic. In that case countless internal struggles regarding priorities, competencies, personalities, and general poor cooperation would undoubtedly result. The Bundestag deputies pointed out that then they would prefer if presently existing Allied intelligence agencies such as the CIC, CIA, FSS, and Surete were maintained. They are perhaps not more palatable but at least more readily understandable as a necessity for the security of the Allied troops than the largely "mysterious" GEHLEN apparatus. No doubt was left that the so-called "Auseenstellen" of the GEHLEN organization which apparently are now covertly present in a considerable

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number of German government offices are felt to be annoying and unwanted. It was stated that General GEHLEN'S alleged representative in BONN is former Colonel in the General Staff, KLEYSER.

3. Comments.

- a. This is the first time that the GEHLEN group is receiving semi-official comment from Bundestag deputies, at least to the knowledge of this writer. It is noteworthy that fears and doubts were expressed regarding present activities of the GEHLEN group to the effect that it concerns itself with a lot of problems which are probably none of its business and should logically and legitimately be left to the (internal) Federal Security Agency.

CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

EVALUATION: B-2

Source: P 909/III/B  
Subsource:

Manner information secured: Direct participation  
Date information developed: 5 November 1951  
Date information submitted: 10 November 1951

*for secured -  
see D-269062  
Vol 23*

*SW*  
E.H.

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STR#433:

 III 13974

30 October 1951

Region I, 66th CIC Detachment, APO 154, US Army

b6

RE:

b1

1. During the early part of October 1951, [b6]  
[b6] present address [b6]  
Deputy-Chief of the [b1]  
stated that he is in contact with [b6] a former German Wehrmacht  
officer, residing in Bavaria. [b6] is allegedly the leader of an intel-  
ligence net operating both in and out of Germany. [b6] connection with  
GEHLEN is allegedly through a third person, an un-named agent of GEHLEN's  
operating in the STUTTGART area. Furthermore, although [b6] association  
with GEHLEN is on a friendly basis, it is continued primarily for business  
reasons.

(B-3)

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Page 1 of 1 Pages  
27 Copies4 - Hq, 66th, ATTN: [b6]  
1 - CIC Central File1 - CO, Reg IV  
1 - File

30/10/51

4 February 2009

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: CO CIC REGION IV MUNICH FROM [b6]

TOO: 140700Z OCT 51 <sup>4h</sup>

FOR ACTION: CO HQ 66th CIC DET FOR [b6]

TOR: 140810Z OCT 51

<sup>Not</sup>  
~~PARAPHRASE REQUIRED.~~  
CONSULT COMMUNICATIONS  
CENTER BEFORE DECLASSI-  
FYING OR ~~ADDING~~ ADDITION-  
AL COPIES OF THIS MESSAGE.

FOR INFO:

REF NBR: D-1788

ROUTINE

AT APPROXIMATELY 0030 HOURS 13 OCT GERMAN NATIONAL

[b6]

BORN

[b6]

[b6]

PRESENT ADDRESS

[b6]

[b6]

WAS ARRESTED BY GERMAN CUSTOM POLICE FOR BLACKMARKETING COFFEE. HD  
CUSTOM POLICE TURNED HIM OVER TO STARNBERG STADT POLICE WHO SEARCHED HIM AND LATER  
HIS RESIDENCE PD SEARCH REVEALED FOLLOWING CLN ONE PD IDENTITY CARD WITH PICTURE AND  
FINGERPRINTS ISSUED 1 MARCH 51 NR [b6] STAMPED WITH A BLUE STAMP BOTH OFFICIAL\*  
INSCRIBED IN MIDDLE PD ADDRESSED THE SAME AS ABOVE KENNKARTE NR SAME AS ABOVE AUTHOR-  
IZING SUBJECT POSSESSION OF ONE GERMAN MACHINE PISTOL NR 40 AND ONE U S PISTOL 45

SIGNATURE

[b6]

RPT

[b6]

SERIAL NR

[b6]

PD PARA TWO PD GERMAN

POLICE FOUND IN THE ABOVE RESIDENCE RADIO TRANSMITTER RECEIVING AND SENDING TYPE PD  
OTHER OCCUPANTS OF HOUSE WAS IDENTIFIED AS A FORMER GERMAN GENERAL NAMED GELLEN PD  
UPON DISCOVERY OF RADIO AND IDENTITY CARD STARNBERG POLICE CONTACTED C I C AND CUSTOMS  
POLICE CONTACTED C I C PD THE UNDERSIGNED CALLED MAJOR BAEMS D A D LIAISON OFFICE TO  
IDENTIFY SUBJECT PD AT APPROXIMATELY 2000 HOURS SUBJECT WAS IDENTIFIED AND ARRANGEMENTS  
MADE FOR SUBJECT TO BE TRANSFERRED TO U S CUSTODY UNTIL PHYSICAL IDENTIFICATION COULD  
BE MADE BY D A D PD C I C ONLY PARTICIPATION IN THIS WAS TO CONTACT D A D FOR IDENT-  
IFICATION PD IT IS OPINION OF UNDERSIGNED THAT THIS OPERATION OF D A D HAS BEEN

Page 1 of 3  
Copy 1 of 3 Copies

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: CO CIC REGION IV MUNICH FROM b6

TO: 140700Z OCT 51

FOR ACTION: CO HQ 66th CIC DET FOR b6

TOR: 140810Z OCT 51

*for*  
~~PARAPHRASE REQUIRED.~~  
CONSULT COMMUNICATIONS  
CENTER BEFORE DECLASSI-  
FYING OR REMITTING ADDITION-  
AL COPIES OF THIS MESSAGE.

FOR INFO:

REF NR: D-1788

**ROUTINE**

BLOWN WIDE OPEN PD THIS IS BASED UPON REMARKS OF CHIEF OF GERMAN CUSTOMS WHO STATED  
THEY ARE FAMILIAR WITH WHOM GENERAL GELLEN IS WORKING FOR AS WELL AS WHAT HE IS DOING  
PD CUSTOMS PEOPLE KNOW THAT GENERAL GELLEN WAS FORMER GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE  
OFFICER SPECIALIZING IN SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PD THEY ALSO KNOW HE IS EMPLOYED BY U S  
AGENCIES PD STARNBERG STADTS POLICE ALSO KNOW OF GENERAL GELLENS OPERATIONS PD

\* WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST.

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*R. 1515*

*282212*  
*18 Sep*

*K/11/11/11*

HEADQUARTERS  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
US ARMY, EUROPE

AFPO 154  
18 September 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR b6

*file in  
Gehlen Gruppe  
desires*

SUBJECT: Conflicting DAD Operations

1. Pursuant to your verbal request, this date, the following brief is prepared in clarification of the "phony" b1 (actually operatives directed by the Special Detachment - DAD), which has been interfering with Region I sources in an effort to obtain information on the KPD, and the alleged revival of the German Abwehr or German Army intelligence, possibly under the aegis of a US military intelligence agency.

2. The first matter, that of the Special Detachment, was brought to b6 attention in July after reports had been received from Region I to the effect that representatives of a so-called b1 b1 were attempting to recruit Region I sources to report on the W/B KPD.

a. On 1 August b6 sent a letter to b6 explaining the confusion resulting from the activities of these Special Detachment operatives and requesting the Special Detachment to withdraw these operatives from the KPD mission.

b. No answer to this letter has been received to date: to the contrary, it would appear that the contents of this letter were shown or described to the Special Detachment operatives, who then berated the Region I source for reporting this information to CIC.

3. The second matter, that of the alleged revival of the German Abwehr, may or may not be attributable to DAD. Clarification is necessary from that organization. The facts of this second matter are as follows:

a. b6 (with whom DAD has previously admitted "occasional" contact) is operating an agency in BAD GODESBERG (BONN) known as the Archiv fuer Gegenwartsforschung (Archive for the Study of Present Day Problems). According to b6 himself, this is a cover name, and the "Archive" is nothing more or less than the "unofficial birthplace" of the

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*18/9/50*

*48*

[REDACTED]

German Abwehr. This effort is supposedly under the personal supervision of [b6], recently appointed "advisor on technical questions of security" to Chancellor ADENAUER.

b. The "Archive" is gathering intelligence information from the DDR and from the Soviet satellite countries.

c. [b6] is described as an "employee of Time-Life, Inc." The Time-Life office in FRANKFURT admits knowing [b6] but would not or could not give details of his employment.

d. [b6] is visited by an American by the name of [b6] (phonetic spelling), who is allegedly a field representative of Time-Life, Inc. It is possible, therefore, that the [b6] "archive" is a top-level US-directed intelligence effort.

4. While these two cases are unrelated incidents, they do emphasize an acknowledged need for coordination among CIC and DAD and other US intelligence organizations in certain fields of activity in which conflict and confusion are becoming increasingly apparent. The following factors are important:

a. The recruitment of CIC sources by Special Detachment operatives.

b. The lack of security consciousness displayed in making known the contents of the Colonel's letter to the Special Detachment operatives.

c. The embarrassment involved when CIC exposes intelligence operations of other US intelligence agencies.

d. The automatic delay imposed on CIC investigations in such matters as the [b6] case, where agents involved must draw back and wait for clarification.

e. The increasing interest of DAD in counter-intelligence targets in general and in assigned targets of this organization and particular.

[b6]  
Case Officer

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *25*  
*Destroy or file*  
*CS.*

Reinhard Gehlen

Master of 4,000 men

The Story of a German Counter-Espionage General in American Services

By a Special Correspondent.

Who is Reinhard Gehlen? Who is the man who is the central point of interest after the John case? He lives in the background in mysterious darkness. Is he afraid of the light of publicity? Our report gives answer to these questions. In a series of episodes it shows the life of this man, his work and his connections all over the world. A man who knows perfectly the Gehlen Organization, supplied us with this unique material. It contains facts which have not been published yet by any Baden-Wuerttemberg newspaper. Today we start with the first report.

I. From Lieutenant to General Staff Officer.

He is the boss of 4,000 men - men who in Europe, East of the Elbe, day after day and night after night risk losing their lives as "traitors", who sit at exactly fixed times behind their radio transmitters, who with falsified papers pass as couriers the train and street controls of the Soviets and their satellite-security organs and who have never seen their boss. They work somewhere in Dresden, in Warsaw or Cracow, Kiev or Smolensk. They are agents, spys. 4,000 men who were trained in a difficult school; the school of a European specialist in counter espionage, Reinhard Gehlen, former Lt. General.

Note: Here in the original article is the signature of a counter espionage boss: Gehlen.

Anyone wanting to know whether yesterday morning the sun was shining over the northern Ukraine or whether a storm was over the Caucasus Mountains, may ask the "South German Industrial Analysis (Staff)" Pullach near Munich. This is the cover name for the headquarters - of the Gehlen Organization - in technical language called "General Direction". And anyone interested in whether or not the 2nd regiment of the 4th Soviet Elite Infantry Division is still stationed in the Cottbus area and whether the T-34 tanks of the 5th Division have been replaced yet by the super-heavy "Stalin" types, should ask the "South German Industrial Analysis".

Its address: unknown

Its telephone number: unknown

Personal names of leading personalities: unknown.

There are about 50 persons in Europe and in the United States for whom all this is not "unknown". Only fifty ... and only about ten men can contend to know Gehlen today, to speak to him, to work with him and to know actually who Reinhard Gehlen is.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Like a University Professor.

And Gehlen himself, the boss of 4,000?

One of his closest co-workers says about him: "Today he looks like a responsible university professor, like for example, Heidelberg University professor Alfred Weber. Nobody believes an officer is standing before him. He appears to be a scholar, like a man living in the world of books, but when he talks one can sense the officer. He speaks curtly, sometimes a little abrupt but what he says never seems cold. He never talks about private matters. Those are taboo. His co-workers acknowledge his authority. For them he is the sole manager of the organization. People were trained according to his ideas. He personally checks and oversees constantly the key-positions. Nothing exists or happens in this mammoth apparatus that he has not approved. Even second and third class co-workers are selected and instructed by him. But those people do not know that it is Gehlen they are facing at such moments. But this is the Gehlen practice."

60 Years Old.

Reinhard Gehlen's career is that of a typical career officer: 1923 lieutenant in 3rd Field Artillery Regiment; 1934 captain with the quartermaster (Section 10) in the Imperial War Ministry; 1937 major on the General Staff; 1940 colonel; 1944 major general and shortly prior to the end of the war promoted to lieutenant general. In a character sketch made of him by a prominent military man, it is said:

Careful and Reserved.

"Gehlen stands out because of a specially noticeable talent for organization. He is careful and reserved in the selection of his co-workers. You can speak of special talent in this respect."

Not a word about espionage, counter-espionage and agents. But the Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) in Berlin, Bendlerstrasse, concluded from this characteristic that Gehlen might have special talents for counter-espionage missions. He became chief of the secret counter espionage section "Foreign Armies East" in the OKH. In other words, when the German armies were in Russia he established a counter espionage and espionage organization for the East-European territories. Purely military, independent from Admiral Canaris and the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) which was commanded by SS-people. The OKH, a real domain of old-Prussian officers, who did not want to function mutually with the SS and SD, saw importance in the fact that the chief of the counter espionage section be a career officer. That is the background to Gehlen's appointment. This also explains the rivalry between Gehlen and the SS which is still noticeable at the present time.

OKH Against SD

In the East - West espionage war in European territory confronting one another today are: Gehlen and his old co-workers of the OKH on the Western side and

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the SS and SD people on the Eastern side. One works for the Americans and the others for the Soviets. Naturally, there are borderline cases but they are not important.

How it came that the former rivals still today are opponents is a story the sensational circumstances of which could come up only in the chaos of the capitulation. It commenced with the mass-flight to the West and the retreat of the German army. And when the tanks were still shooting at the Rhine and in the Mark-Brandenburg the soldiers of both sides still fought and died, some Americans appeared in Bavaria. They were from CIC. They had a special mission...

## II. "Top Secret": The Gehlen Archives

They had a special mission. "Top secret" - "strong geheim". This word was printed in red letters on the files these men brought from Washington to Germany. There was no war for them any more - only war booty. Not ammunition, tanks or planes. That interested Americans? They had enough of that. They wanted people! Men who could give them more than an arsenal of weapons. Men who would put their knowledge at their disposal, their knowledge about the most secret activities and their knowledge of the opponent of tomorrow: the Soviet Union, its factories, its roads, its military secrets and its soldiers - for example, about Stalin's son who lived for weeks in Gehlen's East-Prussian headquarters as prisoner of the counter-espionage chief.

### Found in Two Days.

The CIC people with their special mission were looking for Gehlen. They found him in two days. A few radio calls to the division commanders signed by the three mysterious letters "CIC" worked better and more precisely than the casual orders of a German staff sergeant. Gehlen was placed behind barbed wire. He was isolated in a villa near Wiesbaden. But this barbed wire did not mean a camp life with a miniature daily ration (three cigarettes, a package of biscuit, a bag of coffee, 50 grams of sausage, and five sheets of toilet paper) but a luxury life with officers' rations. That was the beginning of Gehlen's post-war career, the career of a German counter espionage chief in American services.

### Acknowledged Ungrudgingly.

Gehlen worked 14 hours per day in his barbed-wire-villa. One year long. He did the same thing he had done in East Prussia. Only not for the OKW in Bendlerstrasse but for CIC in Washington. More explicitly, for its branch office in Wiesbaden. He made reports and evaluated his archives - archives which the CIC people had to acknowledge ungrudgingly, were prepared with German exactness and contained much more than Washington had believed in its wildest dreams.

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For years these archives were "vier hoch vier" (super secret), the German slang expression for more than "top secret". No money can pay for anything like that. One has it or one does not. And the one who has it, has won a battle. The Americans had it.

#### Gehlen Expresses His Conditions

The archives alone were not the reason for the offer CIC made Gehlen in Fall 1946; he should enter American services, build up an organization and deliver to the Americans reports about the Red Army in the Sovzone. A clear mission. Gehlen accepted. But he stated his conditions: selecting his co-workers and wide-reaching independence. The Americans said yes. Gehlen commenced his work.

For more than a year Gehlen worked with only about 100 men. All people of his former staff. Capable heads, unobjectionable character, officers and non-commissioned officers used to obeying the orders of their new and old chief and to working precisely. The Americans were satisfied. At that time, however, Gehlen was only one of their many people.

#### The Great Moment

When the East-West honeymoon came to an end, when General Clay saw Marshal Sokolowski no longer as an ally in war-time, but an opponent in the cold war, this was the great moment for Gehlen, since the Americans recognized the real value of the German counter espionage chief. What they wanted was the extension of the military espionage into the East-block states, the Soviet Union, the Balkans, and the Orient. Military espionage and counter espionage. That is: 1) procurement of military information from these areas; 2) defense against the opponent's espionage not only in the East but in the Federal Republic as well.

That is a mission which requires a mammoth apparatus and which costs money; a lot of money. The Americans fixed an annual budget of 26.5 million Deutsche Marks.

With this money Gehlen built his net. The basis were war-time connections. Only in the Orient did he have to engage new men. He found them in the bankruptcy of the SD and the Canaris organization. He carefully took them over into his net. The old hostility gave way to the pressure of cooperation.

#### "General Direction"

The formation of the Gehlen organization is a science in itself. This is the scheme:

1. Top of all is the "General Direction" in Pullach near Munich. It is the "brain" of the Gehlen organization;
2. Eight "General Agencies" which are located all over Federal Republic;

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3. Each of the "General Agencies" has some, mainly three to six "Sub-agencies";
4. Each "Sub-agency" has "Branch Offices";
5. Abroad "Residences" work exclusively. These are small and even smaller instruction groups. They might be compared with advanced staffs. The formation is purely military;
6. Each "Residence" has its own agents' nets which work completely independent. Highest principle: no one knows members of the neighboring net or the neighboring residence;
7. Each "Residence" has at its disposal two radio sets, two radio operators, two substitute radio men and two couriers.

This organization principle assures a maximum of security. It is thought over so carefully that the entire area of work of this organization is spotted with agents who, however, have only a limited knowledge (of the organization itself). Only the total sum of the information forms a complete picture.

#### A. Man "Doubled"

Eastern counter espionage does not sleep. It is certainly understandable that Gehlen had to take set-backs, like any other espionage service. But up to now only one single Gehlen Branch Office was destroyed by an action of the Eastern State Security Service. This sensational action started with the fact that one man was "doubled" in East Berlin. He started a chain-reaction. His name: Wolfgang Hoehner.

#### III Radio Message "Close Up Immediately"

The man's name was Wolfgang Hoehner. His description: 40 years old; profession jurist (studies not completed); former first lieutenant, four years in Soviet captivity; since 1951 co-worker of the Gehlen apparatus. He did not know too much. He worked in a small West Berlin office, an office which had Dresden as its exclusive area of control.

His case has some background. Let us go back a little:

Since the first of November 1953 a campaign was started in the Sovzone against Gehlen. Almost every day, even today, news are published. Its tendency: Gehlen is a US agent; he torpedoed reunification; his co-workers in the Sovzone are mercenaries; the StS will get them one day. Purpose of this series of propaganda: To intimidate the agents; they should voluntarily report to the StS.

#### The Great Opponent

None of the Gehlen people did so. They kept silent. In some way they are idealists. And over there? On the other side? Wollweber's apparatus is a colorful mixture. Old, true communists, men of the SS and SD are working for Wollweber, the great opponent of Reinhard Gehlen. One is chasing the other.



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Around the end of last year Gehlen was some lengths ahead of Wollweber. Pankow's big propaganda case had fallen through. On 20 December, some few weeks prior to the Berlin Big-Four-Conference, a thick pamphlet was supposed to appear. Entitled: "Memorandum on the Espionage Activity of Western Intelligence Services in West Berlin". Number printed: 300,000 copies. Two days prior to 20 December the pamphlet was withdrawn. All copies were destroyed. Only the most intimate co-workers of Wollweber knew why their boss had given the order therefor. His Main Section Chief "West", Rudolf Gramsch, had not returned to his headquarters in East Berlin. He fled across the sector border, he had "taken off."

#### Reciprocal Action

Gramsch knew everything. He knew the names of the big and the little agents in the Federal Republic. He knew on what primitive material Wollweber's "Memorandum" was based and he would have been able to refute it immediately. He was a double agent. In his capacity as section chief to Wollweber he worked for two sides: officially for Wollweber and unofficially for Gehlen. He reported continuously to the Gehlen office in West Berlin on SFS activities. When he fled, only a short note in the West Berlin press appeared. It said a high KVP officer fled to the West. Those who wanted to see Gramsch had to conquer the Gehlen "barrier". Almost nobody could do so.

The Gramsch case did not allow the SFS respite. It sought a counter case. It found Wolfgang Hoehner. SFS contacts had detected him in one of the West Berlin agents' restaurants. The little agents of the different intelligence services meet rather regularly in several restaurants of the divided town. One night Hoehner had drunk a little too much. And another thing; a few women were also there, women whom one could see had bought their elegant dresses with a few reports which they had gathered in various ways. As said before: Hoehner had drunk more than is good or even allowed for an agent. He expostulated, criticizing Gehlen. Twelve hours later he was "doubled". That means SFS people bound him by obligation to go on working for Gehlen but also for them. Hoehner did so. He delivered reports.

And the SFS wanted to strike a blow. It wanted to break the Dresden Gehlen net and to present the co-workers to the international press in East Berlin. An enormous propaganda action against the West. Everything was prepared. Nothing could fail. Wollweber forgot only one thing: Exactly one day prior to the planned action a warning was on the table of the Gehlen organization. It was a short report of a "second Gramsch", a man who was in the operations section of the SFS as a double agent.

#### "Sauve Qui Peut" (Save Yourself, Who Can)

Gehlen reacted swift as lightning. Wireless message to Dresden: "Leave immediately, destroy everything!" Such a message was equal to alarm stop No. 1: Save Yourself who can. The three dozen agents of the Dresden area started on their way to West Berlin. Each individually. But not all got through.

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Some of them got caught in the SFS control nets. They were "little people", no loss for the organization. Since none of these men knew more than a code number or a "dead letterdrop", a spot in a wood, at a street side or in a house where information was placed to be collected by a courier. And that the SFS had caught them? Well, that is an agent's fate.

The East announced: "Gehlen-net blown up!" It rejoiced. It knew exactly what a meager result it was. The Gehlen apparatus was not even damaged. A little scratch, a little accident in the firm, nothing more.

The Gehlen-Wellweber guerilla warfare goes on. A tough war where there is no pardon. Neither on the one nor on the other side. The East takes up a new tactic: Even the smallest agents caught in the Sovzone are presented as "Gehlen spies". Almost every week half a dozen are presented. For months. And Pankow's press officer claims: These agents also work against the French, not only in the Sovzone and not only against the Red Army.

#### IV "You Come From The French?"

The Mass Decides.

What kind of people are they? "Poor wretches", one would say. People who sell information for a few cents, who sit in an East Berlin office and occasionally smuggle a document with production figures across the border. Cheap information dealers. In Berlin there are, well, let us say at least 2,000. They hardly have a chance with Gehlen. But with the French. With the French Secret Service. It is known in agents' circles that it also has the cheapest men working for it, saying the masses decide.

Gehlen refuses to employ agents who have been working at any time with the French. Why? He argues: These agents are "spoiled". Many of them work not only for one, but for two, maybe for three sides. If somebody reports to Gehlen offering his services one of his first questions is "Do you come from the French?"

Naturally the man says "no". But then the investigations start, then the threads go through all intelligence services. And if they detect any French cross connections, the Gehlen people shake their shoulders in regret. They are sorry, they have nothing for them....

#### Official Order of Succession

If, however, someone comes from the British, then the matter is "all right". The British Secret Service is said to be the most secure. Less is said about it.

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And this is the best recommendation. There is an unofficial order of succession on the value of the secret services:

1. the British Secret Service,
2. the Gehlen Organization,
3. the American Secret Service,
4. the Soviet Secret Service,
5. the French Secret Service,
6. the Sovzonal State Security Service,
7. the Czech Secret Service,
8. the Polish Secret Service.

Gehlen's suspicion towards the French is grist in Pankow's propaganda mill. Pankow rakes the fire. The SFS men are good propagandists. They spread a rumor which is not without effect. Its tendency: Gehlen also plays the spy in France. What the Americans do not want to do on French territory, the Gehlen people are doing for them: Military and political espionage in France.

Are These Rumors?

It is a fact that Gehlen has some contact to France but he does not have any agents' net there. Occasionally he performs a special order, less at the present time than formerly. One says he felt the ground getting too hot under him. He has withdrawn mainly from the "French business". And that is correct.

But he did not withdraw from the "German business". To say it more precisely from the Federal Republic business. But more about this later....

Gehlen had another "accident in the firm" in the hot Berlin territory. A woman was involved, however, she was on Gehlen's side without knowing it. A hazardous incident saved Gehlen from a critical situation.

These are the facts: The paper representative and "writer" Geyer had been bought by the SFS. One knows the SFS practice: A man in the Sovzone says a few words against the regime while sitting at the reserved table (Stammtisch). An ideal SED man hears it and denounces him to the SFS. A few days later the name of a new agent is noted in the SFS files. That is the way one gets the people.

After signing his obligation Geyer received an order to seek contact to a Gehlen office in West Berlin and to start his own intelligence service, the 87th in West Berlin. His order was to commence this net, have it grow and grow and later, on a certain date, "jump over" to East Berlin and compromise all the agents recruited during all that time. Geyer did good work. He rented an office in Berlin-Charlottenburg and looked for and found co-workers in the Sovzone. These were not agents but people who delivered information to West Berlin in the belief that they were doing real work in the resistance against the hated regime. Geyer also got in contact with some contacts of the Gehlen apparatus. On the ladder of West Berlin intelligence services which starts

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low down in mysterious little groups and ends in the Gehlen office, he gradually climbed up to about the 10th step. He had a certain name, he seemed to be trustworthy.

#### Home Search At Geyer's.

One day Geyer looked for a secretary. Under a cover name he put an advertisement in the paper. 34 girls reported, all unemployed for a long time. 5 girls were on the select list. He decided on one. But she found the business somewhat mysterious. She asked Geyer for what kind of "firm" she was going to work. Geyer answered evasively. She became suspicious. She went to the police; Geyer probably was a profiteer. The police moved in. They made a search in Geyer's office. Geyer himself was not present during these hours. When he returned home his landlady told him about the search. Geyer was of the opinion that he had been discovered as a SFS agent and fled to East Berlin. There he sold a few secrets he knew. They were no sensation but again a few agents were arrested in the Sovzone. They were represented as Gehlen people. And again they started the slogan: Gehlen also worked for the French. They started a real drum roll against Gehlen and his people.

The Eastern allegations precipitated one another: Gehlen, the master-agent of the Americans observes French politicians; Gehlen, the American mercenary does military espionage in France; His agents sit in the head offices of the French military air bases. Gehlen remained silent. As always during his life. He did not say a word. But others spoke in East and West....

#### "What Does The Information Cost?"

These are sinistre people, these "wild" agents. They sit around in doubtful restaurants and work for everything and nothing. Sometimes for bread and butter, sometimes for a pair of shoes. When they once meet a journalist then they boast, they have the "scoop" of the year. In other words: they have the sensation, a tremendous story with many dead in an Erzgebirge Uranium mine. "Absolutely reliable". If one checks the matter it blows up like a soap-bubble; it melts like a snowflake in a blast furnace.

#### A Real Jungle.

But those people make a living at it. They always find mysterious "counter espionage organizations" which buy such reports and place them into channels which finally end at one of the recognized intelligence services. It is a jungle, a real information jungle. This would be understandable if the Pankow State Security Service did not have its fingers also in this pie, if it did not play along with them.

#### "Operations Material"

The SFS has its go-betweens. These are reliable men, mainly former co-workers

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and a smaller movie room. Films were shown here. From the Soviet Union, the people's democracies, and the Sovzone. Purpose of these performances: Western German juveniles, especially youth leaders should get an impression of communist propaganda tactics and the technique of mass-influence. There also met in this room at regular intervals the men standing in the front line of the resistance movement: Co-workers of the different West Berlin organizations, working exclusively in the Sovzone, who have dozens of confidential sources in almost all towns of the Sovzone.

#### Responsible Co-worker

A little more than two years ago a new doorkeeper was needed for the house. Two dozen people reported, all recommended by reliable personalities. Among those was Kapahnke, a man of 40 years and recommended highly by all his friends as a reliable, absolutely responsible co-worker. Kapahnke had a special recommendation. Since 1950 he had been working with various West Berlin intelligence services, had some success and was also well known to many Gehlen people.

#### Kapahnke Hired.

Kapahnke got the job. From the very first day he worked for the StS. He noted down names and addresses of people who went in and out of the "House of the Future". And more: He even knew the private addresses of important agents, he knew the real names aside from the cover names, he knew the private lives of the agents and he knew the most intimate secrets of the leading people of the "House of the Future". Kapahnke was more than just a doorkeeper. After a few co-workers from the Sovzone had made their reports, he drove them to their West Berlin billets, he was then invited for a glass of schnaps, then he was informed about things which only the inhabitants of the Sovzone dared to whisper.

#### He "Unveiled"

Every week Kapahnke delivered a report to the East Berlin central office of the StS. Month after month. Year after year. Until one day when he felt uncertain. His suspicion was unfounded. However, Kapahnke never returned to Hagenstrasse. He reported in East Berlin. Two days later he gave the headlines for the Pankow papers. He "unveiled" the alleged agents' activity of the "House of the Future", he published details about the Gehlen organization and gave names of genuine and false co-workers and agents in the Sovzone.

#### Globke - Assigner of Missions.

The East Berlin press still today makes propaganda with Kapahnke. They designate him as the man who knows the most intimate secrets of the Gehlen organization and especially about Gehlen's espionage activity. But they never published concrete

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details. One thing is certain: Kapahnke knows a lot, he knows many names, but he has no idea of the work of the Gehlen people on this side of the Iron Curtain.

He indicated already that recently Gehlen tried to get into the political sector also. With hesitation but systematically. It commenced with missions the Corman counter espionage general in American services received from the intimate circles around the Federal Chancellor. The man who gave the order directly was State Secretary Globke, the Chancellor's closest, perhaps the sole, confidant.

Globke was not satisfied with the official reports coming from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. He wanted to know more. He approached Gehlen, he sounded out the atmosphere and then he decided to include Gehlen into his information net. Negotiations took place with the Americans. The CIC people gave their "O.K." This "O.K." was the hour of birth for Gehlen's official work (activity) on federal territory.

It was a turning point in Gehlen's work. There is a straight track from this O.K. to John's flight and to the discussion about the incorporation of the Gehlen apparatus into federal service.

#### VI. Gehlen's Dangerous Game

The turning point in Gehlen's activity was the Americans' O.K. From that time Gehlen also worked in the Federal Republic - he "makes politics". His contact man and boss was and is CDU State Secretary Dr. Globke. Gehlen worked for him at first only hesitatingly and groping carefully but then more and more intensively. The information presented by Gehlen was first class. It did not matter whether it concerned the activity of the GSI secret service against the units of the Federal Border Police or details in the lives of personalities in which Bonn was very interested. The communists played only a secondary role in Gehlen's activity. Let us admit: He has informatively prepared various actions against communist groups or against the FDJ, but all this was just a matter of course. The center of emphasis is placed on special missions, the surveillance of certain personalities. It is natural that thereby the official missions of the BfV countercross the missions of the unofficial Gehlen apparatus. It is also natural that very often various reports are being made on the same personalities.

Gehlen knew very well this weakness in the operation. He also knew his opponent in the Western German operation area: Dr. Otto John, chief of the BfV. There was and is a necessary competition between these two organizations. Both are concerned with the same matters, both have agents. One apparatus somewhat more official than the other. The one is officially supervised by the Federal Ministry of Interior and the other works unofficially for the Chancellor's office.

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Grotesque situations arise therefrom. For a long time Globke was suspicious of the reports from the BfV. He therefore gives almost all information for counter examination to Gehlen. He only believes his information, only then does he present them to the Chancellor. The third in this union of secret and counter espionage services is the Blank Office. It also has a counter espionage office, which however, concentrates on military matters, however, also touches the civil sector. It is a fact that sometimes all three organizations work on the same mission, that all three observe one and the same person.

Gehlen wants to clear out this counter espionage jungle. In the race for the leadership he is several lengths ahead. An incident helped him. Otto John deserted and former Col. Heinz, chief of the counter espionage office in the Blank Office resigned, a victim of intrigue.

#### The Main Points.

Gehlen knows exactly whom he has to address. State Secretary Globke. Just a few days ago he presented him a new plan for the reformation of the political and military counter espionage service. This very detailed plan has the following main points:

1. After announcing the sovereignty for the Federal Republic the political and military counter espionage service will be placed under the supervision of the chancellor's office, that means directly under State Secretary Globke. This would be a first class concentration of power.
2. The counter espionage service of the Blank Office will be reduced to an evaluation office for military information. It should be bound also to instructions from the chancellor's office.
3. The Constitutional Protection Office will be dissolved.
4. A purely political counter espionage service to be based only partly on the assistance of the Federal Laender, will be established under control of the parliament. The chancellor's office should also have a certain power of direction to this office.

#### Centrally Directed

The background of this plan: Formation of some sort of a "leadership cell" in the Federal Chancellor's office. From there all counter espionage and surveillance missions shall be steered centrally. The Federal Ministry of Interior would lose an important part of its functions.

The final decision on this plan is still open. Globke was the only one who agreed to it without any reservation. The Minister of Interior has many doubts. The Blank Office also is against it. The question now is who will be successful? Gehlen, the expert in counter espionage, plays a dangerous political game. Or, to say it better, political personalities play a dangerous game with the expert in counter espionage, Gehlen. The victor has not been found yet. The fight about the power has only started. Who will fall by the wayside we will know in a few months. We might hope it is not the democracy.....

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Partial Listing of Pertinent TIB and RUSTY Dossiers:

D-237630 ✓

D-183056

D-211020

D-169325 ✓

D-237630

D-22246

D-216302

D-184746

D-202539

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ABAKUMOV, Victor Semenovitch General

b6

b6 - Active Rusty Agent

b6

b6 - Code No TXC 600-23 TIB Agent

b6

b6 - Intell Sect - 6 Nov 47

b6 - Not Rusty

b6

b6

b6

b6 - Rusty

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✓ b6

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b6

b6 - Rusty

b6

b6 - CIE dtd 21 Apr 46

b6

b6

b6 ✓

b6 - Res: formerly PARSBERG, later HAMBURG - furn. Czech info

b6

b6

b6

b6 ✓

b6

b6

b6 - Active Rusty Agent

b6

b6 - Dropped from Rusty. Numerous Arrests - March 1948

b6 - Rusty

b6

b6 - Prosecutor and IBC

b6

b6 - Former TIB member

b6

b6

b6

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✓ b6

b6

b6 Dnu - Suspected Rusty Agent, later dropped

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b6

b6 Fnu - Rusty Informant

b6 - Rusty (26 Dec 47)

b6 Fnu - TIB agent 3 Oct 1943

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b6 - Chief at MAGDEBURG, father of ANNABERG Chief

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b6 - TIB agent

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b6 - Active Rusty Agent TIPSCHENREUTH Region V

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b6 - Rusty informant Reg III

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b6 - dropped from Rusty Dec 47, res: HOF

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b6 - dropped Jan 48

b6 - TIB as of 12 Jan 49

b6

b6 Rusty agent PARSBERG Region V

b6 Rusty

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10.

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b6 ✓

b6 - Rusty

b6 /11/4

b6 - Rusty

b6 ✓

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[REDACTED]

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b6	- suspected Rusty agent	b6
b6	- TIB as of 12/1/49	b6
b6	- suspected Rusty agent	b6
b6		b6
b6	- TIB agent	b6
b6	- inactive	b6 Region I .
b6	Re: SNB	b6
b6	Dropped from Rusty 15/12/47	
b6	- Dropped from Rusty Apr 43	b6
b6		b6
b6	- TIB agent	b6
b6		b6
b6	- activity unknown GOGGINGEN Region V	
b6		b6
b6	- Rusty 15/10/47	
b6	- Rusty agent in MARBURG 12 Jan 43 Reg IV	
b6	low level Rusty agent 20 Feb 43 Reg VI	
b6		b6
b6		b6
b6		b6
b6	Rusty - TIB agent	b6 (12 Nov 47)
b6	- TIB agent	b6
b6		b6
b6		b6
b6		b6
b6		b6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b6 - Rusty agent

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b6 Rusty agent

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b6 - Rusty agent

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b6 - Rusty -

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BEFESCH, Johann Born: 3/6/96 ALSTADT/CSR

D-235326

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b6 - Rusty

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b6 - TIB agent

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b6 Reg I

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6 - TIB agent b6 ✓

b6 - TIB agent ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ b6

b6 - active Rusty informant Reg III

b6 - TIB agent b6

b6 b6

b6 - active Rusty informant Reg II<sup>1</sup>

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 - active Rusty informant Reg III

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 - active Rusty agent LUDWIG Reg V

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 - double soviet agent b6 (2/11/43) VI

b6 - operation Rusty agent picked up in STUTTGART

b6 - TIB agent

b6 - TIB agent

b6 - active Rusty agent Reg VI

b6 - TIB agent b6

b6 - TIB informant 184 b6

b6 - Rusty informant b6 (23/1/43)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b6	- Rusty	b6	(16/9/47) III
b6		b6	
b6	- not opn Rusty	b6	(26/12/47)
b6		b6	
b6	- doubtful Rusty agent	Reg VI	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6	- Rusty until Dec 46		
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6	- TIB agent	b6	(12/1/49)
b6		b6	(23 Apr 48)
b6		b6	
b6	- TIB as of 12/1/49	b6	(15/12/43)
b6	- Rusty	b6	
b6	- suspected Rusty agent	b6	(19 May 48) III
b6		b6	
b6		b6	(23/12/48) III
b6	- TIB agent	b6	
b6	- not opn Rusty	b6	(23.1.47)
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6	- dropped from Rusty	30 Jan 48	

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b6 - Rusty and TIB agent

b6 (7/10/48) I

b6 - suspected Rusty agent

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b6 - dropped by Rusty 1 May 48

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b6 former Abw West

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b6 - doubtful Rusty informant Reg VI

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b6 - Rusty operator 9 Sep 48 Reg VI

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b6 (2/7/48) VIII

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b6 active Rusty agent Reg VI

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b6 TIB agent

b6

b6 - Rusty agent

b6 (23/8/48) V

b6

b6 Reg IV

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[REDACTED]





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b6	- suspected Rusty agent	b6	(12/7/48) VIII
b6		b6	
b6		b6	VIII
b6	- dropped by Rusty 1 May 43	b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6	- TIB agent	b6	(16/12/53) ID
b6		b6	(April 1949)
b6		b6	
b6	- active Rusty informant Reg VI	b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6	- activity unknown HOF Reg V	b6	
b6		b6	
b6	- suspected TIB agent	b6	(6/9/49)
b6	- Rusty in Austria	b6	(27/9/48)
b6	- Active Rusty informant Reg VI	b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6		b6	
b6	GI Sergeant	b6	
b6		b6	

CHOLEWA, Max Ernst Born: 4/11/17

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D-270129



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[b6]	[b6]
CHUIKOV, General	D-273313
[b6] - dropped by TIB	[b6]
[b6]	[b6] VIII (2/7/43)
[b6]	[b6]
[b6] - doubtful Rusty agent Reg VI	
[b6]	[b6]
[b6]	[b6]
[b6]	[b6]
[b6]	[b6]
[b6] TIB contact	[b6] (15/6/49)
[b6]	[b6]
[b6]	[b6]
[b6]	[b6]
[b6] - active Rusty agent LANDSHUT Reg V	
[b6]	[b6]
[b6] - Prosecuted for IBC	[b6]
[b6]	[b6]
[b6] - Active Rusty agent	<del>IX</del> Region VI
[b6]	[b6]
[b6] - Opn Rusty informant	[b6]
[b6]	[b6] (27/7/43) I
[b6] - TIB agent	[b6]
[b6] - Rusty informant	[b6]
[b6]	[b6]
[b6]	[b6]
[b6]	[b6]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] b6

b6 - Rusty informant 20/1/43

b6 - TIB agent b6 (April-May 1949)

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 Active Rusty agent MESSNERSCHLAG Reg V

b6 b6 VIII (17 Nov 43)

b6 b6

b6 - possible Soviet agent - works for CIC in MANNHEIM Reg III

~~XXXXXX~~ b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 b6

DENIKIN, Gen D-14506

b6

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 - doubtful Rusty agent Reg VI

b6 b6

b6 b6

b6 Rusty agent dropped 1 July 43 - Res: ULM b6 (23/9/43)

b6 b6

139

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	- Active Rusty Informant Reg VI
b6	b6
b6	-Rusty agent
b6	- Rusty operative - 2 Sep 48
<del>SECRET</del> b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	b6 ( 2 March 1949)
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	
b6	- doubtful Rusty informant - Reg VI
b6	b6 (29 Dec 48) III
b6	
b6	- activity unknown REGENSBURG Reg V
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	b6 (3 July 1947) b6
b6	-Not Opn Rusty - b6 (28 Jan 48)
b6	b6
b6	b6

136

[REDACTED]

~~XXXXXX~~ b6 - Rusty informant

b6 (28 Sep 43)

b6 - Sov deserter

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6 (29/12/43) III

b6 - Rusty agent dropped 1 May 43

b6

DUCHOPOLNIKOW, Fnu Gen-TIB agent member of Croatian Resistance Movement

b6 - TIB informant in Czech Refugee Camp b6 (29 Dec 43) I

b6 - dropped by Rusty 30 Jan 43

b6

- Rusty agent dropped 1 July 1943 b6 (28 Sep 43)

b6 - TIB agent

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6 (14 Oct 47) V

b6 - allegedly dropped by Rusty 15 Dec 47

b6

- dropped by Rusty in Dec 47 b6 (12 Nov 47) VI

b6

b6

b6 - activity unknown - HOF Reg V

b6

b6 Reg I b6 (26/9/

b6 - dropped in Jan 43/

b6

b6 III 7 July 43

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6 - not opn Rusty

b6 28 Jan 43 IV

b6

b6

[REDACTED]

[b6]	- Active Rusty agent - Reg V	
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]		[b6] (26 Aug 47) Reg VI
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]	- Doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI	
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]	- dropped Rusty informant 1 May 48	[b6] (28/9/43) 7321 CG)
[b6]	- dropped Rusty 4 Dec 47 Reg IV	
[b6]	- TIB as of 12 Jan 49	[b6] (15 Dec 43)
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]	- Alleged Rusty employee	[b6]
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]	- Rusty informant	[b6] (2) (31 Oct 47) IV
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]		[b6] (23 Dec 43) III
[b6]	- TIB agent	[b6]
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]	dropped by Rusty 1 Jun 48	[b6]
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]	- active Rusty agent - Reg VI	
[b6]		[b6]
[b6]		[b6]

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[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ [b6] - doubtful Rusty agent Reg VI

[b6]

[b6]

b6

Fnu - not Rusty  
- Rusty informant  
- dropped Jan 43

b6

b6

- doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI  
activity unknown NEUMARKT Reg V

Rusty informant [b6]

[b6]

alleged Rusty operative

b6

( 3 May 43)

[b6]

- active Rusty informant dropped May 43 III

[b6]

[b6]

[b6]

[b6]

- unknown

[b6]

- Rusty informant 22 Jan 43 Reg VI

[b6]

[b6]

- dropped Rusty March 43

[b6]

- Rusty informant -

b6

Reg I 30 Jun 47

Reg I 27 July 43  
24 June 43

b6

dropped Rusty Jan 43 Res: [b6]

doubtful Rusty agent Reg VI

Rusty informant

b6

193

[b6]

- active Rusty agent Reg VI

[REDACTED]

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b6

b6

FREUND, Kurt - born 25 Nov 96 LEIPZIG

b6

- not Rusty

28 Jan 47 IV

b6

TIB agent

8 March 49

b6

activity unknown HIEBURG Reg V

b6

b6

- doubtful Rusty informant Reg VI

b6

b6

- TIB agent

8 Mar 59

dropped Rusty 20 Mar 43

b6

- active Rusty agent Reg VI

b6

- TIB agent

3 Jan 49

b6

(female) - not Rusty - 12 Jan 43

b6

- Rusty operator 14 Sep 43

b6

- suspected Rusty operative

b6

Reg VIII

I 30 Apr 48

b6

Reg VI

b6

dropped Rusty 1 May 43

- TIB agent

16 May 49

134

b6

b6

9 June 43



[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

b6

suspected Rusty agent

b6

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 May 48

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty 15 Nov. 47 15 Dec 47

b6

III 13 Mar 43

FD-247743

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty Feb 43

active Rusty agent - HOF Reg V

- not Rusty MUNICH Reg IV

b6

- not Rusty- 28 Jan 43 Reg III

GLASENAPP, General - doubtful Rusty agent Reg VI

b6

b6

Reg VI

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 Apr 1943 -

b6

Rusty agent

IBC

195

[REDACTED]

b6

VI 7 Jul

b6

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b6

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 May 43

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty Dec 47 Reg: GUESTROW/Mecklenburg - MUNICH IV

b6

- dropped Dec 47 (ECIC)

b6

suspected Rusty agent

- unknown connections

Active Rusty agent Reg VI - not Rusty March 43

b6

b6

- TIB agent

b6

b6

, Lothar - not Rusty

b6

b6

- active Rusty agent RES: BAYERBACH, Kreis Griesbach Reg V

b6

b6

III 23 Dec 43

covered SED ANNABERG VIII - Jul 43

b6

b6

GRASER, Pnu General - wanted by Third Army 31 Aug 46

b6

b6

- dropped TIB

b6

21 Jun 43

suspected TIB agent

b6

16 Sep 49

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

b6 - Rusty informant - Reg VI 4 Dec 47

b6

b6 - Rusty employee after July 1946

b6

b6 - dropped Opn Rusty Dec 47

b6 - covered gas & electric ANNABERG

b6

b6 - activity unknown - MOF - Reg V

b6

b6 - active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

b6

b6

b6 - Rusty informant

b6 - active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6 - active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6 - dropped Rusty Aug 47

b6

b6

b6 - suspected Rusty agent (under b6 - Reg I

b6 - dropped Rusty 1 May 48

b6

b6

b6 suspected Rusty agent b6 Reg III

b6 - active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

b6 (3 Apr 48)

b6

b6 Reg VIII (2/7/48)

b6

b6

11 Feb 47

b6 (7970th CIC Sq)

b6

b6

b6 (16/9/47 Reg III)

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	- activity unknown - PASSAU - Reg V
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	b6
b6	- confirmed TIB agent
b6	Rusty agent
b6	Chief at Neu Ruppin
b6	- dropped Rusty Dec 47-in Brazil - MUNICH Reg IV
b6	not Opn Rusty informant 28 Oct 47
b6	- dropped Rusty July 47 (20 Nov 47)
b6	- former Rusty agent
b6	b6 Reg I 30 June 48
b6	b6
b6	- MVD, b1 PW b6
b6	- Rusty informant 19 Jan 48 Reg VI
b6	b6
b6	not Rusty informant 12 Jan 48
b6	- suspected Rusty agent
b6	b6 Reg V 6 Aug 48
b6	b6
b6	
b6	b6
b6	- dropped TIB early 47 - real name b6
b6	- dropped Rusty 1 June 48
b6	- US intell. 198
b6	- Rusty informant b1

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

suspected Rusty agent

b6

III 26 July 48  
VIII 12 July 48

b6

dropped Rusty March 48 - numerous arrests

b6

- dropped Rusty March 48 - numerous arrests

NASAL, Antouian Gen

D-243859

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 July 48 Resk ULM

b6

23 Sep 48

- active Rusty agent - PASSAU - Reg V

- doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

Reg VI

30 July 47

b6

- suspected Rusty, former Major, res: HARTHAUSEN - Reg I

b6

b6

suspected TIB members

b6

15 Aug 49

b6

b6

- TIB agent

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

- Inactive Rusty informant - Reg VI

b6

(CX)

b6

199

b6

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b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6 (6 Sep 49)

b6

- US intell.  
- TIB agent

III 7 July 48

(26 Apr 49, 1 May 49)

KENKE, Andor - born 14 July 1895

D-16475

b6 - activity unknown - SCHWEINFURT - Reg V

b6

dropped Rusty March 48  
7821 Comp Group, 14 Sep 48  
active Rusty agent - Reg VI  
TIB agent

b6

b6 - Rusty agent dropped 3 Sep 48

b6

b6

b6

- Rusty agent

b6

- doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

b6

- Rusty agent  
- Rusty agent  
- suspected Rusty agent  
dropped TIB 47 - aka  
not Rusty 28 Oct 47

b6

VI 19 May 48

19 Aug 48

19 Aug 48

b6

b6

[REDACTED]

b6

- Rusty, dropped April 48
- Rusty
- Rusty
- Rusty

b6

20 Sep 48, 7821st CG  
I, 30 June 48  
I, 30 June 48  
. 22 Aug 47. I  
26 Dec 47

b6

- not Rusty
- suspected TIB agent

b6

b6

- TIB agent

b6

- not Rusty

b6

b6

b6

b6 (see b6)

b6

- not Rusty

b6

CG, 17 June 48

b6

- dropped Rusty Dec 47

b6

b6

- former Rusty

18 July 49

b6

- doubtful Rusty informant - Reg VI

b6

- activity unknown - Reg VI

b6

b6

201

b6

- not Rusty

b6, 12 Jan 48

b6

- active Rusty agent - Reg VI

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

b6

b6 - TIB agent

14 Feb 49

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 May 48

b6

b6 - Rusty

b6 (?)

b6

- Rusty agent

b6

I, 30 June 48

b6

VI, 3 Jan 49

b6

dropped Rusty Dec 47 # - MUNICH Reg IV

b6

- TIB agent

b6

3 Jan 49

b6

- dropped TIB 1 March 49

b6

III, 13 Oct 47

b6

- dropped Rusty 15 Nov 47

VI, 15 Dec 47

b6

- not Rusty

23 Jan 48

(CK)

b6

b6

- TIB agent

b6

b6

b6

-doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

8 March 49

b6

- Rusty

D-244780

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HUNGARIA (?) - Operation Rusty informant -

b6 - not Rusty

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6 - TIB

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6 - former TIB member

b6

b6 - Rusty informant, 5 Dec 47 - Rsg III

b6 - suspected Rusty agent

b6

b6 - not Rusty

b6 - not Rusty

b6

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6

b6

203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

IV, 5 Nov 47

26 Dec 47

9 Sep 49

DAD, 10 Aug 49

b6

VIII, 12/7/48

23 Jan 48

26 Dec 47

(CK)

(?)

6 Sep 49

4 June 48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

b6

- activity unknown - MUNICH - Reg V

b6

- active Rusty agent - REGENSBURG - Reg V

b6

b6

b6

- suspected TIB agent

b6

6 Sep 49

b6

Rusty informant

b6

IV, 5 Nov 47

b6

(of Berlin recruiting scientists for Russia)

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 June 47 Reg I, 12 Jan 48

b6

- employed by Rusty from 1 Feb to 1 June 47

b6

- active Rusty agent - PASSAU - Reg V

b6

b6

VI, 18 July 47

b6

- possible Soviet agent - Reg III

b6

b6

b6

- Rusty agent

b6

IV, 8 Oct 48

b6

b6

b6

- Rusty informant Res:

b6

b6

- not Rusty

b6

20 Jan 48

b6

- Rusty -

b6

b6

- not Rusty-

b6

b6

IV

b6

b6

b6

- 7821 CO

b6

I, 21 Oct 48

b6

204

b6

b6

3 May 48

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

b6

III, 7 July 48

b6 - US intell

b6 - Rusty agent

b6

b6 - Moscow committee

b6

b6 - doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6 employed by SED

b6 (?)

b6

b6 - TIB agent

b6 16 Sep 48

b6

b6 - active Rusty informant - III

b6

b6 - b6

b6

V, 18 Nov 47

b6 - dropped Rusty informant, Feb 48

23 Sep 48, 7821 OG

b6

b6 - doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6 - Rusty informant

b6 TIB agent

b6 - prosecutee, border crossing

b6

15 Apr 49, DDID

b6 - active Rusty informant

b6

b6 - activity unknown - FURTH a/Wald - Reg V

b6 - activity unknown - MUNICH - Reg V

b6

- dropped Rusty 29 March 48

b6

22 June 48

205

b6

[REDACTED]

b6 - doubtful Rusty informant - Reg V ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6 - Rusty employee

b6

I, 30 June 48

6 Sep 49

b6 - suspected TIB agent  
- Rusty - 28 Jan 48

b6 - dropped Rusty 1 Apr 48; emigrated to Australia

b6

b6

(CK)

b6 activity unknown - EOF, Reg V

- dropped Rusty 1 Mar 48

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 Mar 48

Rusty informant dropped 30 July 48, III

b6

no record as TIB agent

b6

b6

b6 - TIB agent

b6 - TIB

b6 - dropped Rusty Dec 47

b6

- suspected Rusty agent

Apr 59

b6

19 Aug 48, ID

b6

b6 - TIB agent

b6

b6 - dropped Rusty 12 Jan 48, I

b6

206

b6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
b6

III, 11 June 47

b6

b6

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6

b6

b6

b6 - Rusty informant

b6 - dropped Rusty 1 Apr 48

b6 - doubtful Rusty informant - Reg VI

b6 - Rusty agent WEISSENBERG - low level - 20 Feb 48 Reg VI

b6

b6

Apr 49

b6

TIB agent

TIB agent

b6

- double agent

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 May 48

b6

b6

b6

- active Rusty informant Reg III

b6

b6

b6

- active Rusty agent - PASSAU - Reg V

b6

- TIB agent

207

b6

17 Feb 49

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

suspected Rusty operative  
- suspected Rusty operatives

b6

VI, 19 May 48  
VI, 19 May 48

b6

- doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

Rusty in Belgium

24 Aug 48, 7821 CG  
IV, 20 Nov 47

- dropped Rusty 1 May 48

b6

- dropped Rusty Dec 47 - MUNICH IV

b6

4 June 48

b6

- confirmed TIB agent

b6

- active Rusty agent - Reg III

b6

b6

V, 9 Sep 48

b6

- dropped Rusty 8 July 47 IV, 20 Nov 47, IV

b6

b6

active Rusty informant - Reg VI

- dropped Rusty 1 May 48

b6

b6

- activity unknown - MUNICH \* Reg V

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

(CK)

b6

- prosecutes, border crossing

b6

- TIB

208

15 Dec 48

b6

- TIB agent

I, 29 Oct 48

b6

- Rusty informant - 20 Jan 48

b6

- Czech

b6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

[REDACTED]

b6

b6

dropped Rusty 1 May 1948

Rusty employee

TIB agent

I, 30 June 48

3 Jan 49

(Apr 49)

b6

- Rusty agent

Reg I, 24 June 48

b6

b6

I, 27 July 48

b6

- Rusty agent

b6

V, 23 Aug 48

b6

b6

b6

- Rusty informant - wanted by Yugoslavia

b6

IV, 27 Apr 48

b6

b6

b6

- not Rusty informant

26 Dec 47

b6

- activity unknown - MUNICH - Reg V

b6

b6

b6

b6

- not Rusty informant - 12 Jan 48

b6

b6

b6

b6

- re visits to Yugoslav Consulate

b6

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[REDACTED]

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b6 - Rusty informant

b6

b6 - not Rusty informant - 28 Oct 47

b6

b6

b6

b6

- TIB agent

- Rusty informant

- activity unknown - WEIDEN - Reg V

b6

29 July 47

8 Mar 49

15 Aug 47, VI

b6

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6 16 Sep 49, DAI

b6

b6

b6 - alleged Russian spy

b6

b6 - not Rusty  
not Rusty

b6 26 Dec 47  
28 Dec 47  
15 Aug 49

b6 - former TIB member

b6 - activity unknown - REGENSBURG - Reg V

b6 Rusty informant

b6

VI, 2 Aug 48

b6

28 Apr 48

b6 - Rusty

b6

b6

b6





[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

b6 - Rusty

b6 - TIB agent

b6

b6

I, 30 Jun 48

b6, 29 July 47

b6

b6

b6

b6 - Rusty - b6

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6

9 Sep 49

b6 - doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

III, 28 Dec 48  
VI  
I, 30 Jun 48

b6 - active Rusty informant - Reg III

- Rusty - ENGERWITZDORF, Austria - Reg V

b6

b6

VI, 14 Sep 48 (02)

V, 5 May 47

b6

b6 - Rusty agent

211

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
b6 - TIB agent

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6

b6

b6 - dropped Rusty Dec 47 - MUNICH - IV

b6 - suspected Rusty - Reg I

b6 - Rusty agent

b6

b6

b6

b6 - TIB

b6 - Rusty

b6 - not Rusty

b6 -

b6 - Rusty

b6 - doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6 - MUNICH - Rusty

b6 - Rusty informant

b6 - possible Soviet agent <sup>Res:</sup> ULM former Lt Col, Reg I

b6 - dropped Rusty 1 Apr 48

b6

b6 - dropped Rusty 1 May 48

b6

212

b6

15 Dec 48

9 Sep 49

b6

III, 15/7/48

b6

b6

I, 17/5/48

b6

b6

22 Mar 49, DDID

b6

VIII, 2/7/48

b6

22 Jun 48

b6

b6

I, 16 Jan 48

b6

VIII, 14 July 48

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[REDACTED]

DOZ12274

b6

b6

TIB agent

b6

b6

- Rusty III

- dropped Rusty 1 Mar 48

b6

- TIB agent

21 Jan 49

b6

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty Dec 47 - Res: HDF

b6

- activity unknown - HDF Reg V

b6

- Rusty 29 Jan 48

b6

- inactive Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

b6

Rusty

b6

25 Aug 47

RD-153918

b6

b6

b6

b6

- TIB agent

b6

b6

b6

3 May 48.

b6

3/8/48

b6

213

III, 28 Dec 48

b6

- Rusty agent

I. 30 June 48

[b6] - Rusty informant 17 Dec 47, Reg I - former Hauptmann

[b6]

[b6]

[b6]

Soviet deserter [b6]

[b6]

[b6]

MALTSEV, Michael Mitronovich, Brig Gen

[b6]

[b6]

[b6]

- Rusty liaison man in BAMBERG

[b6]

- TIB agent

- Rusty informant

[b6]

[b6]

- TIB agent

[b6]

- TIB agent

[b6]

- dropped Rusty 1 May 48

[b6]

[b6]

- activity unknown - WEIDEN - Reg V

[b6]

- not Rusty informant - 11 Feb 48

[b6]

[b6]

[b6]

III, 28 Dec 48

[b6]

- not Rusty informant - 30 Jan 48

- dropped Rusty 21 May 48 - emigrated to Argentina [b6]

- Rusty 12 Sep 47

214

[b6]

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

b6 - suspected Rusty operative

b6 - TIB dropped Nov 48

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6

b6 - TIB

b6 - Rusty

b6

b6

b6 - Rusty dropped Autumn 47

b6

b6 - TIB agent

b6

b6 - doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6

b6

b6

b6 - not Rusty informant - 11 Feb 48

b6 - active Rusty informant - Reg VI

b6

b6 - dropped Rusty Nov 47

b6 - not Rusty

b6

[REDACTED]

b6

ID, 19 Aug 48  
15 Dec 48, 169325  
9 Sep 49  
9 Sep 49  
  
15 Aug 49  
III, 30 July 48

b6

b6

8 Mar 49  
7821 CO, 28 Sep 48  
  
17 Feb 49 (Apr 49)

b6

6 Sep 49

b6

b6 16 Sep 47, III

b6

31 Oct 47, III, VI

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b6

b6

- active Rusty agent - WEISCHIED - Reg V

b6

- TIB agent

b6

b6

- falsifies fragebogens for Rusty (GOTTINGEN) 12 Jan 48

b6

- active Rusty informant Reg VI

b6

- suspected FIB agent

b6

9 Sep 49

b6

b6

IV, 27 May

b6

b6

- Rusty informant - 17 Dec 47 (1147)

b6

b6

- doubtful Rusty informant Reg VI

b6

14 May 48

b6

- active Rusty agent -PASSAU, Reg V

b6

- not Rusty

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

- TIB agent

29 July 48

b6

- active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

- Rusty

b6

b6

b6

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by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

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b6

b6 - Rusty

b6 III, 16 Sep 47

b6

- Rusty agent, REGENSBURG, V

b6

b6 I

b6 - Rusty agent

b6

b6

b6

b6 - activity unknown - MUNICH - Reg V

b6 chief at ZETZ

b6 VIII, 2 July 48

b6

b6 III, 7 July 48

- not Rusty 12 Jan 48

TIB agent 9 Nov 48

b6 3 Jan 49

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6 - dropped Rusty 47

b6 - active Rusty agent - RUDERDING, Reg V

b6

b6 8 Mar 49

b6 - active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

b6

b6 24 Aug 48

b6

- Reg IV

- not Rusty

b6

- Born: b6 NR in CR

b6

- activity unknown - BAMBERG - Reg

b6

- Rusty

b6

b6

- suspected Rusty agent - Reg I

217

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b6 Rusty agent

b6 - former Rusty agent, dropped by TIB - Reg V b6

b6

b6

b6 prosecutes, border crossing

b6

b6 - active Rusty agent-Reg VI

b6 - Rusty informant - BAMBERG - known to b1 17 Dec 47

b6 b6

b6 - active Rusty informant - Reg III

b6 - Rusty dropped 11 July 48 b6

b6 b6

b6 - TIB b6 DDID, 18 Apr 49

b6 TIB agent b6

b6

b6 - chief at LEIPZIG

b6

b6 - TIB

b6 - Rusty

b6 - doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6 firm - cover for Rusty

b6 TIB agent 18 Jan 49

b6 - not Rusty 218

b6 TIB member

b6 VIII, 2 July 48

b6 III, 3 June 48

b6 I, 30 Jun 48

b6 ID, 15 Feb 49

b6 V, 19 Nov 47

b6 5 Aug 49



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[redacted] b6

[redacted] b6

[redacted] b6

b6

[redacted] b6 - active Rusty informant - Reg VI

[redacted] b6 - doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

[redacted] b6 - suspected Rusty operator

[redacted] b6 - Rusty

[redacted] b6

[redacted] b6 - activity unknown - SCHWABING - Reg V

[redacted] b6 - dropped Rusty Dec 47 . born [redacted] b6

[redacted] b6 - not Rusty [redacted] b6 26 Dec 47

[redacted] b6 - TIB agent [redacted] b6

[redacted] b6 - active Rusty agent - BIREBACH - Reg V

[redacted] b6 - suspected Rusty operative [redacted] b6 V, 6 Aug 48

[redacted] b6

[redacted] b6

[redacted] b6

[redacted] b6 - NTS courier, born [redacted] b6

b6

dropped Rusty 1 May 48

[redacted] b6

[redacted] b6 - unknown if Rusty informant - 11 Feb 48

b6

b6

b6

219

- possible Sov agent

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 May 48

- active Rusty agent - SCHWANDORF - Reg V

- Rusty agent

b6

V. 30 Mar 48

- activity unknown - NUERNBERG - Reg V

b6

- suspected TIB agent

6 Sep 49

12 Oct 48

ID. 19 Aug 48

- suspected Rusty operative

- Rusty LO in FUERTH

**Rusty agent**

b6

12 Oct 48

b6

4 Jan 50

(CK)

(CK)

b6

220

FEB 04 2003

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b6

TIB agent

- Rusty agent

Rusty operator 12 Sep 47

doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

b6

b6

Rusty informant

b6

b6

- activity unknown - Reg V

- TIB member

b6

- suspected Rusty

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty

b6

- Rusty agent

b6

- TIB agent

b6

b6

- active Rusty informant - Reg VI

b6

dropped Rusty 47

221

b6

activity unknown - WALDMUNCHEN - Reg V

b6

June 47

7, 6 Feb 48

b6

15 June 49

b6

VI, 19 May 48

VI

I, 30 June 48

17 Feb 49

b6

I, 18 Aug 48

b6

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6

b6

I

Rusty agent - VI

- Rusty informant - III

- Rusty informant - MUNICH, 1 Dec 47

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

b6

- Rusty informant dropped Aug 47

b6

b6

V, 19 Nov 47

III, 5 Sep 47

III, 14 July 47

(CK)

b6

- suspected TIB agent

b6

DAD, 16/9/49

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

V, 19 Nov 47

b6

- Rusty

b6

22 Oct 47, III

b6

- TIB informant

- suspected TIB agent

b6

b6

I, 29 Dec 48

6 Sep 49

b6

- Rusty agent 9 Dec 47

b6

b6

- TIB agent

272

III, 27 Jan 48

[REDACTED]

FEB 04 2009

b6

b6

b6

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

- suspected Rusty agent

dropped Rusty Dec 47

b6

b6

- Rusty 10 Sep 48

b6

Rusty informant

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

(6140)

- active Rusty informant - Reg III

- dropped Rusty 18 Feb 48

b6

b6

- active Rusty agent - not Rusty Mar 48 - Reg VI

b6

dropped Rusty Dec 47.

b6

VIII, 2 July 48

b6

b6

b6

- not Rusty - MENICH

223

b6

- not Rusty - 29 July 47

b6

- Rusty

b6

VIII, 24 June 48

[REDACTED]

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b6

b6

b6 - TIB agent

b6 - Rusty

b6

b6

b6 - dropped Rusty 13 Feb 48

b6

b6

b6 - dropped from Operation Rusty Dec 47

b6 Gavorilovich

b6

b6

b6

b6 - head of Rusty cover orgn in North Germany b6

b6

b6

b6

b6 - dropped Rusty Dec 47, b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6 - active Rusty agent - NEUALBENREUTH - Reg V

b6

b6

224  
[REDACTED]

b6

24 Nov 47, IV

VIII, 28 Jun 48

DDID, 18 Apr 49



[REDACTED]

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b6

b6

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty 1 May 48  
parttime Rusty

b6

suspected Rusty agent

b6

- activity unknown - GEISENHAUSEN

b6

- TIB agent

ROPP, Baron George von der - born: 15 Jan 93

b6

b6

20 Nov 47, IV

VIII, 12 July 48

D-152677, IV

b6

b6

b6

- Rusty agents 24 Feb 48

b6

- Rusty

b6

22 Oct 47 b1

b6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

b6

4 June 48

b6 - active Rusty informant - Reg III

b6 - suspected TIB agent

b6

not Rusty

b6

b6 - not Rusty

b6

b6

not Rusty

- not Rusty

b6 - active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

b6 - Rusty July 48

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6 - not Rusty agent

b6

b6

b6 29 Apr 48

226

b6 VIII, 2 July 48

b6 - former Rusty June 48

b6

b6 - TIB

b6

b6

[REDACTED]

b6



b6

b6

b6

b6 informant

b6 - Rusty 12 Sep 47

b6 - Rusty agent

b6

b6

b6 - possible Sov agent

b6 - not Rusty agent

b6

b6 - Rusty informant - b6

b6 15 Oct 47, VIII

b6

- not Rusty

b6

12 Jan 48

22 Mar 49 (Apr 49)

b6

active Rusty agent - PASSAU - Reg V

- Rusty

b6 - not Rusty

b6 - suspected Rusty agent

b6 - dropped Rusty 1 Mar 48

b6

b6

b6 - Rusty

b6

11 Dec 47, III

b6 - dropped Rusty 15 Feb 48 b6

b6 - TIB agent

b6 Count b6

227

b6

b6



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

b6 - activity unknown - Reg V

b6

- dropped Rusty Feb 48  
- not Rusty

b6

b6

- doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI  
- dropped Rusty May 48

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty informant  
- dropped Rusty Jan 48, ras: BOP

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

- probable MGB agent in DESSAU

b6

b6

re Anti-Sov Mov

b6

b6

- Rusty informant - 11 Feb 48

b6

dropped Rusty Dec 47

b6

- active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

9 Jan 48, 211020

b6

b6

b6

30 Jan 48

b6

10 Dec 47, VIII

b6

CK

228

b6



b6 - dropped Rusty Dec 47

b6 - activity unknown - NUERNBERG - Reg V

b6 - activity unknown - GROSCHLATTENGRU - Reg V

b6 - dropped Rusty

b6 - dropped Rusty Apr 48

b6

- dropped Rusty Dec 47, res; SEGEBERG - Reg IV, MUNICH

- TIB agent

b6

- TIB agent

b6

- Rusty dropped 3 Sep 48

b6

- dropped Rusty informant

b6

Reg I - suspected Rusty agent

- TIB agent

b6

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

- activity unknown - HOF - Reg V

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

- dropped Rusty Jan 48, res; STOCKHOLM

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty agent 26 June 48

b6

b6

Dec 47, ECIC

28 Sep 48

b6

30 Jan 48, ECIC

IE, 27 Apr 48

b6

26 Dec 47

10 Dec 47

b6

III, 28 Dec 48

28 Sep 48, 7821 C

III, 5 Jan 47

[redacted] - Rusty

[redacted] IV

[redacted] - doubtful Rusty agent - Reg VI

[redacted] - possible Rusty agent

b6

III, 28 Dec 48

[redacted]

[redacted] Rusty dropped Apr 48 [redacted] 28 Sep 48, 7821 00

[redacted] active Rusty agent - Reg VI

[redacted]

b6

15 Dec 47

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] TIB

b6

15 June 49

[redacted] - Rusty

15 Aug 47

[redacted] - TIB

[redacted] - active Rusty agent - Reg VI

[redacted] - Rusty

b6

12 Jan 48

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] - TIB

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] suspected Rusty operative

b6

- suspected Rusty operative

Rusty 18 Sep 48

230

VI, 19 May 48

VI, 19 May 48

211176

[redacted]

[redacted] - Rusty

[redacted]

I, 30 June 48

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

- active Rusty agent - Reg V4

b6

b6

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ b6

b6

b6

TIB agent

ID, 21 Jan 49

TIB agent

ID, 21 Jan 49

b6

b6

Rusty agent

I, 30 June 48

b6

- suspected Rusty operator

ID, 19 Aug 48

- suspected Rusty operative

IB, 19 Aug 48

b6 - negative TIB agent

b6 - Rusty agent dropped 1 Oct 48

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6 - Rusty informant

b6

[REDACTED]

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b6 - not Rusty

b6

b6 - Rusty informant

b6 - poss Spv agent

b6

b6

active Rusty agent - Reg VI

- inactive Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

b6 I. 30 April 48

b6

b6

b6 - active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

b6 (CK)

b6

- Rusty operative in SALZBURG

b6

b6

- active Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

Operation Rusty informant

b6

25 Nov 47

b6

b6

b6

- Capt. Sov deserter

b6

b6

- Rusty agent

b6

V. 30 Mar 48

b6

b6

- activity unknown - REGENSBURG, V

Rusty informant

b6

b6

active Rusty agent - FURSTENZELL, V

232

b6

b6 - dropped TIB 19 May 1943

b6 - Rusty - 3 Oct 47

b6 - active Rusty informant - Reg VI

b6

b6 - Rusty informant

b6

b6

- dropped Rusty

- Rusty informant

- Rusty dropped 6 June 43

b6 - Rusty dropped Jan 43

b6

b6

- Rusty dropped Dec 47

- Rusty dropped 1 May 43

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

233

b6

23 July 47

VI, 13 Nov 47

I, 30 Apr 43

VI, 1 Jun 43

b6 - Rusty dropped 1 Apr 48

b6

b6

b6 - TIB agent

STELLWAG, Ernst - born: 29 Apr 03

b6

b6

b6

suspected TIB agent

b6

b6 - Rusty dropped Jan 48

b6 - TIB agent

b6

b6

b6 - Rusty informant

b6

b6 - Rusty

b6

b6 - Rusty dropped Nov 47

b6 - poss Sov agent

b6

b6

b6

b6

activity unknown -

b6

b6

8 Mar 49

VI, 1 Jun 48

ID, 16 Dec 48

D-53499

b6

b6

DAD, 16 Sep 49

b6

I, 16 Jun 48

b6

13 Feb 49

VI, 5 Nov 47; 200526

22 Oct 47

VIII, 2 July 48

3 May 48

234

b6

19 Nov 47



[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

b6

- Rusty informant

- TIB agent

Rusty informant

b6

b6

- not Rusty

b6

- Rusty

b6

- Rusty

b6

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

- Rusty dropped 20 Apr 48

b6

- TIB agent

b6

TIB agent

b6

- Ex-Rusty informant

b6

b6

- activity unknown - Reg V

b6

235

[REDACTED]

b6

VI, 24 Nov 47

3 Jan 49

V, 18 Nov 47

12 Jan 48

VI, 13 Aug 48

b6

23 Nov 48

III, 7 July 48

8 Mar 49

15 Jan 48, IV

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

b6

b6 - Rusty dropped 15 Nov 47

b6 - TIB agent  
- Rusty dropped Aug 47

b6

b6

b6 - Rusty dropped Jan 48

b6 - Rusty informant

b6

b6

b6 - TIB agent

b6 Rusty informant

b6

b6 - suspected Rusty - Reg I

236

b6

b6

[REDACTED]

b6

15 Dec 47

5 Aug 47

IV, 29 Jun 48

6 Feb 48; 182932

6 Oct 47

3 Oct 47

b6

b6

III, 28 Dec 48

b6

b6

b6

4 Sep 46

b6

- Rusty dropped 15 Dec 47

b6

IV, 20/11/47

b6

- activity unknown - PFUHL, Rag V

b6

b6

26 Dec 47

b6

- Rusty agent

ex-Rusty informant

b6

12 Oct 48  
RD-169325

IV, 8 July 47

b6

- active Rusty agent - REGENSEORG, V

b6

- TIB

b6

III, 29 Dec 48

- doubtful Rusty agent, Reg VI

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

VI, 9 Dec 47

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

- suspected TIB agent

b6

9 Sep 49

VASSILIEV, Lev Mstislavovich - born: 7 Jan 03

D-238470

b6

- suspected Rusty - I

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

237

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b6

b6

III, 7 July 48

- Rusty dropped Dec 47 - MUNICH, Reg IV b6 Dec 47

b6

b6

- TIB agent

b6

b6

- Rusty informant

13 Nov 47, IV

b6

b6

- Rusty dropped Dec 47 - MUNICH, Reg IV b6 Dec 47

b6

- TIB agent

b6

28 Apr 48

12 Jan 49

b6

b6

- TIB agent

11 Aug 48

b6

- Rusty dropped 28 Junw 48

b6

28 Sep 48

VIII, 14 Jnl 48

b6

- TIB agent

- Rusty agent

X, 26 Aug 49

V, 30 Mar 48

b6

b6

238

  
active Rusty agent - REGENSBURG - Reg V

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

WEISS, Karl - born : 2 March 1897

b6

b6

- TIB agent

b6

- Rusty dropped 15 Nov 47

b6

15 Dec 47

b6

suspected Rusty agent; TIB agent

b6

10 Feb 49

b6

III, 28 Dec 48

b6

b6

- Rusty dropped Jan 48

12 Jan 48, IV  
235586

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

- Rusty dropped 1 Mar 48

b6

b6

239

b6



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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1

b6

b6

b6

- Rusty dropped

b6

b6

b6

b6

- not Rusty - MUNICH

b6

- Rusty 1948

b6

- Rusty dropped 1 March 48

b6

- TIB agent

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

b6

Rusty dropped

b6

b6

activity unknown - WALDMUEHLE, Reg V

b6

- TIB agent

b6

21 Jan 49

b6

former TIB member

240

,DAD, 10 Aug 49

b6

VIII, 24 June 48

18 Jan 50

I, 10 Dec 48

b6

15 Dec 47

III, 7 July 48

30 Jan 48, 184468

[REDACTED]

b6

TIB agent

b6

b6

5 Jan 48, I

-Rusty dropped 1 July 48

- not Rusty informant

b6

28 Sep 48

26 Dec 47

(May 49)

b6

TIB agent

b6

b6

b6

- TIB dropped

b6

- activity unknown - Reg V

b6

b6

VI, 19 May 48

15 June 49

b6

b6

- Rusty informant

b6

b6

- Rusty dropped May 48

b6

b6

26 Dec 47 ;204733

b6

- activity unknown - PASSAU - Reg V

poss Rusty agent

b6

b6

b6

- Rusty agent - Reg VI

b6

241

[REDACTED]

b6

FEB 04 2008

[REDACTED]

b6

- former Rusty

b6

VI, 13 Aug 48

b6

- Rusty dropped Jan 48 - Res: WEISSENSTADT b6 12 Nov 47

b6

15 Dec 47

247743

b6

b6

[REDACTED]



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MAINE FIELD OFFICE  
REGION XII 66TH COUSPER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
APO 227 US ARMY

28 June 1954

R/P 63

SUBJECT: [b6]

TO: Commanding Officer  
Hq, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

4  
320529  
b6

file in  
D-320529

1. Reference is made to R/P 19, 12 May 54 and R/P 36, 28 May 54.  
Subject: [b6]

2. [b6], born [b6], resides at [b6].  
[b6] He is unmarried and his parents are deceased. He has a brother, name unknown, who lives in BRAZIL, and a sister, name unknown, who is employed as a nurse's assistant at the American military hospital at HEIDELBERG. She is dissatisfied with her position at HEIDELBERG and wishes to secure a similar position at WIESBADEN or MAIN. [b6] and his sister have strong ties, and [b6] customarily visits her in HEIDELBERG at least once each week.

3. Prior to World War II, [b6] was employed as an engineer by the Junker aircraft company, and when called into military service, entered the Luftwaffe as an ordnance technician. He served at air force bases in Germany, Norway and Austria. During the last months of the war, he was a member of an air field security company near VIENNA. From 1946 to 1948, [b6] lived at HEIDELBERG. In 1948, he was recruited into the GEHLEN organization, and worked as an agent of GEHLEN in MUNICH and Rheinland-Pfalz until he resigned to enter the [b1] [b6] in 1953. [b6] entered the NSDAP in 1928 and remained a member until the party was dissolved in 1945. He did not attain any position of prominence or leadership in the NSDAP. He still adheres to the principals of National Socialism and claims that all excesses, atrocities and failures of the Nazi regime were the result of personal failures and not any lack or error in National Socialist principles. His most prized possession was a set of scrapbooks containing almost all of HITLER'S speeches, but this "historically valuable collection" was confiscated and destroyed by Allied soldiers. His current hobbies are German history - with emphasis on the pseudo-historic deeds of Siegfried, the early German emperors and the Teutonic Knights, and "nature walks". He is very proud of the fact that he can identify all "native German" songbirds by either song or appearance.

4. [b6] claims that he does not permit his personal beliefs and attitudes to affect his work as [b1]. He claims that he conforms to both the letter and the spirit of the policies and regulations of his superiors and the Land Government, even though his

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

R/P 63, Subject: [b6] 28 June 1954.

personal opinions are at complete variance with some of these policies and regulations. He attempts to conduct all the the [b1] work personally, and utilizes his assistant primarily as a file clerk. Due to his reluctance to make use of the [b1] personnel assigned to [b1] he is able to pursue only the most promising leads and must "file and forget" less promising ones. [b6] is in complete agreement with the policy that [b1] interests are dominant over [b1] interests, and submits all matters of [b1] decision.

Distribution:

Hq, 66th CIO - 3  
Control - 1  
File - 1 -  
Reg XII - 1  
Maine FO - 1

[b6]  
LO, Rheinland-Pfalz

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~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

b6

320529/3

III-34419

24 June 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. REFERENCE: Letter, Headquarters 66th CIC Group,  
Subject: [b6] File No. [b6], dated  
1 June 1954.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and  
file as above, dated 24 June 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A" is X-895-Hq.
- b. Evaluation of Source: Source is temporarily  
evaluated F.
- c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.
- d. How Information was Obtained: The informa-  
tion was obtained from [b1] a former or cur-  
rent member of the Gehlen Organization.
- e. Date on Which Information was Obtained: The  
information was obtained on 19 March 1954.
- f. Date on Which Information was Reported to  
Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent,  
[b6] on 5 June 1954.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information:  
See paragraph 1 above.
- h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

- a. The [b6] referred to is probably [b1]  
[b6]

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(Continued)

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III-34419  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

24 June 1954

b. It is believed that the information contained in the attached Summary of Information will help to corroborate the information contained in the Summary of Information, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, Subject as above, file No. IV-33854, dated 13 May 1954, which was attached to the above mentioned correspondence.

c. This report was prepared by S/A b6

b6

b6

Lt Col OrdC  
Commanding

Incls: a/s  
JTE/mz/49-833

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on

FEB 04 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOL/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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24 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

Gehlen Organization

III-34419

1. Retired [b6] residing in [b6], telephone 2423, is now a co-worker of [b6], who did and possibly still does head the LUEBECK (UTM) 32UPE1171 office of the Gehlen Organization. [b6] is a member of the Military Committee of the Christliche Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union - CDU), whose chairman is retired Major General Von SCHELLWITZ, residing in HAMBURG (UTM) 32UNE6535. [b6] was formerly, probably before [b6], head of the Abwehr Office of General Area Headquarters I in KOENIGSBERG (UTM) 32UUU2882. [b6] also is said to be well acquainted with [b6]. According to his own words, [b6] has extensive material relating to "Radio Free Europe" which he is prepared to make accessible to interested Western officers.

2. [b6] is another person who recently became a co-worker of [b6] of [b6]. [b6] was also formerly assigned to the Abwehr Office with General Headquarters I in KOENIGSBERG. [b6] speaks several languages and is said to have considerable Eastern experience.

3. Both [b6] and [b6] are in opposition to Dr. Otto JOHN\*, although the reason is unknown.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

4. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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4 - Hqg, 66th CIC Grp 1 - Reg III File  
1 - CIC Central File

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

b6

320524/3

24 June 1954

III-35714

SUBJECT: FELFE, Heinz

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USARIUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Summary of Information, Region III, 66th CIC Group, Subject and file as above, dated 10 June 1954.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 24 June 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq.

b. Evaluation of Source: Temporarily evaluated F.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.

d. How Information was Obtained: The information was obtained through conversations with b6 of the Gehlen Organization.

e. Date on Which Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 12 April 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to handling Agent, b6, on 15 April 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

h. Status of Case: Pending.

4. REMARKS:

a. b6 has been released by GEHLEN because of the volume of unavory information regarding his past,

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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~~SECRET~~

(Continued)

29039

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~~SECRET~~

III-35714

24 June 1954

SUBJECT: FELFE, Heinz

but the remainder of the clique is still in his employ although the investigation points toward their being responsible for the leak to the East.

b. Results of the investigation by [b6] will be forwarded as they are obtained.

c. This report was prepared by [b6]

[b6]

[b6]

Commanding

Incls: a/s  
JTD/mz/49-833

28 JUN. 1954

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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-24 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FELFE, Heinz

III-35714

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

5. The personalities marked by an asterisk (\*) have been reported previously by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

23 June 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 23 June 1954.
2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:
  - a. Source: Source "A" is X-933-Hq.
  - b. Evaluation of Source: Temporarily evaluated F.
  - c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.
  - d. How Information was Obtained: Source "A" obtained the newspaper article from which the information was derived from b6
  - e. Date on Which Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 3 March 1954.
  - f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6 on 11 March 1954.
  - g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: The compromise of a large Gehlen Organization net operating out of BERLIN is known.
  - h. Status of Case: Pending.
3. REMARKS:
  - a. The information contained in this report was derived from the press. Noteworthy is the substantiation of names and addresses previously reported by this Region.

(Continued)

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29036

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III-34419

23 June 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

b. The identification of Subsource [b6] is a matter of record at Headquarters, 66th CIC Group.

c. This report was prepared by [b6]

[b6]

b6

Commanding

28 JUN. 1954

Incls: a/s  
JTD/mz/49-833

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
23 June 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
- TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The Saturday and Sunday (19 and 20 December 1953) edition of the "Freies Volk" (KPD PV Central Organ) printed in DUESSELDORF (UTM) 32ULB4576, utilized all of page eight.. (8) for a reprint of an article that originally appeared in an East Zone publication concerning the Gehlen Organization, which resulted from the compromise of a large Gehlen net operating into the Soviet Zone from BERLIN (UTM) 33UUU9220.

2. The article begins with a brief note concerning the American backing of General Reinhard GEHLEN\*, the organization and staff; the type of cover used by the various offices in Western Germany and the utilization of primarily former members of the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service - SD), Schutzstaffel (Elite Guard - SS), Gestapo and Abwehr as Agents. The article also reveals the struggle between GEHLEN and [b6], former intelligence chief with the [b1] for supremacy as the Federal Republic Intelligence Organization. After having covered the above mentioned topics, the article continues with a breakdown of Gehlen offices, legends and personnel including aliases and personal data. The information regarding these personalities as published by the "Freies Volk" is as follows:

a. Headquarters:

(1) General GEHLEN alias "Dr. SCHNEIDER" with the code number 30.

(2) [b6] alias [b6] with the code number 30.

(3) [b6] alias [b6] with the code number 35.

(4) [b6] with the alias [b6] with the code number 31.

(5) [b6] with the alias [b6] with the code number 40.

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G. E. ROYCE-WENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 16-52350-1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
23 June 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION:	
COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

b. Offices:

(1) STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203. The office is located at Verastrasse 68 and camouflaged as the "Schwaebische Industriebertretung". There are four (4) agents employed at this office. The head of the office is b6 alias b6.

(2) MUNICH (UTM) 32UPU9134. The head of this office is b6 alias b6 former Colonel in the Wehrmacht, residing in b6. His assistant is b6 alias b6, a former Colonel in the Abwehr. The alphabetical designation of the MUNICH office is "G".

(3) BREMEN (UTM) 32UND8780. The head of this office is b6 whose assistant is b6 alias b6 former Colonel in the Wehrmacht residing in b6. The BREMEN office has the alphabetical designation "B".

(4) KARLSRUHE (UTM) 32UMU2528. The head of this office is b6 former Sergeant Major, residing in b6. The assistant is b6 alias b6, former noncommissioned officer.

(5) DARMSTADT (UTM) 32UMA7525. The head of this office is former fascist General Erich BRANDENBURGER alias "KORNIG". His assistant is Regierungs-Kriminalrat Dr. (Fn) b6 alias b6. This document has been

(6) The office in MUNICH-Socking (UTM) 32UPU9134, is headed by alias b6 and his assistant known under the alias of b6.

c. Schools:

(1) One (1) Gehlen School is located in WEIDENKAMP (UTM)(nca) approximately twenty (20) kilometers

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
23 June 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

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USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

from STARNBERG. The school is situated in an old castle which belongs to Countess [b6] but was confiscated by the Americans. The head of the school is alias "KERNER" a former General.

(2) Another school is located in WEINHEIM (UTM) 32UMU7688, near HEIDELBERG (UTM) 32UNV7873, and der Bergstr.

d. Personalities:

(1) [b6] born in 1915 in [b6]  
[b6] residing in [b6]  
[b6] is a former Captain and heads his office under the cover of the Export Company "Steg".

(2) (Fnu) SOMMAN\*, alias "LANGE", former Standartenbuehrer in the SS, residing possibly in HAMBURG, telephone [b6] He is presently in charge of the BREMEN "B" office.

(3) [b6] alias [b6], residing in [b6] telephone: [b6] [b6] operates as a trade representative.

(4) [b6], alias [b6], who has been residing in [b6]

(5) [b6] alias [b6], born [b6] (nca) whose return address is [b6]

(6) Max STAUDINGER, alias "PREUSSER MAX", fifty (50) years of age, former Kriminalrat in the Gestapo, residing in MUNICH-Passing, Lichtingerstrasse 24, telephone: 8 09 36. STAUDINGER heads an affiliate office of the Gehlen Organization.

(7) [b6] residing in [b6] [b6] telephone: 4 83. [b6] is a former Kriminalrat in the SS.

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
23 June 1954

## PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

## SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	- TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

(8) [b6] alias [b6], residing in  
[b6] telephone:

[b6] occupies himself with KPD matters.

(9) [b6] alias [b6] and  
[b6] a former Colonel, who until 1953 was in charge of  
twenty-one (21) Bezirkvertretungen (District Agencies) in  
STUTTGART.(10) [b6] alias [b6] and  
[b6] born in 1918, residing in STUTTGART and formerly a  
resident of BERLIN-Zehlendorf, Steubenrauchstrasse. [b6]  
travels often to BERLIN in connection with espionage work.(11) Karl Edmund GARTENFELD, alias "SCHAEFER",  
"HANS", "KOKS", "BAUMANN" and "ECKBARD", born 1899 in AACHEM  
(UTM)(nca) and residing in BERLIN-Dahlem, Spielstrasse 6.  
GARTENFELD was formerly connected with the Air Ministry with  
the rank of Major. He also operates his cover organization  
as the O.E.GARTENFELD Automobile repair shop in BERLIN-  
Wilmersdorf, Bendlerstrasse 14.(12) [b6] alias [b6], born in  
Baden, has to do with the schooling of radio operators for  
the Gehlen Organization. [b6] is known as a drinker and  
immoral type.(13) [b6] occupies himself as an in-  
structor for radio operators. He has a residence in [b6]  
[b6] as a  
tenant with the family [b6] where he receives informants.(14) [b6] the wife of [b6]  
[b6] born in 1916, and equally as active as her husband  
in the Gehlen Organization.(15) [b6] residing in [b6]  
[b6] His family lives in PILSING (UTM)(nca) in  
Southern Bavaria. [b6] was formerly a Sturmbahnfuhrer in  
the SS.

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# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

23 June 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
- TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

(16) [b6], alias [b6], heads one (1) of the smaller offices in West BERLIN. His office is in BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Grolmannstrasse 53. The office is camouflaged as an Export-Import firm. [b6] resides in [b6]

(17) [b6] born in [b6] [b6] a former non-commissioned officer, residing in [b6] Telephone: [b6] [b6] works on Gehlen matters pertaining to Poland.

(18) [b6] born 1919. Formerly a resident of CHEMNITZ (UTM)(nca) and currently residing in BERLIN-Zehlendorf.

(19) [b6] born 1924. A former member of the Abwehr. [b6] is a member of the Gehlen Organization and at the same time an Agent for French and American Intelligence Offices. [b6] has the aliases [b6], [b6], [b6] and [b6]. He resides in [b6]

(20) [b6] born 1917, former officer, residing in [b6]

(21) [b6] thirty-five (35) years of age, residing in [b6]

e. Mercenary Agents: Another category of Agents are employed by the Gehlen Organization who are only interested in money and stand prepared to work for either side and engage in traitorous acts whether it is national interest or for friends or relatives. Among those who belong to this category are:

(1) [b6] Weberresident (recruiting resident) of the Gehlen Organization, a former Captain, who operates a construction firm in FRANKFURT/M.

(2) [b6], chief Resident Agent

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE														
Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army		23 June 1954														
PREPARING OFFICE																
SUBJECT	<p>Gehlen Organization</p> <p>CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>OF SOURCE:</td> <td>OF INFORMATION:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE . . . . . E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6</td> </tr> </table>		OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4	UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6
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COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1															
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UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5															
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6															
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		III-34419														
<p>(Hauptresident), residing in [b6] [b6] a former Engineer with the Siemens works.</p> <p>(3) [b6], alias [b6], born 1915. Chief Resident Agent, former officer, residing in [b6]</p> <p>(4) [b6] Prostitute, born 1912, a recruiter for the Gehlen Organization, once resided at [b6]</p> <p>(5) [b6] forty (40) years of age, born in TILSIT (UTM)(nca), former Major of Artillery, residing in West BERLIN.</p> <p>(6) Franz MEURER, born 1882 in the Blackforest, Baden, an architect and spy by profession, residing in BERLIN-Lichterfelde-West, Albrichtstrasse 9a.</p> <p>(7) [b6] born 1922, Chief Resident Agent, residing in [b6]</p> <p>(8) [b6] thirty (30) years of age, a member of the Sport Club "Brandenburg" and a courier for the Gehlen Organization, residing in West BERLIN.</p> <p>(9) Friedrich ILSE, born 1895 in EDGERSLEBEN (UTM)(nca), Resident Agent of the Gehlen Organization, residing in BERLIN-Britz, Franz-Kernerstrasse 83a.</p> <p>(10) [b6] important Agent, (Wertwoller), residing in [b6] [b6] works in the administrative department of the Criminal Police in NUERNBERG where he works on police and government officials.</p> <p>(11) [b6] born 1916, residing in [b6] [b6] She is an Agent for the Gehlen Organization and the French Secret Service.</p>																
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
23 June 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
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OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
—TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

(12) [b6] born in 1913 in [b6] (UTM) (nca), former member of the SD and currently an Agent of the Gehlen Organization. He works for the firm "Fischbach" in MUNICH and resides near MUNICH in the town of [b6]  
[b6]

(13) [b6] residing in [b6]  
[b6] His Spirit business is used as a cover for correspondence of the Gehlen Organization and his home is placed at the disposal of official Gehlen agents for their operations.

(14) [b6] residing in [b6]  
[b6] His home is used for the forwarding of Gehlen espionage material.

(15) [b6] residing in [b6]  
[b6] Her residence is used by the Gehlen Organization for the forwarding of material.

(16) [b6] residing in [b6]  
[b6] His residence is placed at the disposal of the Gehlen Organization.

SOURCE: "A"

P-3

3. The personalities marked with asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

EXHIBIT - I - Photostat of newspaper article

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

b6

320529/3

23 June 1954

III-35714

SUBJECT: FELFE, Heinz

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Summary of Information, Region III,  
Subject and file as above, dated 10 June 1953.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject  
and file as above, dated 23 June 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources:

- (1) Source "A" is b1 through X-899-Hq.
- (2) " " "B" is b1 " "
- (3) " " "O" is b1 " "
- (4) " " "D" is X-899-Hq.

b. Evaluation of Sources: All sources are  
evaluated F.

c. Relationship of Sources to Target: None.

d. How Information was Obtained: Source "A"  
obtained the information through his Gehlen organization  
activities; Source "B" through a visit to PARIS; Source "O"  
through his connections and personal knowledge of war time  
activities in TRIER where he was a police official; Source  
"D" from personal knowledge of Abwehr, Gestapo, Sipo and  
RSHA activities, and confirmation through contacts.

e. Date on Which Information was Obtained:  
Source "A" obtained the information on 17 February and  
15 March 1954; Source "B" on 26 February 1954; Source "O"  
on 26 February 1954; Source "D" during February and March  
1954.

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9646

25 June 1954

III-5774

WAS: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

f. Date on which information was reported to  
Source: Information was reported to the handler  
Agent, [redacted] b6 on 15 and 30 March 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information:  
None.

h. Status of Case: Pending.

4. SUMMARY:

a. [redacted] b1 is identified as the person who  
furnished 1-899-Hq. his legend.

b. The information contained in part 9  
of the collected Summary of information is based on  
analysis of 1-899-Hq.

c. Further information concerning [redacted]  
will be reported as it is received.

d. [redacted] b6

[redacted] b6

b6

Continued

1-899-Hq. 1-3

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23 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FELFE, Heinz

III-35714

1. The previously mentioned [b6], who comes from Schleswig-Holstein, was in Wuertemberg (Oberschwaben) in 1949 and 1950. It was there that [b6] made the acquaintance of a former Abwehr officer who was engaged in activities in behalf of the Gehlen organization, and whose trust [b6] took it upon himself to win. He accomplished his mission and, as a former RSHA-IV man (Reichs Main Security Office-Department IV), became a member of the Gehlen organization and was assigned his own office in [b6] (UTM) 32UNF7321. There was, at that particular time, a situation whereby people with certain taints could be slipped into the organization. Through [b6], SUBJECT was brought into the organization, but assigned to KARLSRUHE (UTM) 32UNU2528, without giving up connections with KIEL. During the following period, a small group of former Sicherheits Dienst (Security Office - SD) people from Schleswig-Holstein, although outside of KARLSRUHE, were able to maintain contact with the situation there. [b6] brought in (Fnn) [b6] also a former SD member, who came from HAMBURG (UTM) 32UNB6553. At this same time, [b6] was living quietly in the area around KIEL. He had contact with the group including [b6] and SUBJECT, and came into the organization. [b6] introduced his friend Karl SCHUETZ\* to the organization, who later brought in [b6]. In 1952, SUBJECT obtained a place for [b6] in the DUESSELDORF (UTM) 32ULB4576 office. Whether or not [b6] and [b6] appeared there together with [b6] is not yet known. It is known only that [b6] had difficulties with the

[b1] in DUESSELDORF, an office headed by [b6] and with the press. Because of that, the office there was dissolved and [b6] was sent to STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203 where he functions as chief at the present time. Also with him there at the present time are [b6] and [b6] and [b6] remain in the North, connected to the BREMEN (UTM) 32URD8780 office. Also connected to this office are [b6] formerly an employee of [b6] of the Betriebschutz in ESSEN (UTM) 32ULC6101, [b6] [b6], and [b6] a group against the SD clique.

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23 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FEIFE, Heinz

III-35714

The LUEBECK (UTM) (nca) office, handled by [b6] is also attached to BREMEN. [b6] who worked primarily headquarters matters, has been released because of falsifying information regarding his driver's license. [b6] who was primarily an investigator, is currently suspected of having had contact with opposition intelligence offices and of having placed a price on official secrets. [b6] was repeatedly proven to have made indiscretions which according to the facts of the case constitute negligent acts of treasonism. He is under investigation.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

2. Information contained in SUBJECT's personal history statement in the Gehlen headquarters is as follows:

- a. 1941: School examinations.
- b. 1941-1942: Acceptance of a leading position with the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police - Sipo).
- c. 1942: Began a career as a criminal commissioner.
- d. 5 March 1943: Passed criminal commissioner examination with mark of "good".
- e. August 1943-May 1945: RSMA-VI in Switzerland as a teacher.
- f. 1945: Serving in Holland with rank of SS Obersturmfuehrer.
- g. 1 December 1946: Released from a British POW camp.
- h. Summer 1947-Spring 1950: Engaged with the (British) Intelligence Section in BONN (UTM) 32ULB7623 working on KPD and affiliated matters.

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Region III, 66th CIO Group, AIO 757, US Army

FELFE, Heinz

III-35714

1. February 1950-1 October 1951: Engaged with the Kaiser Ministry as an interrogator in a refugee camp, particularly gathering material on the Volkspolizei (Soviet Zone People's Police - Vopo), Soviet army order of battle and Soviet Zone State Security Office (SSO) agents.

SOURCE: "A"

F-2

3. SUBJECT continues to have contact with a certain [b6] in the Kaiser Ministry, who works for a Dr. [b6] a reporter on political affairs. Only recently [b6] was particularly interested with the Saar question. Into the sphere of activity of the Kaiser Ministry, [b6] has placed [b6]. According to what is heard from the Ministry, [b6] has placed two (2) Volkbund fuer Frieden and Freiheit (People's League for Peace and Freedom - VFF) people in SAAR-BRUECKEN (UT) 32ULV5356, who have contact with [b6] through [b6] and [b6] had repeatedly dealt with both VFF people in TRIER (UT) 32ULA3014, who are financed by an [b6] of PARIS, who plays some role in the organization known as "Peace and Liberty".

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

4. During his stay in PARIS in preparation for a meeting of the "Committee International", a German member of the committee was approached by the two (2) SAAR-BRUECKEN VFF people through [b6]. They stated that they were hopeful of obtaining certain information from him. Angry with [b6] and distrustful of [b6] the individual, unfortunately, did not allow the two (2) persons to further explain their mission, but dismissed them forthwith.

SOURCE: "B"

F-3

5. There is a possibility of a connection between SCHUETZ and [b6] and [b6] offices in TRIER. In the Spring or Summer of 1952 it was learned from TRIER that [b6] was released from French arrest and through a French office offered a position with the Saar police.

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23 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FEIPE, Heinz

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The same people suspected that [b6] had been forced into some kind of service for the French. This assumption is based on the fact, that, prior to his move to DUESSELDORF from his original place of residence in STUTTGART, he frequently made hurried trips to COLOGNE (UTM) 32ULB5745 as if to evade the French.

SOURCE: "C"

F-3

6. In the MUNICH (UTM) 32ULU9134 headquarters of the Gehlen organization is one Dr. Emil AUGSBURG, born 1 May 1904 in LODZ, Poland, a philologist and student of folklore and former member of the SD, who is an expert on questions pertaining to the East. Available personal data are as follows:

a. Prior to 1924: Attended the German Senior High School in LODZ and later studied Germanic and Slavic languages in LEIPZIG (UTM) (ncs).

b. After 1926: Connected with the firm "Aduedo", a translation and interpretation office; later a full time interpreter of Polish and Russian languages in county and district courts in LEIPZIG and still later a lecturer for the [b6] publishing company.

c. From 1936 until 1938: Connected with the Eastern research department of the Wannsee Institute, BERLIN (UTM) 33UUU9220, as department head and later head of the department of Culture and Nationalities; still later, during the same period, deputy to the head of the Institute, originally an independent institution, but later taken over by the RSHA and after 1943 incorporated into the "Federal Institute for Geography".

d. In 1938: taken into the SS and promoted in 1944 to the rank of Sturmbahnfuhrer. A graduate of a University for Political and Foreign Studies.

e. In the war against Poland in 1939, returned to the Wannsee Institute for special tasks.

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f. At the beginning of the Russian campaign in 1941, sent to the advance headquarters (Vorkommando Moekau). Wounded on 16 September 1941. In April 1942 released from the hospital.

g. In the Summer and Fall of 1942, sent on an exploratory mission to Southern Russia and the Caucasus front.

h. In the Fall of 1942, again returned to the Wannsee Institute.

i. Subsequent to the end of the war, continued Eastern research. Since 1946, a member of "Gruppe Condor" as evaluator. In 1937 married. Four (4) children.

7. It is asserted that [b6] received a loan from the Jesuits in ROME. [b6] was for a period of time a member of Polish General Anders's staff in Northern Italy.

SOURCE: "A"

P-3

8. Concerning the past activity of [b6] the following is that regarding his person as he provided it.

a. 1928: Abitur (secondary school examinations).

b. 1928-1932: Studies at the Rechts and Staatswissenschaften University of KIEL and TUEBINGEN (UT) 32UNV01474.

c. Fall, 1932: Bar examination and court work while preparing for the bar examination. Called in to the high Justice Educational office. Bar studies interrupted by a lingering illness and leaves of absence to other activities.

d. 2 April 1937: Graduated as a Court Assessor and sent to the Oberlandesgericht in STUTTGART.

e. March 1938: Called into the interior services of Land Wuerttemberg, Assessor with the chief administrator in LEONBERG (UT) 32UNV0106, near STUTTGART.

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f. August 1938: Taken into the direct Reich Service as liaison junior barrister to the Wuertemberg Ministry of Interior (Police organizations, foreigners, Foreign Police and Passport and Visa affairs).

g. August 1939: Delegated to the Reich Ministry of Interior (RMDI) as administrative assessor.

h. November 1939: Organization and construction of the Central Visa Office.

i. April 1940: Appointed Regierungsrat.

j. November to December 1940: Ordered to the Italian Colonial Ministry in Rome.

k. January to April 1941: Reich Ministry of Interior (Passport and Visa affairs-border police matters).

l. May 1941: "Raum TRIER Abwehr (Abwehr assignment in the TRIER area)".

m. August to December 1942: Sent to the front.

n. January to April 1943: TRIER, Abwehr.

o. May 1943: Assigned to the Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) Regiment "Nordland". Sent to the SS Junker School in BAD TOELZ (UTM) 32TPT9293, with rank of Untersturmfuehrer and later to the armored school in FARDUBITZ.

p. May 1944: Reich Ministry of Interior, Sipo Personnel office.

q. June 1944: Promoted to rank of Oberregierungsrat.

r. January to February 1945: Order to the front and engaged in the BARONOW offensive in upper Silesia.

s. March to April 1945: Commander of the Waffen-SS battalion (Sipo) near BERLIN.

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t. Family Status: Divorced, one (1) child eleven (11) years of age. Father is [b6] residing in STUTTGART-Weulimdorf. Mother is deceased.

SOURCE: "A"

P-3

9. With reference to the information outlined in paragraph 4 above, the information concerning certain of [b6] statements, considered untrue, is outlined in the following sub-paragraphs:

a. There is doubt concerning SUBJECT's statement covering the period 1932 to 1937. Since [b6] is an "old fighter" the possibility must be considered that prior to the formation of the Third Reich, he was expelled from the high Justice Educational office because of his activities with the organizations which became part of the Third Reich, which at that time were illegal.

b. Regarding his activity in August 1938, [b6] bragged in TRIER when he was stationed there in 1941 that he had been associated with the SD Leitabschnitt STUTTGART at the time of the alleged illness etc.

c. Instead of being delegated to the Reich Ministry of Interior in 1939, [b6] must have actually been with the RSHA.

d. Regarding the period November to December 1940, [b6] made a mis-statement concerning his being sent to the Italian Colonial Ministry in ROME. Actually, this was a military police course which [b6] as head of the Sipo and SD had formed. Members of the Sipo and SD attended these courses, first in BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Schlossstrasse 1, and later in ROME with the assistance of the Italian Africa Police Corps, for future assignment to Africa. Naturally, Minister [b6] was interested in the organization and did not miss an opportunity to greet the students. Detached service of one single student to the Italian Colonial Ministry cannot have been the case.

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Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FRITZ, Heinz

III-35714

e. January to April 1941: Some confusion exists between the RMDI and the RSHA.

f. May 1941: The assignment in TRIER lasted until the Summer of 1942. "Raum TRIER Abwehr" as b6 wrote, must have meant Regierungsbezirk (Administrative area) TRIER. b6 never had anything to do with Abwehr matters unless the forbidding of church worship "because of Air Defense technicalities" or the persecution of old women because of utterances considered inimical to the state are Abwehr matters. b6 came to TRIER in 1941 as an SS Sturmabfuhrer and Regierungsrat and as deputy to the chief of the Gestapo office for the administrative region of TRIER. Due to the fact that the chief of the Gestapo resided mostly in Luxemburg from the Summer of 1940, b6 actually headed the TRIER Gestapo office. To this office, naturally, was assigned an Abwehr department, namely department III, later IV-E. So far as the Gestapo people were concerned with Abwehr, they limited themselves and placed their initiative primarily to the interior politics of department II and the personnel affairs of department I. Abwehr department III had their own building in TRIER in Kronprinzenstrasse.

g. During the period of May 1942, b6 orders to the front should actually be a special assignment to BDS or KDS in KIEZ.

h. From January to April 1943, b6 was in the same assignment as indicated in sub-paragraph "f" above, in TRIER.

i. b6 remark concerning the period May 1944 should actually read RSHA-I instead of RMdI. For the period June 1944, the information he provided is believed to be correct.

j. In February 1945 it is to be doubted if and under what circumstances, especially in these turbulent days, b6 assignment as assistant department chief would be cancelled and he be sent to the front.

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23 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FELPE, Heinz

III-35714

k. It has been determined that in March and April 1945, [b6] was assistant department chief and was busy assigning new tasks and collecting the Sipo and SD members returning from the area around the Ostsee. In the latter part of April 1945, [b6] was in the area between NUERNBERG (UMT) 32UMV5083 and PASSAU (UTM) 32UUP8781 with the supply column of department I of the RSHA, where he met members of the Gestapo-TRIER, from whom he urgently begged gasoline, possibly to reach the battle area round BERLIN.

SOURCE: "B"

F-3

10. It has been determined, that during the period that the Institute fuer Gegenworte Forschung existed in FRANKFURT-Schwanheim (UTM) 32UEA7752, Voelklingerstrasse 95, SUBJECT, without assignment, maintained parallel contact with [b6]. Also, at the time of the first legal action taken against [b6], SUBJECT attempted, through [b6] and the [b1] to place himself at [b6] disposal.

SOURCE: " "

F-3

11. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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23 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FELPE, Heinz

III-35714

k. It has been determined that in March and April 1945, [b6] was assistant department chief and was busy assigning new tasks and collecting the Sipo and SD members returning from the area around the Odeon. In the latter part of April 1945, [b6] was in the area between NUERNBERG (UTM) 32UMV5083 and PASSAU (UTM) 32UUP8781 with the supply column of department I of the RSHA, where he met members of the Geefapo-TRIER, from whom he urgently begged gasoline, possibly to reach the battle area round BERLIN.

SOURCE: "B"

F-3

10. It has been determined, that during the period that the Institute fuer Gegenwarts Forschung existed in FRANKFURT-Schwanheim (UTM) 32UMA7752, Voelklingerstraese 95, SUBJECT, without assignment, maintained parallel contact with [b6]. Also, at the time of the first legal action taken against [b6], SUBJECT attempted, through [b6] and the [b1] to place himself at [b6] disposal.

SOURCE: " "

F-3

11. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

FILE: IV-33446; D-320529

17 June 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Group

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIO Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/S Section  
Date 6 MAY 1955 Init *ji*

1. Forwarded herewith SOI, Subject and file as above, dated 17 June 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

Source "A" is O-0152-IV, who submitted the information to Handling Agent b6 during February 1954. The information was obtained by Source "A" from the b1  
b1 Source "B" is the files of Region IV, MUNICH, which were examined on 10 May 1954 and 10 June 1954. Source "C" is X-0186-IV, who submitted the information to Handling Agent b6 on 26 May 1954. The preparing agent for this report is Special Agent b6

3. REMARKS:

*Card*  
a. Attention is invited to the fact that Wolfgang MENZEL, born 18 April 1905, the chief of the b1 who is at present under investigation by Region IV, MUNICH was also a MUNICH member of the Order of Maltesians in 1949, when the Order was established in MUNICH. A report on MENZEL and his associations is in preparation and will be forwarded under File IV-29704.

b. Other than the information reported in paragraph 3 of the attached SOI, no information is available on the persons reported on by Source "A" in the files of Region IV, MUNICH.

c. It is realized that the information reported by Source "A" is outdated; however, it is being forwarded for reference purposes. No additional investigation is contemplated by Region IV, MUNICH, in connection

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IV-D 805

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Ltr: Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army, 17 June 1954  
Subject: Gehlen Group, File: IV-33446; D-320529

with the personalities mentioned in this report.

b6

Incl: a/s

b6

/MM 7246-006/apd

Commanding

23 JUN 1954

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Hq, 66th CIC Gp., USAREUR  
ATTN: b6
- 1 - w/1 cpy SOI  
File

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b6

EXTRACT

D- 320529/r

15 June 1954

3. At 1145 hours, 13 May 1954, Minister of the Interior [b6] was called out of the meeting by [b6] from the Ministry of the Interior. [b6] had expected information to be transmitted to him during the Council of Ministers meeting. [b6] told [b6] that a meeting had been held in BQNN concerning the GEHLEN Organization. In this connection, [b6] mentioned the names of [b6] (CDU), Deputy Minister President of the GDR, and [b6], GDR Minister for Public Health. He also stated that he expected more information later in the day.

Eval: F-3

Ref: D-270456 SOI dtd 18 May 54 File: VIII-12124  
Sub: GDR Council of Ministers Meetings on 13 May 54/Presidium meeting on 20 May 1954.

cs [b6]

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

14 June 1954

SUBJECT: Current Gehlen Organization Investigations

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Summary of Information, Region III  
66th CIC Group, Subject and file as above, dated  
24 February and 9 April 1954.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and  
file as above, dated 14 June 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq.

b. Evaluation of Source: Temporarily evalu-  
ated F.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.

d. How Information was Obtained: The informa-  
tion was obtained from b6 of the Gehlen  
Organization.

e. Date on Which Information was Obtained:  
The information was obtained on 30 March 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to  
Agent: The information was reported to the handling  
Agent, b6 on 31 March 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Informa-  
tion: None.

h. Status of Case: Pending.

4. REMARKS:

a. Any additional information regarding per-  
sonalities of interest to the Gehlen Organization will  
be reported as received.

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(Continued)

28732 147

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III-34419

14 June 1954

SUBJECT: Current Gehlen Organization Investigations

b. [b6] and [b6] both have or have had connection with Polish Intelligences.

c. It is suggested that this report be brought to the attention of the CE Division at your Headquarters.

d. This report was prepared by [b6]  
[b6]

b6

Commanding

Incls: a/s  
JTD/mz/49-833

17 JUN 1954

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14 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

Gehlen Organization

III-34419

1. It is believed that [b6] is either no longer connected with the Gehlen Organization or will shortly terminate his association with the organization. [b6] has inquired about an interview with the Bundesverband der Deutscher Arbeitgeber (Organization of German Employers - BDA) with regard to obtaining some type of Werkschutz (Plant Security) job. He stated that he is considered an expert regarding plant security, but that he is not well spoken of by former Abwehr Officers. For this reason, it is believed that [b6] was a fairly ardent Nazi during the Third Reich.

SOURCE: "A"

P-3

2. The personality marked with the asterisk (\*) has been previously reported by this Region.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
14 June 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Current Gehlen Organization  
Investigations

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The Gehlen Organization is currently investigating several firms and personalities in the FRANKFURT/M (UTM) 32UMA7752 area. The following personalities and firms are among the current investigations:

a. [b6] telephone operator, born [b6] [b6] (UTM)(nea), currently employed by the "Neue Verlagsgesellschaft" in OFFENBACH/M (UTM) 32UMA8350 Frankfurterstrasse 43. Although she resides in OFFENBACH/M and works there, [b6] is still registered in BADEN-BADEN (UTM) 32UNV4401, where she has been registered since 10 January 1946, and since 14 October 1952, as a tenant with the family [b6] Erwinstrasse 4. [b6] card in the [b6] labor office in BADEN-BADEN revealed the following information regarding her employment:

(1) 1941-1945: Telephone operator with the German Military.

(2) 10 January 1946-31 May 1946: Employed as a house servant with the French family [b6] [b6]

(3) 1 June 1946-28 September 1946: House servant with the French family [b6] [b6]

(4) 22 October 1946-30 March 1947: Employed as a waitress in the French confiscated restaurant "Zum Suesen Loechl" in BADEN-BADEN.

(5) 1 January 1948-31 October 1949: Stenographer with the news agency "Suedena" in BADEN-BADEN, now known as Dana-Mainz.

(6) 14 April 1950-27 April 1950: Unemployed.

(7) 28 April 1950-31 December 1950: Employed as an audit clerk at the Spielbank (Gambling Casino) in

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
14 June 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Current Gehlen Organization  
Investigations

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

BADEN-BADEN.

(8) 2 January 1951-10 May 1951: Unemployed, and until 9 July 1951, no record of her activities.

(9) 9 July 1951: Employed by the "Neus Verlagsgesellschaft" in BADEN-BADEN.

(10) A remark on b6 card indicates that she is not to be rehired by the b1

b.

b6

b6

telephone: b6

is head of the FRANKFURT/M branch office of the firm "Frigalment", located An der Hauptwache 7/8, telephones: 93 258. The headquarters of the firm, engaged in import, is located in MUNICH (UTM) 32UPU9134.

c. b6 and Company Handels G.m.b.H., FRANKFURT/M, Hochstrasse 56, telephone: 95 262. b6 resides at b6

d. "bobba" G.m.b.H., FRANKFURT/M, Eechersheimer Landstrasse 5/7, telephone: 58 947, and Am Rossmarkt 11, telephone 93 772.

e. Doctor of Law Fritz SIKORSKI\*, born 23 September 1908, a tax consultant and economic trustee, residing in FRANKFURT/M, Forsthausstrasse 89, telephone: 63 822. SIKORSKI finances the Soviet-Polish paper "Nawe Wiadomosci", which appears in FRANKFURT/M.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

2. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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14-June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6

b1

III-17528

1.

b6

b1

b1 is no longer head of REPERET II of Department II. He has been removed from that position for reasons unknown, but due to his status with the b1 cannot be released. b6 was, subsequent to his removal from Department II, suggested for a post in Department III, but was turned down by b6. b6 has just returned from his vacation and is still unassigned.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

2. The Bundesgericht (Federal Court) has notified the b1 that the cases being submitted for prosecution, particularly espionage, are too weak for the courts to gain convictions. One (1) case cited is the b6 case. In this connection, it is rumored that General Reinhard GEHLEN\* is gaining favor with the Federal Republic and with the Ministry of Interior and may be assigned much of the espionage and counter intelligence work, leaving the b1 primarily political work, with which GEHLEN will have nothing to do.

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

3. The coordination of activities within the b1 is improving. Information is being exchanged and the departments are being briefed on the activities of others. In Department III the improvement is especially noticeable and aids in evaluation.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

4. There is still a personnel problem within the b1 part of which stems from the employment of inexperienced personnel. Often a department head will know of some person in particular whom he is desirous of the organization hiring for a particular job. These desires are seldom granted, however persons whose names are submitted by officials of the Federal Government, regardless of their experience, are

4 - Hqs, 66th CIC Grp 1 - Reg III File  
1 - CIC Control File

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14 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b1

III-17528

normally hired for fear of stepping on the wrong toes.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

5. The police in Lower Saxony are apparently operating their own intelligence department. They recently arrested approximately thirty (30) persons in an attempt to discourage the activities of an alleged espionage ring without any notification to the [b1] in the area of their plans or suspicions prior to their action.

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

6. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

b6

320529/3

III-34419

11 June 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 11 June 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: Source "A" is b1 through X-933-Hq. Source "B" is b1 through X-933-Hq.

b. Evaluation of Sources: All sources are temporarily evaluated F.

c. Relationship of Sources to Target: None.

d. How Information was Obtained: Source "A" obtained information in the course of official duties. Source "B" obtained information in the course of official duties.

e. Date on Which Information was Obtained: The information supplied by Source "A" was obtained on b1 and that from Source "B" on b1

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

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(Continued)

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III-34419

11 June 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

a. The files of Region III Registry revealed an Oskar REILE, residing in TRIER, Speerstrasse 22, born 3 December 1896 in STRUTZPON, Kreis West Prussia. He was connected with the Abwehr in PARIS and in France during World War II. No further identifying data is available.

b. The identity of [b1] and [b1] is a matter of record at Headquarters 66th CIC Group.

c. The report was prepared by [b6]  
[b6]

[b6]

Commanding

Incls: a/s  
JTD/ms/49-833

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11 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

Gehlen Organization

III-34419

1. [b6] is now a permanent liaison man from the Gehlen Organization to the Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery) and takes part in conferences having to do with the Gehlen Organization in the absence of General Reinhard GEHLEN\* and Von LOSSOW\*.

SOURCE: "A"

F-2

2. Personal data concerning Werner REPENNING is as follows:

a. Name: [b6]

b. Date of Birth: [b6]

c. Place of Birth: [b6]

d. Religion: Protestant

e. Profession: Salesman

f. Residence: Since 14 February 1953, [b6]

[b6]

g. Previous residences: BENSHEIM (UTM) 32UMA7023-Auerbach, Kreis Bergstrasse, Burgstrasse 9 and BAD GODESBERG, Sedanstrasse 14.

h. Marital Status: Married to [b6]  
born [b6]

i. Children: Two (2) daughters. [b6] born

[b6]

SOURCE: "B"

F-2

3. Oskar REILE is now a member of the Gehlen Organization and has made appearances in BONN (UTM) 32ULB7623. REILE

4 - Hqo, 66th CIC Grp  
1 - CIC Central File

1 - Reg III File

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-11 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

Gehlen Organization

III-34419

is approximately forty (40) years of age, dark complected, and wears glasses. REILE is said to come from KARLSRUHE (UTM) 32UMU2528.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

4. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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b6

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

320529/2

IV-31861; D-320529

10 June 1954

SUBJECT: Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten  
OmB (Student Association for the Furtherance of Scientific Works)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. Reference is made to all previous correspondence on Subject organization, file as above.

2. On 26 May 1954, the Firma Richter and Company, MUNICH 32UPU93, Germany, Walhallastrasse 7, received a letter, without an address of the sender, from OBERDORF nos, Germany. A second envelope within the letter contained a note addressed to "Number 66" from Number 512 o 2" in which it was stated that a railroad ticket was being returned as it could not be used. The ticket was an Allied Forces Duty Rail Ticket, number 070729, valid until 23 May 1954, made out to a b6 for a trip from TAGERSEE 32UQT08, Germany, to IMMENSTADT 32TET96, Germany, via MUNICH. Included also were four (4) copies of an Information Bulletin, dated 8 May 1954, of the Rhein-Ruhr-Klub, an industrial club of the Rhein-Ruhr area.

3. Since Subject agency is a b1 for Gehlen Group or b1, it is felt that the contact mentioned in paragraph two and the interest shown in the Rhein-Ruhr-Klub should be noted.

4. Attempts are being made by Region IV, MUNICH to identify b6 b6

5. The copy of the Bulletin received by Region IV, MUNICH is being forwarded as an inclosure to this letter for your information.

6. The source of the above information is b1 b1 It is evaluated "usually reliable."

Incls a/a  
b6

/MM 7246-006/  
apd

b6  
Commanding

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b6

320524/3

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

IV-33957

10 June 1954

SUBJECT: [b6]

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. Reference is made to Letter and SOI, Subject: Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten GmbH; File: D-320529, IV-31861, dated 2 June 1954. Reference is specifically made to above referenced letter, paragraph 4-c.

2. Forwarded herewith is SOI, Subject and file as above, dated 10 June 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

Source "A" is [b1] Source "B" is SUBJECT's  
[b1] Personal History Statement, which SUBJECT wrote in [b1]  
[b1] on 1 May 1954 and which was sent to [b6] who in turn sent  
it to WELLENTHIN. The preparing agent for this report is Special Agent  
[b6]

4. REMARKS:

a. Attention is invited to the discrepancy in SUBJECT's birth date mentioned in the report referenced in paragraph one as 27 July 1900 and in SUBJECT's PHS as 21 July 1900. The source of the former date is the correspondence between [b6] and WELLENTHIN. The source of the latter date is SUBJECT's PHS.

b. Considering SUBJECT's connections with the Americans, it is possible that an approach possibility may exist.

Incl: a/e  
[b6] MM 7246-006/  
apd

b6

Commanding

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Hq, 66th CIC Gp, USAREUR  
Attn: [b6]  
1 - e/1 opy SOI - File

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GHW/cyd

10 June 1954

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE# IV-33957

MESSMACHNER, Friedrich

1. On 14 May 1954, General Horat von MELLENTHIN, business manager of the Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten GmbH (Student Association for the Furtherance of Scientific Works), was contacted by General Gerhardt MATZEY who requested that MELLENTHIN make comments and/or recommendations on Friedrich Wilhelm MESSMACHNER for a position within the Federal Alert Police.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

2. SUBJECT was born on 21 July 1900 in DRESDEN 32UVS15, Germany. He was the son of Georg von MESSMACHNER, a retired Imperial Russian State Councilor. From 1907 to 1910, he attended the HOCHMANN High School in DRESDEN in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd elementary grades. From 1910 to 1911 he attended grade five (5) of the Fourth Citizens School. From 1911 to 1914 he attended BOEHME's Private High School in DRESDEN. He then attended "Baron BTIEGLITZ" Art High School in St. PETERSBURG, Russia, for four years. From January to September 1918, SUBJECT was an apprentice at the office of the contractors "Axerio Brothers" in St. PETERSBURG. On 15 October 1918, he legally returned to DRESDEN as an emigrant from Russia of German extraction. From January to July 1919, he took a course in bookkeeping, shorthand and typing at a trade school in RACHOW/DRESDEN. He then served an apprenticeship of three (3) years for a dentist's career with Dr. (of medicine) Martin MUELLER, a dentist in DRESDEN. From 15 September 1922 to 1924, he worked as a dental technician in DORPAT and REVAL/Estonia. From January to July 1924 he attended dentists' school in DRESDEN, where he passed an assistant's examination for operations assistants; from then to 1925 he worked as a dentist's assistant in DRESDEN. On 1 May 1925 he opened his own practice as a dentist in DRESDEN, Uhlandstrasse 24. He remained at this practice until 1934. On 19 September 1929 he married b6, who was the daughter of an engineer in DRESDEN, b6. On 15 June 1934 SUBJECT began work as a scientific assistant (Foreign Language Translator) with the RLM (NOTE: May be the Reichsluftfahrtministerium -- Reich Ministry for Aviation), Research Office in BERLIN 33UUU92, Germany, Salary Group III. He was appointed deputy chief of this agency on 1 May 1935. He was transferred to COLOGNE/Deutsch 32ULB54, Germany in this capacity on 2 January 1940; and was appointed chief of the agency on 2 January 1942. He was transferred, as chief, to the office in KOENIGSBERG, Prussia on 1 June 1942. On 6 October 1943 he was drafted into the Army and assigned to the Research Agency in KOENIGSBERG, Prussia, where he remained until 31 October 1944. He was transferred as chief of the agency to POSAN, Poland where he was in charge of research

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1 - Central File

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1 - Hq IV, File

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10 June 1954

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE: IV-33957

MESSMACHNER, Friedrich

on 1 November 1944; and SUBJECT remained there until 20 January 1945 at which time he was evacuated to BERLIN. His family had been evacuated from KOENIGSBERG on 27 August 1944 because of complete bomb destruction of their home. From January to March 1945, he remained at the office of the RIM in BERLIN/Charlottenburg for special tasks. On 2 April 1945, he volunteered for active duty with the 14th Anti-Aircraft Division. On 7 July 1945, he was discharged from Reserve Hospital I in LEIPZIG 3300519, Germany and from military service also. On 19 July 1945 he joined his evacuated family at NEUTMANNSDORF, Saxony and was unemployed there until March 1946. He was still suffering from wounds received in the war. On 8 March 1946 he was employed as an interpreter and translator at the County Commissioner's Office in PIRNA 3200524, Saxony. He left there on 31 May 1948 because of a reduction in forces. From 27 June 1948 to 22 July 1950 he was employed as an interpreter and statistician with the Land Office for Saxony of the "Association for Mutual Farmer's Aid" in DRESDEN. He moved with his family from DRESDEN to BERLIN on 22 July 1950. On 28 July he was acknowledged as a political refugee in West BERLIN. On 10 August 1950 SUBJECT moved to KOBLENZ 3200498, Germany, where he remained unemployed until 9 December 1950, and where, on 10 December 1950 he was engaged as a janitor by Colonel [b6] US Army in KOBLENZ. He remained at that job until 30 June 1951 at which time he was employed as a butler at the US Officers' Mess of the Allied Security Office in KOBLENZ. He left that job on 15 July 1952 to become employed as a janitor by the chief of the US Section of the above named agency and still works there today. In addition, on 27 March 1953, he was appointed as a "generally sworn interpreter for the Russian language at the courts and notary's offices in the area of the Lower Court, KOBLENZ." SUBJECT has had no previous convictions in Germany or abroad; he has no landed property or capital; and he has no debts. He can be used in public office in accordance with Article 131 of the Basic Law.

SOURCE: "B"

EVALUATION: F-6

2-10

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-2-

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4 - Bq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
1 - Central File

1 - Reg IV, File

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

b6

320529/3

III-35714

10 June 1954

SUBJECT: FELFE, Heinz

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 10 June 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq.

b. Evaluation of Source: Source is temporarily evaluated F.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.

d. How Information was Obtained: Source obtained the information from b1, a member of the Gehlen Organization.

e. Date on Which Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on two (2) occasions between 23 December 1953 and 21 January 1954.

f. Date on Which Information Was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6 on 26 December 1953 and 3 February 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. Any additional information relating to SUBJECT will be reported as it is received.

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(Continued)

~~SECRET~~

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90106



III-35714

10 June 1954

SUBJECT: FEIVE, Heinz

b. This report was prepared by

b6

b6

b6

Commanding

Incls: a/s  
JTD/mz/49-833

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10 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FELFE, Heinz

III-35714

1. SUBJECT, a member of the Gehlen organization, is assigned to Department III-F in the Gehlen headquarters in MUNICH (UTM) 32UPU9134, and is described as ambitious, unrestrained and intriguing.

2. [b6] was born in [b6] [b6] Just prior to the end of World War II, SUBJECT was a member of the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police - Sipo) and held the rank of SS Obersturmfuehrer and Kriminalkommissar. On 6 November 1946, SUBJECT was released from a British POW camp and came to HONNEF (UTM) 32ULB7412, at which place he decided to take up residence. On 21 December 1946, SUBJECT was joined by his wife [b6] and a child, [b6] SUBJECT had acquired a place of residence [b6] later resided [b6] Subsequent to their settling in [b6] another child, [b6] was born [b6] [b6] SUBJECT's wife made the unregistered move from [b6] [b6] on 21 December 1946.

3. In late 1949 or early 1950, SUBJECT was active in the "Nauheimer Kreis", headed by Professor [b6] [b6] As part of his activity with this organization, SUBJECT took part in a conference in WEIMAR (UTM) 32PPB6350 and traveled on several occasions in the Soviet Zone.

4. In 1950 SUBJECT was allegedly employed by the Kaiser Ministry (Ministry for All-German Affairs), where he worked on Volkspolizei (Soviet Zone People's Police - Vopo) matters. During this time SUBJECT experienced trouble with the Ministry of Interior and/or the [b1]

[b1] allegedly because of giving false information regarding his person.

5. In 1951, SUBJECT, who also has an identity card with the name [b6] possibly originally his correct name, became an employee of the Gehlen organization and was assigned to department III-F in KARLSRUHE (UTM) 32UMU2528, where

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1 - CIC Central File

1 - Reg III File

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10 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FELFE, Heinz

III-35714

he also established his second legal residence (without his family) at Stephanienstrasse 16. Due to a particularly successful Vopo case, SUBJECT was reassigned to the Gehlen headquarters in MUNICH, where he still worked on III-F operations.

6. Recently, because of the compromise of a Gehlen net operating out of BERLIN into the Soviet Zone, an investigation was begun of the members of the organization and their reliability. The order of battle of the Gehlen organization published by several news organs in the Soviet Zone, particularly the "Deutsche Sender", exposed institutions and personalities on which only a few people were knowledgeable. One of the knowledgeable persons was SUBJECT. It was almost certain that the information which was supplied the Soviets did not come from an individual such as [b6] nor from any member within the lost BERLIN group.

7. There were several factors which caused the Gehlen man assigned the investigation to look with suspicion upon SUBJECT and some of the Gehlen people in the Verstrasse office in STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203. SUBJECT and the others, including [b6], Karl SCHUETZ\* and [b6], were all acquainted and all former Sicherheitsdienst people, and all had rather unsavory backgrounds. SUBJECT was one of the few knowledgeable people in the Gehlen headquarters and, although there are three (3) Gehlen offices in the STUTTGART area, the Verstrasse office alone remained unexposed, which office is staffed by [b6] SCHUETZ, [b6]

8. Although his investigation revealed that many details regarding SUBJECT were lacking, and he was a comparatively new personality in the organization, the investigator did determine the following information regarding SUBJECT:

a. A dossier containing information regarding SUBJECT, particularly pages of evidence on suspicion, had mysteriously disappeared. Included in this dossier was a statement written by SUBJECT himself explaining his previous connections with the East Zone.

a/e

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10 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FELFE, Heinz

III-35714-

- b. Cases which SUBJECT worked fizzled out.
- c. SUBJECT has, over a period of months, interested himself in other matters which were none of his business.
- d. SUBJECT was knowledgeable on institutions and personalities exposed by the East Zone news facilities.
- e. Neither SUBJECT nor any member of his circle of friends in the organization was exposed.
- f. Former SS Oberfuehrer [b6] of the BREMEN (UTM) 32UNDS780 Gehlen office was exposed, which indicates he may not be included among SUBJECT's friends. It is surmised, though, that [b6] came to SUBJECT's attention through [b6].
- g. During a temporary assignment in the Rhein-Ruhr area, SUBJECT was seen in STUTTGART and MUNICH in an amateurish disguise, which in no way concealed his real identity.
- h. It is alleged that SUBJECT has an association with [b6] of the [b1].
- 9. It has become clear that SUBJECT was introduced to the Gehlen organization by [b6]. [b6] was in turn introduced by SUBJECT, and later [b6] brought in SCHUETZ, and later SCHUETZ brought [b6] into the organization.
- 10. SCHUETZ took over the driver of his predecessor, [b6], a former professional soldier who had held the rank of staff sergeant. [b6], because of the bad treatment he received, is very much against SCHUETZ and the ruling clique. He has stated that it is a pity the way the people working in the STUTTGART office must flatter SCHUETZ. [b6] also stated that when SCHUETZ moved to STUTTGART, he arrived with a furniture transport from his former residence in TRIER (UTM) 32ULA3014. [b6] helped with the unloading of the furniture, and came into conversation with the movers. The movers lustily ridiculed the idea that the

a/e

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10 June 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

FELFE, Heinz

III-35714

place into which SCHUETZ moved was not an undercover establishment. When [b6] asked why they thought so, they replied, "We know what he was doing in TRIER". The Gehlen investigator and [b6] as a result of this statement, believe SCHUETZ was thought by people in TRIER to be a French-agent.

11. [b6] SCHUETZ, who evidently know that they are not trusted, show outward evidence of insecurity. According to a person employed in the STUTTGART Versaetraese office, but outside of the clique, [b6] has become a dope user. This person came to this conclusion because of the "up and down" state of [b6] mood. The investigator did not go along with that theory. He has seen both SCHUETZ and [b6] recently and thinks that their mood and activity stems more from fear.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

12. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

b6

9 June 1954

IV-33993

SUBJECT: b6

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE:

a. Evaluation sheet, Subject: b6  
D-374908, dated 28 May 1954.

b. Summary of Information, Subject, b6  
D-374908, dated 11 May 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-0186-IV, who furnished the information from personal knowledge to Handling Agent b6 on 3 June 1954.

b. The information in paragraph two was procured by X-0186-IV on 3 April 1954, and was reported to Handling Agent on 10 April 1954.

c. The preparing agent for this report is b6

b6

3. REMARKS:

a. According to Source, SUBJECT could have been in BRUSSELS for a short period of time prior to reporting to PARIS in 1943. Source, however, has no knowledge of this assignment.

b. Source confirms that b6, a cousin of SUBJECT, was in KO/Denmark.

b6

Incl: a/s

b6

/MM 7246-006/apd

Commanding

Distribution:

3 - w/5 opys SOI

Hq, 66th CIC Gp, USAREUR

Attn: b6

1 - w/1 opy SOI - File

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DBB/apd

9 June 1954

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE: IV-33993

b6

1. SUBJECT was leader of Frontaufkloerungskommando I (Front reconnaissance commando--operational intelligence) Ost (East) with Herragruppe Mitte (Army Group Middle) until 1943 when he was sent to Leitstelle West (Counterintelligence Headquarters with the Commander in Chief of the German Armies-West).
2. SUBJECT presently resides in b6  
b6 According to SUBJECT's household employee, he is in the employ of the Gehlen organization. SUBJECT was not in HAMBURG on 3 April 1954.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

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4 - Hq, 66th CIC Gp, USAREUR  
1 - Central File

1 - Reg IV, File

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 100 US ARMY

b6

340529 Vol 2

2 June 1954

FILE: D-320529; IV-31861

SUBJECT: Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung  
Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten GmbH  
(Student Association for the Further-  
ance of Scientific Works)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: All previous correspondence on Subject organiza-  
tion, Subject and file as above.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above,  
dated 2 June 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source "A" is b1  
b1 The preparing  
agent for this report is Special Agent b6

4. REMARKS:

a. The contacts mentioned in the attached SOI indicate that  
WELLENTHIN, business manager for Subject organization, is evidently  
considered to be an important figure in the future German Army and his  
recommendations and/or comments are held in high esteem in many quarters.  
Subject organization is a b1 for Gehlen Group or b1  
b1

b. Further contacts made to, or by, WELLENTHIN in connection with  
the BOWH government and the future German Army will be reported as re-  
ceived unless otherwise directed by Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

c. Since, from the personal history statement of b6 it  
has been determined that he has had numerous connections with American  
personnel, a report on his Personal History Statement will be forwarded  
under Subject: b6 File: b6

344

b6

Distribution:

- 2 - CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
(ATTN: b6 (w/5 cpy SOI))  
1 - Region IV, File (w/1 cpy SOI)

Commanding

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b6

/wt/MH 7246-006

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 June 1954

REGION IV, 66TH CIO GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE: D-320529; IV-31861

Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung  
Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten GmbH  
(Student Association for the Further-  
ance of Scientific Works)

1. On 14 May 1954, General Horst von MELLENTHIN, business manager of Subject organization, was contacted by General Gerhard KATZKY, head of the Bundesbereitschaftspolizei (Federal Alert Police), of BONN 32ULB66, Germany. KATZKY requested recommendations and/or comments on an applicant for a position within the Federal Alert Police, a Friedrich Wilhelm MESSNACHER, born 27 July 1900 in DRESDEN 32UVB15, Germany. He gave MELLENTHIN a copy of MESSNACHER's personal history statement.
2. On 6 May 1954, MELLENTHIN was contacted by [b6], former Chief of Staff for General ROMMEL and for the Military Commander of France, who was associated with the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler's life, and who is at present advisor and expert on Military Intelligence matters in BONN. He has an address in [b6]  
[b6] telephone [b6] and an address in [b6]  
[b6] telephone [b6] [b6] discussed a certain [b6] and her son who had applied to him for positions with the Dienststelle Blank.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

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5 - 66th CIG Group, USAREUR  
1 - File

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

1820

III-34419

D-375008

1 JUN 1954

SUBJECT: MRONGOVIVUS, Erich

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region III, 66th CIC Group  
APO 757, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. Attached Region IV SOI is forwarded as a matter of interest to your region. Specific reference is made to your letter, file III-34419, dated 24 February 1954, subject: Gehlen Organization Employees.

2. The following corrections in the attached SOI are noted for your information:

- a. The correct name of former [b6] is [b6]  
b. Former [b6] is [b6]  
c. Former [b6] is [b6]  
d. The [b6] cannot be identified.

3. Information in the attached SOI may be brought to the attention of source X-899-Hq or X-933-Hq when necessary to supply leads or confirmation of information developed by either of these sources in current investigations. It is not desired, however, that all of the information in the attached SOI be made available at one time to these sources because of the possible endangering of the Region IV source.

4. Any additional information of interest developed on MRONGOVIVUS will be brought to the attention of your region.

BY ORDER OF [b6]

LIMITED  
DISTRIBUTION

1 Incl: SOI, IV-33854, Rgn IV,  
dtd 13 May 54, subj as above  
WLP/amk/Stgt 9342-7382

[b6]

Adjutant

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4  
HQ 26/20  
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~~SECRET~~

13 May 1954

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE# IV-33854

MRONGOWIUS, Erich (Nickname: "Fritz")

1. SUBJECT is approximately sixty (60) years of age, a former Rittmeister (Captain Cavalry) of the German Army Reserve and resides in MALENTE/Gransmuhlen near, Germany, Ruttiner Chaussee, Haus am Berg. He was born in Lithuania of German parents who were large land owners in Lithuania. Prior to and during World War I, SUBJECT was a reserve Cavalry Officer in the 8th Ulanen Regiment in OUBBINEN, East Prussia. After the end of World War I, he became the general salesmanager for Reemata Cigarette Company in ALLKNESTEIN, East Prussia. SUBJECT entered the German Abwehr (Counterintelligence), after the end of the Polish Campaign in World War II, and was assigned as administrative officer in NEST (Nebenstelle - First Counterintelligence Headquarters below Military District Level) CIECHANOW, Poland, of AST (Ausseeinstelle - Counterintelligence Headquarters at Military District Level) KOENIGSBERG, East Prussia. In NEST/CIECHANOW, SUBJECT was under the command of Heinrich BODEN, then Chief of NEST, and a former Lieutenant Colonel in the German Abwehr. The chief of Section III (Counter Espionage) in NEST/CIECHANOW at that time was [b6]. SUBJECT was transferred from this position to chief of Section III in NEST/KOWNO, Poland. At the time of transfer, Major General JUST was then KOWNO Military Area Commander. SUBJECT was under AST/KOENIGSBERG, and the last commander there was [b6], who is presently in the employ of the Gehlen Organization, and uses the name [b6]. When Lithuania fell to the Russians near the end of World War II, SUBJECT became Commander of the agent's camp for AST/DANZIG, Poland, in late 1944. This camp was located at MALENTE. Shortly after his arrival, SUBJECT requested Source's permission to employ his girl friend, Fraulein [b6] as a secretary and interpreter. This permission was granted. SUBJECT and [b6] were in MALENTE at the end of World War II. They were married there after the end of the war.
2. SUBJECT's wife was a temporary appointed Civil Service Official with the German Foreign Office, and was employed with the German Embassy in KOWNO until 1944. She speaks fluent Russian and has been working until recently as a private translator and language teacher in MALENTE/Gransmuhlen. She recently began to receive a pension for her service in the German Civil Service.
3. Shortly after the end of World War II, probably in 1946 or 1947, SUBJECT and his wife were contacted by [b6] and were assigned the task of procuring information on the Eastern Zone of Germany for [b6] office. SUBJECT stated that his handling agents were varied, and used cover names (continued)

5 - 66th CIC Group, USAREUR. 347

1 - File

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13 May 1954

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 168, US ARMY

b6

MORGENOWIUS, Erich (Nickname: "Fritz")

entirely. He did not know any of them previously, and could not identify them. SUBJECT explained that the greater part of his operations had been unsuccessful because of financial limitation. In 1949, SUBJECT was informed that his operations must cease because the [b1] were not in agreement with this operation. SUBJECT believed this to be only an excuse, not the real reason, and stated that he does not know the actual reason.

4. After SUBJECT ceased to be active for [b6] he requested that the [b6] Cigarette Company assist him in opening a tobacco business in WALENTE. [b6] built a small tobacco shop and turned same over to SUBJECT for operation. This business has thrived to date.
5. SUBJECT revealed that former [b6] who was at one time Chief of III/F (Offensive Counter Espionage Section) of AST/KOENIGSBERG, is presently residing in HAMBURG 52UM63, Germany. [b6] according to SUBJECT, is active in intelligence operations, but for whom or in what capacity is unknown to SUBJECT.
6. The chief of AST/KOENIGSBERG prior to [b6], [b6] resides at the present time in RASTATT 52UM714, Germany. [b6] works for the Christian Democratic Union in church problems. [b6] recently contacted SUBJECT requesting photographs of the Eastern Sector and promised to pay well for same. SUBJECT had no desire to lose any of the pictures still in his possession and therefore, did not sell any of them to [b6]

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-3

343

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5 - 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
1 - File

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114

28 May 54

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

D-320529

1 JUN 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: Counter Intelligence Branch

1. Reference is made to Region III SOI, file III-34419 and D-320529, dated 9 April 1954, above subject, which was forwarded by Transmittal Slip to your headquarters on 16 April 1954.

2. The attached letter from the DAD liaison office is in reply to a request by this headquarters for confirmation of the above-referenced CIC report and is forwarded for your information in compliance with your expressed interest in this matter.

3. The DAD letter neither confirms nor detracts from the CIC report. The CIC report clearly indicated that the information reported had been obtained from [redacted] The DAD letter, on the other hand, comments only on the knowledge of the US authorities responsible for the ultimate transfer of the Gehlen Gruppe from American to German control. In brief, the DAD officials who framed this reply did not know whether or not such a target date had been named by the German agency involved. Evaluation of the original CIC report, therefore, should remain F-6.

1 Incl: DAD LO Ltr, OAD-3184,  
dtd 25 May 54, subj: GEHLEN  
GRUPPE  
WLP/ank/Stgt 9342-7382

b6

Commanding

M/R: CIC had a report which stated that on 1 July 1954 the German Government was going to take over the Gehlen Group. Confirmation of this was requested from DAD.

343

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1/6/54 113

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1st Ind

S: 1 July 1954

D-320529; IV-33446

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army, 28 June 1954

TO: Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154,  
US Army, ATTN: b6

1. Reference is made to conference b6 on 9, 10, 11 June 1954, in which it was decided that the requirements in paragraph 3 of Basic Communication would not be necessary since no Oberpostdirektion is to be found in the SOECKING Post Office.

2. SOECKING Post Office is in STARNBERG 32TPU71, Germany and not in MUNICH 32UPU93, Germany, as reported in the specific report as mentioned in paragraph 2 of Basic Communication.

b6

Commanding

VVE/DBB/MM 7246-006/spd

30 JUN. 1954

Out Log Nr.  
IV 0870

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

S: 1 July 1954

D-320529

28 MAY 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region IV, 66th CIC Group  
APO 108, US Army

1. Information, evaluated F-6, has been received to the effect that the West German Federal Government recently started preparations for taking over the Gehlen organization, also known as SDU, German Element, as the West German intelligence service. Although American intelligence authorities confirm the fact that the German government will ultimately take over the Gehlen organization, no confirmation has ever been received on specific reports on the various aspects of this change-over.

2. One such specific report states that the Gehlen organization will be located in new offices in the Oberpostdirektion building in MUENCHEN-Soecking. No date was given, however, as to when the new offices would be occupied.

3. It is desired that a check of the facilities of this building be obtained, to include the total number of offices located in the building, the number presently vacant or to be vacated and the identity of private firms occupying offices in the Oberpostdirektion building.

4. Your report is desired on or before 1 July 1954.

BY ORDER OF b6

b6

For

WLP/amk/Stgt 9342-7382

Adjutant

3 Jun 1954

In Log Nr.  
IV 0519

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DEPARTMENT OF ARMY DETACHMENT  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

DAD-3184

D-320529

25 May 1954

SUBJECT: GEHLEN GRUPPE

TO: Commanding Officer  
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, United States Army

1. Reference is made to correspondence, Headquarters 66th CIC Group, dated 19 April 1954, Subject and File as above.

2. Discussions within German government circles regarding the general subject of a budget for a German Intelligence Service are known to have taken place periodically during the past year or so.

3. The substance of referenced report is believed to be inaccurate. Whereas the takeover of the Gehlen organization by the German Government has been discussed repeatedly between the authorities concerned, it is unlikely that the takeover will be accomplished much prior to the final ratification of the contractual agreements. In any case the respective American authorities have planned to continue the subsidies for the Gehlen organization until such time as the German Government is able--politically and financially--to assume the burden.

Stgt 9342-7467

b3 Per CIA

DAD Liaison Officer

25 MAY 1954

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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b6

MAINZ FIELD OFFICE  
REGION XII 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
APO 227 US ARMY

12 May 1954

R/P 19

SUBJECT:

b6

b6

TO:

Commanding Officer  
Hq, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. Reference your verbal request of 7 May 1954 concerning  
circumstances of employment of b6 as IIG chief of the  
b1

2. According to b6, chief of the b1 he  
met b6 in the spring of 1951. At that time, b6 was an agent of  
the GSHLEN organization and was functioning as a contact man between  
GSHLEN and the b1 b6 visited b6  
approximately once each two weeks from 1951 to August 1953 in order to  
effect an exchange of information and coordination of activities. In  
June 1953, b6 faced with the problem of organizing a b1  
section and having no qualified personnel, offered b6 the position  
b1 b6 agreed, contingent  
upon his securing an unconditional and non-prejudicial release from  
the GSHLEN organization. The matter was coordinated with both the  
GSHLEN group and the b1 - neither of which  
indicated any objection. b6 was separated without prejudice from  
the GSHLEN organization at the end of August 1953, and after a month's  
terminal leave, was officially employed by the b1  
on 1 October 1953. To the best of b6 knowledge and belief,  
b6 has used no name other than his own, with the exception of  
cover names utilized in b1 operational matters, and has not represented  
himself to be attached to any organization other than the Rheinland-Pfalz  
Ministry of Interior since the date of his employment by the b1  
b6 is known to maintain social contact with former associates in  
the GSHLEN organization; however, b6 has no reason to question  
b6 loyalty, integrity or discretion and is highly pleased with his  
services.

Distributions:

Hq 66th CIC - 3

File - 1

Info

Reg XII - 1, Mainz FO - 1

b6

LO, Rheinland-Pfalz

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12/5/54 107

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

b6  
320541/r

FILE: D-320529; IV-31861

11 May 1954

SUBJECT: Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung Wissenschaftlicher  
Arbeiten GmbH (Student Association for the Furtherance of  
Scientific Works)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAFEUR  
APO 134, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. REFERENCE: Letter, Subject and File as above, dated 15 March 1954.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and File as above, dated 11 May 1954, for your information.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source "A" is [b1]

[b1]

[b1]

Source "B" is [b1]

[b1]

who submitted the information to Special Agent

[b6]

on 26 April 1954. Source "C" is the official records of [b6] which were examined on 27 April 1954. The preparing agent for this report is [b6]

4. REMARKS:

a. Since Subject agency is [b1] for Gehlan Group or [b1], it is the opinion of Region IV, MUNICH, that an official contact by a member of the Prime Minister's office of the Union of South Africa to Subject agency's business manager should be noted. It is entirely possible that the contact was made, however, only in connection with Horst von MELLENTHIN's military activities.

b. A copy of the letter from [b6] to MELLENTHIN is on file in Region IV, MUNICH.

Incl: a/o.

[b6]

/rmc/MM 7246

356

b6

Commanding

Distribution:

3 - Hq., 66th CIC Gp., USAFEUR  
(w/5 cpya SOI)

1 - Region IV, File  
(w/1 copy SOI)

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GHH/ruc

11 May 1954

REGION IV, 66th CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

D-320529; IV-31861

Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung  
Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten GmbH  
(Student Association for the Further-  
ance of Scientific Works)

1. On 26 March 1954, General Horst von MELLENTHEIN, business manager of Subject agency, was contacted by a J. E. BETZLER of the Union War Histories Section of the Union of South Africa, residing with an [b6] of SCHLENDORF am Koehlssee 32PT78, Germany. BETZLER apologized for attempting to see the General while he was ill on 14 March and hoped that MELLENTHEIN was now fully recovered. BETZLER noted that MELLENTHEIN's brother, General F. W. von MELLENTHEIN of 400 Ansonia Road, JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, had said that Horst would give BETZLER assistance with regard to BETZLER's official visits to some German officers. BETZLER asked Horst to suggest a convenient time for the two men to meet.

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-2

2. Johann BETZLER has been residing, since 1 March 1954, at the home of [b6] located at [b6] BETZLER's wife is the sister of [b6]. The BETZLER family came from PRETORIA, South Africa, because of [b6] serious illness. During his stay in Germany, BETZLER is attempting to write a German history of World War II and is attempting to speak to several German officers on this subject. On or about 15 April 1954, BETZLER had a visitor in SCHLENDORF; this visitor was presumed to be General MELLENTHEIN from MUNICH 32UP893, Germany. It is believed that MELLENTHEIN and BETZLER were either acquainted in South Africa or have mutual acquaintances there. MELLENTHEIN remained in SCHLENDORF for approximately two days. The BETZLERs purchased a car when they arrived and do some traveling. They are currently in northern Germany.

SOURCE: "B"

EVALUATION: B-3

3. Johann BETZLER was born on 18 June 1895 in AGENTHAL nos, Germany. His occupation is listed as "registrar"; his nationality is South African. BETZLER's permanent residence is PRETORIA, South Africa, although at present he is residing at Haus 57, SCHLENDORF, o/o MUEHLBAUER. He is married to Ilse BETZLER, nee SCHWIEDING, who was born on 31 March 1905 in HAMBURG 32UNE63, Germany. They have one child, [b6] who was born on [b6].

SOURCE: "C"

EVALUATION: B-2

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4 - Sq., 66th CIC Gp., USAREUR  
1 - Central File

1 - Region IV, File

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HEADQUARTERS, REGION XII  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 227 US ARMY

*file in*  
*D-320529/3*

FILE NO: XII-2543

7. Mai 1954

SUBJECT: b6

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: S-3 Section, Technical Specialist Division

1. Reference is made to IRS, Region XII, File Number XII-1701, Subject: b6, dated 2 October 1953 and letter, Headquarters 66th CIC Group, File Number D-347935, Subject: b6, dated 3 March 1954.

2. On 28 April 1954, the b1 notified this Region that they had apprehended one b6 born b6 b6 who claimed to be an employee of CIC. The reason that the b1 gave for arresting SUBJECT was that b6 wife of b6 had reported to them that she had received letters from one b6 which indicated that he had been in prison with her husband and that he wished to help her. On the morning of 28 April 1954, Frau b6 received a telegram from b6 which stated that SUBJECT would arrive in KAISERSLAUTERN and meet her in the railroad station at 1530 hours. Frau b6 met SUBJECT and talked with him until 1800 hours at which time she departed and the b1 arrested him.

3. Upon questioning, by CIC agents, SUBJECT gave the Code Number EKF-310 and stated that he was working for a US Agency whose chief was named "GRHLEN".

4. All of the telephone numbers listed in Operations Memorandum 13 were called but met with negative results. When questioned, SUBJECT gave the telephone number of one b6 whom he alleged was his chief in MUNICH. When contacted and given the shipment number, as outlined in Operations Memorandum 13, b6 identified SUBJECT as one of his employees.

5. Prior to contacting SUBJECT's handling agent in MUNICH the Region XII duty agent reported the matter to the Group duty officer who contacted SUBJECT's organization. SUBJECT's identity was confirmed by telephone from Group Headquarters on 29 April 1954.

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*7/5/54 104*

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FILE NO: XII-2543

SUBJECT: b6

6. SUBJECT's release was effected and he continued on his assigned mission.

7. The man hours involved have been included in the monthly report on "Support to DAD Operations".

b6

Commanding

JRM/amb/W Mil 8719

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353

5 May 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

Activities of the  
GIESSEN

b1

b6

320524/2

III-17528

1. On 26 April 1954.

b6

b1

b1

at the GIESSEN (UTM) 32UMB7704 Refugee Center, returned from his leave. According to his own statements, the state of his health has deteriorated to such an extent that he has decided to retire on 30 June 1954 at the latest. On 2 May 1954, he went to COLOGNE (UTM) 32ULB5745 to clarify the question of his retirement.

2. b6, the interrogator for the b1 at the GIESSEN Refugee Center will not report to COLOGNE on 1 May 1954 for his new assignment as first anticipated, inasmuch as the appointment of b6 (cover name for b6) to replace b6 was not approved by COLOGNE, allegedly because his relatives are still residing in the Soviet Occupation Zone.

3. b6, former Bundesnachrichtenstelle (Federal Information Office - BUNAST) representative at the GIESSEN Refugee Center, is still in GIESSEN preparing himself for his new job, which is to take charge of the Pre-Screening Group B-1, to be set up at SANDBOSTEL (UTM)(nca). As yet, the Federal Ministry for Expellees has not given permission for the B-1 office to be set up at SANDBOSTEL.

4. b6 of the STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203 office of the Gehlen Group has been replaced as contact man with OELISNER-WOLLER by b6 residing in b6. Telephone number is b6.

SOURCE: "I"

B-2

5. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

360

4 - Hq, 66th CIC Grp  
1 - CIC Central File

1 - Reg III File

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CO, HQ 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
 Attn: b6 CS Office DATE: 26 April 1954

FROM : T.C. Hughes, OCA

SUBJECT: b1 Operation "DACHSBAU".

Reference is made to my memo of 15 April 1954, file b1  
 SUBJECT as above, and to previous correspondence on this SUBJECT.

With particular reference to that information contained in paragraph 4 c of the above referenced memorandum concerning the utilization of a code expert on the staff of SDU to achieve a solution of the code used in "DACHSBAU", I inquired of Mr. F.J. Stalder of OCA who that so-called code expert might be. Mr. Stalder informed me that the expert would be a certain b6 of the BAD CODESBERG "Aussenstelle" of SDU. In response to my inquiry as to what SDU was doing with an "Aussenstelle" in BAD CODESBERG, Mr. Stalder stated--only partially answering the question--that b6 was working together with the Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) on codes.

It is requested that the contents of this memo, unless the information has been previously provided from other sources, not be discussed by representatives of your Hqs with non-CIC personnel inasmuch as Mr. Stalder may have committed a security breach in revealing this information to me and be considerably embarrassed by having it traced back to him.

Information copy to:

b6 CS Office  
 Hq 66th CIC Group, USAREUR

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 18 APR. 1954

TCH

C  
 2-2-2

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CO, Hq 66th EIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: [b6] CS Office

23 April 1954

T.C. Hughes, OCA

[b6]

*file in*  
*D-320529/2*

On 9 April 1954, Mr. Harry Harmsdorf of OCA, who is charged with OCA liaison to the [b1], stated to me that [b6] intends to remove SUBJECT from his present position in the [b1] office. According to [b6], the basis for [b6] intention is that pressure is being brought to bear on [b6] by former General GEHLEN of SDU who refused to provide the [b1] office with military intelligence information as long as [b6] [b6], former head of the [b1] office positive intelligence collection section, was associated with the office. GEHLEN's objections were allegedly based on security grounds. Inasmuch as [b6] was closely associated with [b6] during the latter's tenure at the [b1] office and one of [b6] supporters, GEHLEN stands to regard [b6] in much the same light as [b6] and is pressuring for his removal. Another reason advanced by [b6] for his intended relief of [b6] is the latter's alleged close ties to monarchist circles.

According to [b6] does not necessarily intend to fire [b6] but feels that he will have to transfer him to a less sensitive position within the office.

For your information.

C  
2-2-2

~~FOR EIC EYES ONLY~~

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**Confidential**

b1



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23 April 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group

b6

III-34873

1. According to his own words in February 1954, SUBJECT was no longer connected with the Gehlen Organization, at least not officially, although he has stated that his connections remain as before. As a result of the recent Gehlen Organization fiascos in BERLIN (UTM) 33UUU9220, the resident offices had been withdrawn. SUBJECT himself was trying to return to diplomatic service.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

2. SUBJECT's connections outside of Germany are a b6 b6 in Switzerland, and b6 of PARIS, France, a member of the organization "Peace and Liberty". This connection is maintained by b6, alias b6 because SUBJECT himself is frequently away. b6 constantly travels between BONN (UTM) 32ULB-7629, LINDAU (UTM) (nca), BASEL, Switzerland, and PARIS, France. For the past few months SUBJECT has traveled at regular intervals to HAPPEKRUG (UTM) (nca) near TRAVEMUENDE (UTM) (nca), although the purpose of the trips is unknown. b6 are considered doubtful characters.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

3. SUBJECT actually continues to work for the Gehlen Organization and his primary mission is the maintenance and sometimes recruiting of informants in the various Ministries and agencies in the Federal Republic Capitol. These contacts are maintained on a monetary and social basis. Heinz FELFE\* of the Kaiser Ministry is included among SUBJECT's informants in BONN, this contact running over b6

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

4. SUBJECT devotes himself to the maintenance of contacts at the highest level and he is supposed to have established close personal contact with the personal advisor to the Federal Chancellor, b6. In the Summer of 1952, during the Chancellor's vacation sojourn on the Buergenstock (a mountain in Switzerland), SUBJECT followed and maintained contact with b6. At that time, SUBJECT was accompanied by the Oberbuergermeister of BAD GODESBERG (UTM) 32ULB7619 and a manufacturer by the name of b6 from ANDERNACH (UTM) 32LUA8789, who is engaged in the Chamotte (fire clay) industry. b6 brags of good connections with leading

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6724

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-23 April 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group

b6

III-34873

political personalities, in particular with the Federal Chancellor.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

5. The Schleswig-Holstein representative of the Volkabund fuer Frieden und Freiheit (People's League for Peace and Freedom - VFF) in KIEL (UTM) 32UNP7321, a certain b6, in agreement with SUBJECT, maintains an intelligence not which extends deep into the Soviet Zone. b6 likes to occupy himself with military matters, although his wartime rank was that of a Major in the reserves and he understands very little regarding the significance of military intelligence.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

6. The name of the ammunition manufacturer and father-in-law of b6 alias b6 of the Gehlen Organization, whom SUBJECT met in BERCHTESGADEN (UTM) 32UUM5078, is b6.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

7. The family name of the cousin of Fraeulein b6, who works for SUBJECT in his BONN VFF office, is (Fnu) b6 approximately fifty-two (52) years of age, unmarried, and former resident of MÜNSTERLANER-Raubkammer, where her mother still lives.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

8. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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-22 April 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group

HELBOLD, Phillip

file in  
D-320529/3

III-35007

1. SUBJECT, an employee of the Gehlen Organization and soon to be transferred to the Gehlen headquarters in MUNICH (UTM) 32UPU9134, was born 19 December 1905 and resides at SCHWAEBISCH HALL (UTM) 32UNV5440, Bahnhofstrasse 5. SUBJECT began his employment with the Gehlen Organization as the KIEL (UTM) 32UNF7321 representative under [b6]. SUBJECT is the main organizer or central figure of the former Sicherheitsdienst (Security Office - SD) personnel within the Gehlen Organization, including Heinz PELFE\*, [b6], [b6], [b6] and [b6].

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

2. SUBJECT, an "Alter Kaeampfer" (old fighter), was, in 1933, Mayor of BILGEN (UTM) (noa). During the war SUBJECT was for a short time a soldier and later Stadtkommissar (City Commissioner) in MUEHLHAUSEN (UTM) (noa) on the Elbe. A brother of SUBJECT was the right hand man of Gauloiter [b6] who was executed by the French. The brother is now located in Wuerttemberg working for the State government. Through a friend, the brother was able to accomplish the denazification of SUBJECT, although under false conditions.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

3. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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244/24 93

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20 April 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group

Activities of the [b1] GIESSEN

III-17528

1. On 29 March 1954, the B-I office of the [b1] [b1] at the GIESSEN (UTM) 32UMB7704 Refugee Center received instructions that, effective 1 April 1954, each field office will make out a file card on every person passing through the office. Cards will be made out on the source of a report, as well as on all persons mentioned in a report, even if a file card has already been made out previously for the same person or persons. Carbon copies of the file cards will be made at the same time and a copy kept in the file of each field office submitting the information. Further information concerning these file cards was to be sent to each office in the very near future.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

2. On 19 March 1954, [b6] of the STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203 office of the Gehlen Group visited Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER\*, Chief of the [b1] at the GIESSEN Refugee Center, at which time [b6] [b1] informed OELSNER-WOLLER that the original contact between the [b1] at the GIESSEN Refugee Center and the "H" office of the Gehlen Group located at DARMSTADT (UTM) 32UMA7525 will not be re-established in the near future. There are two (2) reasons for this decision: until recently, OELSNER-WOLLER had still been providing the Gehlen Group with the names of various sources of special kinds, for example, skilled workers and scientists who fled from the East Zone or the Soviet Union. Allegedly, he has been told not to do this any more, because of an agreement with US agencies that these people are not to be submitted to several interrogations. Secondly, the DARMSTADT office is unable to cope with all the work which has been sent to it. However, particularly important cases will still be reported to DARMSTADT via [b6] in STUTTGART. This means that [b6] will continue to act as liaison between these two (2) offices.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

3. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APO 403, US Army

20 April 1954  
(Date)

*file* ✓  
D- 320529  
(CIC File No.)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file III-34419  
dated 9 Apr 1954, subject: Gehlen Organization

Source: X-933-Hq.

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 13 (thirteen) (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

Information is impossible to evaluate at this time.  
Source rating may be raised at such time as information is confirmed.

Desire any and all information available on this Subject.  
Information to be transmitted by TWX.

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FEB 04 2009

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

b6

(Analyst)

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20/4/54 90

gnr/15 Apr 54

D-320529/2

SUBJECT: GENHEM GRUPPE

7 1954

TO: Liaison Officer  
Department of Army Detachment  
APO 757, United States Army

1. This headquarters has received information, evaluated F-3, that no American subsidies will be paid to the GENHEM Gruppe after 30 June 1954. Effective 1 July 1954 the West German Federal Government will subsidize the organization in its continued activities. This agreement was allegedly reached on 25 March 1954 in a BONN conference between GENHEM and federal government representatives.

2. It is requested that this headquarters be advised as to the accuracy of this information.

b6

Colonel, CHIC  
Commanding

LPL/gnr/Stgt 9342-7382

m/r: Self-explanatory. The info was read through a subsource of former Campus source X-933-Mq. b6

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28/19/4/54

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

9 April 1954

III-34419

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. FORWARDED: SOI, subject and file as above, dated 9 April 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A" is X-933-Hq.
- b. Evaluation of Source: Source is temporarily evaluated F.
- c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.
- d. How Information was Obtained: The information was obtained from subsource [b1] who had access to the documents concerned.
- e. Date on Which Information Was Obtained: The information was obtained on 28 and 31 March 1954.
- f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, [b6] on 1 April 1954.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.
- h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

- a. Any further information regarding this matter will be reported when it is received.
- b. The identity of subsource [b1] is a matter of record at Headquarters 66th CIC Group.
- c. This report was prepared by S/A [b6]

14 APR 1954

b6

Commanding

26963

5964  
Incls: a/s  
JTD/kvy/49-833

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85

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

9 April 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. According to a record in the Federal Chancellory, there will be no American subsidies paid to the Gehlen Organization after 30 June 1954. Beginning 1 July 1954 the Federal Government will undertake these payments. On 25 March 1954 there was a conference held in BONN (UTM) 32ULB7623 on this particular subject. General Reinhard-GEHLEN\* was represented by his assistant, b6

b6

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

2. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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FEB 04 2000  
by USAINSCOM/FOLPA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

CIC FILE

D-30529/12

15 April 1954

(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region III, 66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 777, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your region, file III-2449, subject: Gehlen Organization, dated 9 Apr 54, contributed to by I-933-Hq.
2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index of 13 (See reverse side for scale).

3. The following comments are submitted for your information and guidance:

a. Source:

- IX (1) appears well oriented
- (2) appears fairly well oriented
- (3) appears poorly oriented
- (4) appears to be provocateur, double agent or fabricator

b. Target Coverage Attained:

- (1) direct coverage or penetration
- IX (2) partial coverage or penetration
- (3) peripheral
- (4) indirect
- (5) target not considered covered

c. Operational Direction:

- (1) no further reports desired
- IX (2) further reports desired
- (3) answer unfulfilled portions of EEIs
- (4) reorient your source
- (5) determine future use of source with Technical Specialist.

4. Remarks: a. Confirmation of the information in the above referenced report has been requested from DAD. Your region will be advised of the DAD reply.

b. It is desired that this headquarters be advised concerning the continued contact of sub-source b1 by source I-933-Hq, since it had been reported previously that this contact had been or was to be broken. Is source-sub-source contact regular? Occasional? Etc.

b6

CASE OFFICER

375

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86/5/4/54

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1 April 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group

b6

*file in*  
*D-320529*

III-34873

1. SUBJECT is now the First Chairman of the VFF (Volksbund fuer Frieden und Freiheit - People's League for Peace and Freedom), with offices in BONN (UTM) 32ULB7623, Schnumburg-Lippe Strasse 2, and residence in [b6]

[b6] He is the son of a former Prussian General and was discharged from the German Army at the end of the first World War as a Lieutenant. Early in the 1920s he was in the United States, then went to India as the private secretary of an Indian Princess. After the British forced his dismissal from this position, the Princess on the occasion of a visit to BERLIN brought SUBJECT into contact with the Adlon hotel enterprises and he became a director of this firm. He is said to have functioned as hotel director from the beginning of the 1930s until the outbreak of the war in 1939. During this period he came in contact with Admiral Wilhelm CANARIS, for whom he worked. He built up the Adlon enterprises as an intelligence network. It has been rumored that SUBJECT also used this network for the Gestapo, for tactical reasons, but this allegation is as difficult to clarify as the real position of Admiral CANARIS during the various phases of the Third Reich. SUBJECT also had connections with the Foreign Office during the Third Reich. It was reported at the time that he was particularly close to [b6] who was relieved as Chief of Protocol in 1936. [b6] was known in BERLIN as "Auntie" [b6] because of his homosexual tendencies.

2. At the outbreak of the war, SUBJECT, as a reserve officer, entered into service and was assigned to the Wehrmacht. At the time of the German offensive into Russia, SUBJECT was associated with [b6] in KOVNO, who before the Russian offensive was the German Military Attaché to the three Baltic countries. [b6] had also been Military Attaché in Spain and was executed by the Soviets in 1947. Near the end of the war, SUBJECT was in LISBON, Portugal, where, according to his own words, he figured in the rescue of Dr. Otto JUNE from the Gestapo. For reasons which have not been determined, the French government authorities have barred travel through France to SUBJECT, and on his Easter 1953 visit to LISBON he was forced to go through Switzerland and Spain.

3. After the war, SUBJECT appeared in HAMBURG (UTM) 32USB6553, where he shared an interest in various enterprises. In 1950, SUBJECT appeared in BONN, where he made immediate contact with Dr. [b6] the former anti-Commintern Chief under [b6]. Through this contact, SUBJECT became a member of the VFF, for which organization he is today the Federal Chairman. At the

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1 April 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group

b6

111-34873

same time, SUBJECT is an important member of the Gehlen Organization, although it is not known when he first joined. When he came to BONN, SUBJECT was well off financially and drove an Adler-Trumpf car, which in 1951 was traded for a Porsche. He explained that he had taken over the used auto from a business friend in HAMBURG whose tax debt he had paid. This was not true, because the car was new. SUBJECT now drives an Opel-Kapitan, for the acquisition of which he provides a similar story. An automobile expert has determined that the automobile SUBJECT now drives was brand new when he got it.

4. SUBJECT was married in 1938 in HAMBURG to a divorcee with two (2) children who came from FREIBERG (UTM) 32UUS8442, in the Soviet Zone. The wife brought one of her children, a girl, to live with SUBJECT and herself. This child is now in a Protestant Boarding School in KAISERSWERTH (nca). No children were born to SUBJECT and his wife. Well informed circles have hinted that SUBJECT has homosexual tendencies and does not engage in normal relations with his wife. [b6] has also indicated that he regards SUBJECT as a homosexual.

5. SUBJECT resides on the ground floor of a house in [b6] [b6] the second floor of which was, until recently, occupied by an American Signal or Postal Officer, with whom SUBJECT was socially acquainted. SUBJECT's expenditures for rent, help and transportation amount to approximately 1,000 DM a month.

6. The liaison man between SUBJECT and the Gehlen Organization is one [b6], also known as [b6], who resides in MUNICH (UTM) 32UUS9134, and is one of General GEHLEN's closest co-workers. SUBJECT received his payments in MUNICH from one [b6]. [b6] secretary is one Frau [b6], who was secretary to SUBJECT in LISBON and is still a close friend. Both SUBJECT and [b6] use the familiar German "Du" when speaking to each other and SUBJECT calls her his "big sister". When SUBJECT travels to MUNICH, he normally stays in a hotel opposite the Hauptbahnhof, probably the Palest. Before SUBJECT makes contact with [b6], he always sees [b6] at the hotel. On the occasions when he travels to MUNICH, SUBJECT tells the VFF that he is visiting the regional representative of the VFF, [b6]. In addition to [b6] SUBJECT, during his MUNICH visits, also sees a "Frasenbogen" or "Haenenbogen" [b6] of AEG BERLIN. [b6] is allegedly a homosexual. In June

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1 April

Region III, 66th CIC Group

b6

III-34873

or July 1953 the ASG, through [b6], gave SUBJECT for the VFP an amount of 3,000DM. In this connection, it is believed that SUBJECT, for the advancement of his various intelligence and business projects, uses a homosexual clique.

7. A German radio dealer from MADRID has repeatedly visited SUBJECT in BONN. This German is in some way connected with intelligence work, although for whom is unknown, probably not for Spain. It is known only that this person once was to intervene for SUBJECT in PARIS concerning a visa refusal. The person is described as being around forty (40) years of age, medium build, short, with blond hair, and probably from the Rhine-land.

8. On Monday, 18 January 1954, after having spent the weekend in upper Bavaria, SUBJECT called from his office a [b6] Ministerialrat of the Federal Ministry of Interior for the Federal Border Police, and said, "I have made a wager; tell me please, which type of ammunition is used for the most part by the Federal Border Police?" Apparently SUBJECT did not obtain the desired information, since he subsequently sent an acquaintance to [b6] to ask for the same information. [b6] answered to the effect that SUBJECT, being a former soldier, should know which calibre corresponded to the 98-K rifle. It is believed that the motivation behind SUBJECT's request for this particular information was a recent meeting between SUBJECT and [b6] father-in-law in BERCHTESGADEN (UTM) 22UUM5078. The father-in-law of [b6] was formerly engaged in the production of ammunition and he probably has the intention to again produce same.

9. SUBJECT is both chairman of the VFP and a Gehlen functionary. Correspondingly, he applies different tactics to each endeavor. Secretary in SUBJECT's "Gehlen affairs" office is one Fraulein [b6]. This office is located in BONN, Schaumburg-Lippe Strasse. [b6], although a cripple, is considered very intelligent. She previously worked for SUBJECT in HAMBURG and was also formerly connected with the Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk (Northwest German Radio - NWDR), also in HAMBURG. Her steady employment was with [b6] and she worked for SUBJECT on the side.

10. The investigations for the Gehlen Organization in the VFP office in Schaumburg-Lippe Strasse are handled by one [b6] [b6] formerly a Regierungsrat with the Reich Main Security Office, Department I (RSHA-I). All VFP dealings are handled in a cover

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1 April 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group

b6

111-34873

office in BONN, Alexanderplatz 20, the original VFP office. Two of the people in this office are b6, cover name b6 and a female cousin of b6 whose name is unknown. b6 was formerly a Gehlen man and still has connections with Gehlen employees. b6 legal residence is in b6 where after the war he obtained his residence through a member of French intelligence. b6 possesses a passport and valid visas for many countries, among them Spain. He works with a Russian emigre organization known as NTS (Nation Workers' Union) and has connections to Radio Free Europe in MUNICH. In addition to these connections, b6 is frequently in the company of the press representative of the Spanish Ambassador in BONN, whose name is b6

11. The cousin of b6 came to BONN from MUNSTERLAGER-Rauchkammer, where she was chief secretary to a ranking British Intelligence officer, with whom she still corresponds. There is still another unidentified woman who takes care of SUBJECT's foreign correspondence. She is a friend of b6

12. For years SUBJECT has availed himself of the teletype machines of NSDR for the transmission of information. The availability of the machines was made possible through the efforts and connections of BRUNNENHUBER. The communications go to HAMBURG, where the VFP representative, b6 Poststrasse 13 receives them. When he has something to be sent, he calls a secretary from NSDR to come and get it. The secretary he calls works for an NSDR official who is a good friend of SUBJECT's. The communications are signed by SUBJECT with the name of b6 Also, some communications are telephoned by b6 from BONN to HAMBURG to the telephone number b6

13. A b6 or b6, closely associated with b6 is known to SUBJECT. b6 has warned SUBJECT to stay away from the man, but SUBJECT has continued the contacts, receiving probably inaccurate information. SUBJECT's introduction to b6 or b6 came about through a b6 from Switzerland, who appears on occasion at the Alexanderstrasse 20 office.

14. Together with a female Legation Counsellor First Class (of nobility), employed by the German Federal Government Foreign Office, SUBJECT has discussed a plan to build up the BAD GOESBERG "Redoute" as an intelligence center similar to the Adlon, with SUBJECT having business control. This project however, like the one proposed at the

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1 April

Region III, 66th CIC Group

b6

III-34873  
Hotel Krone near the Bahnhof in BONN, fell through. The lady with whom SUBJECT dealt could probably be easily identified since she is the only female Counsellor in the Foreign Office.

15. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

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CID 34 1087

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APO 403  
31 March 1954

350.09 (GID:CI:CS)

SUBJECT: Cehlen Group

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
Attn: b6

1. Forwarded for your information is one (1) copy of a report from DAD/SEU on the recent compromise of Cehlen-activities in the Soviet Zone.

2. Should retention of the subject document be desired by your office, it is requested that a photostatic copy be made and the inclosed copy returned to this division.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

b6

1 Incl: a/s

DHK/jm/Heid Mil 8008

Chief, CI Branch

1 APR 1954

ESSENTIAL  
DOW

ATTN: FILE

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FOREIGN NATIONALS

I. The following is an account of the nature, extent and effects of the major SFS/Soviet Intelligence executive actions against the GEHLEN organization since 29 October 1953. A brief description of the ensuing DDR press and propaganda campaign against GEHLEN is also included.

II. During the past three years, the GEHLEN organization has conducted positive intelligence operations in the DDR which utilized an average of 650 agents within the Soviet Zone. This figure takes into account expected turnover, seasonal personnel gains or declines and "normal" security losses to enemy intelligence services of varying but usually rather limited extent. Over this three-year period, and in fact throughout the entire history of the GEHLEN organization, the eastern bloc failed to grasp several obvious opportunities to publicize the GEHLEN service. From time to time, arrested GEHLEN agents were personally identified, but the organization itself was never exposed by Eastern publicity organs, although enemy intelligence services were without doubt capable of supporting such exposes, at least to a limited extent. Any evaluation of the significance of both the actual arrests described below, and the ensuing press and propaganda campaign against the GEHLEN organization should be viewed in this context.

III. Out of a total of just over 700 agents active in the Soviet Zone at the beginning of October, 1953, to date 70 are known or presumed arrested, while 16 fled to Safety; their services as agents obviously lost. A number of dropped agents, whose names were unfortunately compromised, were also arrested, but these arrests do not affect current operations. Though total losses were unusually serious, they were reasonably well contained by operational compartmentalization. It is fortunately true that the Eastern propaganda effort was forced to include cases up to three years old (several such cases were never GEHLEN controlled, but belonged to other Western agencies) in order to make the sudden blow against GEHLEN appear catastrophic.

IV. Presented below is a brief review of the three specific GEHLEN organization cases which incurred the losses described and set the propaganda wheels rolling. No attempt is made to compare or refute the Eastern press versions of these cases.

A. b6 Case

1. b6 was employed by a GEHLEN agent leader named b6 b6 alias b6 as a courier from Berlin to Thuringia on 1 September 1952. By November, 1952, b6 had offered his nephew as a transportation information source in East Berlin. At the same time, b6 offered one b6 for W/T training.

2. On 1 March 1953, b6 was allowed to recruit a courier to a Soviet Zone couple already trained and in place as a W/T team. On 11 April 1953, this courier was arrested and turned by the SFS, but fled to Berlin and reported this fact. The W/T team was warned and fled to safety. b6 may or may not have been connected with the arrest and subsequent turning of the courier, and this incident is cited merely as a possible indication of the time b6 himself became an SFS agent. At any rate, b6 was not connected with this incident by the GEHLEN organization and he so completely gained b6 confidence that he b6 was installed as an office worker during July, 1953, in the operational office of b6 in West Berlin. The organization was about to promote b6 when he fled.

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3. On 29 October 1953, the [b6] made inquiries about [b6] based on a report of suspicion of the [b6] office by a woman whom [b6] had interviewed for a secretarial position. [b6] was not present at the time of the Krippe visit and was warned by [b6] of the police interest in him. As an Eastern double agent, [b6] understandably jumped to the conclusion that his penetration work had been discovered, made a final unauthorized night check of the office on 29 October 1953, and fled with a quantity of files. Presumably, [b6] had SFS assistance in his decision to flee, since three arrests of [b6] agents were made during the course of 29 October. The first DDR bulletins on the "defection" of [b6] were broadcast on 30 October, and were followed by highly detailed press coverage. This coverage consisted of a clever use of the considerable factual material available to the enemy, combined with purely propaganda claims notably including the false assertion that the GEMLEN organization was engaged in sabotage activities.

4. The exact date and circumstances under which [b6] was recruited by the SFS has not been determined. Resulting investigation did reveal that the W/T agent recruited by [b6] had been turned since April, 1953. This agent, when fortunately apprehended and interrogated, was firmly and probably rightly convinced that he had been betrayed by [b6] therefore indicating that [b6] had been under SFS control at least since April, 1953.

5. Without detracting from the obviously well executed SFS management of [b6] it should be noted that subsequent investigation indicated that inefficient and actually dishonest operations by [b6] made possible the entire coup. Ironically, an independent investigation of [b6] sub-organization based upon suspicion of financial and operational irregularities was already under way, but not sufficiently advanced to have made any significant discoveries. An organizational weakness which contributed to SFS success was the fact that the [b6] unit had been allowed to grow to outsized (and incidentally insecure) proportions compared with other GEMLEN units of a similar level. The loss in agent personnel numbered 53 persons.

#### B. [b6] Case

1. During the night of 13/14 November 1953, a trusted GEMLEN agent leader named [b6] was engaged in preparation of a wire-laying operation intended to establish a clandestine communication link spanning the Berlin sector boundary in the vicinity of the point where Kieholzstrasse crosses from the American to the Soviet Sector. Isolating [b6] were [b6] and [b6], who were intended to service, respectively, the west and east terminals of the line once it was installed. Although for various fairly sound reasons the GEMLEN organization labels the [b6] Case a kidnapping and declines to believe the publicized Eastern statements that [b6] was arrested in the East Sector of Berlin, the fact remains that the actual circumstances under [b6] and his companions came into SFS custody are not known. The three were, nevertheless, captured, along with several items of equipment which were later proudly displayed by the Eastern propaganda experts.

2. A surprisingly few hours after the presumed time of arrest, [b6] received a call from an individual using [b6] alias instructing her to bring from her bedroom a briefcase containing [b6] records by taxi to a point where she would

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be met. As an authenticator, the caller had already caused a letter in [b6] own handwriting to be placed in the [b6] mail box. The letter, obviously dictated, instructed [b6] to comply, and in a natural state of confusion she did so. She was met by a person who may have been identical with [b6], and conducted to a point at the sector boundary where the person seized the bag and escaped into the Soviet Sector when challenged by a West Berlin policeman.

3. As a result of this incident, a total of 16 agents, including couriers, reporting sources and a W/T operator were either definitely arrested or are presumed arrested. However, an almost equal number were successfully warned. [b6] himself, together with several of his agents have since been subject to a show trial which has been thoroughly reported by the DDR press, and have received long prison sentences (life for [b6]). Instead of tracing the simple facts of [b6] undoubted guilt, the trial, whose political motivation was unmistakable, was an elaborate indictment of the GEHLEN organization.

4. In contrast to the [b6] case, efficient and careful operation by the GEHLEN field agency supervising [b6], together with [b6] own meticulous attention to detail, resulted in well defined operational compartmentalization which made the necessary subsequent GEHLEN investigations and protective measures comparatively easy to complete.

C. [b6] Case

1. [b6] was utilized by her husband [b6] as secretary to handle the paper work connected with his agent leader activities for the GEHLEN organization. On 14 November 1953, despite many previous warnings, [b6] went voluntarily into the Soviet Sector. She claims that she was simply concerned for the safety and comfort of her partially disabled mother, who was arriving from Halle at an East Berlin rail station, that she was drawn without thinking seriously of security to meet her mother at the railway terminus rather than at the appointed West Berlin U-Bahnhof. While in the railway station, [b6] and her mother were arrested by East Sector authorities who held them temporarily in Berlin and then removed them to Halle where the mother was released, and [b6] was intensively interrogated for over two weeks. [b6] claims that she was interrogated solely concerning her husband's former activities on behalf of the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, and that only at the very end of her interrogation was she questioned as to her possible knowledge of the GEHLEN organization.

2. On 30 November 1953, [b6] was released in Halle with instructions to return to Berlin and to ascertain before the date of an arranged future meeting the nature of her husband's current activities.

3. The GEHLEN organization is still engaged in the interrogation of [b6]. For various reasons, it is believed that she has not yet been broken. Her version of her arrest, interrogation and subsequent SFS-assigned mission is inconsistent and illogical. Neither she nor her husband have been cooperative with GEHLEN personnel attempting to clarify the case. The mission which she allegedly received from the SFS does not appear genuine. Yet despite existing doubts, many factors argue against either herself or her husband having been SFS doubles prior to her voluntary venture out of West Berlin. All suspicious aspects to the contrary, it is just possible that her arrest was purely chance, that police coordination turned up

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previous record in Halle, that interrogation naturally concerned that previous record, and that the interrogators were so preoccupied with the earlier aspect of the case that they neglected to consider seriously the chance that her husband was GEMLEN-connected. Finding [b6] of no great use or interest, the Sfs may then have released her, having no more in mind than the assumption that her husband must maintain current intelligence connections in West Berlin which would inevitably reveal themselves to an intensively applied surveillance. In fact, [b6] was covered for several days in West Berlin by an enemy surveillance which culminated at a crucial meeting held between [b6] and GEMLEN interrogators while 15 rather definitely identified surveillants watched the outside of the West Berlin address.

4. Fortunately, [b6] only knew the true names and addresses of four GEMLEN agents in the Soviet Zone, and all of these were warned in time. Naturally, these persons are no longer available as informants.

V. Press Exploitation

A. The extremely thorough and effective DDR press exploitation of the above-mentioned cases represented only the first phase of a well planned DDR propaganda action against the GEMLEN organization. Fairly rapidly, older and sometimes non-GEMLEN cases were reported in the DDR press as new Sfs successes. Beginning with the trial of [b6], the considerable knowledge of the GEMLEN organization which the Sfs had gained from [b6] was utilized to good advantage. [b6] had been kidnapped from West Berlin during February, 1953, and has remained since in Soviet captivity in Karlshorst.

B. The expanding DDR press campaign soon consisted of general articles designed for purely propaganda effect emphasizing the "criminal" nature of the GEMLEN organization, its "sabotage activities," and its alleged Nazi, Fascist and German General Staff roots. GEMLEN was accused of operating against the French. Undetected GEMLEN agents in the DDR were urged to surrender and repent in return for amnesty. Although no thorough analysis can be attempted here, it may be assumed that some of the more obvious objectives were:

1. Mustering of antipathy in the minds of the DDR populace against agent operations;
2. Stamping of agents as yet undetected;
3. Establishing the reputation of the new WOLLMEIER Sfs regime; and
4. Arousing of French fears of the German menace as related to EDC ratification.

C. In its climactic blasts against GEMLEN, the DDR press published several general releases on the size, organization, physical location, and personnel of the GEMLEN organization. Though in many details outdated and inaccurate, the exposures were certainly of such a nature as to impress the uninformed public and, it must be admitted, to startle thoroughly the GEMLEN organization itself. Nevertheless, careful study justifies the conclusion that the releases were not nearly as serious in their implications as had been feared. In short, in virtually every case, analysis revealed the probable means whereby each item of information found its way into enemy intelligence hands and eventually into the press releases. In no case did a

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penetration seems probable. On the other hand the GEBLEN security measures have realized any information originating with a penetration in place and have been thoroughly camouflaged. Roughly, the DDR release material, however, course, is as follows:

1. Relatively widely known and previously publicized (in the West) information on the general structure of the GEBLEN organization and on its relationship with the Bonn Government and the Americans.

2. Information concerning GEBLEN headquarters and the American staff which filtered down through the Gehlen training schools and main field bases to chief agent personnel subsequently captured by the SFS or Soviets. Principal person involved here is b6

3. Personality and organizational information about GEBLEN field agencies known to agent leader, personnel now in SFS or Soviet hands.

4. Miscellaneous carded data collected over a considerable period of time in connection with various older flaps assumed by the enemy (partially incorrectly) to be GEBLEN cases.

5. A small number of scattered facts, the method of whose disclosure to the enemy cannot yet be conjectured.

6. Briefs and ERI's sent from GEBLEN headquarters to the field agencies.

Detailed analysis of the general disclosures are still in progress, and corrective organizational, administrative, personnel changes are being accomplished. Understandably, the GEBLEN service is conducting an intensified search for possible penetrations in place.

D. The most recent aspect of the DDR press campaign has been expanded to include all of American intelligence. When considered together with the previous intense anti-GEBLEN effort, this last phase has been interpreted as a possible indication that Western intelligence activities against the DDR may be proposed by the Soviets as an agenda item for the current Berlin Four Power Conference. Conjecture on this point is out of place here.

#### VI. Direct Effect upon Intelligence Operations of the GEBLEN Organization

A. The direct effect of the SFS/Soviet executive measures against the GEBLEN organization has been described above in the operational terms of agents lost.

B. The impact of the DDR propaganda campaigns against the GEBLEN organization (as well as other Western intelligence agencies) with respect to Soviet Zone operations cannot be judged and must be viewed only as one factor which may partially explain such declines in the rate of positive reporting as may occur.

C. To date, the following effect upon GEBLEN positive reporting from the Soviet Zone has been observed:

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1. During recent months, reports disseminated by the Soviet Zone totaled as follows:

May, 1953 . . . . .	326
September, 1953 . . . . .	374
December, 1953 . . . . .	514
January, 1954 . . . . .	450.

2. The above indicates a slight drop in January in the number of reports received from the Soviet Zone. However, the level of reporting is similar to that of the production during the corresponding period of 1953. The stringent security measures instituted by the COMINT organization and all reliability requirements are the cause for the present slight decrease in the number of reports from the Soviet Zone. The psychological reaction of agents to Soviet disclosures of American secrets, together with the COMINT organization. The organization reports a general attitude among agents that now "more than ever" they must continue their work.

3. Certain security measures in effect as a result of the above measures will be incorporated into new standard operational procedures. Therefore, reliability will have a permanent effect upon reports production.

4. The American element, U.S., feels unqualified to comment upon the possible effect of all the above on future American intelligence operations in the Zone of Germany.

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b6

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

320529/2

15 March 1954

FILE: IV-31861; D-320529

SUBJECT: Studiengesellschaft zur Forderung Wissenschaftlicher  
Arbeiten GmbH (Student Assn. for the Furtherance of  
Scientific Works).

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: IRS, Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, Subject and file  
as above, dated 28 May 1953, and answering correspondence Region IV,  
MUNICH, Subject and file as above, dated 26 June and 29 July 1953.

2. In reference to the allegations reported in the above referenced  
b1 the Gehlen Group, it may be noted  
that b6 Special Detachment USAREUR, Liaison Officer.  
has initiated b1  
b1 is identical  
with SUBJECT agency. It is the opinion of Region IV, MUNICH, therefore,  
that SUBJECT agency is a b1

3. The business manager of SUBJECT agency is General Horst von  
WELLENTHIN, born 31 July 1898, in HANNOVER 320ND50, Germany, who was a  
former Colonel, and later General, of the German General Staff during  
World War II. He is known to have connections with the Gesellschaft  
fuer Wehrkunde (Society for Military Science), MUNICH, Lamontstrasse 21.

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H-34419

HEADQUARTERS GROUP  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

D-320529

2 MAR 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization Employees

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region III, 66th CIC Group  
APO 757, US Army

1. Reference is made to your letter, file III-34419, dated 24 February 1954, above subject, which requested Central Registry checks on several alleged employees of the Gehlen organization.

2. The following information has been obtained from Central Registry files:

a. Erich WRONGOWIUS -- a trace exists on a fnu WRONGOWIUS, who was a Rittmeister in charge of Abwehr III at KAUNAS in 1943-44. At that time he was described as about 50 years of age, 1.78 m tall, 190 lbs, spoke Russian and Lithuanian, grey hair, oval face, yellowish skin.

b. Egin von NOTZNY-GATZYNSKI -- believed to be identical with Eginhard von NOTZNY, born 29 October 1894 at HLUCIN, who served with the Abwehr from 1922 onwards and was a close admirer and disciple of Admiral CANARIS. NOTZNY was involved in the 20 July Plot, although Central Registry files did not indicate to what extent. He served with the Prussian police from 1922 until 1936 and during this time conducted espionage against Poland, where he was imprisoned from 1931 until 1933. NOTZNY served as chief of the Abwehr Aussonstelle INSTERBURG from 1939 until the German invasion of the USSR. He then became a FAK leader and served as chief of AST KOENIGSBERG after 1942. In connection with the vetting of X-933-HQ in 1951, NOTZNY was named as an employee of a US intelligence agency in BAD HOMBERG. He has also been reported on previously by source X-899-HQ as an employee of the Gehlen organization in charge of the establishment of sleeper nets. There are lengthy interrogation reports on NOTZNY in the Central Registry which can be made available to your region for study if so desired.

c. [b6] -- a confirmed member of the Gehlen organization who was born [b6] last known residence, [b6] [b6] was a member of the BDS from 1 May 1950 until 24 March 1951. In 1946 he was described as a competent young General Staff officer with no particular aptitude in any profession.

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D-320529

Subject: Gehlen Organization Employees

His last military assignment was in the office of the Chief of Personnel, Ia OKH/HPA/P3 -- Personalbearbeitung der aktiven General Stabs Offizieren.

b6 was then described as being 1.78 m tall, about 150 lbs, dark blond hair, grey-blue eyes, with a scar on his forehead. His wife is named b6 born b6 b6 has an aunt residing in the U.S., a b6 b6 worked for Historical Division, USFET, in 1945-46 and during this time served in CONUS installations at CARLISLE Barracks, Fort Meade and Fort Ritchie. His address in 1946 was b6

d. Fnu KLEIKAMP -- a trace exists on one Gen. Maj. Hellmuth KLEIKAMP, born 28 April 1901, a confirmed member of the Gehlen organization.

e. Fnu WIEBE -- identity cannot be established, but a Central Registry record exists on one Walter Konrad WIEBE, born 20 November 1895, a Kaapitaen-zur-See who served with the Abwehr in DANZIG, KOENIGSBERG and STETTIN from 1932 until 1945. If this is the WIEBE of interest, there is much additional information in Central Registry which can be supplied.

f. b6 - cannot identify.

g. b6 -- previously reported as a contact of source X-899-HQ. A trace exists on one b6 who served as leader of FAK 304 in 1942 and later served in Abwehr III F in KOENIGSBERG and BERLIN.

h. Fnu MUELLER -- cannot identify.

i. Fnu Von MEILENTHIN -- believed to be identical with Horst von MEILENTHIN, General of the Artillery, General Staff officer from 1932 onwards, previously reported as being connected with the Gehlen organization.

j. b6 -- cannot identify.

k. b6 - reported twice before by source X-899-HQ as being employed by the Gehlen organization.

l. Fnu SOMANN -- a trace exists on one Otto SOMANN, born 24 October 1899, former SS Oberfuehrer and Oberst der Polizei. He may be identical with the Otto SOMANN who appeared as a state witness in the b6 trial in MUNICH. A fnu SOMANN alias LANGE was reported as a Gehlen employee in the 18 December 1953 edition of "Neues Deutschland."



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Subject: Gehlen Organization Employees

m. Fmu SOMMER -- cannot identify.

n. Fritz BUSCH -- born 3 June 1905 in BERLIN. BUSCH was a high ranking member of the Gestapo and SD, PARIS, from June 1941 until December 1943. He is reported to have claimed that he was in charge of "communistic affairs investigations" during this period. BUSCH served as assistant Gestapo chief in INNSBRUCK in 1939-40 and from December 1943 until May 1945. He has been previously reported as an alleged Gehlen employee.

o. b6 -- no record.

3. It is desired that this headquarters be kept fully advised of any and all plans of source, X-899-HQ, to contact and/or approach any of the personalities listed above. Under no circumstances are any approaches to be made without complete satisfaction in the security of source and this organization and until complete details pertaining to each and every planned contact have been reported to and approved by this headquarters. In this connection, further instructions will be forthcoming.

BY ORDER OF b6

b6

WLP/amk/Stgt 9342-7382

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTR INTELLIGENCE SCRP GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization Employees

TO: Commanding Officer  
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

24 February 1954

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Date 16 Jan 54 init 2

1. It is requested that a Central Registry check be made to determine how many of the below listed personalities can be positively identified as members or agents of the Gehlen organization.

*und*  
a. ~~X~~ Erich ERONGCVIUS, WALENTE, Schleswig-Holstein, Kampstrasse 2. From 1941-1944 he was assigned to the Abwehr branch office KOVNO, of the Abwehr headquarters RIGA, East Prussia. From 1947 until 1949, he was a member of the Gehlen organization, assigned to Department I.

*1373*  
b. ~~X~~ Egin von NOTZNY-GATZYNSKI, MARBURG, Georg-Voigt Strasse 54. A former Colonel of the German army, he is presently assistant chief of the Gehlen office in BREMEN for the British Zone. After 1925 he was connected with the political police in BOCHUM. Before and during World War II he was chief of the German Abwehr Office I in KOENIGSBERG, East Prussia. His first employment after World War II was employment with the Gehlen organization.

*152.85*  
c. ~~X~~ b6  
He frequently uses the cover name of b6 and is assigned to the personnel section of the Gehlen organization.

*34712*  
d. ~~X~~ (Fnu) KLEIKAMP, former Major General, address unknown. He was until 1944 chief of section P-3, German General Staff. After 1944 he commanded a division.

e. ~~X~~ b6 In 1945, just prior to the capitulation, he is known to have been in the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), Section I, Mil. C.

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f. [b6]

may be a cover name. He has a telephone number [b6] where he is connected with the "Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung wissenschaftlicher Aufgaben M.B.H.", with central offices located at Senefeldstrasse 8, telephone 71 184.

g. [b6]

[b6] telephone [b6] was a captain, assigned to section III-f of the Abwehr, Department III, in BERLIN in 1936. [b6] is known as a very capable man and is currently active in the LUEBECK (UTM) 32UPE1107 area on important work, probably for the Gehlen organization.

h. [b6] STUTTGART, assigned to Section III of the Gehlen organization, East Zone.

i. (Fnu) von MELLENTHIN, an alleged member of the Gehlen organization, uses the cover name of MAERKER.

j. [b6]

[b6] Active in the Gehlen organization and known as one of the "Alter Kaempfer" (Old Nazis), he is assigned an office in the Verastrasse address of the Gehlen organization. Formerly [b6] was in the Sicherheits Dienst in STUTTGART and then later with the Gestapo (State Police) in TRIER and CHEMNITZ. Towards the end of the war [b6] was assistant chief of RSHA I (Personnel) and at the end of the war held the rank of SS-Obersturmfuehrer and Oberregierungsrat. He uses the cover name of [b6]

k. X Karl SCHUETZ, residing and working in STUTTGART, Verastrasse. In 1938 or thereabouts, SCHUETZ was Kriminalkommissar with the Stapo in TRIER and SAARBRUECKEN, and towards the end of the war held the rank of SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer and Kriminalrat. The name [b6] is used as a cover name, and until recently SCHUETZ was in DUESSELDORF where he was responsible for area coverage. SCHUETZ had trouble with the [b1]

[b1] He has connections with [b6] of the Industrieschutz in ESSEN.

l. X (Fnu) SOMANN, of STUTTGART, Verastrasse, and the Gehlen office in BREMEN. He introduced [b6] to the Gehlen organization. He is currently working on espionage cases against [b6] and others. He is also one of the "Alter Kaempfer".

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Ltr, dtd 24 Feb 54, subj: Gehlen Organization Employees

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m. <sup>+</sup> (Enu) SOMMER, former SS member and currently  
an alleged member of the Gehlen organization. *Parallel from K-100-1042*

109424  
20-268861  
7/11/49  
X n. Fritz BUSCH, one of the "Alter Kaempfer", who  
at the end of World War II held the rank of SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer  
and Kriminalrat. BUSCH comes from BERLIN and in 1933 was a  
member of the SA and Hilfspolizei. From 1937 until 1939 he  
was in Department II of the Stapo in TRIER and later in  
INNSBRUCK. He uses the cover name of BUSSE. It is not  
definitely determined if he worked for Gehlen or as a  
mediator from SCHUETZ. [b6]

o. [b6], who uses the name of [b6], is  
possibly a co-worker of SCHUETZ.

2. The data regarding the above mentioned individuals  
was reported by X-899-Hq to [b6] as a result  
of his contacts with various sub-sources. If the above  
mentioned personalities can be connected with the Gehlen  
organization, further information on each will be forth-  
coming.

3. The above information can be considered a progress  
report concerning Source's target survey.

[b6] /1bd/49-833

26 FEB 1954

b6

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*[Signature]*

Memorandum for Record

SUBJECT: DAD/G2, USAREUR Conference on Control of Gehlen Group

1. On 9 February 1954, representatives of this headquarters and of G2, USAREUR, met with DAD/SDU representatives in DAD Headquarters in FRANKFURT to discuss a projected CIC coverage of the Gehlen Group (SDU, German Element). This meeting was the result of a previous informal SDU statement that CIC operational cooperation was desired in maintaining security coverage of the Gehlen Group.

a. CIC representatives were: [b6]

[b6]

b. G2, USAREUR, representatives were: [b6]

[b6] representing both CI Branch and G2 Operations.

c. DAD/SDU representatives were: ([b3 For CIA] [b6])

and Mr

2. [b6] made a lengthy opening statement during which he described a series of incidents which had given rise to the G2 request for this meeting, implying all the while that SDU had never requested CIC cooperation in maintaining any security coverage of the Gehlen Group.

[b6] then projected his discussion into the future need for penetration of the Gehlen Group after it becomes an integral part of the GIS, i.e., after the Contractual Agreements. He implied that high-

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level penetration was necessary, but he did not explain this statement or attempt to indicate the separate CIA and military interests in or capabilities for obtaining such penetration.

3. At this point, [b6] was asked by [b6] to state what was meant by "high-level penetration" and, later, whether or not CIC cooperation was desired. [b6] then entered the G2 opinion that any CIC coverage of the Gehlen Group could be established only with the approval of G2, Department of Army, and that it would logically follow CIA-DIA coordination at WASHINGTON level.

4. [b6] replied that he could hardly visualize his organization forwarding a letter to CIA headquarters recommending that the Gehlen Group be added to the CIC target list. ([b6] Per CIA) then inserted his only contribution to the meeting: "It should be obvious to all that DAD is not asking CIC for help."

5. [b6] then explained that the peripheral coverage of the Gehlen Group offered by CIC in the past had been of "immense value." He then outlined the type of CIC support desired by DAD/SDU:

- a. Central Registry checks.
- b. Peripheral coverage - that is, incidental coverage of Gehlen activities, incidents or personnel coming to the attention of CIC.
- c. Coordination between SDU and CIC case officers.

6. SDU, in turn, will supply this organization with Gehlen rosters and information on the GUS which comes to its attention through Gehlen Group operations and negotiations with the Federal Government.

428

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To Here -

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7. [b6] then described at length the serious personnel reductions taking place in the 66th CIC, a cut of 400 from an overall strength of 1600 to 1200. [b6] then discussed the recent CIC letter to G2, USAREUR, requesting the elimination of certain requirements on this organization. One of the suggested eliminations, [b6] pointed out, was that of servicing DAD/SDU and other agencies with Central Registry checks and information. The Colonel explained that he simply did not have enough personnel to maintain these services.

8. [b6] replied that the Central Registry was tremendously important to US intelligence agencies in Europe and that should the elimination of such services be approved, he would attempt to offer ten persons to work in the Registry to perform the DAD/SDU checks. [b6] asked that [b6] remember his promise should matters indeed come to that point.

9. [b6] then requested both DAD and SDU to be more explicit in making Central Registry checks, especially in indicating what information or type of information was desired. This would both ease the work of those sections who form the replies to DAD/SDU and would insure that the pertinent information desired by these user agencies would be supplied with all file check results.

.. 423

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

*hy*  
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

8 February 1954

SUBJECT: DAD Cooperation in Coverage of GEHLEN Group

*file in*  
D-320529

1. Representatives of this headquarters were called upon to brief representatives of ACoS, G2, USAREUR on 5 February 1954, on the organization and operations of the GEHLEN Group (SDU, German ~~general staff~~), and to outline certain security problems of interest to USAREUR intelligence. The GIG representatives specifically pointed out ~~the~~ security factors such as:

- a. Use of old Abwehr and RSHA intelligence complexes.
- b. Failure to provide initial clearances for personnel employed.
- c. Failure to maintain <sup>adequate</sup> ~~any type~~ security operations.
- d. Sensitivity of target organization to direct penetration and/or infiltration.
- e. Sensitivity of operations and exhibited exposure of operations in eastern Germany.
- f. Undisguised political ambitions of the GEHLEN Group.
- g. Infiltration of important governmental agencies and offices.
- h. Infiltration and control of vital b1 functions.
- i. Probability of GEHLEN Group becoming the future German intelligence agency with ~~probable~~ <sup>direct</sup> connections to EDC.

2. It was decided at this meeting that G2 would propose the establishment and maintenance of a military intelligence security operation on the GEHLEN Group and that DAD would be requested to approve this operation and to cooperate with G2 in its continued function.

3. It was further decided that the approval of G2, Department of Army, is necessary before any action can be taken by G2, USAREUR, and that such approval will be sought after DAD approval and cooperation has been ~~promised~~ <sup>obtained</sup>.

4. The CIC representative pointed out that should this headquarters be assigned the mission of running the security operation on the GEHLEN Group, cooperation on the following points must be received from DAD:

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430

23 8/2/54



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a. G2, USAREUR, is to be furnished with the complete personnel rosters, including identifying data, on all German members of the GEHLEN Group.

b. G2, USAREUR, is to be furnished with a complete organizational study, including a list and description of all installations and personnel employed.

c. G2, USAREUR, is to be furnished a detailed description of GEHLEN operational missions, to include counterespionage operations, with an evaluation of the sensitivity and worth of each operation.

d. G2, USAREUR, is to be furnished with the complete description of previous internal security operations by SDU, either American or German elements.

e. G2, USAREUR, is to have access to GEHLEN security files.

f. G2, USAREUR, is to have direct liaison with the internal security section, if any, of ~~the GEHLEN Group or~~ SDU, American element.

g. G2, USAREUR, is to be furnished indications of DAD penetration.

5. No indication was given that G2, USAREUR, intends to request DAD to contribute finances or personnel to this operation. Such problems must be coordinated between this headquarters and G2, USAREUR, and resolved, should the operation be assigned to this headquarters, in one of the following manners:

a. G2 ~~must~~ <sup>to</sup> furnish additional funds and personnel to CIC for this operation.

b. G2 ~~must~~ <sup>to</sup> eliminate certain CIC target requirements already assigned but which do not hold the same priority designation.

c. G2 ~~must~~ <sup>to</sup> request DAD for funds and personnel.

b6

~~Ext 9382~~

~~Case Officer, CS Div~~

... 431

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/ The CIC representatives pointed out that should this headquarters be assigned the mission of running the security operation on the GEHLEN Group, cooperation on the following points must be received from DAD:

- a. CIC is to be furnished with the complete personnel rosters, including identifying data, background data, cover names and characterizations on all German members of the GEHLEN Group.
- b. CIC is to be furnished with a complete organizational study, including a list and description of all installations and personnel employed and all residences, safe houses, radio nets and courier personnel.
- c. CIC is to be furnished a detailed description of GEHLEN operational missions, to include counterespionage operations, with an evaluation of the sensitivity and worth of each operation and identity of agents and sources involved.
- d. CIC is to be furnished with the complete description of previous and present internal security operations by SDU, either American or German elements. Extent and standards.
- e. CIC is to have access to SDU, American element; security files, to obtain results of security investigations on GEHLEN personnel.
- f. CIC is to have direct liaison with SDU, American element, to provide for the future exchange of information.
- g. CIC is to be furnished a description of DAD levels of penetration to avoid duplication of effort.
- h. CIC is to be furnished with a roster of all GEHLEN representatives, sympathizers and contacts in the Federal and Laender governmental agencies, and major political parties.
- i. CIC is to be furnished with a list of all GEHLEN personnel who are particularly suspect but who have not been investigated.
- j. CIC is to be furnished with a list of all GEHLEN employees who are considered pro-American but who have not been exploited by DAD.

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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WLP/abb/gnr

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

4 February 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, US Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army D-320529

SUBJECT

THE GEHLEN GROUP

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 8 December 1953, Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER, Chief of the b1 b6 Refugee Center, resumed contact with the "H" office of the GEHLEN Group located in DARMSTADT (UTM) 32DMA7525 through the visit of a new man from the "H" office. This man was accompanied by (Fnu) DEHNERT of the STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203 office of the GEHLEN Group. The "H" office must have been vitally affected by the recent arrests in the Soviet Zone; since these arrests have taken place, the "H" office has become extremely cautious. From now on, carbon copies of reports from the b1 will be sent to "H" via b6 who will pass them to a b6. Whether b6 is the new man who visited OELSNER-WOLLER with b6 on 8 December 1953 is not known; however, it is presumed that he is.

(B-2)

436

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(2) - ACoS, G2, USAREUR

(1) - CIC File

(1) CIC Central File

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

Berlin, den 28. Januar 1954

Betr.: Organisation G E H L E N

Aus einem Gespräch mit dem persönlichen Referenten des Ministers [b6] geht hervor, daß dieser über die Verhaftung der GEHLEN-LEUTE sehr gut informiert war.

Feldmann behauptete, daß der Nachtwächter in einem Büro der Organisation GEHLEN alles verraten habe. Der Nachtwächter fühlte sich persönlich durch einen Mitarbeiter der vorgenannten Organisation beleidigt und zurückgesetzt und hat aus diesem Grunde den gesamten Apparat verraten.

Der Nachtwächter soll die auf der von ihm zu bewachenden Dienststelle vorhandene Kartei fotografiert haben.

Source critical

*Strongylocentrotus*

Source unchanged in this instance. . . . 437

b6

(Poa) verticillata Fy.

2AA cancelled Conf as soon as

25, 2. 18

**Abstract**

they know policies are in force.

Dropped at St. Andrew 3 Jan 53.

Collected from water by V&P in Dec 53; very

gated report in Jan. 1945.

total by 'tad all to 122, five more

provincia. How very narrow

Steady. Direct line through lens

*Agrostis flexuosa* Ehrh.

not mentioned

Santiago at same time - probably pretty close together

1. ~~From~~ From E. by the back out. 2000

many people have not been

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRANSLATION

Berlin, 28 January 1954

Subject: Organization GEHLEN

In a conversation with [b6] the personal referent of Minister [b6] it was learned that he [b6] was extremely well informed on the arrest of the GEHLEN people.

[b6] claimed that the night-watchman in an office of the Organization GEHLEN had revealed every thing. The night-watchman felt himself personally insulted and slighted by a co-worker of that Organization and for this reason betrayed the entire apparatus.

The night-watchman allegedly photographed the card file of the office which he guarded.

(B-3)

\*\*\*\*\*

3675  
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

438

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~~SECRET~~

14 January 1954

D-353673; XII-1988

b6

On 5 January 1954, (b6) (b1) case worker in this case, was interviewed and stated in substance: (b6) had been an engineer in the Junkers Aircraft Factory prior to World War II, and had served in the German Air Force during World War II. (b6) was associated with the Gehlen group as a net-leader, for a period of five years. (b6) still maintains contacts with his former associates in the Gehlen group. (b6) stated that in his present position he works completely alone, and has no additional clerical or agent help. He would like to hire assistants, but he is by law only permitted to hire persons who are presently members of the Criminal Police, or persons with rights under law 13 (former officials with tenure rights). However, (b6) does not feel that such persons would be satisfactory, and he is presently looking for a means to obtain the services of some of his former Gehlen people. (P-6)

AGENT'S NOTES: (b6) did not elaborate further on his background, nor was he questioned further on the statements he made. (b6) furnished the undersigned with the following documents, attached as EXHIBITS as indicated: Photograph of (b6) (EXHIBIT I); copy of (b1) interrogation of (b6) (EXHIBIT IV); copies of two reports forwarded by (b6) to his East Zone handling agent, (EXHIBITS II and III).

Page 1 of 5 pages  
2 of 5 copies

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b6

66th CIC Group

b6

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE  
APO 742 US ARMY

ADM ASST ED2  
TEAM CHIEF TH  
OPNS OFF Cap

D-257594; VIII-20807

8 January 1954.

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Summary of Information  
(Amnesty for Individuals Arrested in the GEHLEN Case)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: Order of Battle Office

1. Reference:

a. ICM 4-52

2. Remarks:

a. Source Control Information: Source is Y-156-VIII (P)

b. Subsource Control Information: Subsource is b1

b1 residing in b1  
b1

c. Date Information Received: 6 January 1954.

d. Handling Agent: b6

e. Comments: Y-156-VIII (P) stated that b1 made remarks as shown in attached SOI at a party on 26 December 1953. b1 told source that the information was told to him in strictest confidence b1 is an intimate friend of Y-156-VIII's former wife, with whom Y-156-VIII (P) is still friendly. b1 is supposedly a convinced Communist and is from a family of convinced Communists. Since b1 appeared to discreetly impart the information in the attached SOI, source was desirous that this information not be publicized because he himself might be indicated as source.

1 Incl:  
SOI (5)

BERLIN 42900 b6 /gmm/OB

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b6

Commanding

443

1954  
Reg VII  
200  
5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
8 January 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, OB Team VIII-20807

NHF/gmm

SUBJECT

Amnesty for Individuals Arrested  
in the GEHLEN Case.

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 26 December 1953, Y-156-VIII (P) was told by subsource that in the early part of January 1954, individuals arrested as agents, spies, and saboteurs in the recent GEHLEN case would receive an amnesty for the crimes. The trials in the recent past in the East Zone of Germany against so-called agents have been in part only show trials. According to the sub-source, approximately 60% of the individuals now working for the Western intelligence agencies in West BERLIN have been dispatched by East Zone intelligence agencies and are only apparently working for the West.

Eval: F-6

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8/1/54 4



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(Classification)

# INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

FILE No: G - 7/54

SUBJECT: Reports from the [b1]

DATE: 8 January 1954

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
-----	------	---------	------	---

1 [b1] See Dist. 8Jan54

1. Transmitted herewith are nine (9) reports received from the [b1] Refugee Center, with file numbers as follows: [b1] to [b1] inclusive. Also included is a CPI card, in duplicates, on [b6] SDU representative who, during the summer months of 1953, was appearing at the GIESSEN Refugee Center for the purpose of screening former members of the Soviet zone VOPO (People's Police). [b6] no longer appears at the Refugee Center.

## Distribution:

- 1 copy of transmittal letter to Hq, 66th CIC Group (Attn: [b6])
- 2 copies of each report to Reg III, CIC (Attn: Opns Officer)
- 1 copy of each report to file

[b6]

[b1]

13 JAN 23570

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(Classification)

451

6 January 1954

Region III, 66th CIC Group

Activities of the [b1]

BEST  
COPY →  
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III-17528

1. On 7 December 1953, there was an official conference for the pre-screening group interrogators of the [b1]

[b1]  
[b1] at their headquarters at COLOGNE (UTM) 32ULB5745. The following subjects were discussed: Recent developments in the Kessernarte Volkspolizei (Garrisoned People's Police - KVP); the relative importance of various information targets; collaboration with the [b1] offices and the nature of their work. The information targets, in order of their importance, are: Staatsekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit (State Secretariat for State Security - Sfs), border police, KVP, and miscellaneous. In connection with the question of collaboration with the BUNAST offices, it was stated that the work of the investigators at the UELZEN (UTM) 32UPD0105 and GIESSEN (UTM) 32UMA7704 Refugee Centers, in particular, was very important. It was suggested that a BUNAST man should be assigned to each of these refugee centers to investigate the possibility of establishing contacts in the Soviet Zone through defectors. The work of the BUNAST offices, especially the BUNAST office in KASSEL (UTM) 32UNB3586, was severely criticized. It was asserted that so far, the work of these offices had been completely unsuccessful, and that the reports they had been receiving from their sources were worthless. Presumably, more time will be devoted in the future in this field and the work of the organization will be improved. The conference was attended by the following: [b6] of Department II; [b6] and [b6] of Department III; [b6] from UELZEN; [b6] from GIESSEN; and the new Volkspolizei (People's Police - VP) interrogator in the BERLIN Refugee Center, whose name is unknown.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

2. There have been no changes in regard to the work of the KASSEL BUNAST. [b6], chief of the BUNAST in KASSEL, was ordered to report on 17 December 1953 for a conference in COLOGNE. Presumably he will visit GIESSEN on his way to COLOGNE.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

3. On 8 December 1953, Fritz OELSNER-WOLLER\*, Chief of the [b1]

Page 1 of 2 pages  
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4 - Hqs, 66th CIC Group; 1 - CIC Central File; 1 - Region III File

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6/1/54

6 January 1954

Ion III, 66th CIC Group,

Activities of the [b1]

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← Available  
III-17528

at the GIESSEN Refugee Center, resumed contact with the "H" office of Gehlen Group located in DARMSTADT (UTM) 32UMA7525 through the visit of a new man from the "H" office. This man was accompanied by [b6] of the STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203 office of the Gehlen Group. The "H" office must have been vitally affected by the recent arrests in the Soviet Zone; since these arrests have taken place, the "H" office has become extremely cautious. From now on, carbon copies of reports from the [b1] will be sent to "H" via [b6], who will pass them on to a [b6]. Whether [b6] is the new man who visited OELSNER-WOLLER with [b6] on 8 December 1953 is not known; however, it is presumed that he is.

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

Page 2 of 2 pages  
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a/e

453

1  
12.1.1954

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

28 December 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. Reference is made to Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 3 December 1954, and to further references apparent therein.

2. Forwarded herewith is a Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 28 December 1954.

3. Source "A" is X-1080-III, who obtained the information personally from b1 (Known to your Headquarters) on 8 December 1954 and submitted same to handling Agent b6 on 17 December 1954.

4. This report is part of a continuing project of obtaining, through b1 and incidentally through other contacts of source, information pertaining to GO personalities which may have security or CI interest.

5. Further reports will be forthcoming.

6. This report was prepared by b6

Inclo: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/amz/49-833

b6

Commanding

30 DEC. 1954

5991

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451

4 February 2009

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

AMH DTH 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

**SECRET**

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

28 December 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE

USUALLY RELIABLE

FAIRLY RELIABLE

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE

UNRELIABLE

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES

PROBABLY TRUE

POSSIBLY TRUE

DOUBTFULLY TRUE

IMPROBABLE

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The following additional personal and background information on personalities of the GO (Gehlen Organization) has become available:

a. [b6], alias [b6] used to work under the cover name [b6] and he is often referred to by this obsolete cover name by General GEHLEN\*. This often leads to minor confusion within the GO, and in articles in the Communist press of the DDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik - German Democratic Republic) in December 1953 it was stated that the correct name of the man known as [b6] was [b6] [b6] brother in SAIZBURG, Austria, owns a dairy or dairy products business, which should make it possible to check [b6] identity there.

b. [b6], alias [b6] of the BREMEN 32UNB7119, Germany, GV (General Vertretung - Main Branch), is listed in the BREMEN telephone directory at Marcusallee 45. His occupation is listed as merchant (Kaufmann). He is very autocratic in his manner ("It can be done because it must be done!"), and is typical of the German drill-martinet (reference the recent novel "08/15").

c. [b6], who was recently transferred from STUTTGART 32UNV1203, Germany, to the BREMEN GV, used the cover name [b6] in STUTTGART. It is probable that he has changed cover names since his transfer. During the last war he spent some time as an officer of the KO (Kreigoorganization - a special intelligence set-up maintained by the German Abwehr in friendly or neutral countries) in Rumania.

d. [b6] (alias), more recently known as [b6] now with a special GO office near AUGSBURG 32UFU4060, Germany, was formerly with a Department I (espionage) agency in GROSS OSTHEIM near ASCHAFFENBURG 32UPA1035, Germany. This agency was located in a requisitioned villa belonging to the Eder Brewery.

e. The personnel chief of the GO at present is (Fnu) [b6] (correct name), who formerly used the cover name of [b6], and now is known as [b6]. He is a cousin of General GEHLEN.

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3 - CIC Central File

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

28 December 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

442  
f. [b6], former Lt. Colonel (German Army) with the Abwehr, after the war was for a while Land representative of the Advisory Office for Industrial Security (Beratungsstelle fuer Betriebschutz) under [b6], and is now 15'10'93 with the BREMEN GV of the GO under [b6]. He is an enemy of [b6] and is supposed to have played a role in getting [b6] ousted from his position with the BREMEN GV. In spite of [b6], however, it is suspected that [b6] still has ties to [b6]. [b6] like [b6] (see above), is working in the III-F field, but according to information received has been somewhat pushed into the background by [b6].

1900-1 : : 102-1355)  
g. [b6], former Colonel in the German army, during the last war was CI officer with the G-2 (AO beim I-c) of the Central Army Group. He has personal connections with Albert RADKE [b1]. [b1], is now doing III-F work with the BREMEN GV.

h. [b6], alias [b6] who has already been reported in connection with the [b6] complex, is carried by the GO under code number (Karteinummer) 2665. The following notation on a file card referring to [b6] is of possible interest as indirect confirmation of what has already been reported regarding him: "Subj: BRUNS, Gerhard, born 15 August 1889 in DUISBURG-Beek (320LC4400, Germany), iron foundry director, lives [b6], [b6] married to [b6], [b6] born [b6] in [b6]. Beginning 1936 cooperated with the SD Main Office in DRESDEN (320VS1257, Germany). 2665 tried repeatedly to visit BRUNS, who is considered reliable and an opponent of the Communists, in order to gain his cooperation, but the door was never opened to 2665's repeated ringing."

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

2. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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444

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EURGIE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419; D-320529

27 December 1954

SUBJECT: [b6]  
Re: Gehlen Organization; [b1]

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USA EUC  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. Reference is made to instructions received 30 November 1954 from [b6] of your Headquarters to have inquiries made of subsource [b1] regarding the story behind SUBJECT's appointment as [b1] director.

2. Forwarded herewith is Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 27 December 1954.

3. Source "A" is X-1080-III, who obtained the information by questioning subsource [b1] personally on 12 December 1954. [b1] furnished the information from personal knowledge, and has promised to make further inquiries to determine whether there are other aspects to this affair. Source "A" reported the information to Handling Agent, [b6], on 17 December 1954.

4. It might be noted that [b1] who is a good friend of [b6], was not aware of any intention on [b6] part to leave the [b1] at present. [b1] made the statement quoted in paragraph 3 of the SOI.

5. X-1080-III on this occasion stressed the sensitivity of information received from subsource [b1] and said he would never entrust such information to one of the amateurish American intelligence agencies in Germany like, for example, CIC. This is brought out in order to emphasize the necessity of protecting our possession of this information from this source.

(Continued)

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Page 1 of 2 Pages

4 4 Cont-  
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III-34419; D-32-529

27 December 1954

SUBJECT: b6

Re: Gehlen Organization; b1

6.. This report was prepared by b6

1 Incl  
SO1 (in quad)  
JTD/mz/49-833

b6

Commanding

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4 4 447



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27 December 54

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6  
Re: Gehlen Organization;  
b1

III-34419; D-320529

1. SUBJECT is the successor to b6 as director of the b1. He enjoys the particular confidence of the hitherto Bavarian Minister President, b6, and in political respect is a "clericalist" (supporter of ecclesiastical rather than Marxist political ideas), whereas b6 had been a Socialist. Until he took over the b1  
b1

b1, SUBJECT was with the GD (Gehlen Organization), where he used the covername b6. His mission was the maintenance of liaison with Bavarian government offices and agencies, especially with the Office of the Minister President. In this capacity, and particularly because of the importance of his function, he was also a member of the GD (General Direction).

2. It can be stated fairly positively that Minister President b6 called SUBJECT in to take over the b1. The fact that Minister of Interior b6 was willing to accept SUBJECT's temporary appointment can probably be attributed to the general political uncertainty preceding the Landtag elections. However, there can be no doubt that SUBJECT's appointment was coordinated first with General Reinhold G. LHM.

3. Whether or not SUBJECT will return to the GD is uncertain. A colleague from the GD has said, b6 is incompetent enough to stay in the b1 job for a while; but it is possible that he will not be so acceptable to the new Bavarian government as he was to b6.

4. b6, another old GD man, is still with the b1. He is now in charge of Department II-G (the same as the old Abwehr section III-F - aggressive counter-espionage). b6 has always described b6 as incompetent, but it is not clear at present whether his incompetence was the sole reason for b6's removal. Prior to coming to the b1, b6 was State Attorney in WUERZBURG 320246716, Germany; he was pushed rather strongly by the then Minister of Interior b6 (SPD), so that the political aspect of his appointment is clear. Before b6 was given the II-G position with the

4 - Hqs, 66th CIC Grp 1 - Reg III File  
1 - CIC Central File

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27 December 54

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6

Re: Gehlen Organization;

b1

III-34419; C-320529

b1 there was talk of bringing in a man from the b1 in  
RhineLand-Pfalz named b6 No further  
details are known in this connection.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

5. Personalities marked with an asterisk are known to  
this organization.

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a/s

Page 2 of 2 pages  
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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

3 December 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Summary of Information, Region III,  
66th CIC Group, Subject and file as above, dated 23 June 1954.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file  
as above, dated 3 December 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A" is X-1080-III.
- b. Evaluation of Source: Source "A" is evaluated B.
- c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.
- d. How Information was Obtained: Information was  
obtained from b1 of SUBJECT Organization.
- e. Date Information was Obtained: Information was  
obtained on 15 November 1954.
- f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent:  
Information was reported to handling Agent, b6,  
on 16 November 1954.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information:  
None.
- h. Status of Case: Pending.

(continued)

*25 funded*

6. DEC. 1954

*5374*

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*433*

~~SECRET~~

III-34419  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

3 December 1954

4. REMARKS:

a. [b1] has had the security of the GO under investigation for a long time now, and is apparently hoping that the identity of the individuals in court, as witnesses for the defense, will give him a long sought lead.

b. This report was prepared by [b6]

[b6]

Incls: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/amz/49-833

b6

Lt Col OrdC  
Commanding

491

~~SECRET~~

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 3 December 54														
PREPARING OFFICE Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army																
SUBJECT  Gshlen Organization	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION <table border="0"><tr><td>OF SOURCE:</td><td>OF INFORMATION:</td></tr><tr><td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A</td><td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1</td></tr><tr><td>USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B</td><td>PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2</td></tr><tr><td>FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C</td><td>POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3</td></tr><tr><td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D</td><td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4</td></tr><tr><td>UNRELIABLE . . . . . E</td><td>IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5</td></tr><tr><td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F</td><td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 5</td></tr></table>		OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4	UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 5
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UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5															
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 5															
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION III-34419																
<p>1. SUBJECT Organization is attributing considerable importance to a certain phase of a fairly unimportant trial taking place in LINZ/Rhine (nca), Germany, which may reveal a hseretofore undetermined weakness in the security aspect of SUBJECT Organization. The trial, resulting from legal proceedings initiated by [b6] residing in [b6] against the editorial staff of the publication "Freiss Volk", KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany) PV (Partei-vorstand - Party Headquarters) news organ, is based on a December 1953 article naming [b6] as an agent of the Gehlen Organization. In rsality, the article was an extract from a Soviet Zone publication which exposed some West Zone residents as so called agents for the Organization.</p> <p>2. [b6] was for a short time in contact with Gehlen people, but she was not aware of the Organization for which she was working at the time.</p> <p>3. The interesting phase of the trial for SUBJECT Organization is the defense attorney's statement that his Source can produce two (2) individuals who can prove that [b6] was an agent of SUBJECT Organization. In order to do this, the court may request that the two (2) individuals be identified. This may identify a "leak" in the SUBJECT Organization.</p> <p>SOURCE: "A" C-3</p> <p>4. The personality marked with an asterisk (*) has been previously reported by this Region.</p>																
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">This Document Has Been Classified By C/S Section Date 8. DEC. 1954 [Signature] 492</div> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 10px;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 4 February 2009 by USAINSCOM POLPA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</div>																
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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

3 December 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. Reference is made to Summary of Information and cover letter, this Region, Subject and file as above, dated 1 December 1954, and to further references therein cited.

2. Forwarded herewith is a Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 3 December 1954.

3. Source "A" is X-1080-III, who obtained the information on 30 November 1954 from b1 and submitted same to handling Agent b6 on 1 December 1954. b1 also furnished a copy of a report of investigation performed by a GO agent on Heinz FELFE and devoted to a check of statements made by FELFE in his personal history statement. This will be submitted as a separate report.

4. This report was prepared by b6 Further reports will follow.

Incls: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/amz/49-833

**b6**

Commanding

5390  
6. DEC. 1954

493

**SECRET**

430

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
3 Decembsr 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The following additional personal and background information on personalities of the GO (Gehlen Organization) has become available:

a. [b6] (formerly identified as chief of "exploratory financing" in the CD (General Direction)), livss in [b6] telephone [b6]

b. The correct first name of [b6], alias [b6] (previously reported) is [b6] lives in [b6]

2. The following additional personalities have been added to the original list of questionable persons in the GO by [b1]:

Date 28 APR 1955

a. [b6] (previously reported), who is in charge of work on and in emigre groups (Emigrantenbearbeitung). His office is located in MUNICH, Tusrkenstrasse (number unknown), and he resides in CAUTING near MUNICH (sxact address will be furnished later). His family lives in NEUENDETTELSAU near KITZINGEN 32UNA8310, Germany, Unterfranken. It has been suggested that the following persons can furnish information regarding AUGSBURG: [b6] Russian emigrs, lives at [b6] [b6] Russian emigre, livss at LEVACK, Ontario, or at [b6] [b6] Until about two (2) years ago, [b6] and [b6] worked for the GO in MUNICH, then emigrated. For a time, AUGSBURG worked as interpreter for [b6] [b6] got rid of AUGSBURG, and commented at the time that he considered AUGSBURG at the very least a Polish agent. [b6] came out of the Vlassov Army. [b6] finally took AUGSBURG's place as interpreter for [b6] knew AUGSBURG personally, and shared [b6] opinion of him.

b. [b6] residing in [b6] Formerly head of the Personnel Department, now in the Director's Department (Fuehrungsabteilung). His father was or is a member of the CDU (Christliche Demokratische Union - Christian Democratic Union) in the East Zone and after 1945 was for a considerable

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
3 December 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
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UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

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DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

time a government Minister in Saxony-Anhalt or Brandenburg.

c. [b6] residing in [b6]  
[b6] Head of the Department for  
Special Liaison (Sonderverbindungen).

d. [b6] (previously reported on extensively).

e. Karl SCHUETZ\* (previously reported on extensively).  
In this connection, SCHUETZ was observed on the evening of 19  
November 1954 in the Monzinger Tavern, KARLSRUHE 32UMU2528, Ger-  
many, together with a man named [b6] allegedly from TRIER  
32UIA3014, Germany, and another person described as about  
thirty-five (35) years of age, with dark brown hair worn straight  
back, a gray suit, a green Loden coat, and a Tyrolean hat.

SOURCE: "A"

B-3

3. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been  
previously reported by this Region.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on

4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

29 November 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. Reference is made to SOI and cover letter, this Region, Subject and file as above, dated 22 November 1954.
2. Forwarded herewith is Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 29 November 1954.
3. Source "A" is X-1080-III. Information contained in paragraph 1 of this report was obtained by Source on 25 November 1954 from b1 who supplied the information from personal knowledge. Information in paragraph 2 was furnished by b1 in the course of a recent conversation with X-1080-III regarding the further investigation of personalities discussed with him. b1 suggested that X-1080-III, should he do any checking in the MUNICH area and need help, go to b6 with regards from b6 b6 is herewith reported as a probably GO contact within the Police.
4. This report has been prepared by b6 from a written report submitted by X-1080-III to handling b6 on 26 November 1954. Further reports will follow.

1 Incl  
SOI (in quad)  
JTD/mz/49-833

b6

Commanding

6. DEC. 1954

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23 April 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
29 November 54

## PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

## SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

### OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

### OF INFORMATION:

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POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The following additional personal and background information on personalities of the GO (Gehlen Organization) has become available:

a. [b6], alias [b6] lives in [b6]  
[b6]

h. Guenther (possibly also Joachim) ROHLEDER\* was born 28 April 1892. By the end of the first World War he had become an officer, then went over to the peace-time Reichswahr. His original unit was the 8th Infantry Regiment of FRANKFURT/Oder, 33UVT6999, Germany. He has held the rank of Colonel since 1941. As Department Chief of III-F in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), AAA (Amt Ausland Abwehr - Office of Foreign Intelligence) from about 1934 or 1935, he was responsible for building up the III-F Department. In 1937/38 he was detached as Staff Intelligence Officer (I-C) to the Legion Condor (German unit in the Spanish Civil War). In 1938 he returned to the OKW to his old job. His special fields are Spain, Portugal and the Latin American countries. He had spent some time in Argentina after the first World War and operated a farm there. After 20 July 1944 he was transferred to the RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt - Reich Main Security Office), Amt (Dept) IV, under SS-Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER, where he continued in his III-F work (known in the RSHA as Dept IV-E). His political convictions are those of the pre-Hitlerian Deutsches-Nationale Volkspartei (German-Nationalist People's Party), and he is very conservative ideologically. His wife is very prosperous and is a partner in a well-known Westphalian armaments factory. ROHLEDER is very highly thought of by General GEHLEN, but his own colleagues are divided in their estimation of his work because of his personality and nature, which are very stubborn. By virtue of personal qualification, technical knowledge and experience, he is the best man in the GO.

b. [b6] is at present in charge of all aggressive counter-espionage against the East. He is about 45 years of age and is being backed very strongly by General GEHLEN. It is suspected, although not known definitely, that [b6] is in some way related to GEHLEN.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
29 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th GIG Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
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RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

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POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

c. The correct name of (Fnu) WAGNER\*, head of the GV (Gensralvertrstung - Main Branch) in BREMEN 32UND8780, Germany, is Hans WORGITSKY or WORGITSKI. He is 44 years of age, a former Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel (General Staff), come from GIFHORN/Lusneburger Heide (nca), Germany, and lives in [b6]. His father was a regular army officer and in 1915 was a Major and Commanding Officer of the Replacement Battalion of the 93rd Infantry Regiment in DESSAU 32UUT1047, Germany. WORGITSKY joined the 100,000-man army with the 8th Infantry Regiment in GOERLITZ 32UVS9967, Germany. According to a former superior officer from this unit he was a good soldier. During the war he was Staff Intelligence Officer (I-C) with the Central Army Group, where he was also considered a good soldier, but without the slightest notion of intelligence work, and his assignment as I-G was found incomprshensible. He probably got into the GO through personal connections with GEHLEN. Two (2) of WORGITZKY's co-workers in HAMBURG 32UNE6553, Germany, are a former [b6] [b6] .....(name will be reported later), and a former Lt [b6] who was recently transferred from STUTTGART 32UNV1203, Germany, to work with WORGITZKY, is a former Colonel who worked in the OKW, AAA, Department III-G (civilian sector), whose work deal with the exploitation of court trial records and coordination between military counter-intelligences and the justics system. He is in his early sixties, and was in Spain together with HOHLEDER.

2. For investigations in the MUNIGH area, [b6] has recommended contact with [b6] of the MUNIGH Griminal Police. [b1] suggested that [b6] be given personal gretings from himself [b1], as well as from a certain [b6] (a former Gestapo official who is supposed to be still in hiding). [b6] is a Silesian, formerly worked under [b6], and knows [b1] personally. It is quite possible that [b6] makes use of [b6] in his GO work.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

3. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

AEUC-OP

SUBJECT: Postlager Addressees in Bayreuth (u) (S)

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region IV, 66th CIC Group  
APO 108, US Army  
ATTN: S3

1. The [b1], through the local DAD representative, has reported that your Region is attempting to determine the holder of Postlager addressees "P. G. 203" Bayreuth and/or "P. R. 242" Bayreuth, Postamt 1 through the Bundespost. The [b1] states that these boxes are used in [b1] operations, and the [b1] requests that your Region drop its investigation.

2. The [b1] reports the following background information on events leading up to your Region's understandable initiation of efforts to determine the holders of these boxes:

A [b1] contact in the Hof police interviewed one [b6] and passed the information given by her on to the [b1] as a CE lead without reporting the data through police channels. Later, [b6] again came to police attention and pointed out she had already told her story to the police, naming the [b1] contact. When faced up with fact he had not reported this information, the [b1] contact panicked and entirely on his own initiative claimed he had given the lead to CIC Hof. Naturally the police checked this out with CIC.

3. The [b1] expresses its regrets that its contact implied or stated that he was working for CIC Hof. The [b1] has contacted the police and arranged for the termination of the investigation.

✓ 4. It is requested that your Region discontinue any investigation pertaining to information reported above. Further request your office report to this Headquarters any information developed to this date regarding this incident.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Telephone: Stgt W11 8402  
WLB/Jeh/los

M/R: Over

Adjutant

REGARDING OR A CALL BE PREDETERMINED

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

M/R: It seems that a [b1] contact, employed as a policeman in Hof, gave us a cover story when he was discovered not reporting info to his office, that he made the report in question to CIC, Hof. Police evidently questioned Hof CIC and discovered that the [b1] policeman had lied. DAD has requested we inform Region IV of the incident and to not investigate the case any farther. JSB/las. 26 Nov 1956

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-15611

26 November 1954

SUBJECT:

b6

b6

320529/2

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 26 November 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

e. Sources: Source "A" is b1 through X-1080-III. Source "B" is b1 through X-1080-III.

b. Evaluation of Sources: Source X-1080-III is evaluated C. The information submitted by Sources "A" and "B" is evaluated by paragraph.

c. Relationship of Sources to Subject: None

d. How Information was Obtained: The information attributed to Source "A" is probably that which the Gehlen Organization furnished as a basis for b1 investigation of SUBJECT. The information attributed to Source "B" is known to him personally. Although he does not know SUBJECT personally, b1 had something to do with SUBJECT's removal from office and was himself desirous of being SUBJECT's successor.

e. Date on Which Information was Obtained: The information from Source "A" was obtained on 12 September 1954 and that from Source "B" was obtained on 15 September 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6, on 16 September 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information:

501

~~SECRET~~

(Continued)

418

~~SECRET~~

III-15611

26 November 1954

SUBJECT:

b6

An examination of the Region Registry, Region III, revealed information similar to that contained in the attached SOI regarding SUBJECT's b1 connections.

h. Status of Case: Pending

3. REMARKS: This report was prepared by

b6

b6

1 Incl  
SOI (in quad)  
JTD/mz/49-833

b6

Commanding

502

~~SECRET~~

419

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26 November 54

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6

III-15611

1. SUBJECT\* is currently under investigation by the Gehlen Organization, primarily regarding his identity, past, and present activity. Some years ago, SUBJECT applied for the job as chief of the [b1]

[b1] for Schleswig-Holstein, the headquarters of which is located in KIEL 32UHF7321, Germany, but without success. Later, SUBJECT was successful in obtaining a position with the [b1] in HANNOVER 32UHD5004, Germany.

SOURCE: "A"

C-5

2. On 3 September 1950, SUBJECT, who comes from BERLIN 33UHU9220, Germany, was given the position of chief of the [b1] in Schleswig-Holstein by the SPD (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - Socialist Unity Party of Germany) Land government, with the rank of Oberregierungsrat. Three (3) days later, that government party stepped down and a "Bloc" took over. The Bloc dismissed SUBJECT, since he was not an experienced intelligence man, only a good SPD member and a protege of the SPD press chief, [b6].

SOURCE: " "

C-3

3. Subsequent to his dismissal from office in Schleswig-Holstein, SUBJECT applied for the same position with the [b1] in Lower Saxony, but this application was turned down through the efforts of the Buergemeister of HAMBURG 32UHB6553, Germany, [b6]. It is believed that SUBJECT does not have a good reputation in the SPD and there is also belief that SUBJECT belongs to the Dr. Otto JOHN\* circle.

SOURCE: "B"

C-3

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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1 - CIC Central File Copy 3 of 6 copies

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FILE COPY  
FOR  
REGISTR

HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

26 November 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIG Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US ARMY  
ATTN: [b6]

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 26 November 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources Source "A" is X-1080-III. Source "B" is X-1081-III.

b. Evaluation of Sources: Both Sources are evaluated C.

c. Relationship of Sources to Target: None

d. How Information was Obtained: The information in paragraph 1 was obtained from [b1], a Gehlen Organization investigator. The information contained in paragraph 2 was obtained from sub-source [b1]

e. Date Information was Obtained: The information in paragraph 1 was obtained on 26 July 1954. The information contained in paragraph 2 was obtained on 10 October 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 respectively was reported on 29 July and 12 October 1954 to the handling Agent, [b6]

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

(Continued)

504  
**SECRET**

5115  
27  
415

~~SECRET~~

III-34419

26 November 1954

SUBJECT: Gahlen Organisation

h. Status of Case: Pending

3. REMARKS:

a. The identity of sub-source [b1] is a matter of record at headquarters 66th CIG Group.

b. This report was prepared by [b6]

[b6]

1 Incl  
SCI (in quad)  
JTD/ms/49-833

[b6]

Commanding

505

~~SECRET~~

414

**CONFIDENTIAL**

26 November 54

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

Gehlen Organisation

III-34419

1. Subject organization is in receipt of a report from [b1] concerning his having seen the acquaintance of one [b6] on the Bodensee during June or July 1954. The appearance of [b6], allegedly from MUNICH 320729134, Germany, caused the official to check the Population Registry (Einwohnermeldeamt) in MUNICH regarding [b6], which proved to be negative. [b6] often uses the cover name [b6] and often uses the first name [b6] in the same connection. The name [b6] could probably be located in the files of the Fucratenhof Hotel in MUNICH, where [b6] usually stays when in that city.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

2. On 8 October 1954, General Reinhard GEHLEN\* appeared at the meeting in BONN 320127623, Germany. It was his first visit since 29 September 1954. GEHLEN's representative, [b6] was in BONN on 1 October 1954.

SOURCE: "B"

C-3

3. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

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4 - Hqs, 66th CIC Grp 1 - Reg III File  
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Page 1 of 1 pages  
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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

IV-33446

24 November 1954

SUBJECT: GEHLEN, Gruppe

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. Forwarded herewith is a translation of an article regarding General GEHLEN, as found in the "Stimme des Friedens", number 46, dated 3 November 1954.

2. The information contained in the attached translation was obtained by X-0300-IV, evaluated "B" who submitted the information to his handling agent on 22 November 1954.

3. The original copy of the newspaper article is being maintained in Region IV, MUNICH files.

b6

Incl: a/s  
copy of translation of newspaper article  
b6 MM 7246-006/lm

Commanding

29 NOV. 1954

73517

Distribution:

- 2 - Co, 66th CIC Group  
(w/3 cpye Incl)
- 1 - Region IV, File  
(w/1 cpy incl)

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by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

507

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412

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SUBJECT: GEHLEN, Gruppe

SOURCE: b1

DATE: 3 November 1954

RATING OF SOURCE: None

General GEHLEN and his "employees" b6. The facts, which were disclosed during the latest proceedings against GEHLEN espionage, caused considerable nervousness in "interested" circles of the Federal Republic, since the people are not, under any circumstances, to learn that a large part of the so-called "deficiencies" in the DDR are the direct result of the "liberation activities" which are financed with 25 million dollars every year. Therefore, it was not even attempted to disprove the naked facts; instead, evidence was furnished for the fact that the almighty GEHLEN organization is in a position to coordinate press organs in the Federal Republic, namely by means of newspaper articles pertaining to the measures taken against West German agents in East Germany, which appeared in almost the same wording everywhere. It will be shown how the provincial press misuses the whole affair for purposes of war agitation - in this connection the word is absolutely correct - in one single example. Although he knows better, the "commentator" b6 writes in the "AZ" (MANNHEIM) "that a group of parasites and fanatics uses terror means for the purpose of keeping the people, who were intimidated by them and therefore loathe them, under their own and under Soviet pressure" and he approves of "the liberation of central Germany from the Communist yoke" - entirely in keeping with the line of DULLES and his students. b6 "did not hear anything yet" about the 53 suggestions for negotiations on withdrawal of occupation forces from the four Zones and about the peace treaty. With this form of war agitation and with this glorification of GEHLEN espionage under the slogan "he who was murdered is guilty", severe blows are being dealt against the efforts to unify Germany by peaceful means.

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Date 26 MAY 1955 Init 169

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16837

411

CO RGN VIII

CO 66TH CIC GP

1-5169

FM b6 FOR b6

AT MEETING OF ALL EMPLOYEES DEUTSCHE HANDELSZENTRALE  
HAUSHALTSGUTER ON 20 NOV CURR EMPLOYEES WERE TOLD THAT ALL DEUTSCHE  
HANDELSZENTRALE CENTRAL MANAGEMENT OFFICES PRESENTLY LOCATED IN  
SOV SECTOR BERLIN ARE TO BE MOVED TO VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN GDR RPT  
GOR. EMPLOYEES WERE TOLD THAT THESE MOVES CAME AS RESULT OF RECENT  
GEHLEN RPT GEHLEN TRIAL HELD IN SOV SECTOR BERLIN. OHZ RPT OHZ  
HAUSHALTSGUTER SCHEDULED TO MOVE TO LEIPZIG ON 27 AND 28 DEC CURR.  
OHZ OPTIK WILL MOVE TO RATHENOW ON SAME DATES. FUTURE LOCATIONS  
OTHER OHZ CENTRAL OFFICES UNK BUT THEY WILL MOVE TO LOCATIONS NEAR  
FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIES WHICH ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE  
DUTIES. THOSE PERSONS PRESENTLY EMPLOYED WHO DO NOT DESIRE TO MOVE  
TO GDR WILL BE RELEASED FROM THEIR POSITIONS ON 15 DEC CURR.

SOURCE IS b1 PRESENTLY b6  
b6 WHOSE WIFE IS EMPLOYED b1  
b1 EVAL IS F-3. INFO FWD BY MSG INASMUCH AS  
POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT OTHER GDR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES PRESENTLY  
IN SOV SECTOR BERLIN MIGHT ALSO BE MOVED TO ZONE, RESULTING FROM  
EVENTS OF RECENT GEHLEN TRIAL.

509

23/11/54

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1 - 320529  
APO 403, US Army

D-320529  
(CIC File No.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23 November 1954  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file III-34419  
dated 16 Sep 54, subject: Gehlen Organization,  
Source: X-899-HQ.

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 12 (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

24 NOV 1954

b6

(Analyst)

510

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FEB 04 2009  
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH GOUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

22 November 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIG Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

This Document Has Been

Classified Section

Date 2 Aug 52 Init 237

1. Reference is made to SOI and cover letter, this Region, Subject and file as above, dated 29 October 1954.

2. With regard to the "LUDWIGSBURG document", mentioned in paragraph 1, c, herein, your attention is invited to SOIs, this Region, Subject and file as above, dated 2 August and 28 September 1954, which give the background of this reference.

3. Forwarded herewith is Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 22 November 1954.

4. Source "A" is X-1080-III, who obtained the information directly and in the manner described in paragraph 2 of inclosed SOI, from [b1] of Subject organization. The information was obtained originally on the evening of 27 October 1954, and was supplemented considerably by [b6] on 13 November 1954. The two (2) reports have been combined herein.

5. It is suggested that specific, rather than general, EEIs be prepared for presentation to [b1] by X-1080-III. At the outset, these EEIs should concern themselves exclusively with the ten (10) personalities suggested by [b1] for investigation by the Americans, or with aspects definitely related to the information furnished by [b1] in this report. This is necessary for the time being, inasmuch as the rationale of the security and personnel situation of the GO has been used throughout by the handling Agent and the GS Team Commander in dealing with X-1080-III and by the latter in his dealings with [b1], on the GO target. An evidence of interest and activity on the part of the not further identified

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(Continued)  
26. NOV. 1954

SECRET

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III-34419  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

22 November 1954

American agency with whom [b1] knows X-1080-III is associated, would readily serve to draw [b1] further into his relationship of confidence with Sources.

6. It is also suggested that some effort be made to check out the individuals proposed by [b1] beginning with checks of all documentary repositories available to this organization. Consideration should also be given in this regard to a check of the German Army records held at Camp King under the guardianship of USAREUR Headquarters, G-2. The latter Headquarters must in all cases give approval for access to these records, it has been determined in other cases in the past.

7. It is further suggested that this operation involving the exploitation of [b1] through X-1080-III be made a matter for a detailed operational conference between representatives of this Region and your Headquarters in the near future.

8. This report was prepared by [b6] from written reports submitted by X-1080-III to handling Agent, [b6] on 30 October and again on 14 November 1954.

1 Incl  
SOI (in quad)  
JTD/mz/49-833

b6

Commanding

513

~~SECRET~~

405

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **SECRET**

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
22 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. According to [b1], member of Subject organization, the following persons who hold key or sensitive position with the GO (Gehlen Organization) either represent security risks and/or threats, or have backgrounds or records which have not been sufficiently clarified to satisfy minimum security considerations:

✓ a. [b6], alias [b6] head of the whole "Abwehr I" (positive intelligence) apparatus of the GO, with offices in the GO General Direction (GD - central headquarters). [b6] resides in MUNICH 32UPU9134, Germany. In characterization, [b6] says that [b6] is "bajuwarisch" (exaggeratedly Bavarian by nature and conduct), and unmilitary, especially in his discipline as over against General Reinhold GEHLEN\*, his superior. [b6] does not consider himself unconditionally bound to the directives he receives, and in organizational questions is always opposed to rigid and tight centralization. He has enjoyed a number of operational successes, but has also had as many outright fiascos. (NOTE: [b6] has also come up in connection with the [b6] investigation and appears in a bad light in that case.)

✓ b. (Fnu) ROHLEDER\*, correct name, cover name not known, Department head of III-F (aggressive counter-intelligence, penetration of enemy services) under [b6], with offices in the GD in MUNICH. [b1] characterizes ROHLEDER as energetic, industrious, stubborn, and from the security point of view apparently clean. He has developed new operational techniques whereby more open operations are preferred to super-conspiratorial methods. For this reason he is opposed by many of the leading men in the GO. On the subject of the combination of I and III-F functions, [b1] explains that there is a III-F group integrated into every I-unit in the GO.

✓ c. (Fnu) KLEIKAMP, alias KLEIBER, former Generalmajor (Brigadier General), used to reside and work in West BERLIN 33UUU9220, Germany, now lives in AUGSBURG 32UPU4060, Germany. Until the middle of 1953 KLEIKAMP was the "front man" (Exponent) for the GO in BERLIN, was head of the courier and central w/t (radio transmission) networks, and responsible for the walk-in

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
22 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

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NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

offices for East Zone fugitives and refugees. Although he did not engage in intelligence operations per se, he nevertheless had considerable insight into the internal workings of the GO. He knew all the GO connections that ran over BERLIN. Because of serious personal misconduct he was relieved in 1953 and put in charge of the GV (Generalverwaltung - Main Branch) in AUGSBURG, where he is concerned primarily with "operations in depth--Poland". His predecessor as head of the AUGSBURG GV was [b6] alias [b6], who was relieved because of conflict with an American agency over a Polish informant.

[b1] characterizes KLEIKAMP as arrogant, extravagant, and known for excesses toward women when under the influence of alcohol. He has been known to make passes at the wives of his own colleagues and agents (i.e. sources) while drunk. The LUDWIGSBURG 32UNV1415, Germany, document, which is now believed to have originated somewhere within the GO, devotes two (2) pages to an analysis of KLEIKAMP's personality, and concludes that he would be approachable over women. [b1] describes the contents of the LUDWIGSBURG document as regards KLEIKAMP as correct. [b6] the wife of a GO operative who in 1953 was abducted into the Soviet Zone, is now in the Federal Republic and has stated that KLEIKAMP made very blunt overtures toward intimacy with her. [b6] has meanwhile been given his freedom in the East Zone and has published an expose of the GO. Immediately after his release, [b6] was approached by Soviet agents in BERLIN and invited to join her husband. However, she preferred to withdraw to the Federal Republic. KLEIKAMP enjoys strong support within the GO. His new assignment is attributable exclusively to the "softness" of General GEHLEN in personnel questions, who has backed KLEIKAMP against the unanimous better judgement of all other leading men in the GO. It is incomprehensible to most of the GO leaders even today why GEHLEN insists on keeping KLEIKAMP in AUGSBURG, because this GV is one of the most important special units in the organization. Although premeditated treason on KLEIKAMP's part is not considered likely, he represents such a weak link in the organization that he must be looked upon as an outright threat.

✓ [b6] (correct name), formerly [b6], now resides in [b6]

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
22 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

AUGSBURG, but has retained his BERLIN residence. [b6] was the handling agent for the kidnapped [b6] (see above, KLEIKAMP), and after the abduction of [b6] was supposed to be cut out of the GO. Out of fear for what he might do if dropped, it was decided later to use him within the GV in AUGSBURG, where he showed up while [b6] (see above) was still head of the GV. [b6] is being used on III (counter intelligence) operations. According to his own claims, [b6] was 1st Lieutenant in the German Army during the war, shortly after the capitulation was released from PV captivity (it is not known which of the Allied powers held him), and then went to work in BERLIN for French intelligence. It is considered doubtful that he broke off his French connections completely when he went to work for the GO. Like KLEIKAMP, [b6] conducted himself in a very conspicuous and unbusinesslike manner in BERLIN, where he was widely known under the pseudonym "Agenten-Tim", and he also claims to be the anonymous author of the notorious war novel "Einen Besseren findet Du Nicht". KLEIKAMP and [b6] both had specific instructions while in BERLIN to avoid all contact with one another, but attracted attention on numerous occasions by their drunken orgies and escapades with women together. In general, [b1] states that his comments on the continued utilization of KLEIKAMP are also valid for [b6]. In addition, he points out that investigations in the case of the abduction of [b6] in BERLIN have shown that [b6] was handled by [b6] in a completely irresponsible manner. Up to his abduction, [b6] work was done with such industry and conscientiousness that it is unbelievable that his abduction was a put-up job. What he did then during his arrest and after his release in the East Zone must have been done solely to save his own skin. In his statements to the SfS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) and in his publications, the only one of his former co-workers whom [b6] protected was [b6]. However, it is considered quite possible that [b6] led [b6] into a trap without the latter's knowledge. It is incomprehensible why [b6] has been kept on in the organization, and especially why he has been put together again with KLEIKAMP.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
22 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

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UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

e. ✓ (Fnu) von KLEIST (correct name), former Lt Col or Colonel, MUNICH. Responsible in the GD for "exploratory financing" (Forechungefinanzierung, a euphemism for source and target surveys and recruitment). [b6] describes von KLEIST as a clear-cut anti-Soviet officer, but arrogant, talkative and extremely ambitious to be a "big shot", which makes him a definite risk in intelligence work. Asked whether von KLEIST ever had connections with an American agency in the Heeseian area in the years following the war (with reference to Baron Helmut von KLEIST, born 26 March 1891, known to your Headquarters), [b1] states that cautious inquiry around the GD seemed to indicate that von KLEIST has never had any connections with the Americans.

✓ [b6] alias [b6] already reported in connection with the GO "Waldkapelle" (internal security apparatus), MUNICH. He is a historian by profession, was a 1st Lieutenant in the reserve, came to the Abwehr during the last days of the war. He comes from VIENNA, Austria, where according to his own statements he was a Regierungsrat (government official) upon the outbreak of the war. A brother of [b6] operates a dairy or related business in SALZBURG, Austria. For some reason, as [b6] has remarked upon occasion, he can not show himself in VIENNA. [b6] has been with the GO from the very beginning, even before General GEHLEN took the organization over from [b6] and for that reason GEHLEN is hesitant to remove him. However, this does not change the fact that [b6] position in the GD has deteriorated considerably as a result of the neutralization of the whole III network in the Soviet Zone. In spite of constant objections by other members of the GD to [b6] method of operating in the Soviet Zone with networks, there has been no change in this situation. When asked for an explanation of why the GO operated a III-network in the Soviet Zone at all, [b1] replied that operations of the GO in the Soviet Zone should not be compared directly to the old operational breakdown of the Abwehr. The GO did maintain a separate III organization in the Soviet Zone, and this apparatus was completely neutralized by the Communists, for which particularly [b6] is to blame. Now, the GO is in the process of building up a new Soviet Zone

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE  
22 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

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FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
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UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

organization on the I-basis (positive intelligence). [b1] also states that, for some unknown reason, [b6] is an embittered enemy of [b6] ([b1] official, old GO man). [b1] final comment on [b6] was, "I just hope he is not the double-dealing type of Austrian".

g. [b6] (correct name), [b6]  
[b6] Ranking representative of General GEHLEN. A loud-mouthed braggart of the first water without any usable knowledge or experience in the intelligence field. His release would be of unending benefit to the organization.

h. [b6] (nca), [b6]  
[b6] not related to former General Franz HAJDER. A young man, during the war a 2nd or 1st Lieutenant, detached to Abwehr duty during the last few days of the war, and therefore acquainted from that period with [b6]. Is one of the so-called "Fuenfziger" ("the Fifty-men", an expression used by [b1], the significance of which is not clear, may refer to a group who joined the GO in 1950). Present function is with the I-Department of the GD, and as such has operational direction over the GVs. He is a fine, pleasant person, a native of MUNICH, but likes to talk a lot and is not considered secure. He is a friend of the journalist Prince [b6] of Bavaria.

1. [b6] (an alias), head of the GV in BREMEN 32UND8780, Germany. The GV used to be located in an establishment known as the "Haus am See", but has since been moved, probably because [b6] had become too conspicuous in the old location. He is an unpleasant, arrogant officer-type, who is conspicuous in conduct and throws money around indiscriminately. In HAMBURG 32UNE6553, Germany, the BREMEN GV maintains a hotel suite for operations which has become known as such to every employee of the hotel because of [b6] obnoxiousness. Former Lt Col Egon von NOTZNY-GAICZYNSKI, reciding in MARBURG 32UMB8329, Germany, is attached to [b6] GV. To assist in locating the present sits of the BREMEN GV, [b1] points out that a man named [b6] (phonetic), who had long been in Spain, was recently transferred from the GV in STUTTGART 32UNV1203, Germany, to the GV

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1 JUN 47

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE  
22 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Rsgion III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

in BREMEN. Since his instructions were not explicit, [b6] [b6] officially registered out with the STUTTGART police and it is quite likely that he gave the address of the BREMEN GV as his new address.

j. [b6] (cover name), who recently changed his alias to [b6] is in charge of a special office in the AUGSBURG vicinity. With him works a [b6] (whether alias or correct name not known), who was formerly with the SD (Sicherheitsdienst - Nazi SS Security service) in SALZBURG. Both of these men are unknown quantities, so far as security considerations are concerned. Further details will be forthcoming.

k. Dr (Fnu) OTTO (an alias), former general staff officer, lives and works in TUEBINGEN 32UNVO474, Germany. An unknown quantity. Further details will be forthcoming.

2. The above listing of ten (10) relatively important personalities within the GO who represent outright security risks/threats, or whose backgrounds are so unclear that it is impossible to decide whether they are secure or not, was compiled by [b1] after consultation with a personal friend of long standing in the GO. Although the identity of this friend is not known, [b1] made it clear that his friend shares his [b1] discouraged view of the security situation in the GO itself. [b1] furnished this list, with background data and comments, with the knowledge that the information would be passed to an American agency, not as an act of bad faith or betrayal toward his own organization, but with the conviction that under the present circumstances, pressure from the outside (and specifically from the side of the Americans) is the only hope of cleaning up what is rapidly becoming a hopeless mess in personnel security within the GO. According to [b1], the leaders of the GO are so concerned with winning political backing from all sides in preparation for the establishment of the GO as a government agency, that they will tolerate impossible security situations merely to avert a scandal similar to the "Otto JOHN Affair". [b1] is convinced that there is at least one (1) leak to the Communists on relatively high level in the GO, possibly even right in

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
22 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gshlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

the GD itself. Others in the GO share this conviction, but little if anything is being done at present for fear of the scandal which might result. [b1] compiled the above list from the point of view that these persons represent targets for thorough investigation by the Americans, and in most if not all cases the results of a thorough investigation should make it clear that the person concerned is completely untenable in an intelligence agency from the security or moral point of view. [b1] is willing to support these investigations, and will gradually pick up as much background information as he can without attracting attention, because he sees in the possibility of American pressure on General GEHLEN directly the only chance to save his organization from becoming an impossible quagmire.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

3. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-37570

22 November 1954

SUBJECT: Arbeitgemeinschaft fuer Ostfragen e.V.

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

b6

320524/2

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 22 November 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: Source "A" is X-1080-III.

b. Evaluation of Source: Source is evaluated C.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: None

d. How Information was Obtained: The information was obtained from b1 of the Gehlen Organization, who is charged with a phase of the investigation.

e. Date Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 12 September 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6, on 16 September 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

h. Status of Case: Pending.

(Continued)

- 521

~~SECRET~~

317

~~SECRET~~

III-37570

22 November 1954

SUBJECT: Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Ostfragen e.V.

3. REMARKS: This report was prepared by

b6

b6

1 Incl

SOI (in quad)  
JTD/mz/49-833

b6

Commanding

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

522

~~SECRET~~

312

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22 November 54

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer  
Getragen e.V.

III-37570

1. The Gehlen Organization is currently investigating certain aspects of Subject organization, namely the mission and the financier of the organization, which is located in BERLIN-Wilmersdorf 330009220, Germany. [b1] are suspected.

2. Some of the personalities identified with the organization are:

a. Chairman - [b6], until 1945 connected with the Research Department of the Reich Air Ministry. Around 1950, [b6] was associated with [b1], having to do with transmissions directed toward the East.

o. Co-founders:

(1) [b6] journalist, until 1951 editor of the "Neue-Zeitung". At the present, [b6] is in the Political Department of the NWDR (Northwest German Radio) in BERLIN. Co-founder of the DU (Deutsche Union - German Union).

(2) [b6], head veterinarian, BERLIN-Zehlendorf.

(3) [b6] lawyer, BERLIN-West.

(4) [b6], doctor and bacteriologist, BERLIN-West.

(5) [b6] lawyer and notary, BERLIN-West.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

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4 - Hqs, 66th CIC Grp 1 - Reg III File  
1 - CIC Central File

Page 1 of 1 pages  
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DAD— 8649

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DETACHMENT  
APO 757  
US ARMY

21 November 1956

SUBJECT: Postlager Addresses in Beyrouth  
TO : Commanding Officer  
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, United States Army  
ATTN: S-3

1. The [b1] has reported that your Group is attempting to determine the holder of Postlager address [b1] through the Bundespost. The [b1] states that these boxes are used in [b1] operations, and the [b1] requests that your Group drop its investigation.

b1

( [b3] Per CIA )  
DAD Liaison Officer

BTGT: 8467

524

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424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

16 Nov 1964

D-320529

16 November 1964

(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO : Commanding Officer  
Region III, 66th CIC Group 757  
United States Army, Europe

1. Reference is made to report, your region, file III 34419, Subject: GERMAN Organization, dated 29 Oct 64, contributed to by X-899-21.
2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index of 19 (See reverse side for scale).
3. The following comments are submitted for your information and guidance:
  - a. Source:
    - XXX (1) appears well oriented
    - (2) appears fairly well oriented
    - (3) appears poorly oriented
    - (4) appears to be provocateur, double agent or fabricator
  - b. Target Coverage Attained:
    - XXX (1) direct coverage or penetration
    - (2) partial coverage or penetration
    - (3) peripheral
    - (4) indirect
    - (5) target not considered covered
  - c. Operational Direction:
    - (1) no further reports desired
    - XXXX (2) further reports desired
    - (3) answer unfulfilled portions of WFI's
    - (4) reorient your source
    - (5) determine future use of source with Technical Specialists

4. Remarks: a. It is desired that source continues to use this penetration of Subject Organization in a discreet manner, obtaining only that information which sub-source provides on the basis of his association with source. Consideration is being given to the possibility of directing

b6

hds/stgt 9342-7484

525

(Case Officer)

WB Form 188  
25

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FEB 04 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

399

READ C.S. TEAM

18144

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Numerical Value:

0	Worthless - obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
8	Valuable	Late	Low level
9	Valuable	Late	Medium level
10	Valuable	Late	High level
11	Valuable	Timely	Low level
12	Valuable	Timely	Medium level
13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
20	Extremely valuable	Late	Low level
21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

source to conduct a complete and continuing exploitation of sub-source.  
Further instructions will be provided your region on this matter.

TECH  
ON FEB 04 2009  
DYU  
AMBI

526

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-37378

15 November 1954

SUBJECT: SCHUETZ, Karl

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Reference is made to SOI, Region III, 66th CIC Group, Subject and file as above, dated 2 November 1954.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 15 November 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: Source "A" is X-1080-III.

b. Evaluation of Source: Source "A" is evaluated C.

c. Relationship of Source to Subject: None

b6

d. How Information was Obtained: The information contained in paragraph 1 of the attached SOI was obtained by Source from b1 who in turn

b1

b1

b1

The information in paragraph 2 and 3, was provided by b1 himself, who has personal knowledge of the activity around TRIER during and after the war.

e. Date on Which the Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 10 August 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6 C. b6 on 23 August 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

527  
**SECRET**

17 NOV 1954  
(Continued)

392

16328

309728  
2/15/53

b6

~~SECRET~~

III-37387  
SUBJECT: SCHUETZ, Karl

15 November 1954

h. Status of Case: Pending

4. REMARKS:

a. [b6] was contacted by [b1] with the request that he check the files regarding SUBJECT's court activity in that area. [b6] reply to [b1] was to the effect that he could state unequivocally, that no one with the same identity as SUBJECT, had been connected with the courts in the KOBLENZ area.

b. While [b1] was assigned to the Gestapo in TRIER in 1943, he was sent to a concentration camp by [b6] [b6] previously reported by this office, who not too long ago was fired by GEHLEN.

c. Apparently, the information reported by SUBJECT in the life history statement referred to in paragraph 1 above, is inaccurate in the accounting for the years 1932 to 1934.

d. This report was prepared by [b6]

1 Incl  
SOI (in quad)  
JTB/mz/49-833

b6

Commanding

.. 528

~~SECRET~~

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
15 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

SCHUETZ, Karl

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-37387

2012  
233739  
1. SUBJECT\*, born 11 April 1907 in MAYEN 32ULA7377, Germany, is not registered in the examination bureau of the Appellate Court in COLOGNE 32ULB4576, Germany. By the same token, SUBJECT is not registered with the lower court in ANDERNACH 32ULA8789, Germany, nor the circuit court in KOBLENZ 32UMA0800, Germany, as ever having served as a court apprentice (Gerichtsreferendar), in those cities.

2. In 1945, subsequent to the war's end, SUBJECT worked for a time with former Criminal Secretary of the Gestapo (Geheim Staats Polizei - Secret State Police) in TRIER 32ULA3014, Germany, one [b6], who operates a detective agency in TRIER-Pallien. [b6] is an ambiguous individual, and may be tied to the French.


159044 3. In TRIER, SUBJECT had contact with former Colonel Oskar REILE\*, (until 1939 Abwehr III-F (Foreign counterintelligence) representative in TRIER of the Abwehr Headquarters of the XIIth General Headquarters in WIESBADEN 32UMA4598, Germany, who is presently a Gehlen Organization employee. It may be assumed that REILE, who in the pre-war period was quite gullible, had something to do with SUBJECT's gaining a position with the Gehlen Organization.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R



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1 - CIC Central File

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Possibly:

b6

Res:

b6

An SED member from SED Kreis  
BERLIN/Koepenick, residing in the Soviet  
Sector, who is engaged in cultural activities  
and recently attended a conference on  
cultural matters organized by the  
SED RL BERLIN. B-2

RD-137898, 13 Nov 53

b6

a German, is employed in the  
Culture Dept of the "Tägliche Rundschau".  
He looks like an elementary school  
teacher, gray hair, corpulent, native of  
DRESDEN, unimportant. F-3

RD-239567, 12 Jan 49

SUBJECT is painter & art teacher, Head of  
Käthe KOLLWITZ Art School in BERLIN.

RD-169596, Memo 21, 10 Jun 47

Possibly:

b6

Main Administration: Bau

Section: Arbeitskraft

Listed in telephone book of GDR Ministry for  
Heavy Industry. B-1

RD-289871, 24 Sep 51

Info sent to CO DAD, APO 757, US Army on

1 Sep 54.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

(2)

D-320529

12 NOV 1954

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch

REGRADED SECRET, BY AUTHORITY OF

b6

b6

b6

BY

ON

25 Aug 58

1. Reference is made to the following correspondence:

- a. Letter, your office, file 350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL.), dated 12 February 1952, Subject: West Germany Intelligence Agencies.
- b. ICE 18-52, your office, dated 25 April 1952, Subject: West German Government.
- c. Letter, your office, file 350.09 (GID/CI/CS), dated 20 October 1954, Subject: Cooperation and Collection re: b1 Complex.

2. Further reference is made to the briefing of representatives of your office by a member of this headquarters on 5 February 1954 in HEIDELBERG on the subject of the organization, operations and influence of the Gehlen Group (See Annex A for a copy of a memorandum on this briefing prepared in this headquarters immediately after the event), and to the conference between G2, USAFEUR/CIC representatives and DAD/SDU representatives in FRANKFURT on 9 February 1954 on the subject of coverage of the Gehlen Group as the prospective German intelligence service (See Annex B for a copy of a memorandum on this meeting prepared in this headquarters immediately after the event).

3. Immediate cognizance of the serious security problems involved in the pending transition of the Gehlen Organization into a West German intelligence service must be taken by US military intelligence authorities. Specifically, a decision must be rendered as to the role of this headquarters in maintaining its present coverage of existing West German intelligence agencies, namely the b1

b1 at Federal and Land levels, and for projecting coverage of West German intelligence agencies to be formed in the immediate or near future.

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Hq's 66th TSC Log No.

B

7246

I certify that I have reviewed this document and determined that it should be downgraded as of this date.

28 Apr 58  
b6  
JAC, TSC officer  
(Name, Grade, Title)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
**SECRET**

D-320529

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization

4. Present and projected West German intelligence agencies have a common source of operational traditions, technique and personnel, namely the former military intelligence service of the German armed forces and, to an only slightly lesser degree, the RSHA. In planning present and future cooperation and coverage with West German intelligence agencies, therefore, definite basic precepts must be accepted:

- c. That German intelligence is traditionally nationalist in character.
- b. That German intelligence before and during World War II was divided by political and psychological differences which caused the formation and isolation of separate intelligence cliques, both pro- and anti-West, which have never been thoroughly screened and classified by US military intelligence.
- c. That post-war political factors in Germany have caused further and more serious development of these factional differences.
- d. That intensification of East-West intelligence rivalry has rendered anti-Western elements within West German intelligence agencies ripe for present and/or future exploitation.
- e. That German intelligence before and during World War II was penetrated by foreign intelligence services, including Russian, and that remnants of the previous German intelligence service which have returned to West German service, both within b1 and the Gehlen Organization, have not been satisfactorily screened for the identification of eastern penetration suspects.
- f. That US intelligence, both military and civilian, has been responsible for the development of the Gehlen Organization into its present size and to the extent of its present operations.
- g. That the Gehlen Organization is to become the future German intelligence service and that a position of "preferred liaison" has been assured to US intelligence when this change has become a reality.
- h. That in view of political factors, US intelligence will retain no control over the West German intelligence service following ratification of the German sovereignty agreements.

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2 7  
2 8

~~TOP SECRET~~

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D-320529

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization

1. That US military intelligence is vitally concerned with the development of West German intelligence and that no security screening and surveillance program has been implemented or planned for the protection of US military intelligence interests.

5. A study of available information in Central Registry has been conducted for the purpose of pointing out the contradictions involved in the present CIC coverage of West German intelligence agencies. Under the directives referenced above in paragraph 1, CIC is charged with coverage of the [b1] service the Institut fuer Gegenwartsforschung (IGF). Coverage of the Gehlen Organization as a potential agency of the West German intelligence service has never been implemented, and under existing G2, USAREUR directives, no such coverage can be undertaken. It must be noted, however, that to an ever increasing extent CIC coverage of [b1] and the IGF is resulting in penetration of Gehlen Organization operations and personnel because of the extensive spheres of influence of that organization in the agencies being covered by CIC. In specific instances, penetrations arranged by this headquarters for coverage of the [b1] and/or IGF are not penetrations of these agencies but are in every respect penetrations of the Gehlen Organization itself.

6. An outstanding example of this specific situation is with the [b1] which is now completely under the domination of the Gehlen Organization:

a. The operations officer of the [b1] is [b6] a Gehlen representative from 1945 until 1951. As late as May 1953 it was admitted by US officials of SDU that "it was likely" that [b6] was still with the Gehlen Organization. (B-2) Soon after [b6] accepted his present [b1] position, he informed the US liaison officer that he maintained a direct contact with Gehlen though "an old friend of more than thirty years standing." It was subsequently revealed that the old friend was known as [b6] and that the direct contact between the two agencies was so thorough as to include Gehlen file clearances on all [b1] targets and sources. (B-2)

b. In the early fall of 1954, the former chief of [b1] [b1] Oberstaatsanwalt [b6], resigned after the Bavarian government advised him of alleged communist connections on the part of his brother-in-law, with whom [b6] maintained steady social contact. [b1] [b1] called upon the Gehlen Organization to conduct the investigation of [b6]. This Gehlen investigation was under the leadership of [b6] who in October 1954 was publicly announced as the new chief of the [b1]. [b6] is continuing to run the Gehlen investigation of [b6] at the present time while serving as [b1] chief. (B-2)

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Hq's G6H 787 Log No.  
B 7246

3 7  
3 4

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

D-320529

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization

c. More significant is the fact that the alias of [b6] is [b6] and that through [b6] he has been intimately concerned with [b1] operations for the past three years while serving as a higher Gehlen representative. (B-2)

d. It is known that as early as 1953 the American Element of SDU considered the [b1] "as a kind of an extended arm" of the Gehlen Organization and had "current and continuing interest in reports on the operations, organization, personnel and affiliations" of the [b1] (B-2)

e. Now that [b6] as an openly avowed Gehlen representative has taken over the [b1] CIC coverage of this target is inextricably involved with Gehlen interests and will in time prove to be little more than coverage of certain Gehlen operations and personnel. In this same connection, the position of the US liaison officer is an extremely embarrassing one, since he is no longer certain that he is representing US intelligence interests with an independent [b1] and may at any time be caught between conflicting interests while attempting to resolve exactly which matters are of interest to the [b1] and which to Gehlen. An example of his precarious position has already been received. When the [b6] investigation broke, SDU, American Element, requested your office and this headquarters to coordinate the case under its control. This request was refused on the basis that security matters of this type were the responsibility of G2, USAREUR and CIC. Now [b6] as chief of the [b1] has approached the US liaison officer with the statement that he knows CIC is investigating certain aspects of the [b6] case and has requested that this CIC investigation be coordinated with the one he is conducting. To refuse flatly would endanger future US/[b1] relations; to coordinate would embarrass your office and this headquarters with DAD/SDU, since the coordination request of that agency was refused. No matter what solution is found, the position of the liaison officer has been embarrassed.

f. Other members of the [b1] have been suspected for some time of being Gehlen employees. Proof of these cases is now an academic question, since the Gehlen Organization holds complete operational and administrative control of the [b1].

7. The Gehlen Organization is also working towards control of the Hessian and [b1] in a similar manner:

a. In June 1953 a liaison program between the Gehlen Organization and the [b1] was established by the then chief of the [b1], [b6] and representatives of the Gehlen Organization. This liaison was encouraged by Albert RADKE, vice-president of the [b1]. (B-2)

4 530

7246

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
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☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s): *(b)(3) PER CIA*

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Page(s) *5-10-5-18*

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH SOUTHERN LOGISTICS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

b6

5 November 1954

III-37429

SUBJ: ELIASSON, Wilhelm

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th SIG Group, USAR-UR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

320529/3

1. **FORWARDED:** Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 5 November 1954.
2. **C SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:**
  - a. **Source:** Source "A" is X-1060-III.
  - b. **Evaluation of Source:** Source "A" is temporarily evaluated F.
  - c. **Relationship of Source to Subject:** Source is a personal friend of Subject, dating back to pre-war and wartime days.
  - d. **How Information was Obtained:** The information was obtained through conversations with b6, whom he still contacts occasionally.
  - e. **Date Information was Obtained:** The information was obtained on 11 August 1954.
  - f. **Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent:** The information was reported to handling Agent, b6 on 23 August 1954.
  - g. **Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information:** None.
  - h. **Status of Case:** Pending.

(continued)

540

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R



III-37429  
SUBJ: KRIEBITZ, Wilhelm

5 November 1954

3. REMARKS:

a. Source believes he is the sole recipient of the intelligence KRIEBITZ is producing, for which he pays nothing but a few expenses incurred by KRIEBITZ on work requested by Source such as name checks, etc..

b. KRIEBITZ told Source that he considers REMINDER one of GEBELER's most competent agents. As a result of this, Source has requested KRIEBITZ to engage [b6] in conversation concerning the personnel set up in the Gehlen Organization, especially in the various departments, at the next opportunity.

c. KRIEBITZ has told Source that [b6], a Gehlen man, is suspected of contact with the French. Source had contemplated the idea of contacting [b6] but will not put that idea aside for the present. Source has hesitated to question [b6] in this regard so far.

d. This report was prepared by [b6]

[b6]

Incls: 5  
JED/amz/44-233

[b6]

Commanding

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5 November 54

Region III, 68th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6

III-37429

1. SUBJECT\* was recently approached by former colonel b6 of the Gehlen Organization, with the request that SUBJECT take on some work for that Organization. The, SUBJECT refused, since he is of the opinion that the Organization's main departments are staffed with incompetent people, who do not want qualified persons as agents.

2. SUBJECT is still primarily interested in industrial work such as plant protection, and when b6 re-tires, would gladly take over the Betriebschutz if the position were offered him. While awaiting future developments, SUBJECT still has a three (3) year contract with the Dornier Works, in addition to a pension and salary.

3. b6 has attended two (2) meetings of former Abwehr personnel in BOMB 329LM7623, Germany, which have taken place within the last three (3) months. The conferences mainly had to do with the selection and discussion of personnel for the future Abwehr. SUBJECT did not participate actively in the conferences, which usually resulted in everyone wanting to be in a top position. He is rather biding his time for a break, until which time he will continue to operate his own private network.

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P-3

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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4 - Bqs, 68th CIC Grp 1 - Reg III File  
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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNT & INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, GCS  
A O 757 US ARMY

III-34419

4 November 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization Sources

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USA  
APO 154, US ARMY  
ATTN: [b6]

1. FORWARD: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 4 November 1954.

2. Content of Information:

a. Source: Source "1" is 7-001-14.

b. Evaluation of Source: Source "1" is temporarily evaluated F.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.

d. How Information was Obtained: [b1]

[b1] supplied the personal data found in paragraphs 1 and 4. The remainder of the information contained in the attached Summary of Information was supplied by [b1], a Gehlen Organization investigator.

e. Date Information was Obtained: This information was obtained on 6 June 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to [b6] on 9 June 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. Remarks:

552

(continued)

24

4452

380

III-34419

4 November 1954

SUBJ: Gehlen Organisation Sources

a. This information is being submitted late due to the priority of other material.

b. Source will be queried as to the status of the two individuals mentioned in the attached Summary of information.

c. Specific attention is drawn to [b6] contacts outside of Germany.

d. This report was prepared by [b6]

[b6]

Incls: 8-1  
JTD/acz/49-833

[b6]

Commanding

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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4 February 2009

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4 November 54

Region III, 66th SIG Group, A : 757, 25 May

Gehler Organization  
Sources

III-34419

1. During June 1954, [b6] of the Gehler Organization was in the process of running background investigations (vettings) on two (2) individuals who have been working with Karl [b6] of Subject organization in STUTTGART 3208V1203, Germany. One of the two (2) persons is Reinhold F. [b6], about whom the following details are available (those of which concern him last are according to his own statements):

- a. Name: Reinhold F. [b6]
- b. Date of birth: 25 May 1906.
- c. Place of birth: [b6] in GIG 3208V0090, Germany.
- d. Profession: dealer in imports and exports.
- e. Present address: [b6]  
[b6] first residence, his second being [b6]
- f. Previous address: B. [b6] 3308V9220, Germany.
- g. Marital status: Married on 1 June 1939 to  
[b6]

2. Concerning [b6]'s activities prior to, during, and subsequent to the war, the following information was supplied Subject organization by [b6] himself.

- a. Studies in elementary, high and technical schools, resulting in specialization towards merchandising.
- b. 1925—1935: Correspondent and export merchandising in [b6] in BAG, [b6] [b6] 3208V7573, and [b6], Germany.
- c. 1935—1940: Primarily active with the [b6] (Reichsicherheitshauptamt - Reich Main Security Office) in other countries as a translator and evaluator. Later, chief of the Spain-Portugal and North African department, and after 1936 primarily active in Italy, Portugal, Spain and Morocco.

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4 November 54

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Region III, 66th SIG Group, APO 757, US Army

Gehler Organization  
Sources

III-34419

d. 1941-1945: Foreign delegate for the Gnipol AG combine, having to do with the Skoda Works, then one works Bruehl AG, with secondary missions for the RSHA in Spain, Morocco, France, Portugal, Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia.

e. 1945-1946: Interned in the GNR.

f. 1946-1952: Technical employe of the British Royal Engineers in addition to which engaged in own foreign trade.

3. Gehler is conversant with the French, Spanish and Italian languages. Today, he has contacts in France with Senator ROSE SRAU, agent for Germany of the Compagnie commerciale Continentale in Paris, which in turn acts as representative for the German Fair and Exhibition S. G. in Paris. 320005004, Germany; Directeur S. G. of the Economic Ministry in Paris; President [b6] of the Electro-Technical General Syndicate; [b6] among others; also personalities of the resistance. Gehler's present day contacts in Spain and Portugal include economic circles and former co-workers. He maintains contact with personalities of the Arab nationalist movements in Spanish and French Morocco.

4. The other of the two (2) individuals connected with the Gehler Organization is Harald G. [b6], whose available personal data are as follows:

- a. Name: Harald G. [b6]
- b. Date of Birth: 26 November 1903.
- c. Place of Birth: [b6] (now) Upper Bavaria, Germany.
- d. Profession: Building Contractor.
- e. Present address: [b6], [b6] 15.
- f. Present and former addresses: 32-127653, Germany, and also Sonnenberger Strasse 20, am Wilhelmshafen 2 in [b6] GNR.

a/s

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7 November 54

Region III, 56th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

Gehlen Organization  
Source

III-34419

g. Marital Status: Married to Hedwig, nee HAST on  
17 May 1905.

h. Children: Two (2).

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

5. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been  
previously reported by this Region.

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c/s

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-36974

3 November 1954

SUBJECT: b6

b6

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USARMEUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

320529/3

1. REFERENCE: OM, H-528-54, 2 November 1954, from b1 Subject as above.
2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 3 November 1954.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:
  - a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq.
  - b. Evaluation of Source: X-899-Hq is temporarily evaluated F.
  - c. Relationship of Source to SUBJECT: None
  - d. How Information was Obtained: X-899-Hq obtained the information contained in the attached SOI as a result of conversations with b1 a Goshon investigator and personal acquaintance of SUBJECT's.
  - e. Date Information was Obtained: The information was obtained in early October 1954.
  - f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was submitted to the handling Agent, b6 b6 on 27 October 1954.
  - g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.
  - h. Status of Case: Pending.

557

(Continued)

~~SECRET~~

375

158-21



~~SECRET~~

3 November 1954

III-36794

SUBJECT:

b6

4. REMARKS:

a. The information contained in the attached SOI was given to both b6 during a meeting with X-899-Hq on 27 October 1954.

b. This report was prepared by

b6

1 Incl  
SOI (in quad)  
JTD/ms/49-833

b6

Commanding

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3 November 54

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6

III-36794

1. SUBJECT has been on close terms for a long time with former Kriminalsekretär [b6], representative of the Gehlen Organization in the FRANKFURT/M 32UMA7752, Germany, area. It is known that SUBJECT functioned as a source (Gswachsmann, as opposed to Vertrauensmann) for the Gehlen Organization, controlled by [b6] long before SUBJECT took over as director of the [b1]

b1

2. According to what has been learned from [b6] SUBJECT originally was used by the Gehlen Organization as a channel to get information out of the Sicherungsgruppe (SG - Security Guard) and [b1] through [b6] and on several occasions [b6] has driven SUBJECT to BONN 32ULB7623, Germany, for the specific purpose of having SUBJECT obtain information desired by the Gehlen Organization from [b6]. In such cases, [b6] did not permit himself to be seen in connection with the inquiries made by SUBJECT, but waited at some out-of-the-way spot until SUBJECT had completed his inquiries.

3. That SUBJECT's ties to the Gehlen Organization through [b6] have continued since his appointment as director of the [b1] is brought out by the following incident. On a recent occasion, when [b6] was consulting with a working acquaintance on the possibilities of obtaining certain needed information somewhere in Land Hesse, the associate suggested that SUBJECT could be contacted, as he and the associate had known one another for years. At this time, [b6] remarked that he could not prevent the associate from contacting SUBJECT for the purpose of getting information, but requested that his associate exercise discretion inasmuch as [b6] did not want to be called upon by his superiors (the Gehlen General Direction in MUNICH 32UPU9134, Germany) to explain why he permitted other persons to horn in on his [b6] source.

SOURCE: "A"

P-2

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-37387

2 November 1954

SUBJECT: SCHUETZ, Carl

b6

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USARNUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

320529/3

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 2 November 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq.
- b. Evaluation of Source: Source "A" is temporarily evaluated F.
- c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.
- d. How Information was Obtained: Information contained in this report was gained by Source from b1 b1 an investigator for the Gehlen Organization.
- e. Date Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 23 June 1954.
- f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to handling Agent, b6 b6 on 26 June 1954.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.
- h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

(continued)

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2 November 1954

III-37387

SUBJECT: SCHUETZ, Carl

a. This information is being submitted late due to the priority of other material.

b. The date on the life history statement was 21 April 1951, which indicates that the period from the end of the war until 1951 is unaccounted for by SCHUETZ.

c. This report was prepared by b6

b6

Incls: SOI  
JTD/amz/49-833

b6

Commanding

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

2 November 54

Region III, 66th CIC Group, ALC 757, US Army

SCHUETZ, Carl

III-37387

1. On 21 April 1951, Carl SCHUETZ\*, at the time in TRIER 32U1A3014, Germany, submitted a brief life history sketch to the Gehlen Organization, which then wound up in SUBJECT's personnel file with that organization. The following is a translation of the sketch:

Life History of Kriminalrat (retired) Carl SCHUETZ.  
Elementary and secondary schools - 1926 graduation (Abitur).  
Study of law and political economy at the Universities of MUNICH 32U1U9134, Germany, MANNHAGEN 32U1B8329, Germany, BONN 32U1B7623, Germany, and COLOGNE 32U1B5745, Germany. Early 1932 first state law exams at the Superior Land Court, COLOGNE (fully satisfactory).  
Practical court work (Gerichtsreferendar) at Kreis Court ANDERNACH 32U1A8789, Germany, and Land Court AACHEN 32U1A0080, Germany (grade of very good in civil, penal and procedural law).  
1934 entry into State Police (Stapo) (TRIER).  
For eleven (11) years exclusively counter-espionage.  
For three (3) years head of the Commissariat "Border Control and Border Security".  
Meanwhile, intelligence training with Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) and Armed Forces.  
Psychotechnical and mental aptitude tests for advanced executive service (police). Three-fourths (3/4) of a year Commissar's course (intermediate and final exams, very good).  
1938: Criminal Commissar.  
Department head for Counter Espionage and Counter Sabotage.  
1942: Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW), Intelligence, I-G.  
1944: Kriminalrat.  
Denazification: Category IV, follower (no personal involvement, no professional limitations).  
At present: Unemployed.

2. On 24 February 1953, SUBJECT claimed that he first came into the Criminal Police, and from there was transferred to the Gestapo. The Gehlen Organization is checking SUBJECT's background thoroughly.

SOURCE: "A"

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

1 November 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 1 November 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: Source "A" is [b1] through X-899-Hq. Source "B" is Sub-source [b1] through X-933-Hq.

b. Evaluation of Sources: All Sources are temporarily evaluated F.

c. Relationship of Sources to Target: None.

d. How Information was Obtained: Information from Sources "A" and "B" was obtained through conversation by the respective Sources and both "A" and "B" have official knowledge of their information.

e. Date Information was Obtained: The information from Source "A" was obtained on 1 September 1954. The information from Source "B" was obtained on 19 October 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information attributed to Source "A" was reported to handling [b6] on 2 September 1954. The information attributed to Source "B" was reported to the same handling Agent on 20 October 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

h. Status of Case: Pending.

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4 NOV. 1954

(continued)

4310

~~SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
1 November 1954

III-34419  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

3. REMARKS: This report was prepared by b6

b6

Incls: SOI  
JTD/amz/49-833

b6

Commanding

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
1 November 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The man now the second ranking individual in Subject organization is one [b6] (an alias whose real name is not known). The third man in position within Subject organization is still believed to be [b6], a nephew of General Reinhard GEHLEN\*. [b6] because of his connection to [b6] and his personal ambitions, has lost the confidence of the Gehlen organization headquarters.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

2. General Reinhard GEHLEN is currently visiting [b6] [b6] and other personalities in the Federal Chancellory in BONN 32ULB7623, Germany, at least once each week.

SOURCE: "B"

F-3

3. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been preveiously reported by this Region.

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Date 12. NOV. 1954

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

29 October 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 29 October 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A" ie X-899-Hq.
- b. Evaluation of Source: Temporarily evaluated F.
- c. Relationship of Source to Target: None
- d. How Information was Obtained: The information contained in the attached SOI was obtained from b1 b1 a Gehlen Organization investigator (see below).
- e. Date Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 29 September 1954.
- f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6 on 30 September 1954.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.
- h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

- a. It has been reported previously that an unidentified individual who recently returned to Germany from

17 NOV. 1954 (Continued)

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**SECRET**

4241

364

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~~SECRET~~

III-34419  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

29 October 1954

abroad had been assigned the job of cleaning up the Gehlen Organization. It is believed that [b6] is that individual.

b. The background of this particular report is deemed worthy of further explanation. Over a considerable period of time during which [b1] has been discussing on a personal basis numerous factors pertinent to security or lack of same of the Gehlen Organization with X-899-Hq, [b1] has become more and more frustrated and discouraged on the subject of Gehlen security. This development apparently reached a climax shortly before the meeting between [b1] and X-899-Hq on 29 September 1954, which produced the information contained in this report. [b1] declared at that time that all of his efforts and the efforts of others interested in cleaning up some obviously weak situations within the Organization would never be effected under the present circumstances. He claimed that the bosses of Subject organization would do everything in their power at the present time to avoid the development of any scandal involving the organization. Meanwhile, X-899-Hq on 16 September 1954, in accordance with discussions at your Headquarters, had been directed to intensify his efforts to obtain detailed information about the security, screening and vetting apparatus of the Gehlen Organization. In the course of lengthy discussions on 29 September 1954, Source succeeded in persuading [b1] to furnish him with the information contained in present report as a start, with the understanding that [b1] information would be treated with the utmost discretion. It must be pointed out that [b1] has for several years been aware that X-899-Hq was in touch with some high-level American agency, without knowing any further detail and without, for reasons of professional ethics, making any attempt to pump X-899-Hq for details. On 29 September 1954, [b1] specified to X-899-Hq that he was furnishing this information on his own organization not from a point of view of betraying his organization, but solely in the hope that X-899-Hq would be able to place this information into outside channels capable of using the information in an attempt to pressure the top of the Gehlen Organization into making some sorely needed changes in the setup and security policies.

(Continued)

-- 560

~~SECRET~~

563

~~SECRET~~

III-34419  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

29 October 1954

c. Using this first detailed discussion on 29 September 1954 as an opening, X-899-Hq was instructed to propose to [b1] that X-899-Hq (the agency with whom Source is in contact was not mentioned in this connection) do some checking on certain personalities occupying sensitive or key positions in the Gehlen Organization and whose backgrounds, personal lives and/or associations have never been satisfactorily clarified. For this purpose X-899-Hq presented to [b1] a tentative list of ten (10) names known to Source. After thinking the matter over, two (2) days later [b1] presented X-899-Hq with a revised list of his own and some background data and comments regarding each. This information together with a fuller expose of the circumstance of the newly developed relationship between [b1] and X-899-Hq will be submitted to your Headquarters at the earliest possible date. It is expected that Source's full report on this matter will be obtained on 30 October 1954.

d. This report was prepared by [b6]

[b6]

1 Incl  
SOI (in quad)  
JTD/mz/49-833

b6

Commanding

570

~~SECRET~~

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2 February 2009

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Auth para 4-102, DOI 5200-1R

29 October 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. In its early days, Subject organization was engaged only in Abwehr I type (collection on enemy ground) work. Nothing is known about a so-called Haukapelle (special squad) being in existence at that time. (NOTE: The term Haukapelle is a terminus technicus of German intelligence and security jargon which designates a special, super-secret squad of selected personnel, usually not subject to the normal bureaucratic hierarchy of the organization to which it belongs, one of the main responsibilities of which was and is secretive security checks, controls and investigation of the organization and its personnel.) In all probability, such activity was launched only with the initiation of Abwehr III type (counter espionage) work. It is since then that a Haukapelle has been existent under the name "Waldkapelle".

2. The "Waldkapelle" works independently of the Personnel Department (b6) of the Gehlen General Direction (GD). However, (b6) Department does pass cases on to the chief of the Waldkapelle, particularly personnel investigations. The chief of the Waldkapelle at the GD is the former Lieutenant Colonel Dr (Fnu) (b6), an Austrian national residing in MUNICH 32UPE9134, Germany. (b6) has been with Subject organization for a long time. He was a protégé of the GD's first chief, (Fnu) BAUN, since deceased, although he was able at the same time to establish himself with General Reinhard GEHLEN\*, who even during BAUN's reign was looked upon as the future chief. Whether or not the name BAUN was an alias is unknown.

3. (b6) past is not altogether clear. During the war he was a reserve officer with counter intelligence. For certain unknown reasons he would not risk returning to his native Austria, and on the occasion of brief visits to relatives there, he invariably moved with extreme caution.

4. With (b6) as the overall chief of the Waldkapelle, the latter's activities have not been conducted on an independent group. Rather, certain groups of Department III within the General Agencies (GV-Generalvertrastungen, the "Regions" of the Gehlen Organization) performed the Waldkapelle work besides their regular Department III duties.

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 29 October 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . .	1
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

However, for a long time the Department III staffe devoted their energies more to tasks appropriate to a political police, rather than to Department III assignments proper. This was due both to frequently incompetent leadership from above as well as to arbitrary and aimless operations of the individuals concerned as well as at headquarters level. They were all anxious to deliver as much material as possible to their employers, with the result that their production could be guaged more by quantity than by quality. In particular, the Department III units devoted much attention to more or less unimportant local Communist activities. This is why hardly anything was undertaken within the framework of the Waldkapelle. [b6] not only failed to notice these negative results, he never took any initiative to push the implementation of his own mission.

5. Thus was the negative course of events until the publication of the sensational East German press releases of December 1953. After all possibilities had been thoroughly checked, it was established that the Soviets' knowledge of the Gehlen Organization did not stem from revelations made by persons apprehended in the East Zone in the course of security raids, nor from kidnapped individuals. Rather, the conclusion was reached that the Soviets could have culled their knowledge only through the treason of someone within Subject organization. [b6] still stubbornly clings to his opinion against this conclusion. He doubts the possibility of treason, without, however, offering any valid reason for an opinion which no one in the GD shares.

6. After the aforementioned 1953 events, the entire organization of Department III was liquidated and built up anew, for tactical reasons. Since that time, i.e. early 1954, the Waldkapelle has its own organization composed of two (2) independent agencies for the whole Gehlen organization, again under a central chief, who is once more [b6]

7. In the opinion of one member of Subject organization, [b6] is primarily to blame for the past failure. To say the least, he lacks professional qualifications. As to him personally, not everything is clear in that respect, either.

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

29 October 54

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Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

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## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
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 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

He enjoys a privileged position only because he was in Subject organization from its infancy. [b6] warrants clarification in any case. This man has made his opinion of [b6] clear to the GD and, in the week ending 25 September 1954, spoke about [b6] to [b6] (phonetic) alias [b6] a relative of GEHLEN's, who recently returned from South Africa and is presently considered the third ranking man in Subject organization. He gained the impression that [b6] shared his views of [b6] but is proceeding with caution and slowly in this matter, only out of consideration for GEHLEN's own methods.

8. The suspicion that Heinz FELFE\* and the SD (Sicherheitsdienst - Nazi Security Service) clique which followed him into the organization are "enemies" has been growing steadily. About ten (10) weeks ago FELFE showed up at one of Subject organization's MUNICH offices, camouflaged under the name "Suedlahor". FELFE in reality had no grounds for being present. It was ascertained later that FELFE had made his appearance in various offices, each time asking for something or other, obviously with the intent of engaging in conversation, only to retreat then, stating that he was in the wrong office. The incident was immediately reported to the GD with a view to withholding FELFE access to any of the offices unless in the accomplishment of regular business. This was accomplished. As far as possible, FELFE is being kept away from Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the BONN 32ULB7623, Germany area, because he is not trusted. However, it is necessary to let him travel to these areas now and then since he still has two (2) live contacts there. It is reported that FELFE still is in touch with former COLOGNE 32ULB5745, Germany, state prosecutor (Fnu) [b6], who since 1950 is with the [b1]

[b1] in DUESSELDORF 32ULB4576, Germany. Shortly after FELFE was seen at the MUNICH office, that office received a postcard addressed to "City office of the Gehlen Organization" "Suedlahor". The unknown writer of this postcard expressed thanks for having had the opportunity of taking interesting pictures at the entrance of the "Suedlahor". This postcard is now in the possession of the Gehlen GD, and is being treated

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DATE  
29 October 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

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UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
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POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

as highly secret. Here too, FELFE is suspected, who undoubtedly sought revenge for the dressing down he was subjected to. It is likewise suspected that FELFE had something to do with the LUDWIGSBURG affair. With reference to that affair, the man who was apprehended after the film was found, as he was walking toward the cache, is Walter KUNDE, born 9 July 1908 in BERLIN 33UUU9220, Germany. He is currently being held in protective custody in LUDWIGSBURG 32UNV1415, Germany, upon order of the Chief Prosecutor.

9. In the East Zone press release of December 1953, the following personality is mentioned, among many others:

b6 UNKEL/Rhine (nca), Germany, Bahnhofstrasse, without number, born in 1918, agent (female) of GEHLEN and of the French Intelligence Service". It is a fact that b6 once worked for GEHLEN. However, she never worked for the French. The Soviet Zone press release otherwise matches the entry on the Gehlen information card, where b6 address is even given as "Bahnhofstrasse, without number". The following is known about the b6 case: b6, a close friend of b6, recruited b6 for KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany) coverage. At that time, b6 was responsible for NRW, and b6 was his subordinate. b6 had promised b6 not to give her name to his superiors, and all admonition notwithstanding, he stubbornly held to that promise. Shortly after his last interview on the b6 case with b6 relinquished his NRW field of activities to b6, for whom FELFE had set up the Gehlen office in DUESSELDORF. The turning over of the business by b6 to b6 took place in the Hotel Kaiserhof in ESSEN 32ULC6101, Germany. Present at the time were also FELFE and b6. Whereas b6, in consideration of b6 commitment to b6 had agreed to the withholding of her real name (she was known by the cover name b6), b6 brusquely demanded her real name. FELFE and b6 then took b6 sharply to task, stating that if he kept up his obstinacy, his job could not last long. To this, b6 merely said, "As you please!", an attitude which b6 rightly termed a clearcut stand. In the course of time, b6 softened,

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

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SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

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TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

however, and gave [b6] real name to SCHUETZ and FELFE. That is how she was carried in the information card file. It is believed [b6] has since been dropped as unproductive. Inasmuch as many other names of agents and co-workers mentioned in the Soviet Zone press release were within the sphere of knowledge of SCHUETZ and FELFE, the suspicion against them remains. The GD is aware of these factors.

10. One [b6] cover name [b6] of the Gehlen GD, carries out security assignments in MUNICH-Pullach and the MUNICH area. [b6], who fully trusts [b6] [b6], had a talk with the latter, in the course of which he stressed the need for keeping an eye on FELFE. [b6] [b6] promised his cooperation.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

11. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

FILE: IV-33446

26 October 1954

SUBJECT: CEHLEN Cruppe

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of a brief history of the CEHLEN Cruppe, as found in the "Sunday Times", CUMBERLAND, Maryland, dated 19 September 1954.

2. The information contained in the "Sunday Times" was obtained by the CS Team through the courtesy of b6 a member of Region IV, MUNICH, who submitted the information on 12 October 1954.

3. The original copy of the newspaper article is being maintained in Region IV, MUNICH, files.

b6 /apk/MM 7246-006

Incl:

Cpy of newspaper article

b6

Commanding

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SUBJECT: GEHLEN, Gruppe  
Source: Sunday Times, Cumberland, Md  
Date: 19 September 1954  
Rating of Source: None

GERMAN PRODIGY OF GERMAN STAFF  
RECORDED U.S. NO. 1 SPY ABROAD

BONN, Germany, Sept 18 (AP)--A former prodigy of the German general staff is America's No. 1 spy abroad.

Without Reinhold Gehlen's name ever being mentioned in an appropriations debate in Congress, he spends six million dollars a year from the U. S. Treasury.

Thousands of agents of diverse nationality are on his payroll, together with the elite of the old German army's counterintelligence corps.

HEADQUARTERS SEALED OFF

Like an atomic installation, his headquarters on American-requisitioned property, near Munich in Bavaria, is sealed off with barbed wire and armed state police.

The Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon appear to trust this retired German lieutenant general more than they do any Allied statesman.

On his secret reports, which evaluate the findings of his costly anti-Soviet espionage operating as far beyond the Iron Curtain as Siberia, much of American defense planning admittedly depends today.

Gehlen has worked for the United States uninterruptedly since he surrendered to American troops in the closing days of the war in 1945.

First, he was assigned to comb through the mass of secret documented information on Russia which he brought with him as a prisoner.

From 1942 on, he had commanded the counterintelligence section, Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East), on the Russian front. His analysis of Soviet military strength was so consistently accurate that he nearly wound up being executed as a defector.

|| He was one of the last voices that urged the Nazi regime, early in the Eastern invasion, to win over the Russian people by generosity while rooting out the Communist system. For he had become quickly convinced that the Soviet Union could not be overwhelmed by German military means alone.

Instead, two million Soviet war prisoners, who might have fought loyally by 1942 in a German-led crusade strictly against the Kremlin, were reduced to subhuman misery in Nazi extermination camps.

|| It was also Gehlen who proposed to Reich police chief Heinrich Himmler in 1944 the creation of strong German underground resistance behind the advancing Russian lines.

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Gehlen suggested it be modeled on the Polish underground, which had caused the Nazi command so much grief. Himmler was afraid even to mention it to Hitler at the moment.

In the last 10 months of the war, Gehlen rocketed from colonel to lieutenant general despite his unpleasant estimate of Soviet capability. He was only 43 when he reached three-star rank.

#### ORGANIZED ESPIONAGE

He spent another 10 months as a privileged American POW, then was given autonomous command over a personally chosen German staff to organize cold war espionage in the Soviet zone for the United States.

A veil of secrecy around the Gehlen organization was suddenly ripped by the East German government last year after the June 17 anti-Communist revolt.

As the Eastern SED (State Security Service) seized hundreds of Soviet-hating Germans in a reprisal campaign that went on for months, the East Berlin government denounced virtually all of them as "Nazi Gehlen agents."

This was the first that some 48 million citizens of the Bonn republic had heard of the slender little ex-officer in his American-financed Bavarian hideout.

In Bonn, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer knew him intimately, of course. His deep confidence in Gehlen was unintentionally contributed to much more unwanted publicity this year.

(human!) With West German sovereignty and rearmament seemingly just around the corner, the Chancellor started preparing this summer to take over the Gehlen organization from the Americans down to its last strange cipher.

Then Dr. Otto John, West German security chief and jealous rival of Gehlen, openly deserted to the Communist East July 20.

Many West German newspapers demanded Gehlen drop his mystery. Noting that this "faceless general" was reputed never to have been photographed, jeering tabloids printed a splash of black ink for his "portrait."

#### AUTHENTIC PICTURES

Finally, the Rhein Ruhr Zeitung at Dusseldorf proudly came out with a real scoop: authentic pictures of Gehlen with his counterintelligence staff on the Russian front. A former staff officer had been unable to bear press ridicule and had voluntarily gone to the Dusseldorf paper with souvenir snapshots of the wartime chief.

But Gehlen is still a shadow to millions of his countrymen, a figure of doubt with alien allegiance.

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The cover name for his headquarters at Pullach is Sued-deutsche Industrie-Verwertung (South German Industry Utilization). He heads its Generaldirektion.

Scattered through the West German Republic are a half-dozen G. I. Generalvertretungen (general representatives), each with several Unterververtretungen (subrepresentatives) and Filialen (affiliate).

Outside West Germany, there are Residenzen (residents), controlling individual rings of agents, and supplied with shortwave radio equipment and couriers.

The basic principle of operation is an old one in spy history: restrict an agent's knowledge of the espionage apparatus to one little ring. At headquarters, put together the fragmentary, disjointed field reports into an intelligent mosaic of information.

#### TOUCH AND GO FOR MEN

Behind the Iron Curtain, it is always touch and go for Gehlen men. Some are rumored parachuted into Poland, White Russia and the Ukraine. Some are known to have died on Communist gallows or before Soviet army firing squads. Only in East Germany are most of them Germans. In other Red satellites, most are Slavs.

Gehlen's primary mission is to identify and locate at all times the forward Soviet and satellite armed forces. This is fundamental to Allied security, including 400,000 American, British and French troops outposting West Germany.

A quiet scholarly man with a high forehead, receding fair hair and large blue eyes, Gehlen looks like anything but a master spy.

He has the clipped, terse speech of the military profession, but likes to range over many current topics in philosophical discussion with his lieutenants. He often works as much as 14 hours a day, concentrating a mammoth amount of administrative detail in his own hands.

Military service has been his life. Son of the director of a publishing house, he was born in Erfurt, Thuringia. After completing his secondary school education at Breslau in 1920, he joined the Reichswehr. By 1923, he won a lieutenant's commission in the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment.

In the Weimar Republic, soldiering was a dead-end street. Not until 1934 when Hitler was in power did Gehlen receive promotion to captain. With it, he was assigned to the Reich War Ministry—a dream spot for ambitious junior officers.

#### BRILLIANT AT DESK WORK

Gehlen's brilliance at desk work caught the eye of his seniors. He was appointed to the General Staff in 1936 and elevated to Major a year later.

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His first war experience on the general staff came in the 1939 conquest of Poland. In 1940, he was liaison officer for the army high command with Guderian's panzer spearheads in their sweep across France. His reward was a lieutenant colonelcy.

In the invasion of Russia, he first served under Gen. Adolf Heusinger, now one of the official planners of West German rearmament. In April 1942, youthful Gehlen was singled out to head the vital new counterintelligence section, Fremde Heere Ost.

Many German front commanders have unstinted praise to Gehlen's summaries on the Red army.

None of his present-day admirers, including men high in the Bonn government, claim that Gehlen's organization has been free of blunders. But except for the British Secret Service, no other intelligence agency is more feared by Iron Curtain countries.

With all the current furor over Gehlen stirred up by Red propaganda attacks and jealous politicians in Bonn, it seems unlikely that Chancellor Adenauer will revive his earlier plan to combine governmental intelligence activities into one big superagency office under the little general.

But it is also unlikely that Gehlen's talents will not be transferred originally from the Americans to the Germans in some form in the coming year.

The role for which his experience best suits him would be Abwehr (counterintelligence) chief in the future German high command. But a man who has been in the hire of a foreign power for nine years even a friendly power such as the United States has become, is not without handicap in hoping for top advancement in German uniform.

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FOR CIC EYES ONLY

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# Office Memorandum •

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
Attn: [b6] CS Office

FROM : T. C. Hughes, OCA

SUBJECT: Organization GEHLEN.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
This Document Has Been  
Classified by [b6] Section  
Date 17 DEC 1954 Init [b6]

During a recent conversation with [b3 Per CIA] a CIA official who has stated that he was dispatched to Germany in connection with CIA's investigation of the Otto JOHN affair, [b3 Per CIA] passed several interesting remarks with respect to SDU and CIA relations with that organization. It is believed that these remarks are worthy of report to [b6] of your Hqs who may bear them in mind and, in the event the opportunity presents itself, discreetly introduce the subject into any conversations with [b3 Per CIA] which he may conduct in the future. It is understood that [b3 Per CIA] in connection with his investigation of the JOHN case, desires to proceed to Hq, 66th CIC Group, at some time in the near future to discuss certain aspects of the JOHN case with competent CIC case officers there.

Aside from the merits and competence of SDU as an organization, [b3 Per CIA] stated that in some CIA quarters there exists considerable dissatisfaction with General GEHLEN as head of SDU. This dissatisfaction evidently stems from the knowledge that GEHLEN is not only enlarging his influence within both the Federal and Land governments but is seeking to discredit a good many prominent liberal personalities in the government. In addition, GEHLEN has indicated to CIA that, following incorporation of his organization within the Federal government, his liaison with CIA will be drastically reduced. In this connection, [b3 Per CIA] made the following specific statements:

a. GEHLEN sees a conspiracy among certain prominent figures within the government which has as its aim a sell-out of German national interests to the advantage of other powers, probably to the east. [b3 Per CIA] mentioned the following persons as being the objects of GEHLEN's suspicion in this regard, indicating that the total number of such persons suspected by GEHLEN to be in the conspiracy is in the neighborhood of twenty-five: [b6] Bundeskanzleramt; [b6]

b. GEHLEN has been seeking to extend his influence within the government and within government agencies. [b3 Per CIA] stated that CIA recently was forced to discontinue from SDU's budget certain funds which had been used exclusively for the maintenance of police contacts throughout Germany and mentioned that at least some one hundred and fifty police officials within various police agencies were involved.

c. GEHLEN has stated to CIA representatives that, following his incorporation into the government, CIA will be permitted a staff of six (6) liaison officers only and that these liaison officers would be permitted only to contact GEHLEN, certain members of his executive staff and department heads. This limitation would be of course designed to prevent CIA insight into his operations. In this connection, [b3 Per CIA] stated that GEHLEN has long been attempting to discourage contact between his lower echelons and CIA people. According to [b3 Per CIA] however, a good many of GEHLEN's subordinates are in

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disagreement with many of his policies, including this one.

Information copy to:

b6, CS Office  
Hq, 66th CIC GROUP, USAREUR

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APC 757 US ARMY

III-34873

14 October 1954

SUBJECT: b6

b6

320541/2

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USARV  
APC 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Reference is made to an Evaluation Sheet, Headquarters 66th CIC Group, Subject and file as above, dated 23 April 1954.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 14 October 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq.

b. Evaluation of Source: Source "A" is temporarily evaluated F.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: None

d. How Information was Obtained: The information contained in this report was obtained from b1

e. Date Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 15 July 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6 on 23 July 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

h. Status of Case: Pending

584

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(Continued)



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III-34875

SUBJECT:

b6

14 October 1954

4. REMARKS:

a. The reference in paragraph 1 above, requested that Source attempt to gather more information relative to VFP-Gehlen complex.

b. This report was prepared by

b6

b6

1 Incl  
SCI (in quad)  
JTB/mx/49-833

b6

Corresponding

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14 October 54

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6

III-34873

1. SUBJECT's\* position in the Adlon in BERLIN 330UU9220, Germany, and his relationship with b6 had not been a secret in certain circles, and it is therefore understandable that Heinrich HIMMLER and b6 were aware of the setup. It is not to be assumed that, even with best intentions, SUBJECT could have withstood this situation. Meanwhile, SUBJECT with his love for good living, was not one to pass up the possibility of double income. There is no doubt but what SUBJECT worked simultaneously for b6 and the RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt-Reich Main Security Office).

2. SUBJECT is believed to have had a lengthy relationship with the actress b6 who lived at the Adlon for several months prior to the war. This relationship broke up rather suddenly and it is understood that SUBJECT threw b6 over.

3. Subsequent to World War II, SUBJECT operated a bar near the Grose-Flotthek Railroad Station in HAMBURG 32UNE6553, Germany, in addition to which he was engaged in the lumber business. It was also in HAMBURG, subsequent to the war, that SUBJECT made the acquaintance of b6 for the first time. b6 is believed to be a member of the SPD (Social Demokratische Partei Deutschlands - Social Democratic Party of Germany), since otherwise he would not be tolerated by the SPD, as he was a particularly ardent Nazi. b6 has for years maintained particularly good relations with the SPD intelligence chief b6, chairman of the Bundestag committee for All German Affairs.

4. SUBJECT still travels each month to a meeting with b6 in GAUTING, near MUNICH 32UPE9134, Germany, where b6 resides (under his real name of b6) at b6. b6 SUBJECT's stepfather, b6, a former armaments manufacturer, resides in GARMISH 32TPT5760, Germany. b6 was last reported to be in charge of the Southern group of the Gehlen Organization and presumably still is. b6 also, until recently, had a US requisitioned house in FRANKFURT/M 32UMA7751, Germany, near Bookheimer Landetresse, at his disposal. SUBJECT worked directly under b6. SUBJECT's reports

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14 October 54

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APC 757, US Army

b6

III-34873

are written to [b6], formerly secretary to SUBJECT, but now secretary to [b6] SUBJECT is paid by (Fnu) [b6] in MUNICH, who is in [b6] office. [b6], on occasion of his visits to BONN 32ULB7623, Germany, normally stays in the Kosnigshof Hotel, Koblenzstrasse.

5. SUBJECT continues to use the FWX facilities of the NWDR (Nordwest Deutscher Rundfunk - Northwest German Radio). Theo LILL\* of the VFF (Volksbund fuer Frieden und Freiheit - Peoples League for Peace and Freedom) is KIEM 32UNF7321, Germany, who initially established an intelligence net which reached into the Soviet Zone, is utilized by SUBJECT. [b6] net was initially established for the [b1]

[b1] in Schleswig-Holstein, however this operation clashed with one of the [b1] in HAMBURG, resulting in the means and request for [b6] operation being withdrawn, resulting in turn in his placing the net at the disposal of the VFF, being used by SUBJECT. SUBJECT receives the information from [b6] holds it temporarily in his office, and then forwards the information to [b6] This is an advantage for SUBJECT.

6. The Hessen state representative for the VFF is (Fnu) [b6], who maintains a strained relationship with SUBJECT. [b6] residing in [b6] comes from the area around [b6] where he held the title of Oberregierungsrat in the state administration and had an office with the Evangelical Welfare organization. He now has the following functions in WIESBADEN:

a. A syndicate for the former LEIPZIG Fur Factory in FRANKFURT/M.

b. Head of the organization "Bruderhilfe-Ost" (an organization for the assistance of travelers from the Soviet Zone) for Hesse.

c. State representative for the VFF, Hesse.

4 - Hqs, 66th CIC Grp 1 - Reg III File  
1 - CIC Central File

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In view of his activities for the "Bruderhilfe-Ost", the Ministry of Interior, Hesse, placed an office at his disposal next to the settlement office, from which he also oversees his other enterprises. b6 is a member of the Exile CDU (Christlich-Demokratische Union - Christian Democratic Union) (those defectors from the East Zone, who, although in the West, consider themselves members of the East Zone CDU in exile).

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

7. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

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4 February 2009  
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

- I. INTRODUCTION
- II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- III. PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
- IV. THE MISSION OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
- V. HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The Office of the Deputy

The Headquarters Secretariat

The Intelligence Directorate

The Administrative Directorate

The Office of Communications

The Security Office

The Psychological Warfare Planning Staff

The Office of War Plans and Operations

The Office of Codes and Cyphers

The Office of Policy and Operational Review

The Office of Documentation and Production

- VI. FIELD ORGANIZATIONS OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
- VII. RELATIONSHIP OF THE HEADQUARTERS AND THE FIELD ORGANIZATIONS
- VIII. THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN STAFF

ANNEX I \* ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

ANNEX II - LEADING PERSONALITIES OF THE GIS

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Incl. 1'

THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

I. INTRODUCTION.

The German intelligence organization, headed by the former German General Reinhard GEHLEN and supported by the United States Government for more than eight years, is called, in this study, "The German Intelligence Service" (GIS) for simplicity and clarity of identification. This term is utilized to clearly distinguish the German organization from any American staff or organization with which it has been associated. It has at this time no official status with the government of the German Federal Republic; there is no intention of cloaking this organization with official status by use of the title "The German Intelligence Service." This term, however, is not inappropriate with respect to the structure and functions of the Gehlen Organization; for a number of years it has, in fact, been a well-rounded German Intelligence Service.

The purpose of this brief study is to answer the requests of several U.S. agencies for basic information regarding the structure, functions and leading personalities of the Gehlen Organization.

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

General Reinhard GEHLEN, the German G-2 on the Eastern Front from 1942 to April 1945, was the initiating force in the establishment of this organization. The implementation of his plan, conceived during the last years of World War II, was initially supported by the United States Army under the immediate direction of the G-2 of the U.S. Forces in Germany. The size of the organization that existed at the end of 1946 has been estimated at between three and four thousand members--a figure that included both staff and agent personnel. Since no accurate records were kept during the chaotic

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postwar years nothing more than an estimate is possible. G-2 sponsorship continued until 1 July 1949. At that time the responsibility for the organization was transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency at the Department of the Army-Central Intelligence Agency level.

Although there is some evidence that the organization was given an interim counterintelligence mission in early 1946 pending a Washington decision on the future of the organization, it is quite clear that the procurement of military intelligence on Soviet and Satellite Forces was the original purpose of the operation.

The present U.S. policy of supporting the organization in its efforts to be accepted as the official German Intelligence Service by the Federal Republic was developed gradually during the years following the transfer to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1949. Since developments during the period 1949-54 are well known to the U.S. agencies who will receive this report, further comment on this period of the history of the German Intelligence Service is omitted.

### III. PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE.

During eight to nine years of U.S. support and sponsorship, during which time the U.S. sponsors gradually came to consider the organization as a German Intelligence Service held in U.S. "trusteeship," the present structure has developed a professional status and political position which make its transfer to the Federal Republic a probability. At present it has 1250 salaried employees who are either full or part-time staff members or cleared consultants. This figure does not include agents, sources and other persons, many of whom are German nationals, involved in GIS operations. In East Germany alone there are approximately 500-600 persons in these

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
categories.

The present organization includes all the staffs and activities that are normal activities of a well-rounded national intelligence service of this size. Although reorganizations have been frequent, changes have been evolutionary in character and have, as <sup>a</sup>rule, resulted in improvement in terms of the efficiency and professional capability of the organization. The administrative developments have been influenced by the civil service structure in the German government. For example, salaries and the payment of travel, per diem and dependency benefits have, for several years, been consistent with existing laws of the Federal Republic. "STAFF" status today implies a definite administrative and security status that sets the individual staff member aside from the variety of contacts, friends and agents of the GIS.


#### IV. THE MISSION OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

The mission of the German Intelligence Service is to produce current intelligence related to U.S.-established intelligence requirements. Within this broad objective the efforts of the GIS are directed primarily at the German-speaking areas of Central Europe which are currently under the control of the USSR. This mission includes specific requirements for military, economic, political, scientific and technical information required to determine the potential to the Soviet orbit of the German-speaking denied areas. Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary are target areas that enjoy equal priority with the GDR and Soviet-occupied Austria in the GIS mission; however, as a practical matter we currently regard the GIS as primarily a major source of intelligence information on the German-speaking areas.

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The U.S. policy of supporting the development of a well-rounded national intelligence service to be eventually transferred to the Federal Republic inherently contains the tacit recognition and approval of the necessity for the GIS to be increasingly sensitive to the short and long-range intelligence requirements of the Federal Republic. Within the Soviet orbit these requirements in the past few years and currently appear to coincide generally with those of the United States. In other friendly and neutral areas in which U.S. and Federal Republic intelligence requirements may not be identical, the GIS has been in close touch with German authorities in planning future GIS activities in those areas. In some areas, cooperation between the GIS and the Federal Republic appears to have gone beyond the planning stage and the establishment of GIS-sponsored personalities under both official and economic cover has provided a basis for future intelligence activities in those areas.

In general, there has been no evidence of the GIS conducting active espionage operations directed at any of the Western European or NATO countries. The GIS has no mission from its U.S. sponsors to engage in espionage outside of the Soviet orbit.




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The conduct of counterespionage operations directed against hostile services is a mission of the GIS. Our general CS requirement is for any and all information on eastern intelligence services, to include organizations, physical installations, personnel (staff, service elements and agents), targets, methods of operations and communications (including cyphers and secret writing). In the order listed, priorities given the GIS are the SFS, the SRIS in East Germany, the SHIS in West Germany, the Hungarian and Czech IS, and other satellite intelligence services.

Although not specifically a mission of the GIS, the preparation of estimates and studies for U.S. agencies has been and will continue to be a major GIS activity. GIS military, economic, transportation and scientific and technical studies and estimates have been prepared at the request of various U.S. agencies which receive the GIS product. Many of these estimates and studies have received favorable evaluation and are evidently of value. Political estimates prepared by the GIS, primarily at the request of the Federal Republic, are considered of more limited value to U.S. customers, except insofar as they reflect the political climate within the GIS specifically and the Federal Republic in general.

#### V. HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

In assembling his organization immediately following the complete defeat of Germany at the end of World War II, GEHLEN relied chiefly upon the personal relationships and general solidarity with (a) the German General Staff and (b) the German Abwehr. Although the organization, doctrine and methodology of the German Intelligence Service is strongly influenced by the experiences of the German G-2 on the Eastern Front in World War II, many of the older and perhaps more deeply rooted traditions and practices



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of the German General Staff and the German Abwehr have continued to play significant roles in the GIS. Staff procedures and the function of command within the GIS clearly reflect the military influence. However, eight years of experience and experimentation in the adjustment of GGS and Abwehr concepts to an intelligence organization have produced compromises that satisfactorily combine the best influences of the GGS and the old Abwehr with the lessons learned, often the hard way, during the past years. Also, consistent with the aim of developing a centralized GIS (as opposed to a G-2 organization) GEHLEN has been engaged during the past five years in broadening the basis of his effort through the employment of staff specialists competent in non-military fields. This has, in turn, had considerable effect on the substance of the work carried out; the form of the organization has been less effected and remains essentially military.

GEHLEN, the Chief of the GIS, dominates the organization in both administrative and operational matters. Because he is an energetic and hard-working individual with a small personal staff which arranges his meetings, visitors, travel and correspondence efficiently and in detail, GEHLEN manages to be well informed and to exert a personal influence on many relatively detailed problems. Certain problems within the GIS receive detailed attention by GEHLEN because they are either (a) politically sensitive and potentially dangerous to the GIS or (b) his professional hobbies. (a) includes any matter that involves West German public personalities and agencies, relations with representatives of other governments and matters related to the eventual transfer of the GIS to the Federal Republic. Technical aids and devices, improvements in equipment used in clandestine operations and the general field of counterspionage operations receive considerable detailed attention from him. In general,

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however, GEHLEN leaves the routine, day-to-day operations and administration in the hands of his two actual deputies, KUEHLEIN and WENDLAND.

The Office of the Deputy, headed by the former General MELLENTHIN, is currently undergoing reorganization. MELLENTHIN handled GIS West Germany liaison and contacts very effectively during the critical period 1948-51. During 1952-53 MELLENTHIN became the actual working deputy to GEHLEN--an arrangement that was never entirely satisfactory. Since early 1954 MELLENTHIN, though still carried as the deputy, has been engaged mainly with the recruitment and training of new staff personnel and reorganizing the GIS staff training program. MELLENTHIN is known to be under consideration for a general officer assignment in the new German army. Also, he has been mentioned as a possible candidate for a liaison assignment in Washington.

The Headquarters Secretariat includes a small group of staff officers, administrative and secretarial assistants. In addition to the normal functions of a secretariat, this group, under GEHLEN's personal supervision, carries out liaison with the Federal Republic and maintains contact with several Western Intelligence Services.

The GIS Headquarters Staff breaks down into (1) The Intelligence Directorate and (2) The Administrative Directorate and (3) a number of smaller special staffs. The Intelligence Directorate, headed by the former [REDACTED] is a highly integrated staff structure which includes all offices responsible for the control of espionage and counterespionage operations and the intermediate and final processing of the product of such operations. [REDACTED] does exercise something very close to command with respect to the field organizations. He is highly regarded by his

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subordinates and enjoys the full support and confidence of GEHLEN. The Administrative Directorate, headed by the former [b6] is organizationally on an equal level with the Intelligence Directorate. [b6] is GEHLEN's deputy for administrative matters and well regarded by his associates. Both [b6] were outstanding young officers during the war and are today still in their lower forties.

The Office of Communications includes both staff and operating communications offices. The Chief of Communications, the former [b6] is directly subordinate to GEHLEN and has both staff and command responsibilities. It is noteworthy that, in the GIS, staff communications, communications support of clandestine espionage operations and signal intelligence are all responsibilities of the Chief of Communications.

The Security Office, headed by the former [b6] is concerned with staff and installation security. It is a very small staff with no operating personnel. Its functions cut across and rely upon the facilities of other staffs to a great degree. [b6] is immediately subordinate to GEHLEN.

The Psychological Warfare Planning Staff is primarily a paper organization. Since the GIS currently has no mission in this field, an active staff is not needed. Several individuals assigned to this staff are engaged in the analysis of basic material--some overt and some provided by the Intelligence Directorate--which is related to the field of PW operations. After a legal GIS has been established, this staff will presumably be activated to plan and supervise the type of operations that formerly were the responsibility of Abteilung II of the German Abwehr.

The Office of War Plans and Operations, headed by the former General WINTER, is both a staff and operating office. Physically and

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[REDACTED] administratively isolated from the rest of the GIS, this organization is concerned with planning the necessary measures for the GIS in the event of a war and for the planning and mounting of wartime operations.

The Office of Codes and Cyphers, headed by [REDACTED] b6 [REDACTED] a German specialist rather well known in his field--is located in Bonn and, as the name indicates, is responsible for providing the GIS with equipment and codes to ensure cryptographic security of its administrative and operational communications. This office is directly subordinate to GEHLEN but works in close coordination with the Chief of Communications.

The Office of Policy and Operational Review is headed by Walter SCHENK, an elderly and experienced Abwehr officer who was chief of collection during the period 1948-50. He functions primarily as an inspector general in operational and security matters. He is one of the "elder statesmen" of the GIS and has exerted considerable influence during the evolution of the present operational and training doctrines.

The Office of Documentation and Production, headed by the former Colonel SICHERER, provides documentation and technical aide to support clandestine operations.

#### VI. FIELD ORGANIZATIONS OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

The major field organizations of the GIS are located in Western Germany. The primary axis of communications for the main GIS effort into the GDR is, of course, Munich-Frankfurt-Berlin. There is no major field organization in West Berlin in spite of the fact that West Berlin is the main base of operations for the GIS. A secondary axis of communications of the GIS effort is Munich-Salzburg-Vienna. Numerically the operations

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run from Vienna are insignificant when compared to the GIS effort based in Berlin.

In Western Germany the GIS maintains major operating bases at Bremen (WORGITSKY), Darmstadt [b6] and Munich [b6]. The major effort of each of these three bases is that part of the Eastern Zone of Germany directly to the East. In some instances, these major bases have subsidiary offices also located in Western Germany. Espionage operations are run by principal agents operating either across the zone boundary from Western Germany or across the sector boundaries in Berlin. In the latter case, the principal agent in Berlin is a representative of one of the major bases in Western Germany. The purpose of this organization is to deny the hostile services accessible centralized organization in Western Berlin. Thus, control of operations is effected via the channel Munich HEADQUARTERS-Operations Base West Germany-Principal Agent West Berlin-Agent in GDR. The channel by which timely reporting is effected is short-circuited from West Berlin to Munich.

In the face of pressure from Western intelligence agencies and local officials in West Berlin, the GIS was, in 1953, forced to establish an identifiable and responsible senior representative in West Berlin to whom Western intelligence authorities and local Allied and German officials could turn in matters obviously involving the GIS. Thus, in 1953 the central office of communications, accessible to GENLEN's principal agents in West Berlin only via a system of cut-outs, was expanded to include a senior representative identified to German authorities. The present representative in this post, the former [b6] has been placed directly in touch with German authorities. He continues to deal with

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Allied intelligence officials through the present American sponsor organization.

Berlin-Frankfurt and Vienna-Munich pouches are handled through American channels. Adequate radio communications between Berlin and the GIS Headquarters in Munich are provided through Army facilities in Berlin and a base station under official German cover in the Munich area.

In addition to the three major operational bases in Western Germany which have been mentioned in the above paragraph, several small groups whose operations are subject to closer control by the headquarters are located in Ulm, Munich and Mannheim. These smaller elements are engaged in mounting operations into Czechoslovakia, Poland, running CE cases controlled by the headquarters or conducting operations against specialized S and T targets in the East Zone of Germany.

GIS targets at which the Austrian-based operations are directed include Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Soviet personnel stationed in Austria. These activities are coordinated with appropriate authorities in Austria.

Although each of the GIS operating field bases has a GI/CE mission consistent with its area and target interests, two small units--one in Munich and one in Mannheim--have an exclusive counterespionage mission and are under the close guidance of the CE staff in the headquarters Intelligence Directorate.

#### VII. RELATIONSHIP OF THE HEADQUARTERS AND THE FIELD ORGANIZATIONS.

The relationship of the field organization of the GIS with the headquarters has been deeply influenced by a number of factors that prevailed during the postwar years in which the organization of the GIS was reconstructed. From 1946 until 1953 there was almost no rotation of personnel

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between the headquarters and the field organizations. This was partly the result of GEHLEN's policy, partly the product of inertia in the face of administrative difficulties. The administrative problem involved in the relocation of staff members and their families was an obvious deterrent to any normal rotation program. The almost complete lack of either the means or a system for adequate background security checks on staff members in the early years dictated that a maximum degree of compartmentation be retained. Lacking either official or legal status, the problem of retaining control, discipline and solidarity within individual organizations could be solved only by personal leadership and reliance on earlier personal and professional relationships. Finally, it is clear that the GIS top staff was, from the outset, determined to minimize the exposure of GIS staff personalities to the American sponsors. All of these factors contributed to the unusually stable personnel situation that existed in each of the German elements during the period 1946 to 1953. During the past two years the practice of rotating staff members between field and headquarters assignments has become a more common practice.

#### VIII. THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN STAFF.

During the formative years of 1946-47 the American staff consisted of a very small group of several officers and enlisted men who maintained the channel between the German organization and the G-2 staff in Germany. Through this channel requirements and reports were passed; administrative and logistical support was arranged. During late 1947 and in 1948 the staff was gradually expanded to the strength of 10 officers and 25 enlisted men, most of whom were engaged in providing support to the German organization and operating the installation in Pullach which has, since

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LEADING  
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE PERSONALITIES

Reinhard GEHLEN, Chief of the German Intelligence Service. Born 4 March 1905, Erfurt, Germany. An Army career officer who entered on active duty in 1923 and served continuously until the end of World War II. Between 1942-1945 he was the G-2 on the Eastern Front. In April 1945 he was dismissed from this position by a special order from HITLER and charged with defection following a briefing for HITLER and his staff on the overwhelming Soviet order of battle.

Alexander Horet von MELLETHIN, former General (Artillery) and now deputy Chief of the German Intelligence Service. Born 31 July 1898, Hannover, Germany. A career officer who entered the German Army in 1915. Between 1937-1943 he was Chief of the Military Attache System of the German General Staff. He surrendered to the American forces in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia at end of World War II. Has been with GEHLEN's organization since 1947.

b6 [redacted] executive secretary to GEHLEN. Born [redacted] b6 [redacted]  
b6 [redacted] A member of the German Army during World War II. Joined GEHLEN organization in April 1947.

b6 [redacted] Former Colonel in German Army, now Chief of the Administrative Directorate. Born [redacted] b6 [redacted] A career officer; entered on active duty in 1930; served continuously until end of World War II. A British prisoner of war until 1947. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1947.

b6 [redacted] former Colonel in German Army, now Chief of the Intelligence Directorate. Born [redacted] b6 [redacted] A career officer; entered on active duty in 1930; served until end of World War II. A French prisoner of war until September 1945. Served under GEHLEN during war on Eastern Front. Joined the present organization in 1947.

Walter Friedrich SCHENK, career intelligence officer, currently Inspector General of the German Intelligence Service. Born 6 July 1887; Neu Ulm, Germany. Has held numerous intelligence assignments since 1919. With emphasis on Near and Middle East and Balkan countries. Was dismissed by RSHA in 1944 due to being half Jewish; remained unemployed until end of World War II. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1946.

Fritz POLECK, former Colonel in German Army, now head of Personnel Group in the Administrative Directorate. Born 8 November 1905, Lieke, Posen, Germany. A career officer; entered on active duty in 1925; served until end of World War II. Was British prisoner of war until July 1947. Was a member of German General Staff. Joined GEHLEN organization in June 1950.

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ANNEX II

Hans Hermann DIECKMANN, former staff officer of German Army, now head of the Organization Branch of the Administrative Directorate. Born 20 July 1904, Tilsit, Prussia. Entered army in 1924; served continuously until end of World War II

b6 career civil servant, currently head of Administrative and Finance Branch of the Administrative Directorate. Born b6  
b6 Member of the German Foreign Office between 1941-1945. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1947.

Cuenther CERICKE, industrialist, head of Economic Cover Branch of the Administrative Directorate. Born 1 December 1887, Berlin, Germany. Has held numerous industrial managerial positions. Between 1920-1940 was member of Board of Otavi-Minen und Eisenbahn Gesellschaft. Served in German Army during World War II. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1947.

Berno Adolf von WICKEDE, lawyer and court clerk, now legal advisor of the German Intelligence Service. Born 10 August 1909, Berlin, Germany. Served in German Army between 1937-1945 with highest rank of Lieutenant Colonel. A practicing attorney and court clerk until joining GEHLEN organization in 1946.

b6 former General Staff Officer, now head of Security Branch of the German Intelligence Service. Born b6  
b6 A career army officer; entered on active duty in 1937; served until end of World War II. An American prisoner of war until August 1945. Resumed studies at Goettingen University after the war. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1950.

b6 former Colonel of the German Army, now Headquarters Commandant of the German Intelligence Service. Born b6  
b6 A regimental commander on Russian front during World War II. Joined GEHLEN organization in May 1952.

Leo Phillip HEPP, former Colonel of the German Army, now head of the Office of Communications of the German Intelligence Service. Born 15 August 1907, Ulm/Wuerttemberg, Germany. A career officer; entered on active duty in 1925; served until end of World War II. Between 1937-1939 held post of Deputy Chief of Communications of German High Command. Joined GEHLEN organization in April 1948.

b6 career intelligence officer, now head of the Counterintelligence and Counterespionage Branch of the Intelligence Directorate. Born b6  
b6 Entered Austrian Army in 1937 and then the German Army where he served until end of World War II. The majority of his assignments were in the fields of counterintelligence and counterespionage on the Eastern Front. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1946.



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ANNEX II

Heinz Danko HERRE, former Colonel, now head of the Evaluation group of the Intelligence Directorate. Born 23 January 1909, St. Avoird, Alsace. A career officer who entered German army in 1927; served continuously until end of World War II. In 1944, he was the German army liaison officer to the Vlassov army. An American prisoner of war until June 1946. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1946.

August Otto WINTER, former Lieutenant-General, currently head of War Plans and Special Operations Branch. Born 18 January 1897, Munich, Germany. A career officer; entered army in 1916; served until end of World War II. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1947.

Hermann FOERTSCHE, former General (Infantry), head of Psychological Warfare Planning Staff. Born 4 April 1895, Drahnow, Kreis Deutcheckrone. A career officer, who has been a member of the German General Staff since 1927. After the war, he was a member of the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich. Joined GEHLEN organization to assume his present position in 1951.

Rudolf Johannes KORSECK, career intelligence officer and head of the Intelligence School. Born 15 December 1893, Wohlau in Silesia. Had various front-line intelligence assignments during World War II. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1947.


Leopold Friedrich von SICHERER, former Colonel of German army, now head of Documentation and Production Staff. Born in 1897, Augsburg, Germany. Has held various highly technical assignments; was engaged, between 1928 and 1931, in building a chemical warfare station near Volek in the USSR; later, a member of the chemical warfare section of the German Waffenamt. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1953.

Hans Helmut LUTZ, former Colonel of the General Staff, and now head of the Munich Operations Base. Born 25 October 1906, Ulm, Germany. A career officer; entered the army in 1925; served until end of World War II in various staff and intelligence assignments. Joined GEHLEN organization in July 1946.


b6 [redacted] former army officer, currently head of the Ulm Operations Base. Born [redacted] b6 Fought on Eastern Front during World War II. Captured by Soviets in Berlin; in early 1946 was turned over to American custody and remained a prisoner of war until June 1946. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1946,

b6 [redacted] career intelligence officer, now head of the Mannheim Operations Base. Born [redacted] b6 Held various front-line intelligence assignments during World War II. His last assignment prior to the end of the war was outpost leader of FAT 353 at Saint Die, France. Released from internment during March 1946. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1946.

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ANNEX II

  
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Alfred Franz KRETSCHMER, former Lieutenant-General, currently head of the Darmstadt Operations Base. Born 17 December 1894, Huenern, Kreis Trebnitz, Germany. A career army officer; served continuously from 1921 until end of World War II. His last assignment was German Military Attache in Tokyo, Japan. Arrested by U.S. occupation authorities in September 1945; repatriated to Germany in August 1947. Joined GEHLEN organization in October 1947.

b6, former General Staff Officer, currently chief of the Bremen Operations Base. Born b6 A career officer; served continuously from 1934 until end of World War II. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1947.

b6 former General Staff Officer, now GLS senior representative in Berlin. Born b6 An American prisoner of war. Joined GEHLEN organization in October 1950.

b6, former Lieutenant in German Army, now leader of a second Munich Operations Base. Born b6 An Austrian citizen drafted 1941 into German Army; served 1943-1945 as member of G-2 staff under German Chief of Staff of Vlassov Army. Joined GEHLEN organization in 1946.

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9 February 2009  
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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

28 September 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Summary of Information, Region III, 66th CIC Group, Subject and file as above, dated 2 August 1954.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 28 September 1954.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq

b. Evaluation of Source: Source "A" is temporarily evaluated F.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.

d. How Information was Obtained: Source obtained the information through conversation with b1 a Gehlen Organization investigator.

e. Date Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 21 August 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6 on 23 August 1954.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

h. Statue of Case: Pending.

4. REMARKS:

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(Continued)

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III-34419  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

28 September 1954

a. During his conversation with his sub-source, Source "A" had the opportunity to briefly read through the film document but not to make notes.

b. This report was prepared by b6

b6

b6

*for*  
Lt Col OrdC  
Commanding

Incl:  
SOI (in quad)  
JTD/mz/49-833

*3425*  
E 4. OCT. 1954

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

609

~~SECRET~~

341

4 February 2009

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200.1-R

CONFIDENTIAL

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

28 September 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE

USUALLY RELIABLE

FAIRLY RELIABLE

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE

UNRELIABLE

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

This Document Has

Carded by C/S Sec

Date 10 NOV 1956 Init

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. A quick glance at the film report on Subject organization which was obtained in LUDWIGSBURG 32UNV1417, Germany, indicated that the information on the various personalities was correct, the references to the personal traits of General Reinhard GEHLEN\* excepted. The name "Arthur" appears repeatedly as the source of the report.

2. At the time the film was obtained in LUDWIGSBURG, an unknown individual appeared at the home of the sister of [b6] a former Major, General Staff, in BRANDOBERNDORF [b6] who himself resides in [b6]. The unknown individual told [b6] sister mysteriously, that he came from BERLIN 33UUU9220 Germany, and must speak to [b6]. He also attempted to find out about [b6] and his activities from the sister. [b6] was a fellow student of Count [b6] at General Staff College and is now engaged with a respected firm in DUESSELDORF, although simultaneously working for Subject organization, having worked for the latter organization for over a year, mainly in an effort against the Soviet Zone. Now, due to old ties, [b6] is working on the Blank Office (Proposed Federal Defense Ministry) for Subject organization.

3. A short time later, the unidentified individual appeared in DUESSELDORF at [b6] address and introduced himself as an agent sent from the Soviet Zone and made offers to [b6] that [b6] come to East BERLIN. [b6] reaction was negative although the agent attempted to provoke [b6] to call the police and have him arrested.

4. Members of the Gehlen staff are of the opinion that:

a. The factual personal descriptions included in the film are another indication that there is at least one (1) traitor in the midst of the organization.

b. The provocative contact and approach made to [b6] whose identity and activity are scarcely known, strengthens the opinion concerning a traitor in their midst.

-- 610

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

28 September 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

o. The film document and particularly the approach to [b6] stem from opposition to the Gehlen Organization from within the Federal Republic in an attempt to publicly dsfame it, rather than rpsresenting genuins operation of the East Zone.

d. By virtue of the fact that the first name "Arthur" appears in the film document and [b6] was approached by an individual, it is probably an attempt by the Gshlen op-ponents to have [b6] considered as a suspect by the Gshlen headquarters, thereby increasing the sense of insecurity. Had [b6] called the police in haste, it would probably resulted in a press campaign with the headlines: "West-East" or "Double Agent" in the Gehlen organization. Actually, [b6] is not con-sidered a suspect by GEHLEN.

5. With all due respect to General GEHLEN, there is not enough resoluteness in taking the necessary security measures. Examples of this are as follows:

a. There are in the organization, persons such as Heinz FELFE\* and Karl SCHUETZ\*, as well as a whole group of other persons, who gained entrance into the organization on the basis of past experience about which they made false statments. FELFE and SCHUETZ are suspect in the investiga-tion of treason cases. All of the suspicions against these people are known to the headquarters, but a removal of these people is only possible when proof can be pressnted which could stand up in court. Such a situation is impossible in an in-telligence organization.

b. As a result of the finding of the film document in LUDWIGSBURG, immediate contact was established with the political police and the [b1] in [b1] STUTTGART 32UNV1203, Germany. The impression was gathered, howsber, that the situation was laxly handled and without any particular interest, and especially without an expert being called in on the case. The matter was reported to Subject organization headquarters, and independent action recommended,

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
28 September 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

but GEHLEN was hesitant to invade the jurisdiction of the authorities. Because of this, [b6] has not yet been interrogated in an expert manner.

6. [b6] has neither the professional background for his present activities nor has he learned anything. In the first place, [b6] wants a good job, and secondly, he is interested in the businesses of his father-in-law, [b6]. Then there is also the friendship between [b6]. Solely through his close connection with [b6] has [b6] disqualified himself for continued work with GEHLEN. Anyone could fall temporarily for [b6], but the relationship between [b6] has already lasted too long.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

7. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

Maybe  
b6

14233

612

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1 JUN 47

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COMINT INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

CS  
duyo

D-320529

27 September 1954  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO : Commanding Officer  
Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757  
United States Army, Europe

1. Reference is made to report, your region, file III 34419, Subject:

Gehlen Organization, dated 16/9/54, contributed to by X-892-101

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index of

6 (See reverse side for scale).

3. The following comments are submitted for your information and guidance:

a. Source:

- XX (1) appears well oriented
- XX (2) appears fairly well oriented
- XX (3) appears poorly oriented
- XX (4) appears to be provocateur, double agent or fabricator

b. Target Coverage Attained:

- XX (1) direct coverage or penetration
- XX (2) partial coverage or penetration
- XX (3) peripheral
- XX (4) indirect
- XX (5) target not considered covered

c. Operational Direction:

- XX (1) no further reports desired
- XX (2) further reports desired
- XX (3) answer unfulfilled portions of ECI's
- XX (4) reorient your source
- XX (5) determine future use of source with Technical Specialist

4. Remarks: It is desired that control of information be provided in greater detail. It is insufficient to say information was received from a sub-source without describing how sub-source came into possession of the information and why he made such information available to source. In view of pending disposition of source, closer control of his actions should be maintained.

b6

(Case Officer)

613

VE Form 183  
25 March 1954

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

12213

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

24 September 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 24 September 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq.
- b. Evaluation of Source: Source "A" is temporarily evaluated F.
- c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.
- d. How Information was Obtained: The information was obtained through conversation with b1 a Gehlen Organization representative.
- e. Date Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on b1
- f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6 on 15 September 1954.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.
- h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. Apparently GEHLEN is placing emphasis on schooling and is therefore preparing to reorganize the system for training agents, the question with which the conference was most concerned.

614

(Continued)

3427  
335

III-34419  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

24 September 1954

b. All reports concerning GEHLEN's being taken over by the Federal Government will be forwarded on a priority basis.

c. More information regarding [b6] will be requested.

d. This report was prepared by [b6]  
[b6]

b6

Commanding

18. SEP. 1954

Incls: a/s  
JTD/mz/49-833

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

615

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4 February 2009

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

24 September 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. On 6 and 7 September 1954, a conference was held at the Gehlen Organization headquarters in MUNICH-Pullach 32UPU 9134, Germany, attended by the Gehlen headquarters staff, Gehlen employees from BERLIN 33UUU9220, Germany, and Gehlen representatives from other cities in Western Germany. Items included for discussion on the agenda, only one (1) of which the detailed results are known, were:

a. Preparation for the Organization's shift to Federal public service: while retaining strong leadership and extensive decentralization, will be attempted.

b. A reorganization of the Gehlen Organization schooling system and relocation of same. The castle in which the school was formerly conducted will no longer be used, although proposed sites of the new location were not discussed. In the future training will be primarily a local responsibility. The organization's "main school" will be an academy for advanced students, a graduate institute. The central school's director, (Fnu) von MELLENTIN\*, will supervise local training. Local school directors will be obligated to report to von MELLENTIN, who will both guide and assign directors to local administrations. In the ensuing debate, Local Director (Fnu) von LUTZ\* expressed views contrary to those of von MELLENTIN. The latter believes, that to achieve uniform training programs, local training directors must be directly subordinate to the central training chief, i.e., these local directors must keep the chief in close touch with their departments in addition to getting their instructions from him. Von LUTZ maintained that permitting local training directors to by-pass local chiefs when contacting the central training chief is not in keeping with good business administration practices. After the debate, von MELLENTIN stated that the central training director's judgement, since he could summon local training directors to his office for discussion at any time, would always be decisive and the organizational setup would not affect it. No agreement was reached on this matter.

c. The question of the transfer of the Gehlen

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
24 September 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

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UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
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DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

headquarters was not discussed. During a meal however, (Fnu) **b6** General Reinhard GEHLEN's\* nephew, was asked if he knew anything about the proposed new location of the headquarters and stated that the Eastern edge of the Eifel mountains, approximately on a line through **b6** (nca) and **b6** 32ULB4314, all in Germany, would be particularly suitable.

2. In general, GEHLEN stated that preparations to convert the organization to an official organ of the Federal Government would continue regardless of the failure of EDC (European Defense Community). He stated further that so far, he has had excellent success in obtaining support in various parliamentary leaderships and that he will make every effort to win political support from the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - Social Democratic Party of Germany) opposition also. Concerning the efforts in his own organization, GEHLEN attached great importance to increasing political police units in the larger police stations analagous to the Prussian police I-A divisions before 1933.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

3. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

617

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

17 September 1954

D-320529

SUBJECT: Translation of the Soviet Zone Booklet (on the Gehlen Organization)

TO:

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch

1. REFERENCE: Letter, your division, file 350.09 (GIO/OPS/COLL), dated 12 February 1952, Subject: West Germany Intelligence Agencies.

2. REMARKS:

a. (X) Contents of Inclosure have not been disseminated to any other agency.

b. ( ) Contents of inclosure have been passed to:

c. (X) Source(s) of the inclosed report was:

b1

b1

d. (X) Date of the information was: 26 August 1954.

e. ( ) Investigation is Continuing.

f. ( ) Investigation is considered closed.

g. (X) No official or unofficial reaction on the part of SDU towards the publication of this booklet has been received by this headquarters. No estimate can be given as to the accuracy of the information or to the damage which it may have caused Gehlen operations.

1 Incl: Translation of the Sov Zone  
Booklet (dupe)

b6

Colonel, GMLC  
Commanding

WLP/nem/Stgt 9342-7382

WB Form 206  
Rev 21 Apr 54

613

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17/9/54 331



~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

16 September 1954

III-34419

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO:

Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

This Document Has Been  
Classified by 673 S. Cohen  
30 SEP 1954

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 16 September 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq.

b. Evaluation of Source: Temporarily evaluated P.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.

*Card  
limited dist.*  
d. How Information was Obtained: The information was obtained through b1 including primarily b6 a journalist with extensive contacts.

e. Date Information Was Obtained: The information was obtained on 10 August 1954.

f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6 on 23 August 1954.

g. Other Date Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. SOI, Region III, Subject and file as above, date 9 April 1954, indicated that the Federal Government would take over the fund allocation fund allocation for SUBJECT Organization.

619

(Continued)

20 SEP 1954

~~SECRET~~

2972  
532

~~SECRET~~

III-34419  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

16 September 1954

b. This report was prepared by b6

b6

**b6**

Commanding

Incls: a/s  
JTD/mz/49-833

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 September 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
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 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
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 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The reliable SPD (Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschland - Social Democratic Party of Germany) press service has announced that a sixty-two (62) page brochure on the Gehlen Organization is being disseminated in the Soviet Zone of Germany, most of the material for which is credited to b6 a former Gehlen Organization employee. In reality, it is a summation of material gathered by the SFS (Sekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - Secretariat for State Security) over a long period of time. The whole report is a mixture of opinion, facts, reproaches and prejudices, to which the alleged source may possibly have contributed some personal observations.

2. The purpose of the article is to convince the population that SUBJECT organization is an instrument for the preparation of an imperialistic war. It also discusses the thought in BONN 32ULB7623, Germany, of making SUBJECT organization the official intelligence organization for the Federal Republic. The article aims at domestic and foreign political effects and claims that the countries allied with the United States are being spied upon by SUBJECT organization and that all political and economic institutions, particularly the West BERLIN 330UU9220, Germany, Police Department, are penetrated by Gehlen agents. A particular chapter is dedicated to the French, which will cause resentment. France also is being watched by the Gehlen agents with the approval of the Americans, according to the article. American mistrust of the organization is courted in the article by pointing out the large number of insecure Gehlen agents who await an opportunity to defect. The b1

b1  
 is mentioned as being headed by an old b1  
b1.

3. The press service "Politics and Economy", published by b6 (SPD), reported confidentially that the intelligence system of the Federal Republic will be reorganized. General Reinhard GEHLEN\* is alleged to have suggested to b6 that the political and military intelligence services should be reorganized as follows:

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 September 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

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 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

a. Reorganization of political and military intelligence offices in the Federal Republic.

b. Conversion of intelligence in the Blank Office (Proposed West German Defense Ministry) to a central processing office for military intelligence, under the direction of the chief of military affairs in the Federal Chancellory.

c. Doing away with the [b1] and transferring those [b1] officials with clean backgrounds to the [b1]  
 [b1]  
 [b1].

d. Create a new political intelligence organization under a Bundestag delegate with permanent parliamentary control, whose executive powers would lie with the Ministry of Interior. This would necessitate the State police presidents forming their political police into so-called "I-A Departments". At state level the political police advisors to the police presidents would be under a council of ministers of the State Minister of Interior. At Federal level, the advisor for political security would be a Ministerial-director, who would be bound by the directives of the chief of the political intelligence services.

4. The GEHLEN suggestion calls for coordination of intelligence services. The leadership would be in the hands of representatives of the Chancellor's. GEHLEN is a possible candidate for the military intelligence post and [b6]  
 [b6] candidate for the post of head of the political intelligence. The plans for the change-over should be worked out quickly in order that the plan can be brought forward immediately after Germany gains her sovereignty. [b6]  
 the High Commissioner for Germany, is said to have approved the plan. The [b1] are worried about the tendency to centralize and the [b1] are filled with mistrust. It is expected that the various Laender will object to the curtailment of their authority and that there will be resistance in the Bundestag.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
16 September 54

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

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UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

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POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

5. Finance Minister b6 has allocated 25,000,000 DM for the Gehlen Organization from defense costs. b6 is against GEHLEN heading the military intelligence offices. There are those who are uncertain about the former SD (Sicherheitsdienst - Security Service from the Nazi era) persons in the Gehlen organization, which now numbers approximately 4000 members. Such a well set-up organization as SUBJECT organization should not be broken up. It is doubted that the United States will, however, place any further means at the disposal of GEHLEN. Repeated conferences in BONN and also in confidential parliamentary circles have been favorable toward GEHLEN.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

6. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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1 JUN 47

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

D-320529 (14 Sep 54)  
SUBJECT: GEHLEN, Gruppe

1st Ind

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, US Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army **28 SEP 1954**

TO: Commanding Officer, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army  
ATTN: CS Team

1. Contents of basic communication have been noted.
2. It is desired that this headquarters be provided with complete control of information data on how the SPD document came into your possession.

BY ORDER OF b6

**b6**

Incl: w/d

WLP/akk/Stgt 7382

Adjutant

In Log Nr.  
IV 2161

HQ  
106  
1/2

IV-33446; D-320529 (14 Sep 54) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: GEHLEN Gruppe

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army, 7 October 1954

TO: Commanding Officer, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army,  
ATTN: b6

1. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Information was procured by O-0152-IV, evaluated "B", from files b1 as made available by b6 Chief of the SPD Information Service. The information was turned over to Special Agent b6

2. REMARKS: It is pointed out that the entire file on GEHLEN was made available and this is only a part thereof. The balance of this file as photostated by Region IV, MUNICH, is pertinent in fact and content to

Out Log Nr.  
IV 2717

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2nd Ind: Hqs, Reg IV, 66th CIC Gp, APO 108, US Army, dated 7 October 1954,  
SUBJECT: GEHLEN, Gruppe

identification and operation of alleged GEHLEN organization cover firms  
Terramar, G.m.b.H, MUNICH and HAMBURG. Also the connection between this  
firm and the HAMBURG firm, ZUCKERSHANDELS-Union, G.m.b.H. These facts are  
pertinent to case D-166471; IV-1471, Subject: [b6]  
[b6] which are being included in a report on this subject.

[b6] /apk/AM 7246-006

Distribution:

- 2 - CO, 66th CIC Gp, USAREUR
- 1 - Region IV File

b6

Commanding

13 OCT. 1954

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

FILE: IV-33446

14 September 1954

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Gruppe

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. Forwarded herewith is a translation of the origin and history of the GEHLEN Gruppe as contained in the files of the Sozial-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany--SPD) information service.

2. It is realized that all this information may be known to Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, but in the opinion of Region IV, MUNICH, it is of interest to know just how much is known to the SPD.

20 SEP 1954

Incl: a/s  
b6 /apk/MM 7246-006

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Out Log Nr.

IV 2266

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and 2 cpye translation)
- 1 - Region IV File  
(w/1 cpy origin and history  
and 1 cpy translation)

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

FILE: IV-33446

1 September 1954

SUBJECT: Cehlen Group

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

Attached herewith are newspaper articles regarding SUBJECT which appeared in the "Abendzeitung" on 31 July 1954. The articles are forwarded with translations for your information.

Incl: a/s  
b6 /apk/MM 7246-006

b6

Commanding

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- 2 - CO, 66th CIC Cp, USAREUR  
(w/1 cpy each EXHIBIT I and  
EXHIBIT II and 2 cpys each  
transl)
- 1 - Region IV File  
(w/1 cpy each transl)


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T-R-A-N-S-L-A-T-I-O-N

AGENTS ARE AMONG US

Eighty Secret Services and 50,000 Spies Are Operating in Germany

Report of Facts by \*\*\*\*\*

Apart from the human tragedy connected with the person of the defector, the defection of the President of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Dr. Otto JOHN, to the East Zone has, at one blow, placed another fact into the glaring light of the public: i.e., the fact that already now, nine years after the end of the war, a giant system of intelligence and secret agents is covering all of Germany, West and East alike. Our new report of facts is intended to give a survey of the variety of intelligence services which are maintained by the Germans and also by foreign powers. The nature of the subject does, of course, preclude intrusion into the most secret depths of these intelligence agencies. Yet, a certain insight into the methods, extent and financial backing is possible.

\*\*\*\*\*

In the Federal Republic of Germany, there are two official and one unofficial German intelligence organizations: The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (including the Land Offices for the Protection of the Constitution) and the Counter Intelligence Department of the Blank Offices, as well as the so-called "Agency Cehlen".

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution carries its name somewhat inappropriately. It is not the task of the Office - as you might think at first sight - to protect the constitution; i.e., the Basic Law of the Federation and the constitutions of the Laender, and to prevent violations of the constitutional rights. Actually, the tasks of the office go much further: Administration, information and evaluation are the three main tasks it is concerned with. It is subject to control by the Parliament and is administratively responsible to the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

Since the installation of this office in 1949, the usefulness of this agency has been questioned again and again. During the past time in particular, it turned out that even the Federal Chancellor Dr. Konrad ADENAUER obtained information from the office which was by no means true and correct. The office was also accused of not employing first-class personnel, and even of operating inefficiently.

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### Greenhorns in the Office

With a certain ironical, superior air, experts of the old counter-intelligence agencies criticized the activities of the office and called the President of the office a beginner and an ignoramus. For the uninitiated person, it is difficult to judge in how far this criticism was justified. It is certain, however, that people expected too much from the office, considering the small financial means which were put at its disposal.

The Chief of the Bavarian Land Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Government Director Otto KURZ, talked about the practices of the office in an interview. According to his statements, the operations of the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution look relatively harmless, and not much is to be noticed of the mystery which traditionally surrounds intelligence services. This office is also divided into the legal and administrative section, the information department, and the evaluation department. The information department mainly consists of confidential people (people like to call them "agents"). With certain justification, the offices for the Protection of the Constitution can be reproached for lack of experience and also for the fact that they are operating as an apparatus of officials - with all its shortcomings, faults, and deficiencies.

After the defection of Dr. JOHN to the East Zone, the Federal Government decided to effect a thorough reform of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. It is difficult to predict whether it will still be possible to find a satisfactory solution. Because in consequence of the case JOHN, this office obtained an obstruction which it won't be able to shake off very quickly.

\*\*\*\*\*

The Office Blank, which is still a purely provisional agency and does not have any ministerial authority, also disposes of a counter-intelligence department. Chief of this department is Achim OSTER, son of General OSTER, who as closest colleague of Admiral CANARIS was executed after 20 July 1944. Due to the provisional nature of the Office Blank, the counterintelligence department can also work on a small scale only. So far, the public did not have any reason to deal with this department, which lies in the best hands, more closely. It seems feasible, however, that it make all preparations necessary to amplify its activities as soon as the EDC treaty is ratified.

### Mysterious Organization

A flood of rumors and assumptions is concerned with the so-called Agency Gehlen, also called "Organization Gehlen". In the light of the public, it appeared for the first time on a larger

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scale when it became known that the East-zonal counterintelligence service had succeeded in catching a larger number of agents of the Agency Gshlen. Since the end of last year, East-zonal courts are dealing with the trials of these "traitors" in spectacular tribunals. The organization and its methods of operation are more or less known to the public. Yet, it is surrounded by mystery.

First of all, the individual who lent his name to the organization, GEHLEN. His last rank during the war was Lieutenant General and he was chief of the department "Foreign Armies East". His name is not listed in the telephone book. Nobody is quite sure about his first name, either: Gustav or Reinhard. American papers, the "New York Times" in particular, who know perhaps better than the German papers, regularly speak of Gustav.

His office is located in PULLACH near MUNICH, a place which enjoys world-fame because of the Jesuit-College. There are probably not many people who can boast of having seen this man face to face during the past years. The Swiss paper, "The Dead", quotes an unnamed German politician who said about GEHLEN: "He looks like a professor for modern history in MARBURG possibly or ERLANGEN." This description, as the paper pointed out, serves not only the purpose of emphasizing the intellectual and civilian side of GEHLEN, but also the inconspicuousness of his appearance. He is said to be about fifty years of age.

As Chief of the department "Foreign Armies East", GEHLEN was also responsible for the evaluation of all military intelligence material about the Soviet Union. The present military advisor of the Federal Government, the former General Adolf HEUSINGER, an old friend of GEHLEN's reports that GEHLEN continually raised a warning voice against the Russian adventure and against under-estimation of the opponent during the war - and it always turned out that his warnings were justified.

At the end of the war, GEHLEN succeeded in saving extremely important material. It originated from the archives of the General Staff, and also included personnel folders of important agents in all of Eastern Europe and the near Orient. With this material he went to the Americans who immediately recognized the importance of the General. Contrary to the great number of imprisoned officers and small unimportant Nazis, he did not have to spend his life without meaning in POW and internment camps, but was soon utilized for war-historical work. Although the official American policy during 1946/47 was not yet free of the prejudices of the Morgenthau-Plan, he was assigned the task of organizing a Secret Service which was to extend to areas on the other side of the Iron Curtain, far into the Soviet Union.

#### Agency with US Funds

To a certain extent, GEHLEN saw a model in CANARIS and the latter's counterintelligence organization. The special characteristics of his organization are that it is not responsible to the German Federal Government, that up to now it was not financed by German agencies, and that it is of a decidedly private nature. The organization is being extended from year to year. This giant apparatus does, of course, need tremendous financial means. It receives such means from the United States. It is said, that the costs increased from 3.5 to 5 million dollars during the past years. The trials in the East Zone, the "revelations" of which must, of course, be accepted with utmost reserve only, revealed that the Organization GEHLEN is said to have a total of 4,000 members. The PULLACH Center is called the "Directorate General", its sub-divisions are called "Representations General", "District Representations", "Sub-Representations" and "Branches".

It is certain that the Agency Cehlen mainly consists of former professional officers who have long years of experience in the observation and intelligence field. Some people like to say that in a way the trials in the East Zone serve a useful purpose rather than harm the Organization Cehlen: these trials called the attention to certain sources for faults in the intelligence service which can now be thoroughly eliminated.

There is no doubt about it that GEHLEN enjoys high esteem and great confidence in official BONN circles. There is some talk that the Federal Chancellor ADENAUER would like to attach the entire GEHLEN-apparatus to his own Federal Chancellor's Office. It should also be mentioned that the late parliamentary opposition leader Dr. Kurt SCHUMACHER is said to have seen an extremely trustworthy individual in GEHLEN.

No photograph of GEHLEN can be located anywhere. There is also no picture of the site of his office. The entrance to the Office GEHLEN is closely guarded.

#### The Outsiders

In addition to these three official and unofficial, recognized intelligence services, there are also a number of other agencies who are concerned with the gathering of information; such as the People's League for Peace and Freedom, the Investigative Committee of Liberal-Minded Jurists (BERLIN), the IW (Information Service West) and others. We shall report in detail about the counterintelligence services of the Americans, the British and the French at a later date.

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All these services maintain an army of agents, confidential sources and informants, who either work without pay - as the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution prefer to have it - or for a fee. You can really say, that Germany is literally swarming with agents and spies at the present time. 50,000 persons are probably operating as agents - for the West and the East. Alone 80 secret intelligence services of the Allied and other nations are existing in the Federal Republic, and they form a jungle in which even experts can hardly distinguish between what is genuine and what is not. The Soviet Union is said to have employed 12,800 permanent agents in 1950. This number probably increased by many times in the meantime. These agents, however, are only individuals in key positions and not just agents and spies in general. At the same time, the Americans are said to have disposed of more than 6,600 agents and the British Secret Service is said to have employed 3,860 permanently paid agents. Every one of them is in contact with a great number of sub-agents and other sources. Most of the sources know their employers only by a cover name. Therefore, the shock caused by the disappearance of Dr. JOHN, did at the first moment also concern a great number of sources employed against the East. Dr. JOHN did probably know hardly one of them by name.

The focus of espionage and intelligence services does naturally depend on the political situation. It is not always so that these foci are located in the countries of the big powers. It is just the small countries which are often the area of operations for large espionage groups.

(to be continued)

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This Document Has Been  
 Guarded by C/S Section  
 Hearing on Smuggling Case in Camera

Date 29. OCT. 1954

Munich (Own report)

After four weeks of trial, the Second Penal Chamber of the State Court, MUNICH I, originally intended to pass the verdict on one of the most important smuggling cases ever processed in MUNICH on Friday. This case, however, which was to begin in November 1952 already, cannot be concluded as easily as all that. The fifteen persons accused who are still sitting on the bench now, will have to wait for the verdict for another fourteen days.

It cannot be said why the case is being dragged along like that during its final days, because the court has been holding its sessions in camera for weeks and always at points when they promised to be interesting for the press. As justification for this measure, highly unusual in a smuggling case, they always quoted: Endangering of State Security. The District Attorney, the Presiding Judge and the Defense Counsels referred to their obligation to discretion and were icily silent about what had been discussed during the hearings in camera. Even in treason and high treason cases in Bavaria and at the Federal Court, the press had always been permitted to attend hearings in camera. What is the subject of this trial the indictment of which is dated 9 August 1951?

Accused, in the order of the indictment are: the merchant Rudolf REMPPEL from BREMEN, owner of the firm BECHTEL & CO; confidential clerk Walter OBROCK and the owner of the firm RONNING in BREMEN, Otto Heinrich RONNING; the manager of the former firm "TERRAMAR" in MUNICH, Dr. Karl SEGLER; the merchant Wolfgang PUSCH; the merchant Arthur BARTHEL; the housewife Johanna HOFMANN; the merchant Josef PIWECKI; the merchant Harry MARQUARDT; the certified economist Michael von ALSCHITAJA, a Georgian living in MUNICH; the customs assistant Alfred STRAUSS, the band-leader Otto HOFMANN from BRAUNENBURG, the former customs secretary August SCHMID from OBERAUDORF, the customs assistant Michael SICL from KIEFERSFELDEN and the merchant Josef EBERLE from MUNICH.

Proceedings against further ten accused persons were, for several reasons, temporarily separated or discontinued.

The accusation against those accused is comprised in a few sentences in the indictment: "In consequence of the accused persons' actions, a total of 55,000 kg raw coffee and 10,000 kg cocoa powder were illegally brought into free circulation, whereby a total of 800,000 marks taxes was evaded. The profits achieved by this dark transaction amounted to a total of 100,000 marks."

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The criminal actions are supposed to have taken place in 1949. The coffee, as the prosecution has it, was imported illegally and free of customs duty from some dark sources into the Federal Republic by some of the accused individuals, whereas the other accused persons, including in particular the respectable BREMEN coffee roasters, are said to have purchased these import goods in an illegal manner. Allegedly, customs receipts were falsified in this connection. They properly paid customs duty for one pound of coffee and then changed the amount shown to 4,750 kg afterwards and the amount of customs duty paid to 57,000 marks. In other cases, blank customs receipts are said to have been furnished by bribed customs officials.

There is no reference to the special nature of this smuggling case, either in the indictment or in the court records. Even most of the defense counsels did not know until shortly before the hearings that their clients would justify themselves with an unlikely argument.

These coffee imports are said to have been effected on request of a Secret Service. There is some talk that the organization "GEHLEN" drew money from these transactions. But all that is not more than a rumor for the uninitiated person.

It is a fact, however, that hearings were always held in camera.

It is a fact that the public was excluded for a period of 20 minutes in the middle of the prosecutor's plea.

It is a fact that the defense counsels used the argument, the Munich press had been silent about the case so far as a result of the influence exercised by the Secret Service. (This report proves that that is not true. The Editors)

It is also a fact that the records of this trial were requested by the US High Commission without any indication of reasons, that they were withheld from German courts for more than half a year, and were then, with just as little ado, turned back to the German District Court for further processing.

It is beyond question, that connections of a "state-endangering" nature were really mentioned during the hearings. It seems to be just as certain, however, that the prosecutor does not attach any importance to these connections as far as this trial is concerned, because he requested considerable imprisonment sentences for those accused. The prosecutor applied for penalties between four and fourteen months. On the other hand, he requested that Michael von ALSCHIBAJA be acquitted. Justification: He had only taken part in the transactions as a "forwarding agent" without knowledge of the origin of the goods.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President of the Second Penal Chamber, State Court Director Dr. WEIDENSLAUFER, hopes that the sentence of this case can be pronounced without another hearing in camera. Maybe, the strange veil of mystery lying over the trial will then be lifted.

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*Belgian*

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*file in*

BAD-3691

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DETACHMENT  
APO 757 US ARMY

*D-320529/r*

D-358704

17 August 1954

SUBJECT: Schwaebische Industrieberatung, G.m.b.H.

TO : Commanding Officer  
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, United States Army  
ATTN: CS Section

b6

*Security*  
*Integrated*

1. Reference is made to letter, Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, Subject and File as above, dated 7 May 1954.

2. Subject firm is an SDU/German Element cover organization which has been in the process of liquidation for some time. SDU/German Element, through its liaison with the [b1] has taken steps to avoid further German police investigation.

3. SDU requests that CIC withdraw any investigation it may have initiated with respect to subject firm. SDU would also appreciate any substantiated information which may be in CIC's files concerning alleged neo-Nazi activities conducted by subject firm.

(b3 Per CIA)  
DAD Liaison Officer

STGT: 7467

*691*

*244*

*17/8/54*

~~SECRET~~

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file in

The Effect of the JOHN Case Upon GEHLEN Organisation Operations

~~Being Relegated~~

D-320529/2

1. Three or four days after the disappearance of Otto JOHN, the West German press began to report the arrest of several hundred western intelligence agents by DDR security organs as a direct result of JOHN's defection. Coordination among allied intelligence agencies soon revealed these reports to be entirely untrue. With one single exception (in which JOHN is believed to have heard the name of a GEHLEN agent located in Poland, but probably cannot remember it), such reports must be false in connection with GEHLEN organization agents since JOHN had no access at any time to GEHLEN organization operational data. To the best of our knowledge, no western intelligence agent has to this date been arrested by hostile security authorities as a result of information provided by JOHN. Furthermore, the eastern press has claimed no such arrests. Considering the fact that the hostile propaganda machine has shown no previous hesitation to make false claims of agent arrests when such claims suited their current propaganda line, failure to exploit JOHN in this manner is probably a significant indicator of eastern intentions with respect to utilization of JOHN. Early reports claiming that the DDR press had received strict instructions not to claim agent arrests on the basis of information obtained from JOHN appear to be confirmed by actual developments.

2. Beginning 1 August 1954 the eastern press did undertake a relatively modest campaign of exposing western agents. This expose was based upon the alleged statements of Gerhard KAPANNKE, a GEHLEN organization agent who was doubled by the BfS at an indeterminate date and who fled to the east during April 1953. In point of fact, the statements attributed to KAPANNKE concerned at least four different series of arrests, the oldest dating back to January 1954. KAPANNKE, himself, was a member of a compartmentalized GEHLEN field unit in Berlin. It is entirely inconceivable

that he was aware of the agent relationships which he is alleged to have revealed. Aside from the personalities of his own field unit, KAPAHNKE knew only one of the names he is said to have exposed, and that name (Emil BAIER) was known to him through newspaper articles. The contrived nature of the campaign is further indicated by the fact that several agent names which were known to KAPAHNKE were not publicized, although several of these persons are known to have been arrested. It is gratifying to a certain extent that in spite of the confused state of most of the western press, certain newspapers saw through the propaganda trick described above and nicely analyzed it (notably Neue Zeitung of 12 Aug. 54). *(@ US directed agency)!*

3. As we stated to our higher headquarters on 6 August 54, the eastern releases were an inaccurate association of past flaps presented purely for propaganda effect and obviously timed to compound the confusion resulting from the JOHN affair. We further noted that the DLR papers carefully avoided actually connecting JOHN with the KAPAHNKE expose, and the association was only made in the western press. This fact confirmed the impression that eastern exploitation of JOHN is not likely to be on the level of intelligence revelations and agent exposes. It would appear probable from the timing of the alleged KAPAHNKE statement that it represented a coordinated eastern propaganda reaction designed to relieve the pressure which must have developed among the eastern press at the time of the JOHN defection for sensational spy ring developments. The campaign also served the useful (for the east) purpose of compounding press confusion. Since the attack was concentrated against the GEHLEN organization, it might further be assumed that the east was attempting to counteract the impetus inadvertently given to legalization of the GEHLEN organization by JOHN defection. This impression is strengthened by the recent eastern revelation of the arrest (date unknown) of two further groups of ostensible GEHLEN agents in the DLR, since neither group can be identified as a GEHLEN net. Along this same line is the entirely

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groundless Czech radio report of 6 August concerning the arrest of "dozens" of GERLEN agents in Czechoslovakia.

4. Since the JOHN case, there has been only one relatively serious GERLEN Organization security case in the Soviet Zone, involving the arrest of eight persons. The background of this case is known, and involves the doubling by the Soviets of a radio agent. The case has no possible connection to the JOHN affair.

5. (a) All of the above serves merely to emphasize the fact that regardless of eastern propaganda claims, the GERLEN organization has not and will not suffer specific operational losses as a direct result of any information provided by JOHN, since JOHN is simply not in possession of such information. Obviously, the next important question is to what extent and in what manner the defection of a person at the JOHN level will affect future operations. We have no adequate answer to this question. A reasonable conclusion, upon first consideration, would appear to be that the impact of apparent treachery at such a high level would throw virtual panic into current and prospective agent personnel. The effect of any such initial impact has undoubtedly already diminished since in spite of the KAPANNKE diversion, it is fairly obvious by now that no wholesale roundups are being made, and that exploitation of JOHN seems to be entirely in the political sphere.

(b) Although the primary purpose of this political exploitation would not appear to be the disaffection of actual or potential agents, we have the impression that this may in fact produce the most serious operational results to be expected from the JOHN case. In short, the general weakening of the western position as indicated by such defections will undoubtedly reduce the number of people willing to work for the west. It should be stated, however, that we have no comparable experience upon which to base an estimate of agent reaction.

(c) On a somewhat different level, --- it may be pointed out that contrary to our own expectations, the grievous operational losses suffered by the GERLEN organ-

ization during the latter part of 1953 and early 1954 did not seriously complicate or hinder agent handling or recruiting problems. We can only explain this in terms of several relatively intangible factors. There was a feeling on the part of some ideologically motivated agent that "now more than ever" their own efforts were important, but this factor is impossible to evaluate properly. Perhaps even more intangible, but yet more significant, is the fact that most agents tend to underestimate and almost to ignore the dangers to their own security even in spite of the arrest of others. These and similar factors presumably are still valid. It can probably be assumed also that most agents are sufficiently intelligent to know that there is greater actual immediate danger inherent in a serious operating level flap than in a JOHN case.

(d) It might therefore be concluded that the overall negative effect of the JOHN case on GELLEN operations should be less than the damage suffered in the operational flaps publicized at the beginning of this year (this refers only to undetectable effects likely to influence retention and recruitment of agents, and not to actual agent arrests). We are, however, reluctant to draw this conclusion in the form of a flat prediction, because the effect of the political factors involved in the JOHN case cannot be foreseen.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

2 August 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 2 August 1954.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A" is X-899-Hq.
- b. Evaluation of Source: Temporarily evaluated F.
- c. Relationship of Source to Target: None.
- d. How Information was Obtained: The information contained in this report was obtained from b1 of the Gehlen Organization.
- e. Date on Which Information was Received: The information was received on 21 July 1954.
- f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the handling Agent, b6 on 23 July 1954.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.
- h. Status of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

- a. A b6 is mentioned in the files of Region III as a dropped informant whose residence is listed as being near DRESDEN.

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15 AUG. 1954

(Continued)

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III-34419

2 August 1954

SUBJECT: Gehlen. Organization

b. In the light of past suspicions of Eastern penetration of the Gehlen Organization, this report is deemed of interest.

c. This report was prepared by b6

b6

*for* b6

Commanding

Incls: a/s  
JTD/mz/49-833

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4 February 2009  
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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

2 August 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. On 18 June 1954, one [b6] appeared at the offices of the political police in LUDWIGSBURG (UTM) 32UNV1417, to deliver a roll of film which he alleged to have retrieved from a light switch box in a park in the same town.

2. [b6] was born in 1915 in [b6] (UTM) (nca) and was in the military service until 1944. Subsequent to 1949 he was actively engaged with the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (Fighting Group Against Inhumanity - KGU) in the Soviet Zone and also connected with the Befreiungskomitee (Liberation Committee) of [b6] in West BERLIN (UTM) 33UUU9220. Around 1953, [b6] was engaged with the Gehlen Organization, and presently holds the position as chief representative of the vacuum cleaner company Kadett in BERLIN.

28 APR. 1955.

3. In the early morning hours on 18 June 1954, in order to recover from a night of carousing, [b6] was walking in a park in LUDWIGSBURG, when he suddenly saw a man tampering with a park light switch, which controls the illumination of the park. Noticing that the man was not attired in a park attendant's uniform, [b6] waited until the man had departed and then approached the switchbox, the door of which was open, and from within retrieved a roll of film, which he immediately took to the political police office in LUDWIGSBURG.

4. Development of the film by the police revealed a fairly voluminous report on the Gehlen Organization, destined for an agency in the Soviet Zone. The police immediately placed a surveillance on the park and the switchbox in particular, and on Monday, 21 June 1954, apprehended a man who approached the place in question. The individual, still in custody, identified himself as a resident of the East Sector of BERLIN and further stated that he was complying with a request to pick up the film and mail it to an address in West BERLIN, from which address he would himself retrieve it and personally carry it to the Soviet Sector. He stated that he had received his assignment from an [b6]. The film and a report of the incident were delivered to the [b1]

b1

704

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 2 August 1954														
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 20%;">PREPARING OFFICE</div> <div style="width: 80%;">Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army</div> </div>																
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 20%;">SUBJECT</div> <div style="width: 80%;">Gehlen Organization</div> </div>	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 20%;">CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION</div> <div style="width: 80%;"> <table style="width: 100%; font-size: small;"> <tr> <th style="text-align: left;">OF SOURCE:</th> <th style="text-align: left;">OF INFORMATION:</th> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE . . . . . E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6</td> </tr> </table> </div> </div>		OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4	UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6
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<p>b1 in STUTTGART (UTM) 32UNV1203. Some of the information contained in the filmed report was as follows:</p> <p>a. Personal on <u>General GEHLEN</u>: power hungry, careerist and "not unlike Ignatius of Loyola", capable of murdering tomorrow the persons he calls political and personal friends today. One could find a common tongue with GEHLEN. Then it would be more dangerous for the Americans than for the East. GEHLEN himself has stated that b6 faces a brilliant career and GEHLEN himself would not be disinclined to take b6 position.</p> <p>b. <u>Major General KLEIKAMP</u>, alias <u>KLEIBER</u>: It is said that he is still chief of the message center and courier service in BERLIN, which in fact is not the case. KLEIKAMP is working now in the Federal Republic. He is a typical Adjutant and personnel man, and his craving for alcohol and women could be used to advantage.</p> <p>c. Reference was made to an unnamed "Doctor" in the report, and a remark concerning actual or simulated illness on his part. After recovery he is slated for a job in the headquarters.</p> <p>d. A further notation was, "Thank you for the money. The contact can no longer be maintained as is. In the future variation 'K'".</p> <p>e. Another reference was made to a letter. "Thanks for letter of the 3rd. It contributed to pacifying the official. Was entertaining thoughts of flight. Letter contributed to more reasonable view of the situation. A pity, if what has been in the making for a year were destroyed".</p> <p>f. "Regarding 'Arthur', numerous documents and my detailed report concerning the present situation within the Gehlen Organization as well as concerning the security of the organization's co-workers forwarded, and at the same time characteristics of the most important Gehlen people. There is a stubborn rumor circulating within the Gehlen headquarters that</p>																
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 30%;">DISTRIBUTION a/s</div> <div style="width: 30%; text-align: center;">705</div> <div style="width: 30%; text-align: right;">Page 2 of 3 pages Copy 1 of 6 copies</div> </div>																

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 1200-1R

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

2 August 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
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USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
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UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

a man in a leading position is one of your people. Should that be the case, you must take into consideration that steps to discover and neutralize this person will be or have been taken".

5. In the Gehlen headquarters, with regard to the contents of the remarkable roll of film, the possibility of a "diversion" is not being overlooked, in which [b6] himself may play a part. During a conference in the Gehlen headquarters, the style of the report and the quotation concerning "Ignatius of Loyola" were brought up. It is being considered that [b6] might have been the originator of the report, which might serve the eventual purpose of evoking doubt and uncertainty within and about the organization. /

6. The "Doctor" referred to in paragraph 4c above, might be one of three (3) persons, namely:

a. [b6] (an alias), whose background includes either Gestapo or Criminal Police work in Breslau. [b6] once had a certain [b6] working for him, who in the early part of 1953 was abducted from Wittenbergplatz in Berlin, and who subsequently has been released. Shortly after the [b6] affair, [b6] suffered a nervous breakdown, since he had a dangerous mishap. At that time [b6] had the assignment of shadowing certain "Staats-Sicherheits-Dienst" (State Security Service - SSD) agents, an assignment which he had taken upon himself to carry out. In so doing, he had become so drunk on one occasion, in the company of those he was to surveil, that he made inopportune statements.

b. [b6] who recently suffered a nervous breakdown, the reason for which is unknown.

c. [b6] of DORTMUND (UTM) 32ULC9208. No illness is known in this case, however, he has been and is still today without an assignment.

SOURCE: "A"

F-3

7. The personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously noted by this Region.

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2 August 1954

Regien III, 66th CIC Group, AFO 757, US Army

Gehlen Organization

III-34419

The Gehlen Organization is currently interested in the activities of a certain Nikolai TABORITZKI and his wife Elisabeth, nee von DATTLER, particularly with regard to possible intelligence activities. TABORITZKI was born 16 August 1898 in TARKOVKA, Finland, and is currently residing in WIESBADEN (UTM) 32UMA4648, Hindenburgeralle 46. TABORITZKI is currently without employment, however, he was until recently employed with the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in PARIS, France. TABORITZKI was a Captain in the Czarist Army, corresponding probably to a staff captain or first lieutenant.

SOURCE: "A"

P-3

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*Stranger*

NOTCHY-GACZYNSKI, Walter  
RE: Former Abwehr Personalitiss

2 August 1954

IV-34204

*file in*  
*D-320529*  
*/3*

On 14 July 1954, the records of the Einwohnermeldeamt (Inhabitants Registration Office), TUTZING 32TPU70, Germany, were examined and revealed the following information concerning SUBJECT, a former colonel in the German Abwehr and reputed to be at present in the employ of the Gehlen organization: SUBJECT, a Catholic of German nationality, was born on 29 October 1894 in HUTTSCHIN/RATIBOR nca, Germany. He is a clerk by trade and is married. The first and maiden name of his wife, born 5 September 1904 in URBANOWITZ/Oberschlesien nca, Germany, is not listed. On 4 October 1948, SUBJECT moved from a confiscated building, the Forethaus, OBERZEISERING/TUTZING, Germany, where he and several scientists had been living in a building occupied by the Americans. At that time he gave his future address as ARNOLDSEHEIM nca, Germany. B-2

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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b6 SPECIAL AGENT,  
REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, MUNICH

708

*1/26/54*

b6

*2/8/54 231*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CEW/apd

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

17 July 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE: 1V-33446; D-320529

SUBJECT

Gehlen Group

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

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FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. [b6] an important figure connected with the directing staff of Gehlen Group, lives in [b6]. [b6] He is approximately thirty-eight (38) years old. He is a Sudeten German and of the Protestant religion. He is engaged to a divorced woman, [b6], who has two children and with whom he lives. He has very good foreign political connections, also connections with such royal families as the House of Savoy, the Habsburgs, the Belgium royal family (the mother of [b6] is the cousin of the Belgium King), the House of Windsor, and well-known German aristocracies. During the last war, [b6] was in the Elite Guard -- SS with the rank equivalent to a Second Lieutenant, US Army, in an SS division on the Normandy front. He was seriously wounded during World War II. In 1945, he saw his father killed before his eyes by the Czechs. He is not known to have been associated with CANARIS. He is known to be an unofficial partner in the dealings with General PRCHALA. One of his co-workers was a [b6] an SA (Sturmabteilung -- Nazi Party Storm Troopers) group leader in Schlesia, who in 1950, in spite of the efforts of Gehlen Group to help him, was prosecuted under the denazification and demilitarization law. [b6] is a knight of the Order of Maltesians, even though he is a Protestant. In 1949, the Order wished to establish a branch in MUNICH and [b6] helped it at the request of Gehlen Group. It was felt that the representative of the Order in MUNICH should be an Italian, from the Pope. However, the people concerned in Italy could not make up their minds on this point. The German branch in MUNICH 32UPU93, Germany of the Order set up a temporary office at Holbeinstrasse 10; but the office lasted only one month. The Order helped an SS Obergruppenfuehrer (SS equivalent to Lieutenant General) WOLFF to defend himself at his denazification hearing by obtaining evidence for his defense from Italy. WOLFF was the man who negotiated with Allen DULLES of the Office of Strategic Services -- OSS in Switzerland during the war. WOLFF joined Gehlen through his association with [b6]. [b6] brother drove a Volkswagen on a test run from CAIRO, Egypt to CAPE TOWN, South Africa and there became acquainted with [b6] the Prime Minister of South Africa. Through his brother, [b6] developed close contact with [b6].

2. Following are persons on the directing staff of Gehlen:

- a. General BLUMENTRITZ, deputy to General GEHLEN.

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

17 July 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 108, US ARMY

FILE: IV-33446; D-320529

SUBJECT

Gehlen Group

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

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 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

- b. Colonel General HALDER, Protector of Gehlen Group.
- c. General, Count von SPONECK, formerly with [b6] armored division in Africa and in an American Prisoner of War Camp in TUNIS, North Africa, was for some time leader of the Gehlen Group in GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN 32TPT56, Germany. He later served on the directing staff.
- d. Lieutenant [b6] member of the Headquarters of Gehlen, formerly commander of "Führer-Begleit-Bataillons" (Hitler's Escort Battalion).
- e. Lieutenant [b6], a Gehlen functionary, lived formerly in Gehlen quarters in MUNICH.
- f. Gehlen functionary [b1]
- g. Colonel [b6] Gehlen functionary, formerly with CANARIS, has a very bad reputation.
- h. [b6] who received special, secret assignments from GEHLEN, has connections with the [b1]

SOURCE: "A"

EVALUATION: B-3

3. General BLUMENRITT was Director of Operations in 1943. He is about sixty-one (61) years old and is from Thuringia. His branch of service was infantry. He had the rank equivalent to that of an American Major General. Colonel General Franz HALDER was Chief of Staff in 1942, and he had the rank equivalent to that of an US Army Lieutenant General. He was investigated by CIC for a position of trust.

SOURCE: "B"

EVALUATION: B-2

4. [b6] was in either the Security Service or Abwehr II, Sabotage Troops. [b6] was an administrative man, who was not connected with the active Abwehr. He was a member of the OKW -- Armed Forces High Command. [b6] was in Abwehr Headquarters in BERLIN 33UUU92, Germany.

SOURCE: "C"

-2-

711

EVALUATION: B-2

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~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

b6

320529/2

IV-34094

1 July 1954

SUBJ: Abendlaendische Akademie

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. The Abendlaendische Akademie, located at MUNICH 27, 3205093, Germany; Rauchstrasse 20, maintains continuous contact with Firma RICHTER and Company, MUNICH, Wallhallastrasse 7, an apparent cover organization of the Gehlen Organization also operating under the title of Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten.

2. Subject organization is presently sponsoring a meeting of youths and youth leaders on an European international basis, in VLOTHO, Land Nordrhein/Westfalen, Germany from 2 to 7 July 1954.

3. These observations have been made from perusal of Technical Coverage as afforded b1 through the facilities available to Region IV MUNICH.

4. Region IV, MUNICH, requests any information available regarding this organization.

5. It is the opinion of Region IV, MUNICH, that Subject Organization b1 This has not been confirmed to date nor has any investigation as such been initiated.

b6

WMK 7246

b6

Commanding

713

~~SECRET~~

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The Chancellor's Beloved General

Although his name became well-known here  
His entire nature opposes it

(After Morgenstern)

Kalanag, the evening-filling stage magician, - this was in October 1953 - was completing a performance in Munich's Deutsche Theatre. The sell-out Saturday night performance had reached its climax: From a mug, filled with water before the eyes of the audience, Kalanag poured out liquid in the color of whatever drink was called for.

"Coffee," demanded the audience, with third class imagination.  
"Coffee with Milk", "Tea", "Cocoa", "Red wine".

Then the success with the audience of the magician in the red smoking jacket hung for an instant in the laughter of a sly "sixth-form boy" who from the fourth row of the orchestra called out to the stage that Kalanag should pour out "the milk of a tranquil mind." ("In the bubbling dragon-gift you have turned over to me the milk of a tranquil mind." (Schiller, William Tell)

Kalanag overcame the interruption and poured yellow panned into a glass. Father and mother laughed at the amused sixth-former; two small sisters laughed along with the company.

Whoever sat near the fourth row of the Orchestra of the Deutsche Theater and came from Starnberg, could have identified the Family-idyll as the Family Gehlen which lives in a villa near Starnberg. The father of the family, a rather elegant as well as viry man of middle height, had for some time belonged to the parents' council of the classical high school. At the request of the supervisor of studies, Dr. Jobst, each member of the council was to say a word about himself; the father of sixth-former Christopher Gehlen called himself a merchant, and added that he had to do with commissions, and also worked in the interests of the federal government.

The name of Gehlen reminded Dr. Jobst of a dispute which he had had one time before in an Industrial High School in Munich with Student Katherina Gehlen:

Dr. Jobst had in the course of a historical lecture made some criticism of Prussian officers, whereupon that Katherinn Gehlen arose to make a very decided, outspoken protest. To Dr. Jobst came sudden association: "Have you perhaps something to do with the secret-surrounded General Gehlen?"

The student gave way undecided: he was a distant relation of hers. Father Gehlen, who was put in touch with the exchange at the family table, must have decided differently. After the next hour, Katherina told Dr. Jobst confidentially that she was the daughter of the general.

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The Chancellor's Beloved General

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In fact, the father of the Starnberg table, the parents' council member, and the visitor to Kalanag's performance, was that General Gehlen concerning whom, in recent weeks, it has been written that there were only ten men who can vouch for him, know him, and speak with him.

This man, whom the Soviet and the Soviet-German press daily revile as a degenerate American chief spy, whom Sefton Delmer has written down as boss of the former Goetapo-boys, and whom the officious French "Le Monde" named four weeks ago as the "all-powerful chief of all the secret service of the Federal Republic of tomorrow" was originally nothing else but one of those anonymous wearers of the crimson-red stripes of the General Staff, who are named in no Wehrmacht report, recorded in the proceedings of no War Criminal Trial, and are not once noted in the appendix in the War Literature. He was for 22 years a professional soldier before he had for the first time any concern with secret intelligence. The largest troop unit which he ever commanded was a field howitzer battery. His secret intelligence service arose from the bitter duel between the Wehrmacht and the SS.

Gehlen comes - and here clearly is the standard story which has been constructed since in the last two years he was named the leader of the German-American secret service, false - not from the old army and not from the corps of cadets. He does not speak Russian and has never been an agent or spy. Reinhard Gehlen was in 1920 one of the first officer candidates of the newly developing Reichswehr whose reduction to 100,000 men was still to come.

As an eighteen year old who had passed his final examination at the gymnasium he joined the 1st Battery of the 6th Schweidnitz Artillery Regiment.

His father was director of publications at the Ferdinand Hirt Press in Breslau. Only the fact that his father had been, up to the time he early resigned his commission, an active officer in the old army, makes the school boy's decision to enlist in an army a little understandable, an army that had to offer its officer only paper weapons and a chance-less career with poor pay, in which he, presumably during his entire career, would stand in the shadows of comrades just a bit older in duty-rank, who could find praise for themselves in obscure trials-by-fire and show themselves in the finery of war decorations.


The Ranklists of the Reichswehr list Gehlen as a lieutenant with an officer's commission dating from 1 December 1923, in the 2nd Battery of the 3rd Schweidnitz Artillery Regiment, that was formed from the previously mentioned 6th Regiment. In battery-duty in stable and barracks three more years of duty passed wherein only three dull marking-points appeared: the winter-accounting-inspection in the Spring, the hunt-ride to the manoeuvres in the Fall and the club-party on the feast day of Saint Barbara, the patroness of the Artillery.

2 - 716

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The little Gehlen was one of the most brilliant riders in the regiment and was in 1926 posted for two years to the Cavalry School in Hannover. Two years, a span of time in which day by day a veritable jet-pilot, quite ready, was to be built up. One passed the time in the Reichswehr in schooling mounted officers and horse troops in "all-enveloping development of the military horse and his rider." In the home-based battery or squadron there awaited the officers nothing before the tenth year of service but a routine of duty unprecedented in all the armies of the world.

The Riding School command was craved for, because Hannover, when it was also the city of the hunting clubs, offered still something of its own more than Schweidnitz, Arys or Luenzburg, and they had to be only on the Riders-breakfast round in the Restaurant Schnurre opposite the Cavalry School or in the evenings in the Kerstens Hotel where the spurred ones dominated the milieu of the garrison officer and the post-inflation civilians.

During the (time at the) Riding School command Reinhard Gehlen became, after his eighth year of service, a first lieutenant in 1928, and that meant nothing but that a Battery-command appointment awaited him when he fared back to his Schweidnitz battery.

From 1929 to 1932 he appeared in the rankliste as detachment adjutant. He had now put in twelve years of service, and had married the daughter of an old Hussar officer, a born von Seydlitz. The crisis arose thereupon whether he should remain on troop duty or get General Staff training.

Indeed, the word General Staff had no official status during the time of the Reichswehr. In the Versailles Agreement a "Great General Staff" and the training of general staff officers in a War Academy was forbidden to the German army as a quasi-war crime. The "Great General Staff", whose chief had been directly responsible to the Kaiser, was never again to arise.

The plan of Versailles tolerated only a "Troop Office" within the Army leadership of the National Defense Office, whose chief was at two removes, the Army leadership and the Minister of National Defense, from the head of the state. The Versailles terminology recognized also no "General Staff officers", but only "Leader's aides" (Fuehrergehilfen) and "Leader's staff officers" (Fuehrerstabsoffiziere) a fact which ten years later was to show itself a macebre pun.

Although, in the old army, aspirants had volunteered themselves for examination as new blood for the General Staff, Colonel General von Seeckt introduced obligatory examinations for all Reichswehr officers, who had matured as Senior first lieutenants, according to each Army district command. Whoever, known not under his name, but only under his serial number, qualified through well-written work in the so-called "Army District Exam" was ordered off for "Leader's Aides Training" by the Army District Command. There was no central War Academy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - 717

  
The Chancellor's Beloved General

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On the average seldom were more than ten officers in each of the seven Army Districts released for training. In the year 1933, chosen for the privilege from Army District III, Berlin, was the First Lieutenant Gehlen from Artillery Regiment 3. In 1934 the Army District courses of instruction reverted to the reactivated Berlin War Academy. Reinhard Gehlen attended in the first year, and completed the school-course at the War Academy in 1935.

An average of half of those who completed the course were, as a rule, ordered back to troop duty, where, when they were not troop officers, they worked as teachers of tactics or as staff officers. The red stripes, the sign of their profession in the "general staff", once again so called by Hitler, were maintained by the remaining half - by those in whom the developing war scientists and troop commanders had recognised embryo generals.

Then too, weapons-engineering and Economic Geography, history and sport, political science and technical management problems had their place in the curriculum of the War Academy: the criterion for qualification for duty with the German General Staff was, ever since the days of von Moltke and Schlieffen, the "Comp D'oeil", the swift comprehension of tactical or strategic situations, the quick and promptly confirmed operational decision.

Among the approximately fifty officers of the German army who were posted to the General Staff in 1935 was the Schweidnitz Artillerist Gehlen, who in 1934, in his 18th year of service, became a captain. After a year of probation he was permanently assigned to the General Staff and was allowed to put on the red trouser-stripe, the symbol of that arcane soldier-caste in which the field-glasses were spectacles, the weapon was the charcoal pencil, reputation was obscurity and wherein, frequently, the War decoration was only the service cross.

For each young General Staffer there were two serious decisions: was he to embark on a career in the "General Staff of the Army", or be relegated to General command or the division staff? And; was he to gain entrance to the coveted operations section which in peacetime worked out the attack plans and in war directed the operations of large army corps, or must he busy himself with supply and transport, training and organisation, with the system of regulations, military history or enemy situations. A cardinal rule for general staffers indicated that one should have nothing to do with linguistic knowledge, for the consequence was that one would find himself posted to the little desired station of 1c-officer, the expert on enemy affairs. Reinhard Gehlen took this well-known rule to heart, and with results. His first general staff assignment was as adjutant at Main Headquarters I of the General Staff of the Army, which was the representative of the chief of the general staff, to which was also assigned Detachment I, the operations section.

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With the sections 3 (Foreign Armies West) and 12 (Foreign Armies East) Captain Gehlen of the general staff had no connection, since they were attached to Main Headquarters IV. Gehlen was, after a year of duty as adjutant, transferred to the operations section, which was headed by General von Manstein, and after another year in the I Section, Gehlen transferred to the ground fortifications section, which was developed from the operations section.

In the meanwhile Captain Gehlen had reached his 18th year of service without ever having led a separate unit. The usual troop duty stood before him, and it happened by chance that General Manstein, on 1 April 1938 took over as commander of the 18th Infantry Division, to which Artillery Regiment 18, from AR 3, Gehlen's basic unit, had been sent. As chief of Battery 8 of AR 18 in Liegnitz, Manstein again saw his general staff Captain.

This battery, so willed Gehlen's destiny as a soldier, was to be the largest troop unit he was ever to command, although he was predestined to rise to the rank of general.

Among his fellow battery commanders, with their very new Lieutenant and First Lieutenant commissions in the new Wehrmacht, Captain Gehlen found himself standing, 37 years old, like a museum-piece from the time of the Reichswehr. In the war in Poland, Gehlen marched as a major and First General Staff officer of a Division, (Ia), a division which shows by its high numerical designation (213) that it was composed, not of the active elite, but of the home guard. The whole division staff numbered no more than three active officers.

The military history of the Polish campaign noted no glory for divisional Ia Major Gehlen, but his friends and patrons at Army General Staff had not forgotten him. He was called back, and functioned next as liaison officer to various armies: to the 16th of General Busch, where so hard a man as General Model was chief of the general staff, and later to the Panzer Groups of Hoth and Guderian.

The diplomatic talent which Gehlen showed as liaison officer stirred the chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Halder, to make him his adjutant. And later on it pleased Gehlen, after his term as adjutant, to be called back to the operations section, whose leadership the then Colonel Reusinger, who is today in the Blank Office, the top soldier of the Federal Republic, took over.

Gehlen was the leader of the East-Group in the operations section. It was the time of the Panzer attack in the East. The Army Group von Leeb broke through in three months of war to Lake Ladoga, the Army Group von Bock fought the basin-battle from Bialystok to Minsk, Smolensk, and Wjasma; von Rundstedt reached to the Meuse and the peninsula of Kertsch.

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It was not a time in which the situation on the enemy side was much asked about. In the Fuehrer's headquarters, the classic Fuehrer-word was in force: "that this enemy lies right on the floor and will never arise again." It was a time in which, in the general staff section "Foreign Armies East", general staff prominence was not to be gained.

In peacetime this section evaluated the secret material concerning the armament, strength, structure, and stationing of the armies of the foreign powers to the east which Admiral Canaris had procured through his Office Foreign Country/Counter Intelligence in the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht. It coordinated observations of attaches, publications in books and newspapers, geographical patterns, economic statistics, and documentary reports, in order to give a picture of management, from the point of view of preparedness and military potential, in the lands to the east of the German border.

The product of the section "Foreign Armies East" in the OKH (Oberkommando Heeres - Supreme Headquarters of the Army) was a general staff analysis, not espionage.

In wartime, there were delivered to the section "Foreign Armies East" the communications concerning the situation on the enemy's side, which the IC officers (the experts on enemy-situations on the division, Corps, Army, and Army Group staffs) had put together on the basis of reconnaissance operations accomplished by the troops and through the interrogation of prisoners.

In the leaderless army - Hitler had removed von Brauchitsch and made himself nominal commander-in-chief of the army - the section "Foreign Armies East" could only seldom get itself a hearing. In Hitler's military intuitions the enemy situation played only a subordinate role. The chief of the section, a colonel Kinzel, was scarcely known by name in the Fuehrer's headquarters.

In the judgment of the value of general staff analysis of enemy situations there first occurred positive change when in the winter of 1941-1942 the front clamped shut on Leningrad and Guderian's armor spearhead ground to a halt at Tula. For the change to the real judgment Colonel Kinzel did not last as chief of the operations section. He was relieved by Colonel Gehlen - who was now about forty years old - and who now for the first time in his life came into contact with the straight variety of secret service functions.

Not without astonishment did he learn, from the mouth of his predecessor, that no action for operational planning had been taken with the reports which the men of his section had put together during the course of a year. Colonel Gehlen, who, in his twenty-two years of service, except for his cavalry and artillery duty, had done nothing else but work out general staff problems, was not willing to attack his new task as anything else but

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something with an operational meaning. The preconditions thereto were already fixed, inasmuch as the OKW-Office Foreign Lands/Counterintelligence of Admiral Canaris, whose duty was the collection of secret intelligence, found itself in a double pressure. The agent nets which had been built up in peacetime, particularly in the territory of the enemy himself, were, as a result of the war conditions, more and more shriveled up. The especially keenly sought information on the operational plans and movements of the enemy could be delivered only in insufficient scope.

Furthermore, Himmler's Reich's Main Security Office (RSHA) with the Security Service (SD) of SS Group Commander Heydrich and the Foreign Lands/Counter Intelligence Office of SS Brigade leader Schellenberg - the secret political foreign intelligence service of the SS - questioned the competence of Admiral Canaris and cut him off in the occupied territories and the homeland zones from the connections and bases for operational secret service work.

The political battle between Canaris on the one hand and Himmler, Heydrich, and Schellenberg on the other, aggravated the organizational chaos which ruled without precedent in the German secret service: Admiral Canaris' Office in the OKW gave the information which it had gained, unevaluated and essentially without comment, to the competent general staff sections in the three Wehrmacht districts, in which the only judgment as to how the information was to be evaluated, and what credence was to be placed in it for military decisions was made. A Head-organization of the political-military intelligence service did not exist in Germany. The organizational splintering completely matched the effectiveness of the services.

From the OKW Office Foreign Lands/Counter Intelligence itself, shortly before the calling back of Gehlen, came the stimulus to shift one part of the secret police effort from the Abwehr to the Ic-Sections of high staffs. The intelligence service input and the evaluation of the yield was to be coordinated in the sections "Foreign Armies East" and "Foreign Armies West."

The Ic-service, the enemy situation-division, had indeed in accordance with the German officer-mentality, always been the weakest point on the staff. In peace-time this service existed practically not at all, and in wartime, often, linguistic knowledge, or a schoolteacher's knowledge of foreign countries was considered valuable for the post of Ic Officer, a post which in truth called for high general staff qualities.


It was considered valuable also as a rule to assign capable officers to the Ic posts on higher staffs, and further, to give those officers an instrument for them to keep their newly conceived occupation in hand.

Colonel Gehlen's development in this activity with the Army Groups on the Eastern Front was so very forceful, that within a year after he had taken over his post, the Ic officers of the Main headquarters of the army groups had at their disposal so-called "front-line reconnaissance troops" of regimental strength.

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The fact that there passed over into the competence of the Ic officers things that had in normal times been the concern of the Abwehr, showed itself clearly in the external structure of the frontline reconnaissance groups: In the Abwehr, Section I worked on the collection of covert intelligence. The task of Section II was subversion of the enemy and sabotage. Section III, which thru its "Abwehr" activity gave the whole service its innocuous name, had the duty of fighting against foreign intelligence services and reducing their effectiveness, and, as well, through their own Confidential people (V-men, confidential informants) to penetrate the enemy services.

Corresponding to this make-up, the frontline reconnaissance groups were divided into three commands, I, II, and III. The Rne Group (Russetzungsaufklserung - Armament intelligence) was newly founded. Each disaster which filled down Admiral Canaris' Abwehr increased by that much the power of Gehlen's own service, since in May 1944 Rimmer and Schellberg succeeded in having Admiral Canaris removed and the leadership of the military secret service was turned over from the Supreme headquarters of the Wehrmacht to the Office VI of the Reich's Main Security Office. Gehlen had in the East the only extant Army Intelligence Service, which, under the cloak of the General Staff and the Ic service of the General Staff, could carry on its work relatively undisturbed. Gehlen, who according to the classic capacity of his General Staff function, had been the enemy situation official on the Eastern Front had become, in practice the Abwehr chief of the eastern theatre of operations.

Above all, Gehlen succeeded in breaking with the principle according to which officers under forty who were fit for field operations should not be assigned to Abwehr functions. The frontline reconnaissance troops became recognized as tight-knit units.

For their service also the formula which the chief of the American secret service in the second world war, General Donovan, had coined was applicable: "Eighty percent of intelligence is hard work and the other twenty percent falls into the sector which the novel and the film portray."

The Ic officers of the Army and Army Group staffs fitted together in painstaking precision work the results of statements by prisoners, the results of scouting missions of their own groups, knowledge of opposing units, which, for instance, the units to which prisoners belonged provided, knowledge from monitoring which the Radio Monitoring Service provided, serial numbers and recognition signals from captured weapons and equipment and thousands of other mosaic stones, to put together a picture of the enemy's strategic, morale, and armament-technical situation.

Of course, the intelligence work did not dispense with the romance and danger of the films. Even in the year 1944, for example, it succeeded in directing, from the German front, which was in the neighborhood of Vitebsk, in directing an agent to search for military secrets at Gorki - 400 km beyond Moscow, 900 km beyond the German front.



  
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For such tasks not German soldiers, but Russian volunteers from the Vlasov Army or Russians from the occupied territories, were used.

The German combat intelligence people led the Russian who was sent to Gorki in 1944 through the lines in the nighttime. In a Russian uniform he went over to the enemy installation and announced himself with the proper papers to the competent Russian staff at the front as a major of engineers with the mission of examining the Russian mine fields. At the next higher enemy staff he had already changed his rank markings so as to appear, with written confirmation, as a high political officer on a special control mission.

In his identification bag he carried an envelope sealed with Soviet seals in the proper fashion, indicating that it was secret command matter which was to be opened only by the high headquarters of the Red Army which was noted thereon. In this sealed envelope were to be found nothing else but further sealed envelopes with documentary materials with the "stories" - for arrival, target, instructions, personal history -, which the agent had to take with him in order to travel from the Soviet front through Moscow to Gorki with a credible mission at all times and to have the proper personal, travel, billeting and food papers with him.

The special difficulty for the Gorki courier lay in the fact that in accordance with his rank, high distinctions had to be attributed to him, with which he could succeed with subordinate elements of the army and the security force. But as a rule high honours were awarded for wounds received in front line duty. But the agent could not wait for the proper scars. However the agent was successful in each of the six cover stories which he had to employ on his roundtrip in making himself plausible on this ticklish point.


The activity of the combat intelligence groups, the intensification of the IC work by troop general staffs, and the development of the same section in the OKH, placed General Gehlen in a position to furnish enemy situation products in such a fashion as had never before been reached in the German General Staff. The intention of the enemy, his order of battle, and his weapons, were analyzed with such precision that General Gehlen's enemy situation map proved itself, customarily, a transfer-picture of the enemy's operations map.

In the hands of a responsible leadership, these maps would have had not only battle-decisiveness but national political meaning as well. In a leaderless army, of course, in which General Staff Chiefs Zeitzler and Guderian, after the departure of Halder, were left helpless before the scribbles which Hitler brought about on his operations map, the reports of Gehlen's section had little higher value than as an end in themselves. Gehlen - in 1944 he was, at 43 years old, promoted to major general - could make an impression on chief of operations Heusinger and the chiefs of the general staff, whose judgment of the situation descended to skepticism, but Hitler belloyed him aside.

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In view of the Hitler mentality, it was no wonder that nothing was more unwished for by the OKW officer than a situation report from the Foreign Armies East Section. Only three times did Gehlen himself report on the so-called "Fuhrer-Level," for the rest, the chief of the general staff or Heusinger, as chief of operations, reported when the enemy situation was considered at all.

Guderian, the last chief of the general staff, has, in his Memorias of a Soldier, set down two scenes which are the only notices, up to the present time, which Gehlen has received in the official war literature. On Christmas Eve 1944 he delivered a situation report to the Fuhrer's headquarters in Ziegenberg (Hesse): "My report described the enemy organization and strength situations.... The work of my section 'Foreign Armies East' was a model and absolutely dependable. I knew its chief, General Gehlen, long enough to be able to judge his methods and his results. Gehlen's predictions have proved true. This is an historical fact. Hitler saw the thing otherwise. He recognized the report of the section 'Foreign Armies East' as a fake.... 'This is the biggest bluff since Genghis Khan,' he cried, 'who has dug up this nonsense?'"

On 9 January 1945, Guderian again delivered a situation report in the Fuhrer's headquarters: "Gehlen had scrupulously worked out, concerning the enemy's situation, the basic foundation, a map and exhibit which showed his strength situation. Hitler flew into a great rage when I laid these results before him; he declared them 'really idiotic' and desired that I should immediately shut the reporter up in an insane asylum. Then rage gripped me and I told Hitler: 'The reports come from General Gehlen, one of my most able general staff officers. I would not have laid them before you if I had not made them my own. When you want General Gehlen to come to an insane asylum, then shut me up there at the same time as well.' I put this desire of Hitler's to relieve General Gehlen off bluntly. From then on the wildness grew quiet."

The section "Foreign Armies East" had now collected not only foundations for the operational leadership of the army groups, but it also worked out in its Department II, special studies on the structure, strength and armament of the enemy armed forces, on the economic structure and manpower potential of the Soviet Union, on the armament transport and economic-geographical transport situation and planning, and on thousands of other specialized questions, which were of lasting importance for a judgment of the strengths of the enemy and his potentialities. The card files and the documents of the section "Foreign Armies East" were more than the equipment of a general staff section serving in the preparation of strategy. They were a complete secret service archive of the highest importance.

Gehlen, who could judge in the light of his material the coming catastrophe and also the international complications after the collapse of Germany better than the German leadership and better than the greater part of the members of the Allied political leadership, gave thought very early to the question of how his material was to be saved. He could judge the weakness, at that time, of the American secret service, by the evidence of work on the

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Soviet Union, and he could judge that the uniting of the Americans and the Soviets, through the meeting of armored spearheads driving from East and West which was at that time the main topic of discussion in the soldiers' latrines, would be treacherous.

So Gehlen determined to place the structural material of his card-files and documents on the Soviet Union in three portionings in different safe places in order, after the end of the war, to fill in with it the gaps in the material of the American secret service.

In the last phase of the retreat of the German leadership to the Alpine Redoubt he divided the officers and cleared subordinates and enlisted men of his staff into three groups, and ordered them, after they were taken prisoner, to make no statements concerning their methods of operation, except on written orders from himself or his group-chief.

The general was situated, as the American armor drove through Bavaria for Prague, on the bare mountain pastures above the Schlier lake. Each morning before sunrise he scrambled up onto the mountain with the officers who remained with him, in the correct belief that the Americans would not scout further in the mountains than they could go by jeep.

In the likewise correct belief that the jeep patrols would take place by day, he returned at night to the huts on the mountain slope.


But nevertheless one day the staffers remaining on the slope came under machine-pistol fire and since, shortly thereafter, a full company emerged on the slope, it was clear to the general that the time had come to stop his daily flight and to surrender to the nearest American force..

He showed from the very first his own paybook, and let himself be known as the chief of the section "Foreign Armies East" of the General Staff of the Army. To his disappointment, the American arresting officers in the officers' camp during his routine processing showed not the slightest interest in the information on the Soviet Union which possibly they could have collected from the Soviet-Specialist who had fallen into their hands. After a month Gehlen first struck in Wiesbaden on an American general who worked on Abwehr against foreign secret services and found occasion for his own work to value the German general's knowledge of the Soviet secret service.

Then in the course of time the Americans, after extended interrogations, saw in Gehlen a man who judged their wartime allies, the Soviets, with realism, which clearly showed up from the slow routine of the Counter Intelligence Interrogator, (CIC), an Abwehr service, which at that time in Germany searched only for Nazis and war criminals; he disclosed his secrets, the remainder of his colleagues, and the hideout of the documents which he had laid away.

One week later, in the summer of 1945, Reinhard Gehlen, a handful of his officers, and his prominent treasure of card files were flown to Washington. First, after he was extensively interviewed in the Pentagon and his information stored away in documentary fashion, he was transported back to Germany.

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For the Abwehr general to whom he had first opened himself, and who now attended to him again, there was no rest in the time that followed, for in Gehlen a man sat behind the barbed wire, who showed him how the secrets of the Soviet Union were to be sought out, while previously the American Abwehr received next to nothing more on the Soviet Union than fragmentary attaché reports. First of all, for his own purpose the Abwehr General developed a German staff-section for work on material concerning the Soviet Union and its power.

With Gehlen at the head, this staff settled in an American restricted zone near Frankfurt. Financed by the fat dollars of the American Abwehr, the section "Foreign Armies East" of the German General Staff enjoyed a resurrector behind American barbed wire.

As Washington later sanctioned this foundation, Gehlen placed his requirements for his further cooperation:

His staff should work under his exclusive leadership, with a regular budget, as a pure German organization.

No member should have to work against German interests.

Until the setting up of a German government Gehlen himself was to be guardian of its interests in the field of secret service, after its establishment he would feel himself responsible to it.

The Americans accepted; the organization Gehlen was founded.

For secret service work in the Soviet Zone of Germany they needed moreover a German instrument; and for work in the Soviet Union itself and its satellites the Gehlen staff was superior to them in experience.

The Gehlen officers traveled later, together with their families, from behind the American barbed wire in Frankfurt to Pullach on the bank of the Isar near Munich, near the Grosseesseloher Todes-Brücke.

The Pullach Compound encloses the 20 one-and two-family houses of a reservation for a children's home first founded under the name of "Rudolf-Hees-Siedlung" (a group of dwelling units) and a number of war-time supply-barracks which lie carefully concealed from enemy sight under the trees. The genius loci (proper essence of a place) of a headquarters prevails.

The children of the German personnel, including the four children of Reinhard Gehlen, went in the beginning to an improvised camp-school. The families were as good as completely cut off from the outside world.

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The Pullacher-Secret was, for a long time, kept from the American occupation authorities themselves by all possible means.

In the meanwhile, of course, the families have long since moved beyond the compound, because since 1950 German insiders have known the secret, and apparently for a longer time the enemy has known that, in Pullach a spearhead staff of an autonomous German secret service organization was working, a staff which informed on Eastern regions. The staff has grown to such an extent that in the houses of the area and the barracks there remains no more room for dwellings, school or community.

The camp is guarded by a German guard organization whose green-gray uniform is similar to the duty uniform of the Bavarian State police. According to the "Stars and Stripes" Reinhard Gehlen has raised the black-red-gold national colors. Since the Illustrated-Reporter presented itself at the camp gate for taking pictures in the vicinity, a sign appeared on the gate "Begging and Canvassing Prohibited." Another sign announced: "Turn off your headlights; turn on the light in your car."

To pass the gate of the camp is not allowed to anyone who does not belong to the Gehlen staff or to the American liaison staff.\* (\*If laborers or any other outsiders have anything to do in the compound, they are immediately photographed and must carry identification marks with their own picture in plain sight, in the fashion that is known in the American atom centers.) Even the heads of the Foreign service of the Gehlen organization, the "general representatives," have their meetings with the "Doctor" (Gehlen) and the higher ups of the staff outside the compound; the leading principle of the Gehlen organization, as of any intelligence organization, is that as few as possible of the members know one another.

The internal cover-name-code uses the terminology of an industrial firm. The headquarters in Pullach is the "General direction." The foreign service is arranged by "General representatives," "District representatives," "Sub-representatives" and branch-offices. The branch office is the most subordinate echelon of the organization working in our own territory. In secret service jargon the leader of a branch office is called a "Chief V-man leader," for he maintains the lines of information of the V-people (Vertrauensleute, Agenten - Confidential people, Agents) who have their station in the territory of the enemy.

The popular idea of the "Agent-net" in enemy territory is incorrect for almost all the secret services of the world, but especially for the Gehlen organization. There exists, in the territory in which information is gathered, no circle or net. No V-man knows another; also no V-man knows his directing branch office leader (V-man leader) on the other side of the territorial border. Each V-man has only his information line to the V-man leader, which individual, according to the manner of transferring the material to be delivered, has a postal connection, "a dead letter drop," or a "living letter drop," or a courier or radio connection. The only member of the organization who the V-man knows is, possibly, the courier or the "live letter drop,"

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which latter of course never lies in the territory in which the information is collected itself.

Concerning the inner organization of the Gehlen service, its Medus Operandi and its recruiting of sources, the official bases of the Gehlen staff are not of course available. Documentary material from the East Zone - that is, a publication of the defection former Major and handling agent Hoehner - comprises, as the public true accounts of captured Gehlen people, a chaos of falsifications and phantasies. However, a reliable picture of the structure of the organization, in consonance with its security, can be obtained.

The V-people are divided into P-Sources (Penetration Sources): V-people who have important positions in the parties, or the State or industrial management, in the police or military duty stations, and so forth. With their help the enemy's network of forces shall be permeated.

U-Source (Ueberprüfungs-quellen - Examining sources): The V-man lives in the vicinity of the important target, or has access to it (Barracks, armament industry, rail and street junctions, military training areas). He reports continuously what is going on in the target which he has observed.

R-Sources (Reisequellen - Traveling sources): The V-man has the opportunity, through travel (undertaken because of his profession), to collect and deliver information.

III-Sources (Abwehr-Quellen - Counterintelligence sources): The V-man has a position on the inside of an enemy espionage or counterintelligence organization. With his help our own intelligence service penetrates the enemy's (so-called III-F-Case), in order to discover the enemy's intentions, his knowledge concerning our own service and so forth, and to lead him off the track with false material (play-material).

How does a man become a V-man in the Gehlen organization? General Gehlen has been able according to the Soviet Union and the satellite states, to reestablish contact with a string of former V-men of the section "Foreign Armies East."

In the recruiting of new agents the beginning is the "tip" - given knowingly or unknowingly; through political refugees, through members of fighting-groups and organizations, through acquaintances and former comrades of Gehlen people who in turn have acquaintances or former comrades in the Eastern territory, and through a hundred other sources, who either belong to the Gehlen organization or have an established connection with its V-men, the tip reaches a member of the organization. The tip says that this or that resident of the Soviet Zone, satellite diplomat, Soviet official, and

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so forth, for ideological or personal reasons comes under consideration as a collaborator in the V-man net of the organization. Often the Gehlen people get a tip from conversations, without the person they are speaking to realizing that he is giving a tip.

The tip is further investigated by the Gehlen services, for the tipper the action is over. He does not hear whether his tip is taken up or rejected, nor what has developed from it.

A "Researcher" (Forscher) tries now to clear up the question of whether the person concerning whom the tip has been received has at his command knowledge or insight, according to a political or administrative function which he exercises, which makes him appear a rewarding investment as a V-man, and whether the prospect exists, that he is ready for collaboration.

There is, for example, living in Dresden a chief engineer, concerning whom a tip has been received, who has access to the bridge building projects in Saxony; so perhaps one day an old comrade from the engineer battalion that he belonged to during the war shows up to renew old relations with him, or in Ruegen on holiday he comes to know a nice married couple who pursue the acquaintanceship after the holiday is over, or one of his colleagues may receive a letter from his cousin in West Germany with the request that he help along in some unimportant matter an acquaintance of this cousin, an acquaintance who has soon to take care of some business in Dresden.

The cousin's acquaintance, the nice couple from Ruegen, or his old comrade from the engineers were "researchers" of the Gehlen organization, who had in mind nothing else but to establish the position of the engineer on the subject of Pankow socialism, his efficiency, the circumstances of his personal life, and the characteristics of his individual nature.

If the researchers have discovered that the engineer is a full-fledged opponent of the political system of the East Zone and has a real insight into the bridge construction, which, for instance makes possible a judgment on what kind of armor, in case of an attack, could cross the bridges and what kind could not; then the research worker hands over the tip to the recruiting section with a positive judgment; therewith is the case closed for the researcher; he never learns whether, when, or in what fashion a recruiting of the engineer is undertaken.

It is conceivable that interest in traffic plans in the Soviet zone does not exist at the time the tip is received; in that case the recruiting would be postponed, or be totally ignored.

If interest in the tip which has been investigated exists, then the first step in the recruiting would be made, perhaps in the form of an invitation to a congress in West Germany, a suggestion for collaboration on a professional paper, or the invitation to renew an old acquaintanceship. Finally, of course, the recruiter must, as they say in agent's slang, "let his pants down" and put the straight question to the person on whom the tip has been received, as to whether he is ready to take up intelligence work. Cases



  
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in which anyone works as a V-man for a long time, whether through an exchange of letters or through conversations, without being investigated, are rare.

In the instant in which the recruiter puts his unvarnished question, it is clear whether the researcher has done his work well or not. Will the person who has been tipped drag the recruiter off by the neck to the SSD? Will he at least not betray the recruiter, even when he definitely declines the work? Or is he completely ready for intelligence work? As far as possible, the recruiter should shape a situation for his proposal in which the person singled out need not just call for the porter in order to have him arrested.

If the person tipped on takes the proposition up - really or only apparently, in order to betray the successful recruiting to the SSD - then he gets plans for information connections to his Chief V-man and an emergency plan in case he should be in danger. Therewith is his connection with the recruiter ended. He will never see him again.

The intelligence channel - in the example of the chief engineer for instance - can be a "dead letter-drop." On the basis of a statement made by Gehlen-agent Kaethe Dorn, a clerk in a People's industry, who was arrested in East Berlin, one can make himself an example of how a "dead letter-drop" works: Under the stone of an old grave in the cemetery of Hilmeshagen near Berlin, a hiding-place was cut out, in which Kaethe Dorn hid the information which she had collected. By two trees near the cemetery the knee-high weeds were ploughed up, and from this position the courier who was to pick up the material could see whether information had been stored away or not, in such a fashion that suspicious appearances at the grave would be spared him when no information was hidden there.

The unique or additional method of communication for the chief engineer could however also be in a postal address in West Berlin or West Germany to which he might send off his information either by covert means, written with secret ink or microphotographed, or interspersed with innocent private texts.

If he has occasion to travel frequently to West Berlin without making himself suspicious, then he will get a "live letter-drop," an agreed on address in West Berlin, where he hands over his intelligence material - without of course knowing what role the receiver plays in the Gehlen organization. He will hardly get to know his "branch office" leader, his own V-man leader, on such occasions.

If he is cut off from all these intelligence channels, then a courier will make a run to him, at agreed on times and according to agreed on meeting plans, in order to receive information. His reports and his pay he will, as a rule, get through a similar channel to that in which he reports his information.

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Radio contact is to be established only in exceptional circumstances.

If the V-man chief, or a higher office of the Gehlen organization learns, through information which it is receiving, that the V-man is in danger, then he will receive the agreed on alarm signal, an appointed telegram or an appointed telephone call, and he will try to reach the emergency address which has been allotted him in West Berlin or West Germany.

Although the "branch offices," the offices of the V-man leaders, do not lie in the target territory, a leader can handle at the most three to five V-people. The general rule of caution, to make accessible to a man even in his own leadership-not only at the most a fragmentary knowledge of the V-man string, has proved itself a good one in various mishaps in the Gehlen organization;

In one case, a West Berlin handling agent took part, because of his anti-Soviet enthusiasm, in a pamphleteering operation in East Berlin which was conducted by an organization distinct from the Gehlen apparatus.\* \*(Ideological subversion and preparations for revolt, the classical specialty of the Section II of the German Abwehr, was not undertaken by the Gehlen organization. It limited itself to positive intelligence and to counteraction to the enemy intelligence service.)

He was promptly arrested by the SSD, and the danger was present that he would be recognized as a member of the Gehlen organization and would be squeezed dry for the prize of his information. The circle of compromised V-people was limited to five, with their sub-sources; in all, 22 persons. They were all, by telephone, telegraph, and courier, directed out of East Berlin to the West.

Another case, the Geyer case, is thoroughly treated in Eastern propaganda, and thence has become publicly known. Geyer had, in 1952, come into contact in the Soviet zone with people of the Gehlen organization, and was sometimes used as a "researcher."

In 1953 he was, like the majority of researchers and recruiters, after a certain tour of duty, taken out of the Soviet zone and removed to duty in the home office. He was assigned as an office worker to a West Berlin "branch office." This branch office, indeed, against all the sainted rules of the Gehlen organization, directed almost 30 V-people, who for the most part became known to Geyer from documents. Too late it became clear that Geyer, indeed, before his transfer to West Berlin, had been "doubled" ("umgedreht") and slipped into the Gehlen apparatus as a counter-spy.

To be sure, in fact, a string of V-people, whom Geyer knew from the reports of the Berlin "branch office," could no longer be saved, since one day, in terror that he would be exposed as a counter-spy, Geyer fled to the East Zone. The reports frequently published in the east zone press that "Hundreds of Gehlen Agents" had been blown could however not possibly be true, since the "branch office" 9592, swollen contrary to every valid security

  
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rule, which the counter-spy Geyer penetrated, directed 30, but never even nearly "hundreds" of informants.

Palae also was the Soviet zone representation of the Haase case, another mishap of the Gehlen organization. The eastern propaganda avowed that Haase was stationed in East Berlin territory. In fact the story took place as follows: Werner Haase, a highly decorated major in the last war, led, under the cover name Haister, the Gehlen branch office 120a in West Berlin. Shortly after the Geyer case, which, through the loss of a string of informants and the growing unrest concerning this among the workers of the office, had made the work in the Soviet zone more difficult, Haase planned to facilitate the work, the laying of a telephone cable from the West sector to the East sector of Berlin. A so-called "wire-slurice," a direct cable connection for traffic with an informant in East Berlin, was to take the place of the dangerous courier channel.

The informant who had pointed out the vacant spot, in which the east sector terminal of the wire was to end, and who was to come for the reception of the wire at the sector border, was made known to the SSD by the Traitor Geyer and doubled.

The sector border extends along a stretch through the wooded land skirting the Heidkampgraben. In a general trial run for the laying of the cable, Haase had knotted the end of the cable up in a mechanical toy boat and let the boat sail over the Heidkampgraben, on the eastern shore of which the informant was to receive the cable.

When Haase wanted to lay the real cable, the informant, as it had been agreed, was on the other shore. However, just as Haase was, on the evening of 13 November 1953, beginning to launch his little ship on the Heidkampgraben, along came a squad of the State Security Service, who had hidden themselves on the western side of the canal, out of the bushes, and abducted Haase into the East sector. He was condemned to life imprisonment.

Wollweber ever and again floods the press with reports of such cases, which are unavoidable in the workday of the agent. Not only the eastern counterintelligence, but also both sides, succeed from time to time, in a so-called III-F-maneuver, the penetration of one's own counterparty into the enemy agency, with the difference however, which appears clearly in the Eastern press, where with the authenticity of supporting dates and figures little cases are whipped up into a chaos of swindling and false reports, and parceled out for propaganda purposes, while, for example, hardly anyone in West Germany knows that the Czechish-Polish informant string in West Germany was paralyzed in 1953 by successful III-F maneuver of the Gehlen organization.

The Gehlen organization also refuses to make public the extent of its knowledge of the operations of the SSD, the Soviet secret service, and the

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satellite intelligence services in the Federal Republic. It was for the first time treated in public with official blessing, when it recently denied the unmasking of 300 Gehlen agents announced by the East Zone State Security Service.

The Gehlen organization on the other hand has made no official mention of the "Brutus" case, one of its most outstanding successes:

One of the most rewarding targets for all the secret services operating in central Europe would be to place an informant near the legendary chief of the East Zone SSD, the maritime sabotage specialist Ernst Wollweber, "to stick a bomb on his shirt," as agents' jargon would put it. The Gehlen organization accomplished this work of art. A Gehlen informant with the cover name Brutus, the cabinet member (ministerialrat) Walter Gramsch, held a position - finally as head of the "naval base and harbors" section - in the State Secretariat for Navigation, which latter Wollweber headed until he took over the Secretariat for State Security as successor to Zeissler.

Gramsch had, as a traffic specialist, made contact with Wollweber in 1946. He had also an established insight into Wollweber's operations as chief of the international espionage and sabotage organization, the so-called Wollweber Apparat. From 1947 to 1953, Gramsch, who had let himself, as a former SPD member, be swept over into the SED, worked, for political-ideological motives (20th of July man) for the Gehlen organization, and delivered information on traffic in the East block, but especially III-F material on Wollweber's secret service operations.

On 28 March 1953 he even received from Wollweber a letter of appreciation for his work in the Central Transport Commission of the so-called German Democratic Republic.

As security against the eventual outcome of the Geyer case, he was in 1953 ordered to West Berlin and brought to safety.

Nearly as adventurous as the "Brutus" case is the "Klaus" case, of which the German public similarly has no knowledge; the MVD must take special pains to conceal this type of III-F case:

The Gehlen counterintelligence group succeeded in "doubling," according to all the rules of the art, the district geologist Klaus Vogel, who had been pressed into espionage work, as a punishment for alleged industrial failings, by the district headquarters of the Soviet MVD in Aue, at that time (Goedeletr 14). "Klaus" convinced his Soviet employers that he was a successful Soviet spy, but in reality, he worked for the Gehlen organization.

"Klaus" tasted to the full the favors which the beautiful Soviet chief-geologist Tatjana Patechinina offered him; First Lieutenant Ivan Sergeiwitsch

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and Major Suchjumkin, along with his trim interpreter Rita Wolodina, treated "Klaus" like royalty and fed him Crimean champagne and caviar. Then this young man, so it appeared in the records of the MVD, succeeded in tapping his uncle in West Berlin, a former Abwehr colonel and "chief" in the Gehlen organization.

The alleged uncle, whose name was Hans Strahsow, was neither a Colonel nor a former Abwehrman and holder of the Knight's Cross, but a gallant engineer captain. The "secret conversations" which "Klaus" allegedly overheard and the "secret papers" which he allegedly stole from him were "play material," carefully prepared by the Gehlen organization, which he turned over to his Russian as real. Sergeiwitch and Suchjumkin saw one thing, that "Klaus" would have to give his "Uncle" some reason for his many visits: "Klaus" brought uranium samples from Aue and important information from the uranium fields - this time of course the real thing.


In all the ten years previous, it had happened only once that a "counterplay" with a doubled agent of "Klaus's" stamp lasted more than a year. The "Klaus" case lasted two full years.

When, in the middle of 1953, the Karlshorst Central began to concern itself intensively with the success of its Aue field office, the Karlshorst experts recognized a completely unique opportunity. Colonel Sorokin and the kidnapping specialist Colonel Petrov (who was later to have the Gehlen field office leader Hoehner kidnapped from West Berlin) took over the "Klaus" case, not without seriously criticising Sergeiwitch and Suchjumkin because they had never succeeded, with the help of "Klaus," in dragging Gehlen people into the Soviet zone and putting Uncle Strahsow under pressure in the desired fashion. The Karlshorst MVD officers worked hard on the case. They worked out with "Klaus" preparations for kidnappings whose delicacy left nothing to be desired. One time Uncle Strahsow was to be kidnapped to Vienna and another, together with his family, to the east sector of Berlin. "Klaus" always played along gallantly, and reported directly to the Gehlen people.

As the kidnap attempt failed, "Klaus" was instigated to press his uncle in obscure fashion. At this point the Gehlen people broke off the "counterplay." "Klaus" never went back to Karlshorst. This was the first blow struck at Colonel Petrov, who was so accustomed to success; the second did not sit worse: Through an adventurous confusion-manoeuvre, they succeeded in slipping Klaus Vogel's wife and daughter out of the hands of the Soviets, a scheme in which the People's police, innocent of deception, even provided a sort of honor guard.

Naturally, the fact that, through kidnapped Gehlen people like Haase or the handling agent Wolfgang Hoehner, who, at an agent meeting, was stunned by some red wine spiked by an informant of Petrov and carried off to East Berlin, something of Gehlen's organizational pattern has become known, a fact that no Gehlen worker can dispute today, stands in contrast to those successful III-F cases.

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Thus it is certain, for example, that the firm; "Sueddeutsche Industrie-verwertungs GmbH" (South German Industrial Realty, Inc), of Munich, Emil-Geis-Strasse 50, which stands innocently on page 340 of the official telephone book for the Munich District of the Main Post Office for 1954, with the number 7 12 61, between the "Sueddeutschen Holzwirtschaftsbank" (South German Forestry Bank) and the "Sueddeutschen Kabelwerke" (South German Cable Works), was a covert, quietly established installation of the Gehlen organization. All the general representatives, district, and subordinate representatives of the Gehlen organization use businesses as cover; intelligence correspondence is carried on as business letters.

The cover firms, ordinarily duly registered corporations or companies, must not only maintain their cover, but also for the same reason, in the offices of the Gehlen organization which operate according to civil law, an unobtrusive and efficient contractor must run the shop; automobile registrations must be sent in for approval; office space and houses for secret meetings must be rented, social security premiums for secretaries, drivers and laborers must be paid.

All cover firms arrange for a competent specialist in each branch, who skillfully dismisses visitors and potential business contacts who may appear.

The general representatives and their subordinate echelons are not organized according to professional skills or according to regional sphere of the area in which information is to be collected. All general offices and all subordinate offices maintain branches or field offices - sometimes larger - in West Berlin, whose workers do not know the organizations set up parallel to them.

The sub-representative in West Berlin, who perhaps is in contact with two subordinate branch offices in West Berlin and with a higher district representation in Hannover, does not know to what general division he belongs.

The district representative in Hannover does not know that other district representatives of his general division are to be found, perhaps in Uelzen and Pinneburg and that each of these district offices maintains also another sub-office in West Berlin.

Each member of the organization knows only the contact man to the next higher and lower level, so that a defected or kidnapped district representative of the Gehlen organization cannot betray much more than the firm addressees of his sub-offices and general division. The informants and the branch offices whose material passes through his firm to a higher level, know him only by his cover name.

It is possible that of two informants who are placed in the same People's owned plant in Magdeburg - naturally without knowing one another - the one is

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bound by courier link to a branch office in West Berlin, from which his material, through a sub-representative in West Berlin, a district office in Hannover, and a general office in Muenster travels to the general directing-office in Pullach, while the other is in contact, through the post, with a branch office in Welfenbuettel from which his information travels up through a sub-office in Goettingen, a district office in Kassel, and the general office in Frankfurt. The basis of the principle is that the routing of information is a real schematic operational procedure which has no connection with the recruiting of the informant or the judgment or evaluation of the information.

A given branch office would perhaps direct not only an informant in heavy industry in Saxony, but also possibly a Reise-V-man (traveling informant) from Thuringia, who brings with him, from his business trips, economic and military information of all kinds, and a SSD official from Brandenburg who delivers III-F material concerning the State Security Service, and a foundry engineer from "Stalinstadt" (Euerstenberg/Oder), who reports continuously on steel production figures in his industrial area.

In fact the whole organization of course handles the exploration of the Soviet zone through informants only as a proportionally insignificant sector of operations. Much more delicate and painstaking is the so-called deeper-exploration, the penetration of the Soviet Union and the satellite nations on an informant basis.

Departure points on hand clearly show the fact that the classical secret service roads still, as always, lead to Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Also, official administrative and economic traffic of the states of the eastern block with one another yield up points of departure through which to inject informants into the leading organizations of individual powers among the other "friendly Peoples' Republics" and at the same time to win over opponents of the system through the work of informants. Informants in the Soviet army and recruited Soviet officials who are ordered back to the Soviet Union furnish there base points for the development of informant strings.

At any rate, the popular conception of the traveling spy, who - with his secret camera under his coat lapel and his invisible ink in his fountain pen - slips off on various missions into the territory or target about which information is to be collected, and who, after his mission has been accomplished, travels back to headquarters for the assignment of another, suits the Gehlen organization as little as any other modern secret service. This sort of individual operation is carried on only in a few exceptional cases.

In opposition to the difficulty of the deep-exploration - the reconnaissance in the Soviet Union itself - is the fact that detailed information, however meaningful in the territories which are near the border, is no more of interest. What is important is the big picture of the economic, military

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and political situation and their changes. This picture is in general much more clearly gained from intensive comparison of writings and statistics, geographical evidence and archive material, diplomatic reports and official reference works, than through individual informant reports.

So, therefore, the largest part of the approximately 400 specialists in the Pullach headquarters of the Gehlen service is employed not in the editing of informant material but rather with scientific analysis. With the original Gehlen team, which stemmed in essence from the officers, NCOs and officials of his OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) section, jostle specialists in economics and engineering, natural and political science. Also, of course, there are pure technicians who concern themselves with problems of radio broadcasting, the employment of and the recognition of, secret inks, false papers and documents, and other details of secret service operational methods.


In this technical department Gehlen himself is a unique specialist and precision-worker. The fascination which all things technical exercise over him, extends to breakneck racing in his Mercedes, in which he perhaps also reacts to his unsatisfied cavalry passions. The riding of competition-seasoned jumpers he has given up, at the request of his colleagues and of the Americans, who don't want to see their 52 year old chief and star-performer in a wheelchair, with a broken back. And trotting around on a quiet horse, he suppresses his cavalry spirit.

Almost every week Gehlen is off to Bonn, with changed license numbers on his car and changed personal papers in his briefcase. (\*Within the Gehlen organization, he is called "Herr Doktor" or "dar Doctor"). In his pants pocket he carries a six-shot pistol; his security guard consists usually of two sharpshooters. He wears the necessary dark glasses when he travels against the sun.

When important intelligence information is to be discussed concerning East Germany or the Soviet Union, he is received by the Federal Chancellor; at other times he confers, in the office of the Federal Chancellor, with State Secretary Globke. But he has also taken care to keep up personal contact with Kurt Schumacher and his follower Erich Ollenhauer. They all know him as a slender man, scarcely of middle height, whom Georges Penchenier, correspondent of "Le Monde" has written of, not very amiably, but also not incorrectly, as he put it: "Thin lips, very deep-set eyes under a high barren forehead, his ears very protuberant, such a man is Reinhardt Gehlen."

The abounding, overwhelming energy which speaks from his face is, according to the universally agreed upon impression of all who know him, tempered by the rustic charm of the ruddy coloring of his cheeks and a sort of paternal, very short-cropped moustache, which shows the most essential mark of difference between the general's looks today and the pictures, approximately ten years old, which are the only ones of him in existence.

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The vehemence of his facial impression is tempered as soon as Gehlen speaks in his vigorous, communicative, and strongly mimic fashion; above all the idiomatic geniality of his birthplace, Erfurt, with its "harsh and coft B," still rings through easily.

His hair, on the sides 1/10 millimeters long, is, on the top of his head, sparse, but still blond; his attitude direct, his make-up rather more plain than elegant, but not without little deviations from fashion: a tie clasp of chrome and light brown slippers with composition rubber soles.

The neighbors on the Starnberger See, who live around the premises of Gehlen's double-locked brown wooden house, maintain that they have never met the general face to face. The Gehlen's dog is the fiercest living being in the whole area. The appurtenances of the Gehlen family are not outstanding, but customary among the landholders on the lakeshore: an elderly housemaid, a gardener-chauffeur, a blue Volkswagen for the exclusive use of the members of the family, and a BMW motorcycle, with which the 17 year old son Christoph, a budding student, frightens the strollers.

Up until the flight of Otto John, the premises of the film beauty Ruth Leuwerik ("Royal Highness") held incomparably greater interest for the neighbors.

Since of course, in conjunction with the John case, the question came up regarding what role Reinhard Gehlen was to play in the Federal Republic, once his organization enjoyed legality as a German agency, the rumor again arose at the lake that Gehlen from time to time might make a visit to his neighbors masked.

The cool relationship which had been noticed between the former Protection of the Constitution Chief John and Reinhard Gehlen did not in fact lack a heretofore clearly known motivation, judging by externals. Gehlen is a pupil and admirer of Manstein ("One of the few with the divine spark."); Otto John served in the investigations which led to the trial of Manstein after the war as an alleged war criminal.

However it can be counted as incorrect that Gehlen cultivated his own interest in the president's chair of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Cologne. The office for the Protection of the Constitution is an institution for eliminating the danger to internal security; Gehlen is a man of foreign intelligence. Also the idea often attributed to Gehlen, that he seeks to merge his organization with the Federal Chancellor's office and to set himself up as a State Secretary, has little appearance of truth in itself. It does not suit with the manner of thinking of an officer who grew up in the state-political conception of the Reichswehr, to place agencies of internal and external security within the reach of the fortunes of party politics; but plainly the Federal Chancellor's office would always be the most outstanding bearer of the party-color which at any given time should be in power.



  
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Whoever seeks to come by Gehlen's future plans, which are made known nowhere, by means of analogical deduction and analysis, must begin with the fact of the party-political neutrality of the Reichwehr officer and General Staffer, and that Gehlen can have, as far as professional counterintelligence work is concerned, no deep-rooted reservations contrary to American policy, since he worked with them for so many years.

The USA, however, has had, since 1947, in its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a main administration for all kinds of foreign intelligence, which looks after the interests of the American armed forces as well as the foreign ministry. The CIA, whose chief, Allen Dulles, the brother of the foreign minister, is responsible only to the President, commands a staff composed from both these agencies.

That Reinhard Gehlen aspired to such an autonomous foreign intelligence service for the Federal Republic can be considered as settled upon. The office for the Protection of the Constitution had necessarily to take its place as the other half of this administration.

The question, when the legalization of the Gehlen organization has been carried through, and the Chancellor's beloved general can hold office as a German official, has a housekeeping and a political side: the statement that the Gehlen organization has been endowed with 26 million marks yearly, has never been denied, whence it seems to professional observers to follow, that the budget is at least twice as high. Such an investment does not appear exorbitant, however, when, for instance, one considers the police budget of the Hanseatic city of Hamburg which yearly requires 66.5 million marks, although its sphere of action extends only to Poppenbuettel and not to Alma Ata. In federal housekeeping, however, 50 million marks would be a budget portion which could easily give the opposition members an opportunity to fester themselves on it.

To the other - and here lies the political side of the decision concerning Gehlen, not only the eastern, but the western foreign establishments do not take it as a tempest in a teapot. The British Intelligence Service, the old nobility of all western secret services, can have no outstanding interest in seeing a strong foreign intelligence service established in Germany.

To the French any German agency with foreign interests is an outrage from the start, and to the Russians the very existence of a western secret service is a welcome excuse to cut off their Zone from peaceful-traffic with West Germany, although their secret service has penetrated West Germany even more completely than the Gehlen organization has penetrated the Soviet Zone. French and British newspapers, falling in line with the Soviet-steered press, have found a common formula: Gehlen is an SD-boss, a new chief of the old Gestapo-boys.

  
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For this point of the controversy, of course, Gehlen and the Chancellor are prepared: Gehlen's organization owes its origin to the struggle between the army and the SS. Gehlen's General Staffers have rubbed up against the arrogant claims of Heydrich and Schellannberg in endless controversies, over jurisdiction, both in the domestic war-districts and in the theatre of operations in the East. Even when they remain tolerant or uninterested in the political past of the SS officer, they are nevertheless as unconvinced of the professional capability of those who wore the Reichs-eagle on their sleeve as an old gentleman of the University of Bonn's "Borussia" club face to face with the singers of "Bardia."

To be sure, as informants and "researchers," former SD and Gestapo officials hold places here and there in the Gehlen service, when they have good appeal to former comrades on the other side and when they have penetrated successfully in a series of cases into the enemy's service. For one thing, however, Conrad Adenauer can be taken at his word when he vouches for the political maturity of the Gehlen organization: On Gehlen's staff there is not one former SD or Gestapo man.

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GEHLEN, General Reinhard aka Dr SCHNEIDER:

a/ SUBJECT was born 3 Apr 1902, ERFURT, Germany. GEHLEN's father Walter GEHLEN, was a publisher and a former director of the FERDINAND-HIRTH Publishing house in BRESLAU. GEHLEN attended the classical Gymnasium in BRESLAU, completing the course in 1920. GEHLEN then became a "Fahnenjunker" (Officer-Aspirant) of the First Battery of the Artillery Regiment 6, located in SCHWEIDNITZ. GEHLEN was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant in 1923, 1st Lieutenant in 1928, Captain in 1934, Major in 1936, Lt. Colonel in 1941, Col in 1942 and Brig General in December 1944. In 1926 GEHLEN attended the Cavalry School located in Hannover. From 1929 to 1933 GEHLEN was with Artillery Regiment #3, located first in SCHWEDNITZ and later in FRANKFURT/Oder. From 1933 to 1935 he attended the War College (In 1934 the Military Academy in BERLIN), and in 1935 GEHLEN became Adjutant to the Oberquartiermeister I (Deputy Chief of the General Staff). In 1936 GEHLEN was permanently appointed to the General Staff, and in 1937 he served with Fremde Herre Ost (Foreign Armies East); GEHLEN then became Adjutant for Generaloberst HALDER, Chief of the General Staff of the Army. In 1940 GEHLEN had served as liaison officer with the Army High Commands and Groups under General GUBERIAN, HOTH and BUSCH. After 1942, GEHLEN was head of the Intelligence Division in the Fremde Herre Ost Section.


(B-3)

b. After the war GEHLEN was an Allied POW and was interned by the US Army. In the summer of 1945 GEHLEN was sent to WASHINGTON, D.C., where his services for US Intelligence were accepted, with certain stipulations regarding control and ~~xxxx~~ organization of the staff that SUBJECT was to create and lead. Headquarters for the GEHLEN organization were originally located in FRANKFURT/Main, and then were moved to MUNICH/Pullach (also reported as MUNICH, Senefelderstr 8). In 1955 the GEHLEN organization was reportedly being taken over by the German Government.

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c. On 10 September 1931, GEHLEN was married to Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, born 17 April 1904, the daughter of Friedrich Wilhelm von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, and Oberstleutnant a.D., residence (undated) listed as 6 GLOGAU, Neue Wallstr 18.

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EXTRACT

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25. MAR. 1955

b6

Filed cut to D-320529/2

At a meeting of [b1] chiefs which took place in KORN on 28 February and 1 March 1955, the persons present were informed that the Gehlen Group would become the official, civilian, positive intelligence agency for Germany as of 1 April 1955 and would conduct intelligence operations against Soviet and Soviet satellite countries. With regard to [b1] jurisdiction, one point of contention has arisen; this is whether or not East Germany should be considered as a part of Germany, and therefore, within [b1] jurisdiction, or whether it should be considered a Soviet Satellite. This has not yet been decided upon. [b1] Chief [b6] is of the opinion that the procurement of information on East Germany should be the responsibility of the [b1]. [b1] activity in East Germany, as pictured by [b6], would also include penetration of East German political targets.

Uneval.

Ref:  
Sub:

b1

os [b6]

[REDACTED]

1. [b6] (cont.) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10. U.S.

29. 1 Aug 1951. F-6

1. [b6]

5. 5 May 1906, PISEK, CSR

7-8. Translator, Foreign Military Studies Br., Historical  
Division, EUCON.

10. U.S.

29. 1 Aug 1951. F-6

1. [b6]

7-8. Special Detachment, USAREUR.

29. 14 Aug 1952. B-2

30. 1st Lt.

2. [b6]

(see: [b6])

1. ([b3 Per CIA])

4. ([b3 Per CIA])

6. ([b3 Per CIA])

7-8. Listed as GEHLEN contact.

10. USA

13. 6'

14. 190

15. Stocky

20a. Brown

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1. b3 Per CIA

7-8. Representative of DAD.

29. 20 Dec 1949. A-1.

1. CLARK, Richard R.

5. Lt. Col., FA

7-8. Operation Rusty. Telephone: FRANKFURT 23470.

29. Feb 1947. Uneval.

1. b6

2. b6

3. Male

5. Colonel

6. MUNICH, Pullach

7-8. GO, Commanding Officer, MUNICH/Pullach. (SDU, American element).

29. 10 Jan 1955. Uneval.

30. Exceedingly well informed on entire operation as

he knew b6 Political Section, AMCONGEN,

MUNICH, by rank; referred to b6


b6 and others by name.

1. b6

5. Major, USA No. O-345872.

7-8. Formerly assigned to Historical Division, Hqs, EUCOM.

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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**CONFIDENTIAL**  


[REDACTED]

1. (b3 Per CIA) (cont.)

- 23b. Brown
28. Married
29. Undtd. Uneval.

1. b6

3. Male
4. b6
5. Lt. Col., USA
6. KARLSRUHE, Kaiser Allee 4
- 7-8. Chief, Foreign Military Studies Branch, Historical Division, Headquarters, EUCOM. In constant contact with former German General Franz HALDER.

1. b6

4. b6
- 7-8. Translator in the Foreign Military Studies Branch, Historical Division, Hqs, EUCOM.
29. 1 Aug 1951. F-6
30. AGO No. X-046350.

1. b6

4. b6
6. KARLSRUHE, Hotel Reichshof
- 7-8. Employed on 6 Oct 1950 as a Historian by Historical

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4 February 2009  
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

749

[REDACTED]

 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
1. (b3 Per CIA) (cont.)

Division, EUCOM.

- 10. USA
- 13. 5'8"
- 14. 135
- 15. Thin
- 20a. Black
- 28. Married
- 29. 1 Aug 1951. F-6

1. (b3 Per CIA)

7-8. Worked for DAD, BERLIN. Either CO or Ops. officer, 1947.

29. Undtd. Uneval.

1. (b6)

4. (b6)

7-8. Translator in Foreign Military Studies Branch, Historical Division, Headquarters, EUCOM

10. USA

29. 1 Aug 1951. F-6

30. DAC. AGO C-475603.

1. (b3 Per CIA)

2. (b6)

7-8. Running the DAD group in REGENSBURG

29. 24 Nov 1950, Memo, Hqs, 66th CIC

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4 February 2009  
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

 755



  
1. VERNON, Ralph

4. 9 Jul 1899, WINDSOR, Conn.

5. Lt. Col, USA

7-8. Assistant Chief of the Foreign Military Studies Br,  
Historical Division, Hqs, EUCOM.

29. 1 Aug 1951. F-6

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

  
751  


OID125-0599

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
AC of S, G-2, Intelligence  
APO 403 US Army

~~SECRET~~

APO 403

AEAGB-C(AE) 333.5 CB

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization (U)  
(S)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, U. S. Army

- (U)
1. (SECRET) The attached report concerning personalities of the GEHLEN Organization is forwarded for your information and file.
  2. (UNCLASSIFIED) It is desired that limited handling be instituted upon the attached report and that no further dissemination be made of the information disclosed therein without the concurrence of this Office.
  3. (UNCLASSIFIED) It is desired that this Office be provided with a Summary of Information as contained in the Central Registry files concerning all personalities mentioned in the inclosed report.
  4. (UNCLASSIFIED) Downgrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

1 Incl  
Report listing persons employed  
by GEHLEN Org, 3 pages --  
1 copy, Secret

b6
Colonel GS Chief, CI Branch

Tp: Heid Mil 7864

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FEB 04 2009

by USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

753  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CIID125-0599

REPORT ON:

b6

DATE OF REPORT: 1 December 55

b6

Major, GS, New German Army - Until 1 Nov 55, Chief Soviet OB,  
Gehlen Organization

Born:

b6

Protestant

Family: Father: Same Name. A college teacher and official

Wife:

b6

(wealthy industrial family)

Married 3 June 43

3 children: b6 9 Jan 45

b6 30 Apr 48

b6 8 Oct 51

Residence:

b6

Military: 1934-45, 34th Inf Div; 15th & 23rd Armored Divs -  
Served in France, North Africa and Russia

1945: Major, Chief of Desk IIA, Fremde Heer Ost  
GSC Oram, 1 Apr 44

Decorations: Golden German Cross  
Iron Cross, 1st Class

Prisoner of War: USA, 22 May 45 - July 46

Sports: Track, Swimming, Skiing; Plays excellent bridge

This man served with General Gehlen in Fremde Heer Ost and as one of his most trusted aides remained with him in flight, surrender, POW in USA and in the build-up of present intelligence organization.

He has been Chief of Russian OB Evaluation Section in Pullach Org and has demonstrated extraordinary analytical ability and keen perception. His understanding of Russian military doctrine and psychology is outstanding.

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~~SECRET~~

He is very pro-American, is anti-French but, above all, is a loyal German. He went back to active duty in new German Army 17 Nov 55 with rank of Major because of his intense patriotism and love of the military service."

He had hoped to go to our G & GSC at Leavenworth and have further duty with US Forces but has been ordered to attend British Staff College from Jan to Sept 56 and then join G-3 section of NORTHAG.

I believe this was at the request of [b1] who by reputation and through conferences in Pullach have learned of [b6] keen ability and vast knowledge of Russ OB.

[b6] is very tall (6'4"), slender and slightly stooped. He wears glasses. He is reserved and shy at first; always a thorough gentleman, very courteous and thoughtful of social niceties. His English is very good. He has a good sense of humor, which even extends into his English.

He is an officer one can depend on and one who will rapidly rise in the New German Army.

It is reported that Gehlen and Blank have agreed to share his services in some manner - probably by recurring tours of duty with G.I.S.

His wife is very attractive - a well built, slight, good-looking burnette. She is pleasant but reserved.

The US Army would profit by having [b6] on a NATO Hqs Staff commanded by us.

~~SECRET~~  
755

~~SECRET~~

GERMAN ELEMENT, 6966 SDU

ALIAS

Dr. Schneider

TRUE NAME

Gen. Reinhard Gehlen

POSITION

Chief  
Director of Intelligence  
Chief of Evaluation  
and Production  
Admin Asst to Chief  
Chief of Army Evaluation  
Former Chief of Army  
Evaluation; Now Major  
in German General Staff  
Soviet OB  
Chief of Communication  
Deputy Chief of  
Evaluation  
Chief of Vehicle Numbers  
Satellites OB  
Supply  
Vehicle Numbers  
Rail Transport -  
Satellites & Russia  
Chief of Transport &  
Supply  
Soviet OB  
Soviet OB

b6

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

753

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

APO 154

US ARMY

GIC FILE

upl  
13 Dec 55

FILE: AEUC-OP; D-320529, Vol I, D-264881

SUBJECT: Implementation of ICM 7-55 (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army

1. (SECRET) Reference is made to ICM 7-55, Subject: West German Government - Defense Security and Intelligence Agencies (S), dated 21 October 1955.

2. (SECRET) The provisions of this Intelligence Collection Memorandum are being levied on the elements of 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group for collection. In this connection, the following actions are being taken:

a. Operational memoranda are being prepared assigning collection of information on the Gehlen Organization to the Counter Espionage Division, this Group, and collection on the Defense Ministry, the Defense Ministry intelligence collection agencies, [b1] to the Counter Subversion Division, this Group. These operational memoranda provide for the following collection techniques:

(1) Research Division, this Group, will conduct studies on the four West German Federal Government agencies specified in ICM 7-55.

(2) Regions of this Group are being directed to initiate newspaper and magazine clipping activities related to special releases on the respective agencies.

(3) Regions are alerted to report to this Headquarters all information obtained in an [b1]

(4) Special requirements carried in ICM 7-55 are being levied on the respective liaison officers to [b1]

b1

**SECRET**

Copy 3 of 4 Copies

758

239250H  
207

~~SECRET~~

ANUC-OP; D-320529, Vol I; D-264881  
SUBJECT: Implementation of ICM 7-55 (U)

3. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(SECRET)~~ The collections set forth in the paragraph above will provide information of varying degrees of import in connection with the Federal German Republic agencies specified in your ICM. In order to facilitate a higher level of intelligence collection and to insure a continuous collection, the following is recommended:

a. That 66th CIC Group be authorized to assign liaison officers to the following agencies on the Federal level and at appropriate regional or district offices if such exist:

(1) A liaison officer to the Defense Ministry (formerly BLANK Office).

(2) A liaison officer to the Gehlen Gruppe.

b. That 66th CIC Group be authorized to seek extended overseas tours of duty for the liaison officers appointed to the West German Federal agencies mentioned above, such tours of duty to be on a voluntary basis by highly qualified, fluent linguist, CIC personnel. Such extended overseas tours of service would permit development of close personal relationships based on daily contact and insure the collection of information on the requirements listed in ICM 7-55.

c. That personnel approved in accordance with the two paragraphs above be military and of sufficient rank and/or maturity to enable them to mingle on a social level with any Federal German government personnel. Such personnel should also be authorized sufficient confidential funds to insure an economic relationship which will permit entertainment and a social level commensurate with that of key government officials.

4. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ Material obtained in connection with directives specified in paragraph 2 will be submitted in accordance with normal reporting procedures for 66th CIC Group.

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8402  
WJD/raw

b6

Commanding

758

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~SECRET~~

# DISPOSITION FORM

SECUP

CLASSIFICATION (// comp)

**SECRET**

FILE NO.

AEUC-IB

SUBJECT

Letters to ACoS, G2, USAREUR (U)

TO

Executive Officer

FROM

S2

DATE

7 Nov 55

COMMENT NO. 1

b6

/hp/8365

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) I was present when the Commanding Officer requested the S3 to write the attached letters and go along with the purpose of the letters.

2. (~~SECRET~~) Because of the amount of liaison being directed by the S3, due to specific ICM's, it is suggested b1  
b1 be maintained by the S3. The S2 will be responsible for remaining  
b1

3. (U) (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) I have given instructions to Liaison Division to include paragraph 2 of Comment S2 in with the policy study being worked upon.

b6

3 Incl: Drafts of Letters  
(6 pages)

S2

767

DD FORM 96  
1 FEB 50

REPLACES RME FORM 96, 1 OCT 49, WHICH MAY BE USED

**SECRET**

AGL (I) 4-55.3M-42826



# DISPOSITION FORM

SECUR

CLASSIFICATION (U/mg)

~~SECRET~~

FILE NO.

AEUC-OP

SUBJECT

Letters to ACoFS, G2, USAREUR (U)

TO

Executive Officer

FROM

S3

DATE

1 Nov 55

COMMENT NO. 1

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Attached for your comments and/or approval are draft copies of three letters addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, on the following subjects:

- a. b1 (C)
- b. Establishment of MAAG Activities (C)
- c. Implementation of ICM 7-55 (U)

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) This Disposition Form may be regraded CONFIDENTIAL upon separation from inclosures.

b6

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8402  
WJU/raw

S3

3 Incl: Drafts of Letters  
(6 pages)

-----

768

~~SECRET~~Copy 1 of 3 Copies

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

SUBJECT: Implementation of ICM 7-55 (u)

TO: ACoS, G2, USAREUR

~~(SECRET)~~

1. /Reference is made to ICM 7-55, Subject: West German Government - Defense Security and Intelligence Agencies (S) dated 21 October 1955.

S. 2. The provisions of this Intelligence Collection Memorandum are being levied on the elements of 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group for collection. In this connection, the following actions are being taken:

a. Operational memoranda are being prepared assigning collection for the GEHLEN Organization to the CE Division <sup>this group</sup> and collection on the Defense Ministry, the Defense Ministry intelligence collection agencies, and the b1 the CS Division. <sup>this group</sup> These intelligence Collection Memoranda provide for the following collection techniques:

(1) Research Division, <sup>this group</sup> Headquarters, ~~66th CIC Group~~,

b1

(2)

b1

b1

(3)

b1

b1

769

(4)

b1

b1

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 170

~~SECRET~~

b1

(~~C~~)<sup>(U)</sup> 4. Material obtained in connection with directives specified in paragraph 2 will be submitted in accordance with normal reporting procedures ~~xx~~ for 66th CIC Group.

b6

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

SUBJECT: Military Counter Intelligence, Germany

b1

(S)

TO: ACoS, G2, USAREUR

*Reinhardt*

1. Plans for training and organization of the Military Counter Intelligence, Germany, have previously been discussed with CI Branch, ACoS, G2, USAREUR. During those discussions, it was indicated that MAD will become operative about April, 1956.

2. It is recommended that immediate action be taken to establish liaison officers from 66th CIC Group with b1 and regional and district offices of that agency.

b1

~~SECRET~~

772

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) (b)(6)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 773

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

SUBJECT: Establishment of MAAG Activities

TO: ACoS G2 USAREUR

b1

~~SECRET~~

774

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

CODE CLERK GER

FROM: CD CIC RGN XII

TOO 261545Z OCT 55  
TOR 261600Z

FOR ACTION: CO 66TH CIC GP

FOR INFO:

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED  
EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B  
ENCRYPTION-PHYSICALLY RE-  
MOVE ALL INTERNAL REFEREN-  
CES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR  
TO DECLASSIFICATION-NO UN-  
CLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE  
DATE TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

REFNR: L-1696

OPR FOR CICOP FRDM CICOP.

*In compliance with ICM 7-55 the foll  
is submitted:*

ON 26 OCT CURR b6 DIRECTOR RHEINLAND PFALZ

b1 TOLD b6 b1 LIA RPT LIA OFF THAT ALL b1 RPT b1

b1 VISITED GEN GEHLEN IN MUNICH-PULLACH DN 25 OCT CURR.

MAIN TOPIC SEEMED TO BE WHETHER TO TAKE AWAY FROM b1 THE II G  
SECTIONDS WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH THE STATUS QUO RPT QUO FOR b1  
MISSIONS AS EXISTED PRIOR TO 1953. GEHLEN, WHEN ASKED WHAT HE  
THOUGHT OF THE IDEA, EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE TO  
HIM WHETHER II G OPERATIONS WERE HANDLED BY b1 OR BY HIM.

DECISION ON MATTER IS NOT LIKELY UNTIL END CURR YEAR DUE TO ADENAUERS  
ILLNESS AND SINCE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION HAS STILL NOT BEEN TAKEN  
OVER BY BONN. IN DISCUSSING MATTER FURTHER WITH GEHLEN AS TO  
WHETHER II G SHOULD BECOME A MIL INTEL AGENCY OR SHOULD REMAIN UNDER  
CIVILIAN CONTROL, GEHLEN DECLINED ANY COMMENT. b6 HAS  
IMPRESSION THAT MATTER IS ALREADY SETTLED AND THAT EVENTUALLY  
II G WILL AGAIN BE HANDLED AS A BRANCH OF MIL ESTABLISHMENT. EVAL  
B.2. SOURCE IS b1 P.L.

775

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WB FORM 173

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES  
COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES



CONFIDENTIAL

# OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: Hqs, 56th CIC Group, A.C. 154, Hq Army

Date: 28 Sep 1955

FROM: Attn: [b6]  
[b1]

SUBJECT: [b6]

REF:

On 27 Sep 1955, the W/O invited the four [b1] Chiefs for Northern Germany to dinner. [b1] informed the L/O that the [b1] Chiefs had planned to dine with the Northern Area Chief of the Gehlen Group, [b6] whereupon the L/O extended his invitation to the latter. During dinner the L/O sat too far from [b6] to be able to become acquainted with him at all; however, the [b1] Chiefs had to excuse themselves shortly after dinner in order to resume their conference. As they left [b6] approached the L/O, stating that he presumed that the L/O knew who he was, and adding that he regretted that he had not previously had the opportunity of getting acquainted with the W/O. Thereupon he invited the L/O to remain a while and have drink with him.

During the conversation that followed, [b6] was very congenial. He and the L/O discussed such matters as their families, their children, and the health of The President of the United States. In the course of conversation he stated that he is married and has two children, 13 and 14 years old. He had had very little formal education, since he had joined the German Army at a very young age. He served a total of 20 years in the army prior to 1945, and in 1945, he became a salesman and remained a salesman for five years. During the latter five years (1945 to 1950), he also worked part time for the Gehlen Group (he referred to this as "my present organization" and never by actual name.) He stated that he has been working full time for his present organization since 1951. He gave the W/O his card which indicated that he resides at [b6] and that his telephone number is [b6]. After about one hour he stated that he had to leave in order to keep an appointment. The W/O then invited him to lunch "sometime the week after next." He very willingly accepted the invitation and will await a phone call from the L/O.

It is requested that the L/O be informed as to how much emphasis to place on cultivating [b6] if any; and of any particular subjects which should be handled with unusual care... other than those matters with which the L/O is already familiar through normal orientation.

Distribution:

1-Addressee

1-Region III, 56th CIC Gp

1-File

736

[b6]

CONFIDENTIAL

12053

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APO 403, US Army

D- 320529/2  
(CIC FILE NO.)

8 August 1955  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file III-34419,  
dated 26 April 1955, subject: GEHLEN Organization,  
Source: X-1080-III.

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 9 (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

b6

(Analyst) *let*

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23 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

WB Form 315  
17 Jan 1955  
(C/S)

810

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Numerical Value

0	Worthless-obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
8	Valuable	Late	Low level
9	Valuable	Late	Medium level
10	Valuable	Late	High level
11	Valuable	Timely	Low level
12	Valuable	Timely	Medium level
13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
20	Extremely valuable	Late	Low level
21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APO 403, US Army

D- 320529/2  
(CIC FILE NO.)

8 August 1955  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file III-34419,  
dated 2 May 1955, subject: Cablen Organization.

Source: X-1080-III.

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 12 (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

b6

(Analyst) *glt*

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WB Form 315  
17 Jan 1955  
(C/S)

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23 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
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812

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Numerical Value

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0	Worthless-obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
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23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APC 403, US Army

D-320529/2  
(CIC FILE NO.)

5 August 1955  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file Region III,  
dated 1 July 1955, subject: CHINESE Organization,

Source: X-1080-III.

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 12 (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

b6

(Analyst) *act*

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814

WB Form 315  
17 Jan 1955  
(C/S)

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Numerical Value

0	Worthless-obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of ate	Medium level
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6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
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10	Valuable	Late	High level
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12	Valuable	Timely	Medium level
13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
20	Extremely valuable	Late	Low level
21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

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23 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

815

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APC 403, US Army

D-320529/3  
(CIC FILE NO.)

5 August 1955  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file III-34419,  
dated 1 April 1955, subject: GEHLEN Organization.

Source: X-1080-III.

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 9 (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

b6

(Analyst) *sch*

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17 Jan 1955  
(C/S)

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Numerical Value

0	Worthless-obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
8	Valuable	Late	Low level
9	Valuable	Late	Medium level
10	Valuable	Late	High level
11	Valuable	Timely	Low level
12	Valuable	Timely	Medium level
13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
20	Extremely valuable	Late	Low level
21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APO 403, US Army

D- 320529/3  
(CIC FILE NO.)

5 August 1955  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file Region III,  
dated 10 May 1955, subject: CEHJEN Organization,

Source: X-1080-III.

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 9 (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

b6

(Analyst)

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(C/S)

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Numerical Value~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0	Worthless-obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
8	Valuable	Late	Low level
9	Valuable	Late	Medium level
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13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
20	Extremely valuable	Late	Low level
21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APO 403, US Army

C- 320529/3  
(CIC FILE NO.)

5 August 1955  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
56th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file Reg III,  
dated 11 May 1955, subject: CEHLEN Organization,

Source: P-1089-III (T) and P-1082-III through X-1081-III.

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 9 (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

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(Analyst)

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Numerical Value

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
0	Worthless-obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
8	Valuable	Late	Low level
9	Valuable	Late	Medium level
10	Valuable	Late	High level
11	Valuable	Timely	Low level
12	Valuable	Timely	Medium level
13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
20	Extremely valuable	Late	Low level
21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

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HEADQUARTERS REGION XI  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 800 US ARMY

FILE: II-5326

29 July 1955

SUBJECT: Alleged Members of Organization  
"GEHLIN" in the COBURG Area.

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: None.

2. FORWARDED: Two (2) Agent Reports, Region XI, dated 29 July 1955, Subject and File as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: As shown in the reports with the following exceptions:

a. Source: Source "A" is b1

b1

b. Relationship of Source to Target: Personal contact.

c. How Information was Obtained: Personal contact with Target.

d. Date Information was Obtained: Unknown.

e. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.

f. Status of Case: Pending.

4. REMARKS:

a. Source is a casual Source of this office and generally is most loquacious regarding any information he knows.

827

19 AUG. 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10511

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE: XI-5326, Alleged Members of Organization "GEHLIN" in the  
COBURG Area, 29 July 1955.

b. It is anticipated that background information will  
be gathered on b6

2 Incls:

1-2. ARs, Rgn XI, dtd 29 Jul 55

WFT/WEM/mck/Wu M324 834

DISTRIBUTION:

2-CO, 66th CIC Group

1-CIC Central File

1-File Rgn XI

b6

Commanding

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828

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 330-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Alleged Members of Organisation "GEHLIN" in the  
COBURG Area.

2. DATE SUBMITTED

29 July 1955

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

XI-5326

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 18 July 1955, Source "A" revealed the following information concerning alleged members of the Organisation "GEHLIN:"

The most important member, and possible leader of the Organisation "GEHLIN" in COBURG Palz070, is [b6] living at [b6] [b6] an artist by trade.

Another alleged member of the Organisation "GEHLIN" in COBURG is [b6] She has two addresses in COBURG as she owns and operates a photo shop at Mohrenstrasse 5, and a book shop at Gelseitstrasse 3, in COBURG.

Another member of the above mentioned organisation is allegedly [b6] the present Chief of the City Police, COBURG. Source "A" stated that [b6] was issued the number 3733 as his number for security reasons.

(B-3)

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

829

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[b6]  
66th CIC Group

6. SIG

fo

b6

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30003

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 330-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT		2. DATE SUBMITTED	
Alleged Members of Organization "GEHLIN" in the COBURG Area.		29 July 1955	
		3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER	
		XI-5326	
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS			
<p>On 28 July 1955, the Regional Registry, Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army; was checked in regard to the below listed persons, with negative results:</p> <div data-bbox="418 604 774 781" data-label="Text"><p>b6</p></div> <p>(C-3)</p>			
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT			
b6 66th CIC Group		6. SIGNATURE fo b6	

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830

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

D-320529

28 July 1955

SUBJECT: OEHLER Organization (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

RE: Alleged Neutralist and/or Pro-Soviet Elements

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

This Document Has Been  
Classified by C/R Section  
Date 11/1/85 Init 332

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) FORWARDED: Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 28 July 1955.

2. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source "A" is X-0201-IV, evaluated B, who obtained the information from b1 MUNICH, Germany, on the dates indicated in the report. b1 a former section chief in the OEHLER Organization, is a well known intelligence dealer who is associated with b6. The information is said to have originated from an unnamed personality in an organization for industrial security. Preparing agent for this report is b6

3. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) REMARKS:

a. It is fully realized that the information contained in the attached report is sketchy and normally should not be submitted in its present form without further investigation, especially in view of the doubtful reliability of the sources of that information. In its background and its strange origin, however, this case is somewhat reminiscent of the b6 case which also started from somewhat "hazy" beginnings and yet resulted in the ultimate removal from office of b1

b1

b. The case started out by b6 informing Source "A" that he b6 had highly sensitive and derogatory information on the OEHLER group in his possession. He indicated that he had received that information from b6 who in turn had obtained it from the aforementioned personality in an industrial security organization. b6 995

10345

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D-320529

(U)

28 July 1955

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

RE: Alleged Neutralist and/or Pro-Soviet Elements

added that this information had been furnished them [b6] [b6] for the expresse purpose of bringing it to the personal attention of General GEHLEN, i.e: to find a way to place the information in the hands of GEHLEN without interference and possible sabotage by unreliable elements on GEHLEN's staff. According to [b6] he and his backers thought so much of the importance and value of the GEHLEN group that they wished to prevent this derogatory information from falling into unauthorized or hostile hands.

c. [b6] then told Source "A" that a good possibility for bringing this information to the attention of GEHLEN personally and without the knowledge of the latter's staff may be through [b6] [b6] of the VFF (Volksbund fuer Frieden und Freiheit--People's League for Peace and Freedom) in BONN, Germany. In this connection, it should be mentioned that [b6] who was a trusted informant (i.e: an informant who handled other sources) of the Gestapo in BERLIN under the Nazi Regime, knows [b6] from that time just as he knows Source "A" from the latter's period of employment in BERLIN. Source "A" met [b6] again in connection with the [b6] case.

d. [b6] then related to Source "A" that he had written a letter to [b6] just a few days ago concerning another matter. It appears that [b6] is under fire by the National Front, especially [b6] present co-publisher of the "Rheinisch-Westfaelischen Nachrichten", a DUESSELDORF weekly, for his [b6] anti-communist and anti-National Front work in general and his handling of the [b6] case in particular. [b6] had advised [b6] of a statement made to him by [b6] a co-owner of the MUNICH nationalist-neutratlist weekly "Die Nation", to the effect that the National Front "will get" [b6] for the above-mentioned reasons. In reply, [b6] had invited von [b6] to visit him in BONN to discuss personally [b6] [b6] knowledge of National Front plans against [b6]

e. From BERLIN and through the [b6] case, [b6] already knew that Source "A" was in occasional contact with [b6] In an effort to obtain additional information on this mysterious case, Source "A" invited [b6] to accompany him to BONN. Accordingly they traveled to BONN on or about 15 July 1955.

f. Source "A" subsequently learned from [b6] that [b6] [b6] had discussed the entire complex with both [b6] head of the VFF, and [b6] along the lines outlined above. [b6] had added, however, that this information, which neither he nor [b6] knew in detail, would be turned over only to a person recommended to him by VFF, duly identified as a confidential representative of the VFF and who last but not least had direct access to GEHLEN. [b6] immediately

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D-320529

(U)

28 July 1955

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

RE: Alleged Neutralist and/or Pro-Sovist Elements-

replied that this should not be a problem at all and that he would probably put [b6] in touch with a former Colonel in the General's staff, (fnu) HERRE, residing in MUNICH. According to [b6] HERRE is a member of, or in contact with, the GEHLEN Organization.

g. In the meantime, [b6] seems to have undergone a change of mind as far as HERRE is concerned. Source "A" reported on 25 July 1955, that [b6] received a letter from [b6] on 23 July 1955 in which [b6] advised [b6] that a [b6] would soon contact [b6] to collect the evidence for the allegations in question and transmit it to General GEHLEN. [b6] was not further identified by [b6]

h. Developments in this case will continue to be observed and reported by Region IV, MUNICH. Source "A" was instructed to attempt to determine the identity of the alleged original source of the information (the person in the industrial security organization) and the exact name of that organization. Source was further instructed to determine what type of evidence [b6] actually have for these allegations and the real reason of trying to transmit that information through the VFF and not using a more direct approach to GEHLEN.

i. Source "A" believes to have indications that [b6] was the man who possibly responsible for [b6] dismissal from GEHLEN employment. [b6] in turn, was arrested for alleged treason not too long ago, retained in investigative arrest for some time, and then released again. [b6] blamed this arrest on intrigues by the GEHLEN Organization against him. This appears to indicate that both men must harbor feelings of hatred, or at least dislike, for GEHLEN and his organization. They must be aware of the fact that the VFF is at least an official organization of the West-German Federal Government. They cannot be so naive as to believe that VFF would accept the information and documentary evidence without informing the Federal Government of such action. On the basis of that reasoning one is led to assume that [b6] [b6] are acting as willing front men for a political intrigue, the origin of which is unknown at the present time. If suspicion, even if it has some foundation, can be cast on an important part of the GEHLEN group, it is bound to reflect on the integrity of the entire organization at a time when the transfer of that group from American to German control is under consideration. This is the reason for the above statement that the case has some resemblance to the [b6] case, particularly in view of the fact that the latter case also developed from information and accusations which originated from sources

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28 July 1955

D-320529

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization

RE: Alleged Neutralist and/or Pro-Soviet Elements

connected with an industrial security organization, namely, the Bavarian Beratungsstelle fuer Industrieschutz (Advisory Office for Industrial Security).

j. The files of Region IV, MUNICH contain no reference to HERRE and b6. There is a file card for one Walter SCHENK which is dated 7 November 1946. The SCHENK listed on that card was approximately 55 years old, at that time and his military background is listed as having been a former Abwehr officer and member of the Brandenburg Division. He resided at that time in BREITBRUNN/Chiemsee. The possibility exists that this Walter SCHENK may be identical with the SCHENK mentioned in the attached report.

1 Incl: SOI dtd 28 Jul 55

b6 /bg/MM 746-006

b6

Commanding

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1-Region IV File

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

COOE CLERK WSN

FROM: RESIDENT OFFICE BONN MEHLEM

T00 221200Z JUL 55  
TOR 221220Z

FOR ACTION: CO 66 CIC GROUP

FOR INFO:

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED  
CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER  
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REFNR: C-721

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OPS FROM: LO OCA FDR CICPO.

**OPERATIONAL INFORMATION**

SUBJ IS ALLEGED ACTIVITIES OF AMERICAN INTEL AGENCY IN BONN/BAD  
GODESBERG AREA.

[b6], CIA RPT CIA LO TO SOU RPT SDU, GERMAN ELEMENT,  
MUNICH, AT DCA THIS DATE INFORMED ME OF FOL:

*add* → 18 JUL CURR GENERAL GEHLEN PERSONALLY TOLD [b6] THAT HE HAD  
BEEN DISTURBED BY REPORTS OF OPERATIONS OF AMERICAN INTEL AGENCY BASED  
IN BONN/BAD GODESBERG AREA WITH MISSION OF COVERING GERMAN GOVT PERSON-  
ALITIES AND ORG. GEHLEN SAID 2 AMERICANS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS HANDLING  
OPERATION: 1 A CERTAIN "[b6]" APRX 6 FEET 2 INCHES TALL  
(VERY TALL), OF ENGLISH ANCESTRY WHO HAD EVIDENTLY SPENT SOME TIME IN  
GERMANY, AND A CERTAIN "[b6]" APRX 5 FEET 5 INCHES, OF GERMAN  
DESCENT. GEHLEN SAID THAT TARGETS OF OPERATION WERE [b6]  
OF FEDERAL CHANCELLERY, [b6] AND OTHERS OF FEDERAL PARLIAMENT,  
[b6] AND OTHERS OF ECONOMICS MINISTRY, [b6]  
[b6] ETC., OF DEFENSE MINISTRY, [b6] EICD  
AND [b6] OF INTERIOR MINISTRY, [b6] [b1]  
EAST BUREAUS OF POLITICAL PARTIES, [b6] AND OTHERS OF KAISER MINIS-  
TRY, "VOLKSBUND FUER FRIEDEN UND FREIHEIT," DGB RPT OGB, ETC.

*add* → GEHLEN SAID TO [b6] THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND INTEREST OF  
AMERICAN INTEL IN SOME PROMINENT GOVT FIGURES, THAT HE WOULD ALSO TAKE  
WB FORM 173

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

CODE CLERK WBN

FROM:

TOO

FOR ACTION:

TOR

FOR INFO:

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REFNR: 0-721 PAGE-2 (CONT)

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SUCH INTEREST IF HE WERE MEMBER OF AMERICAN INTEL IN VIEW OF EASTERN TIES AND ANTI AMERICAN VIEWS OF SOME SUCH FIGURES, AND THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS LOYAL TO AMERICANS HE WAS HOWEVER DISTURBED BY THIS OPERATION ON GERMAN GOVT. GEHLEN INDICATED HE NOT AWARE OF AMERICAN SERVICE ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED BUT MENTIONED THAT THOMAS AND STEVENS REPORTED AS HAVING VARIOUSLY STATED THAT OPERATION WAS IN BEHALF OF 1. AMERICAN AMDASSADOR; 2. AMERICAN GENERAL STAFF. [b6] SAID THAT CEHLEN ATTITUDE WHEN PASSING INFO WAS NOT EXCITED OR INDIGNANT BUT RATHER 1 OF PASSING INFO OUT OF LOYALTY AND IN HOPE THAT APPROPRIATE STEPS COULD BE TAKEN. CEHLEN DID NOT INDICATE THAT ALLEGED OPERATION WAS SUBJ OF ACTIVE INVS BY EITHER GEHLEN OR ANY OTHER AGENCY. HOWEVER [b6] NOTED THAT REPORT WAS TYPED ON TYPEWRITER IN GEHLENS OFFICE AND OBVIOUSLY DICTATED BY GEHLEN TO HIS SECRETARY FROM OTHER MATERIAL.

[b6] STATED THAT HE HAS NOT PASSED ON FOREGOING INFO TO ANY ELEMENT OF AMERICAN MIL INTEL BUT AFTER DISCUSSION WITH [b6] OF OCA BECAUSE OF ALLEGED BONN/BAD COOESBERG ACTIVITIES THEY FELT THAT IT SHOULD BE PASSED TO G2 USAREUR THROUGH ~~THIS OFFICE~~. BELIEVE THIS PROBABLY [b6] SUGGESTION IN VIEW OF [b6] SUPERFICIAL KNOWLEDGE OF FORMER ACTIVITY OF NORTH AMERICAN PROCUREMENT AGENCY.

FOREGOING FOR YOUR INFO AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION, INCLUDING NOTIFICATION OF C2 IS DEEMED ADVISABLE.

WB FORM 173

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~~DRAFT~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

CODE CLERK WBN

FROM:

TO:

FOR ACTION:

FOR

FOR INFO:

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CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER  
BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

REFNR: 0-721 PAGE-3 (CONT)

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE IF DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED

NO FURTHER ACTION WILL BE TAKEN BY THIS OFFICE UNLESS INSTRUCTED  
TO CONTRARY BY YOUR HQ.

b1

837



~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

D-320529

13 July 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization (u) (S)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) Reference is made to Summary of Information, this Region, Subject and file as above, dated 10 May 1955.

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 13 July 1955.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. (~~SECRET~~) Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relationship to Subject. Source "A" obtained the information on 24 June 1955 from b1 Gehlen employee, who has contributed to other reports in the past. This information was in turn forwarded to b6 b6 on 28 June 1955.

b. (CONFIDENTIAL) No other data affect the accuracy of the information. As other reports concerning Subject are expected from time to time, this case is pending.

4. REMARKS:

a. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

b. (CONFIDENTIAL) This report was prepared by b6

1 Incl  
SOI  
JTD/bmw/Fox Mil 832

b6

Commanding

840

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
13 July 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization (U)  
(S)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-320529

1. (U) (SECRET) Information has become available which tends to indicate that on at least two (2) occasions, persons have been hired for employment with the GO without having to undergo a background investigation. This information came to light in connection with the [b6] case presently being conducted by the FRANKFURT/Main (MA7752), Germany, office of the GO. [b6] [b6], chief of the FRANKFURT office, requested that [b6] [b6] third ranking member of the GO, furnish the PHS or Life History to use as an aid in conducting the investigation. Finally [b6] was forced to admit that no such document existed. The second such case was one involving Carl SCHUETZ\*, formerly of the DARMSTADT (MA7525), Germany, GO office. [b6] stated to [b6] that his reaction to the situation was one of dejection in knowing that a person could be allowed to fill such a sensitive position without a prior check into his background. [b6] has been employed with the GO since 1952.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

3. (UNCLASSIFIED) GLOSSARY:

GO - Gehlen Organization (West German intelligence organization)

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WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

D-320529

12 July 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization (U)  
(S)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) FORWARDED: Summary of Information,  
Subject and file as above, dated 12 July 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

(U)  
a. (CONFIDENTIAL) Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose  
evaluation is C and who has no relation to Subject organization.

b. (SECRET) Source "A" obtained the information from  
[b1] a Gehlen employee on 23 June 1955. [b1] has  
contributed to other reports in the past. This information was  
in turn forwarded to [b6]

[b6]  
(U)  
c. (CONFIDENTIAL) The information contained in the  
attached report, concerning the reason for the action reported,  
is based purely on rumor and hearsay. As further reports con-  
cerning Subject organization are expected from time to time, this  
case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be  
predetermined.

(U)  
b. (CONFIDENTIAL) This report was prepared by  
[b6]

1 Incl  
SOI  
RCH/bmw/Fox Mil 832

9638  
9636

842 Commanding

~~SECRET~~

Page 1 of 1 Pages

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
12 July 1955

PREPARING OFFICE  
Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization (u) (S)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-320529

1. (U) (SECRET) It has recently been learned that the GO training school was disbanded during the week of 17 June 1955. The reason for this action could not be learned. The information was made public in a form letter which was circulated to the various GO agencies and has resulted in a multitude of rumors as to why such action was taken. One such rumor, stemming from [b6] GO employee, purports that someone within the school was under suspicion by a certain [b6] (cover name) of having delivered information concerning the school outside of GO circles. [b6] himself, would not be surprised if this were true, as he feels that (Fnu) MELLENTHIN\*, the man in charge of the school, has not devoted as much time to such matters (security) as he should have.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

3. (UNCLASSIFIED) GLOSSARY:

GO - Gehlen Organization (West German Intelligence Organization)

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FEB 04 2009

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

843

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WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

D- 321520 161 M

(date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region III, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your region, file 100-111,  
Subject: Colon assassination, dated 1 April 1955,  
contributed to by 1-1080-111 (SECRET).

2. The above-referenced report has been given an evaluation index of  
12 (See reverse side for scale).

3. The following comments are submitted for your information and guidance:

a. Source:

- X (1) appears well oriented  
       (2) appears fairly well oriented  
       (3) appears poorly oriented  
       (4) appears to be provocateur, double agent or fabricator

b. Target Coverage Attained:

- X (1) direct coverage or penetration  
       (2) partial coverage or penetration  
       (3) peripheral  
       (4) indirect  
       (5) target not considered covered

c. Operational Direction:

- (1) no further reports desired  
X (2) further reports desired  
       (3) answer unfulfilled portions of EEIs  
       (4) reorient your source  
       (5) determine future use of source with Technical Specialist.

(CONF)

4. Remarks: A trace is held in Central Registry on a r Hans 100-111,  
born in approximately 1905, who is described as a former S -turnanfuhrer and  
Regierungsrat with Kripo Leitstelle 100-111 before the end of World War II.  
Assigned to Kripo Leitstelle 100-111 in 1935, 100-111 later served with  
Kripo PRA BR and Gruppe I-100-111. 100-111 Disziplinarangelegenheiten des 100-111 prior to  
his work in 100-111. (E-3)

b6

845

b6

(Case Officer)

**Numerical Value:**

0	Worthless - obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
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21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

WIELER is identified as Max WIELER aka Max WILOTZKY, born on 3 March 1883 in ORTELSEBURG/East Prussia, a former Oberregierungsrat in Kripo BERLIN. (B-2)

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

D- 320529 Vol 3

(date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region I, 66th CIC Group  
APO 757, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your region, file D-320529,  
Subject: Cehlen Organization, dated 10 May 1956,  
contributed to by X-1080-111 (SECRET).

2. The above-referenced report has been given an evaluation index of  
12 (See reverse side for scale).

3. The following comments are submitted for your information and guidance:

a. Source:

- X (1) appears well oriented  
\_\_\_\_\_ (2) appears fairly well oriented  
\_\_\_\_\_ (3) appears poorly oriented  
\_\_\_\_\_ (4) appears to be provocateur, double agent or fabricator

b. Target Coverage Attained:

- X (1) direct coverage or penetration  
\_\_\_\_\_ (2) partial coverage or penetration  
\_\_\_\_\_ (3) peripheral  
\_\_\_\_\_ (4) indirect  
\_\_\_\_\_ (5) target not considered covered

c. Operational Direction:

- \_\_\_\_\_ (1) no further reports desired  
X (2) further reports desired  
\_\_\_\_\_ (3) answer unfulfilled portions of EEIs  
\_\_\_\_\_ (4) reorient your source  
\_\_\_\_\_ (5) determine future use of source with Technical Specialist -

4. Remarks: (CONF)

The following additional information on b6 is contained  
in the files of Central Registry:

During World War II b6 was a Sonderführer "4" in charge of the 10  
Staffel at the Leereserve Mitte. (-3) The mission of this unit was to equip

b6

7484

847

b6

(Case Officer)

Page 1

Numerical Value:

0	Worthless - obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
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4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
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22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

agents with forged documents. On 1 October 1944 [b6] was promoted to the rank of Oberfeldrich. (B-2) [b6] allegedly was not a member of the NSDAP. In April 1948 [b6] was seen in Schloss Krasna near KOLIN, CSR. (P-3)

[b6] of the Blank Office is identified as [b6] born on [b6] [b6] is the son of former Generalleutnant Albert [b6] born on 1 November 1872 in RENNROD, and Sophie [b6] born on 11 September 1874 in OBERAMSTADT, both of whom resided at FRANKFURT/Main, Freiherr-von-Steinstrasse 18 in 1963. (B-2)

It is desired that source be queried as to whether a relationship between [b6] has been found to exist.

Concerning the [b6] who was involved in the [b6] affair in 1961, Degeners's Der 1st War (1965) lists his present occupation as Vicepresident of the Bundesrechnungshof in FRANKFURT/Main. It is thought unlikely that he is identical with the [b6] who is the manager of the Rheinland-Fer in FRANKFURT/Main.



~~SECRET~~  
HEADQUARTERS

b6

5 July 55

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4 February 2009

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

D- 20 100 101 3

(date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region III, 66th CIC Group  
APO 787, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your region, file 1-1-24-12,  
Subject: Section Organization, dated 25 April 1951,  
contributed to by X-1030-III, X-1031-III

2. The above-referenced report has been given an evaluation index of  
12 (See reverse side for scale).

3. The following comments are submitted for your information and guidance:

a. Source:

- X (1) appears well oriented  
\_\_\_\_\_ (2) appears fairly well oriented  
\_\_\_\_\_ (3) appears poorly oriented  
\_\_\_\_\_ (4) appears to be provocateur, double agent or fabricator

b. Target Coverage Attained:

- X (1) direct coverage or penetration  
\_\_\_\_\_ (2) partial coverage or penetration  
\_\_\_\_\_ (3) peripheral  
\_\_\_\_\_ (4) indirect  
\_\_\_\_\_ (5) target not considered covered

c. Operational Direction:

- \_\_\_\_\_ (1) no further reports desired  
X (2) further reports desired  
\_\_\_\_\_ (3) answer unfulfilled portions of EEIs  
\_\_\_\_\_ (4) reorient your source  
\_\_\_\_\_ (5) determine future use of source with Technical Specialist

4. Remarks: (1) Source is identified as Alfred XXXX  
born on 17 December 1904 in XXXX, Poland, a former XXXX lieutenant. (1-2)

b6

11-7424

(Case Officer)

REC. WB Form 188  
25 March 1954

850

b6

Numerical Value:

0	Worthless - obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
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25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

b6

July 5, 1965

CC FILE

## HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

D- 7-12-65 51 3

(date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region 1, 66th CIC Group  
APO 75, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your region, file 1-10029

Subject: in loc. registration, dated 11 May 1961

contributed to by 1-1001:1, 1-1002:1, 1-1002:1

2. The above-referenced report has been given an evaluation index of -

12 (See reverse side for scale).

3. The following comments are submitted for your information and guidance:

## a. Source:

- X (1) appears well oriented  
       (2) appears fairly well oriented  
       (3) appears poorly oriented  
       (4) appears to be provocateur, double agent or fabricator

## b. Target Coverage Attained:

- X (1) direct coverage or penetration  
       (2) partial coverage or penetration  
       (3) peripheral  
       (4) indirect  
       (5) target not considered covered

## c. Operational Direction:

- (1) no further reports desired  
X (2) further reports desired  
       (3) answer unfulfilled portions of EEIs  
       (4) reorient your source  
       (5) determine future use of source with Technical Specialist

## 4. Remarks:

The file of central registry contain the following additional information on 1-10029: b6

b6 is the son of b6 a former

Marshall Islands was born on 24 November 1927 in MAINE, and Marie b6

b6 was married on 20 November 1960 to b6

b6 b6 (1-2)

b6 b6

(Case Officer)

WB Form 188

REC-125 March 1954

852

4 5

# Numerical Value:

0	Worthless - obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
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23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

Following attendance at an unidentified Seminarvorubungsschule from 1921 to 1925 [b6] studied at a Gymnasium in PLAUEN from 1925 to 1934. From April 1934 to September 1934 he attended the SA-Fuhrerschule in WERNIGERODE. (S-2)

Entering the German Army on 1 November 1934, [b6] was commissioned a Lieutenant on 1 January 1935. He subsequently was promoted to Oberleutnant on 1 October 1939, Hauptmann on 1 April 1942, and Major on 1 June 1944. (S-2)

Following assignment to Infantry Regiment 152 from November 1939 to February 1942, [b6] attended an unidentified Truppenluftschuttschule from February to March 1942. He then served in various Flugabwehr (anti-aircraft defense - Fla) units until August 1943. From August to October 1943 [b6] was a liaison officer with the Hungarian Army. From October 1943 to January 1944 he underwent General Staff training with the 167th Infantry Division, after which he was assigned to the Generalkommando of the 47th Panzerkorps until April 1944. From April to November 1944 [b6] attended the Kriegsakademie. For an undetermined period after 15 November 1944 he was assigned to the Fuhrerreserve of the OKH. (S-2)

(Page)


HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

D-320529

1 July 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization (U)  
(S)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]



1. (UNCLASSIFIED) FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 1 July 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to Subject Organization.

b. (SECRET) Source "A" obtained the information on 15 June 1955 from [b6], a Gehlen investigator, who has contributed to previous reports. This information was in turn forwarded to [b6]  
[b6]

c. (UNCLASSIFIED) No other data affect the accuracy of the information. Due to the anticipated receipt of further reports concerning Subject Organization, this case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) Source "A" has been instructed to develop background data concerning all personalities mentioned in the attached report.

b. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be pre-determined.

c. (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) This report was prepared by [b6]

Incl: SCI

854

b6

Commanding

Page 1 of 1 Pages

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SECRET

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11724

5. JUL. 1955

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE  
1 Jul 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization (U) (S)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE ..... A  
USUALLY RELIABLE ..... B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE ..... C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE ..... D  
UNRELIABLE ..... E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN ..... F

OF INFORMATION: -  
CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES ..... 1  
PROBABLY TRUE ..... 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE ..... 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE ..... 4  
IMPROBABLE ..... 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED ..... 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-320529

(U)  
1. (SECRET) The GO is presently encountering difficulties with the Federal Ministry of Finance concerning the proposed annual budget for the Organization. According to [b6], third ranking member of the Gehlen Central Headquarters, the possibility exists that the American Government will continue its support to the Organization until such time as a final agreement can be made with the Federal Finance Ministry. This move on the part of the American Government will be welcomed by the majority of the old members of the inner organization, as it will assure a stronger, more rigid personnel policy which would last at least until the Organization finally comes under complete control of the German Federal Government. With reference to its being taken over by the Federal Government, it is alleged that the placing of the Organization under the Federal Chancellory instead of under the Ministry of Defense, is the work of [b6], a Federal State Secretary in the Chancellory. Members of the Organization are not entirely pleased with the idea of being under civilian control. However, there is little to be done about it at this time.

(U)  
2. (SECRET) - A heretofore unreported personality in the GO is one [b6] whose cover name is [b6]. He is a member of the KOHLER/KLAUSNER\* group and is primarily concerned with activities in the "Hauskapelle". Personally unobjectionable, but with no special aptitudes or knowledge, he strives in every way possible to carry out the exact desires of the GD. Since he is alleged to be equally responsible with KOHLER for certain security difficulties involving personnel, it behooves him to avoid any unfavorable report about himself in this regard.

(U)  
3. (SECRET) Major General (Pnu) KLEIKA, F.a.D., chief of the GO's AUGSBURG (PU5049), Germany, office and his assistant, Karl Haina-GERM.BD\*, have for some time been suspected of being in the employ of the French intelligence service. The GD, however, will take no action because of lack of supporting evidence and will take action only when someone is able to furnish more facts concerning these alleged connections. Certain members of the GO who are aware of this suspicion are convinced that inquiries at the former residence of GERHARD in BERLIN-Charlottenburg (UU2084), Germany,leistokowstrasse 3, and a

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 Jul 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 56th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Cehlen Organization (U)  
(S)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-320529

surveillance of both GERHARD and KIDIKALT in AUGSEURG, will  
furnish facts enough to decide the matter one way or another.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) GLOSSARY:

CO - Gehler Organization - West German Intelligence  
Organization

GD - General Direktion - Central Headquarters

a.D. - Ausser Dienst - retired

Hauskepelle - Internal Security Apparatus

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DE UUFPE JIA

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FM CO CIO REGION IV MUNICH

TO CO 36TH CIO GP BAD CALLSTATT

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REFR 1143 OPR FOR CIOCS FROM CIOCO ATTA PARSONSON PD AGHT UHR BLATT-  
CMN NUERNBERG CMN 15 JUL CURR HEADLINE THAT SECRET AGENTS ARE ON THE  
TP NET PD DATE LINE CMN BONN MINISTRY CMN DR STRATER OF NORTH  
RHINE CMN WESTPHALIA SAYS THAT THE KNOCKING AND NOISE IN OUR TP  
INDICATES THAT OUR TP ARE BEING TAPPED PD DESPITE THE FACT THAT  
GERMANY HAS ITS SOVEREIGNTY THE ALLIES STILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO TAP  
TP LINES PD BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN THE ALLIED  
SECRET SERVICES AND THE NEW GERMAN CI ORG OF GEN GEHLEN CMN IT IS STILL  
POSSIBLE DIR OR INDIRECTLY TO TAP GERMAN LINES PD ONE OF THE OFL OF ONE  
OF THE GERMAN STATES ACCREDITED IN BONN CMN IS CERTAIN THAT HIS FONECON  
CMN 1143 16

858

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4 February 2009

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO CUFFED C14

WITH HIS SUPERIOR ARE BEING OVERHEARD PD IN ORDER TO AVOID SUCH DETECTION  
AND ALSO TO AVOID INTCP OF MSG HE TRANSMIT IMPORTANT INFO BY COURIER PD  
A BORN OFL ADMITTED THAT A LOTS AMOUNT OF TP INTCP IS BEING CARRIED  
ON BY THE ALLIED PD ACCORDING TO LAW THE INTCP OF MAIL OR THE MONITORING  
OF FOREIGN IS NOT PERMITTED BY A GERMAN AGENCY PD THE GERMAN FEDERAL  
POSTAL MINISTRY DOES NOT KNOW HOW AND HOW FAR GERMAN AGENCIES CAN BE  
MONITORED BY THE ALLIED PD THE BORN OFL FURTHER STATES THAT THE CLICKING  
AND CRUSONL STATIC ARE DUE TO TEC DEFICIENCIES PD IN SPITE OF THIS  
OBSERVATION THE JOURNALISTS OF BORN OFL UPON HEARING THIS CURIOUS CLICK-  
ING SOUNDING FOREIGN SAY CUFF QUOTE HOW ARE YOU GUSTAV QUOTE UNQUOTE BY  
WHICH IS HEANT THE TEL SECURITY SMOODER CI CHIEF CUFF GIELEN PD  
BT

15/1500

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W 15 JUNE 50/ 2422

859

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

D-320529 Vol 3

(U)  
SUBJECT: Gehlon Organization (S)

Following assignment to Infantry Regiment 152 from November 1938 to February 1942, [b6] attended an unidentified Truppenluftschuttschule from February to March 1942. He then served in various Flugabwehr (anti-aircraft defense - Fla) units until August 1943. From August to October 1943 [b6] was a liaison officer with the Hungarian Army. From October 1943 to January 1944 he underwent General Staff training with the 167th Infantry Division, after which he was assigned to the Generalkommando of the 47th Panzerkorps until April 1944. From April to November 1944 [b6] attended the Kriessakademie. For an undetermined period after 15 November 1944 he was assigned to the Fuehrerreserve of the OKH. (S-2)

1 Incl: SDI, File: D-320529,  
Rgn III, dtd 11 May 55, Subj  
as above (dupe)

b6  
Colonel, CMLC  
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

D-320529

11 May 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 11 May 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1081-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no connection to Subject organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from P-1089-III (Temp) on 28 April 1955 and reported same to b6

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. Since further reports are expected from time to time concerning Subject organization, this case is pending.

3. REMARKS: This report was prepared by b6

b6

Incl: SOI

b6

Commanding

JTD/amz/Fox Mill 832

11. MAY 1955

10207

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

11 May 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE ..... A  
USUALLY RELIABLE ..... B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE ..... C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE ..... D  
UNRELIABLE ..... E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN ..... F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1  
PROBABLY TRUE ..... 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE ..... 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE ..... 4  
IMPROBABLE ..... 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED ..... 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-320529

1. General Reinhard GEHLEN\* was in BONN (IB6623), Germany, on 26 and 27 April 1955 for conferences and discussions. He was accompanied during these two (2) days by his BONN representative, [b6]. However, [b6] did not take part in any of the conferences. It is believed in some quarters that GEHLEN will become an Unterstaatssekretär in the German Government. In connection with the taking over by the German Government of the GO, [b6] of the Federal Chancellery has been asked by the administration to clarify the GO financial situation. [b6] stated that, financially, GEHLEN is in a position to "break away" from the Americans.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

2. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

3. GLOSSARY:

Unterstaatssekretär - Under Secretary, comparable to an assistant secretary in an executive agency of the US Government

GO - Gehlen Organization

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DMK/sou

9 May 1955

Memorandum Report

Subject: Gehlen Organization

GID 65-0365

1. The GEHLEN Organization maintains a school for training agent handlers at BAD TOLZ.

2. An installation on the southern outskirts of STOCKDORF, on the road between PASING and STARNBERG, is utilized by the GEHLEN Organization. Its purpose is unknown.

3. Certain staff members of the GEHLEN Organization are provided with cover names for use in operational contact. Known cover names of respective officers are as follows:

- a. MELLENTHIN, Alexander Horst, aka MERKER
- b. b6
- c. HERRF, Heinz Danke, aka HERSDANI
- d. b6

(B-3)

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1 - 66th CIC Group

1 - File

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

D-320529

11 May 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 11 May 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1081-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no connection with Subject organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from P-1089-III (Temp) and from P-1082-III on 4 May 1955 and forwarded same to b6 on 6 May 1955.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. For the reason that from time to time reports concerning Subject organization are received by this Region, this case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. P-1082-III contributed the personal data a concerning b6

b6 b. This report was prepared by b6

Incl: SOI

b6

Commanding

JTD/amz/Fox Mil 832

11 MAY 1955

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
11 May 1955

PREPARING OFFICE  
Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT  
Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE ..... A  
USUALLY RELIABLE ..... B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE ..... C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE ..... D  
UNRELIABLE ..... E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN ..... F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1  
PROBABLY TRUE ..... 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE ..... 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE ..... 4  
IMPROBABLE ..... 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED ..... 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-320529

1. On 3 March 1955, General Reinhard GEHLEN\* was once again in BONN (LB6623), Germany, to attend conferences and discussions. During his stay he was constantly in the company of [b6], his BONN representative. GEHLEN was traveling by rail on a yearly ticket which cost DM 4000. He is presently trying to get himself reimbursed from the Federal Chancellory for this amount.

2. [b6] assistant in BONN is one [b6] born [b6] [b5] He is a Protestant and is registered with the police as a salesman. He came from BERLIN-Schmargendorf (UU1584), Germany, Friedrichs-taleratrasse 15a on 3 September 1954 and moved to [b6]  
[b6]

3. [b6] is small, being only 5'5" tall, has black hair, a good appearance and is spoken of as being very versatile and given to bragging. He owns a small automobile. [b6] and [b6] have their office together in BAD GODESBERG, address unknown. They also have a secretary. However, her name is also unknown at the present time.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COONTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROOP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 OS ARMY

D-320529

10 May 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Summary of Information, This Region, Subject and file as above, dated 2 May 1955.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 10 May 1955.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-111 whose evaluation is C and who has no connection with Subject organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from Sub-source b1 on 27 April 1955 and reported it to b6  
b6

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. As other information concerning Subject organization is expected from time to time, this case is being held in a pending status.

4. REMARKS:

a. Source "A" mentioned the possibility that the b6 mentioned in the attached report may be identical with one b6 who in 1951 was involved in an affair with one b6 (111-12070). This is, however, pure speculation on the part of Source "A".

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Date OCT 6 1955 Init. 2

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10 May 1955

D-320529

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

b. Further identifying information concerning the personalities mentioned herein will be forwarded as soon as it becomes available.

c. This report was prepared by b6

b6

Incl: SOI

b6

✓ Commanding

JTD/amz/Fox Mil 832

11. MAY 1955

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4 February 2009  
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
10 May 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE ..... A  
USUALLY RELIABLE ..... B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE ..... C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE ..... D  
UNRELIABLE ..... E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN ..... F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES ..... 1  
PROBABLY TRUE ..... 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE ..... 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE ..... 4  
IMPROBABLE ..... 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED ..... 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

D-320529

1. The GO is presently conducting an investigation on one [b6] an employee of the GO's "Abteilung G". [b6] is boarded by the political section (12 Kommissariate) of the FRANKFURT/M police department as a KPD member.

2. [b6] is a graduate chemist and was released from prisoner of war camp in 1946. It is not known if he was captured by the American, French or British forces. Until 1952, [b6] resided in FRANKFURT/M at Woehlerstrasse 4 and then at [b6] where he is still registered. However, he also maintains a residence in MUNICH (PU3592), Germany, where it is presumed that he conducts his business on behalf of the GO. His cover name with the GO is [b6]. It is not known how long [b6] has been a member of the GO.

3. Connected with [b6] indirectly and also under investigation by the GO is one [b6] manager of the "Rheinland Bar" on Kaiserstrasse in FRANKFURT/M. This connection is through [b6] divorced wife, [b6] who keeps company with the mistresses of [b6]. Identifying data concerning this woman as well as [b6] are at present unknown. [b6] lives in [b6] a highly reputable neighborhood where he is completely unknown to any of his neighbors. [b6] address is also given as [b6]. It is possible that she resides here while [b6] permanent residence is in MUNICH, Germany. It has, however, been established that [b6] still has "strong contacts" in FRANKFURT/M. These contacts are not known at present.

4. Specifically, the GO is attempting to ascertain information concerning the following three (3) points:

a. Information concerning [b6]

b. [b6] social and business contacts and connection with [b6] if any.

c. Nearness of relationship, if any, to one Colonel

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 10 May 55
PREPARING OFFICE Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army		
SUBJECT Gehlen Organization	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:                      OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A      CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B      PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C      POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D      DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E      IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F      TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		D-320529
<p>b6 of the Amt Blank.</p> <p>SOURCE: "A" <span style="float: right;">C-3</span></p> <p>5. A trace is contained in the Region III Registry on one b6, a KPD member. This information is evaluated B-3 and stems from the FRANKFURT/M police department. As both personalities have the same identifying data, i.e. date and place of birth and residence, it is believed that this b6 is identical with the b6 reported above.</p> <p>6. Personalities marked with an asterisk (*) have been previously reported by this Region.</p> <p>7. GLOSSARY:</p> <p>GO - Gehlen Organization</p> <p>Abteilung G - A department whose function is photography, identity documents and reproduction</p> <p>KPD - Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on FEB 04 2009 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p>		
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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419; D-320529

2 May 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 2 May 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III whose evaluation is C and who has no connection with Subject organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from Sub-source b1 on 28 March 1955 and reported same to S/A b6 on 1 April 1955.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. As further information concerning Subject is expected from time to time, this case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. The complete identity of the b6 mentioned in the attached report is a matter of record with your Office, as is also the identity of b1

b. This report was prepared by b6  
b6

Incl: SOI

b6

Commanding

JTD/amz/Fox Mil 832

4. MAY 1955

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
2 May 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419; D-320529

1. The Gehlen Organization, along with the b1 and Federal Ministry of Economics, has recently indicated an interest in the formation of an Industrial Counter Intelligence Commission. Although it has been rumored that b6, former Chief Security Officer of the Federal Ministry of Economics, has aspirations in this direction, the question of who will take over the task of industrial security after the treaty ratification is primarily a question of whether it will be the b1 or the GO. GO policy to date has been that of proceeding carefully and cautiously, even though a definite interest is apparent. In any case, the very good probability exists that the BfB of ESSEN (LC6202), Germany, will be incorporated in any industrial security commission that is formed.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

2. The personality marked with an asterisk (\*) has been previously reported by this Region.

3. GLOSSARY:

GO - Gehlen Organization

BfB - Beratungsstelle fuer Betriebsschutz (Advisory Office for Industrial Security)

b1

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419; D-320529

2 May 1955

SUBJECT: Cehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 2 May 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no connection with the Subject Organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from Sub-source b1 on 23 April 1955 and reported same to b6 b6 on 27 April 1955.

c. All data affecting the accuracy of the information have been taken into consideration and are reflected in the evaluation given in the report.

d. Because further reports are expected concerning Subject Organization, this case is being held in a pending status.

3. REMARKS:

a. Source "A" has been instructed to query Sub-source b1 in an effort to develop at least the complete names of the personalities mentioned in the attached report. As an investigation is presently underway in the CO concerning b6 this information should be readily available.

b. Complete identifying data concerning these personalities will be reported as soon as it becomes available.

(Continued)

882 4 MAY 1955

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III-34419; D-320529  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

2 May 1955

c. The identity of Sub-source b1 is a matter of record at your Headquarters.

d. This report was prepared by b6

b6

b6

1 Incl  
SOI

Commanding

JTD/bmw/Fox Mil 832

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 2 May 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419; D-320529

1. Located in the Central Headquarters of the GO is an "Abteilung - G", whose function is similar to that of the I-G Section in the old Abwehr. Technical work such as photography, photocopying and other types of reproduction of classified documents and personnel records is done in this section.

a. Employed in this section is [b6], who, according to a recent report, has been a member of the KPD since 1951.

b. [b6] is divorced, and his former wife (name unknown) is reportedly friendly with the mistresses (name also unknown) of the owner of the Rheinland Bar in FRANKFURT/M 32UMA7752, Germany. This woman, the bar owner's mistress, is suspected by the GO of working for the [b1]

SOURCE "A"

C-3

2. GLOSSARY:

GO - Gehlen Organization

KPD - Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany

I-G Section - Section under Abwehr I, whose principal duties dealt with technical matters such as photography, deception material and identification documents

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

28 April 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US ARMY  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 28 April 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III whose evaluation is C and who has no connection with Subject Organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from Sub-source b1 on 11 April 1955 and reported same to b6  
b6

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. As more reports concerning Subject Organization are anticipated, the case is continuing.

3. REMARKS:

a. The personalities reported in the attached Summary of Information have been previously reported at various times by this Region.

b. The identity of Sub-source b1 is a matter of record at your Headquarters.

c. This report was prepared by b6

Incl: SOI

b6

Commanding

JTD/amz/Fox Mil 832

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2 MAY 1955

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
28 Apr 55PREPARING OFFICE  
Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US ArmySUBJECT  
Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
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NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The following additional background data concerning Subject Organization personalities has become available:

- a. SOMMER, Otto  
DOB: 24 October 1899  
POB: TODDEN (possibly TODDIN 32UPR4221), Germany  
RES: HAMBURG 32UNE6735, Germany  
Formerly an Inspector in the West German Border Police.
- b. SCHWARZBAELLER, Ernst Joehen  
DOB: 13 August 1905  
POB: STETTIN (nca), Germany  
RES: Present address unknown. Resided in HAMBURG at Haynstrasse 13 until January 1955.
- c. 

b6

  
Approximately 5'9" tall, has brown hair, blue-grey eyes and wears glasses.
- d. BUSCH, Friedrich  
DOB: 3 June 1905  
POB: Unknown  
RES: TRIER 32UIA1530, Germany at Petrusstrasse 30; ULM 32UN46272, Germany at Geigergasse 5; HEILBRONN 32UNV5315, Germany, street unknown.
- e. CLEMENS, Hans  
DOB: 9 February 1902  
POB: DRESDEN 32UVS1257, Germany  
RES: STUTTGART 32UNV0312, Germany at Neue Weinsteige 4.
- f. SCHUETZ, Carl  
DOB: 11 April 1907  
POB: MAYEN (nca), Germany  
RES: TRIER at Paulinenstrasse 7; STUTTGART at Werastrasse 63. SCHUETZ is a retired Kriminalrat.

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE  
28 Apr 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
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RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

g.

h.

**b6**

1. Van der HORST, Cornelius  
DOB: 1 May 1906  
POB: Unknown  
RES: EIMSHORN (nca), Germany, at Gerberstrasse 4.

SOURCE: "A"

C-2

2. GLOSSARY:

Kriminalrat - Rank in the Executive Service of the  
Security Police (SIPO)

Oberregierungsrat - High Administrative Official with  
Full Administrative or Legal Training

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

28 April 1955

**SUBJECT:** Gehlen Organization

**TO:** Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
**ATTN:** [b6]

1. **FORWARDED:** Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 28 April 1955.

2. **CONTROL OF INFORMATION:**

a. Source "A" is X-1081-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to Subject Organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from Sub-source [b1] between 13 and 21 April 1955 and reported to [b6] on the latter date.

c. There have been previous reports indicating that [b6] has been succeeded by [b6]. This case is pending.

3. **REMARKS:**

a. Source "A" has been directed to obtain [b6] personal data.

b. This report was prepared by [b6]  
[b6]

Incl: SOI

b6

Commanding

JTD/amz/Fox Mil 832

2. MAY 1955

9881

889

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 28 Apr 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Grp, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE ..... A  
USUALLY RELIABLE ..... B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE ..... C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE ..... D  
UNRELIABLE ..... E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN ..... F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1  
PROBABLY TRUE ..... 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE ..... 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE ..... 4  
IMPROBABLE ..... 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED ..... 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. General Reinhard GEHLEN\* has not visited BONN 32ULB6623, Germany, since January of this year, although he is expected in BONN on 26 April. [b6] is representing GEHLEN in BONN and is assisted by [b6] who has a home in BERLIN 33UDU9220, Germany, but whose two (2) children and cancer-ill wife are presently residing in BAD GODESBERG 32ULB6917, Germany, the same town in which [b6] has his office.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

2. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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320529/3

COUNTER SUBVERSION DIVISION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

SUBJECT:           b6          

*file NO  
further  
correspondence  
in this  
D*

1. On 4 April 1955 on the occasion of a visit of the undersigned to SDU Headquarters in MUNICH, SDU officials           b6           provided information on a suspected GEHLEN net operating in Western Germany with the mission of obtaining additional information concerning the "Rote Kapelle".

2. Three names were provided by the SDU officials:

a. SUBJECT

b.           b6          

c.           b6          

3. SUBJECT allegedly operates in FRANKFURT where he is allegedly in charge of an information service known as the "Springdienst", the "Informationdienst" or the "Deutsche or Deutschland Informationdienst". RITTAGEW operates in BERLIN and ZEIZ in MUNICH.

4. The SDU officials indicated that they would like any information which could be provided by this organization on the individuals named and that possible further coordination between SDU and this headquarters on this complex was desired.

**b6**

Case Officer  
CS Division

Ext 7484

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

26 April 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlsen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Summary of Information, Region III, Subject and file as above, dated 1 April 1955.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 26 April 1955.

## 3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who is not connected with Subject organization.

Source "A" obtained the information from b1  
b1 on 30 March 1955 and reported same to b6  
b6 on 1 April 1955.

b. Source "B" is X-1081-III, whose evaluation is C and who also has no connection with Subject organization. Source "B" obtained the information on 13 April 1955 and reported the information to b6 on 14 April 1955.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. Since additional reports are expected from time to time concerning Subject organization, this case is continuing.

## 4. REMARKS:

a. The above reference pertains to paragraph "1. b." of the attached Summary of Information.

28 APR 1955

(continued)

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III-34419  
SUBJECT: Cehlen Organization

26 April 1955

b. The information reported in paragraph 2 of the attached report could be an indication that the Gehlen Organization will be under the Federal Chancellory rather than under the Blank Office.

c. This report was prepared by b6

b6

Incl: SOI

b6

Commanding

JTD/amz/Fox Mil 832

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE  
26 Apr 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Coblen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The following items of information concerning CO personalities have become available:

a. The person in charge of the GO's DARMSTADT 32UMA7524, Germany, office is General (Pnu) KRETSCHMER, alias KOENIG. KRETSCHMER was formerly the military attache to the German embassy in TOKIO, Japan.

b. Dr. (Pnu) SCHUMACHER, formerly identified as a Coblen employe in the Coblen office in DARMSTADT is no longer employed by the CO. In addition to being named as a Coblen employe in a book written by [b6] SCHUMACHER was involved in an operational blunder that took place recently in BERLIN 33UUU9220, Germany. An operation was taking place during which a contact was to be made in a bar in West BERLIN. Even though SCHUMACHER was warned that the FND was behind the whole thing, he wanted to intercalate. He was, however, not equal to the task and was, as a result, "taken in" by his opponents. In the end SCHUMACHER suffered a nervous breakdown and was subsequently relieved of his position with the Coblen group.

c. [b6] recently came under fire in the GO as a possible cause for [b6] being released as the head of the Land Heese [b1]. He is believed to have committed indiscretions which tipped off the Land Ministry of Interior to the fact that [b6] had been passing information on to the CO. [b6] is presently under investigation by the GO in connection with his contacts with [b6], [b6] predecessor as chief of the Land Heese [b1]. At one time in a personal letter written by [b6], Coblen employe in the FRANKFURT/M 32UMA7752, Germany, area, [b6] described [b6] as being a "charlatan" and a "tramp".

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

2. It is reported that office space is being prepared in the Federal Chancellory for the CO. This space is supposed to be occupied sometime in June or July 1955.

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE  
26 Apr 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Grp, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

3. According to b6, no Gehlen sources were arrested in an alleged wave of arrests that took place recently in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

SOURCE: "B"

C-3

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

5. GLOSSARY:

GO - Gehlen Organization

b1

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

26 April 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 26 April 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no connection with Subject Organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from b1 on 30 March 1955 and reported it to b6

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending, since further information is expected to become available.

3. REMARKS: This report was prepared by b6

1 Incl  
SOI  
JTD/bmw/Fox M11 832

b6

Commanding

28 APR 1955

9686

6440

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
26 April 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. With the exception of very few persons within the hierarchy of the Gehlen Group, there is no one person knowledgeable enough to be able to furnish an exact, overall picture of the internal structure and personnel of the Organization. Except in isolated cases, no member of one group or department can give detailed information concerning a member of another group or department. In many cases persons within a group are acquainted with each other only under a cover name. Therefore, all knowledge of the organization and its workings is based on statements made by long-time members and on observations which have been made from time to time during the course of everyday business.

2. The authoritative positions within the organization have been taken over by old-time former German General Staff people. The only exception is Department III F, which is led by [b6] and which is staffed primarily by former Sicherheitsdienst personnel. This fact is traceable to certain sociological considerations from which can be drawn a significant social-psychological complex. It is known that [b6] a non-General Staff man, feels inferior toward the General Staff people, who because of a traditional class consciousness, are presumptuous and frequently arrogant and insulting to the non-General Staff people. As a result of this, [b6] has come to create in his department a counter-balance in the form of persons recruited from the ranks of the former Sicherheitsdienst. Because these men are not traditionally allied with the General Staff faction and in most cases are filled with resentments against the General Staff faction, [b6], by incorporating them in his own group, has strengthened his own position within the Gehlen Organization.

3. By creating a sort of closed shop, the General Staff faction has protected its ability to carry out its own desires in regard to personnel policy. In this connection, continued efforts have been noticed on the part of the General Staff faction to neutralize [b6] III F department as well.

4. Former so-called "E-Offiziere" of the Abwehrstelle are present in all groups and levels. They are, however, ineffective as a group and act only as a "filler mass". These officers are

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
26 April 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

not the best of their lot. In the years 1934 through 1936 the best officers were needed at the front. The rest were used in the Wehrmeldeamts and Abwehrstellen. It was from this group that GEHLEN had to draw in reconstructing his organization, which had to be rebuilt from the ground up. At the present time, the personnel situation is considered difficult and as such is treated as a "restricted matter".

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

5. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

6. GLOSSARY:

Sicherheitsdienst - Security Service

Wehrmeldeamts - Local Draft and Registration Boards

Abwehrstellen - Regional Military Intelligence Offices

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

1 April 1955

III-34419

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO:

Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAFEBR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date 9/7/56 Init 320

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 1 April 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to Subject organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from (Pnu)

[b6]  
22 March 1955, and reported it to [b6]  
[b6]

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. Source "A" has previously contacted [b6] regarding personalities in the HANNOVER area. Source "A" did not specifically request the information in the attached Summary of Information, but rather learned of it through casual conversation with [b6]. Source "A" has been instructed to gather personal data regarding [b6].

b. An examination of the files of Region III indicated that [b6] was previously reported in a Summary of Information dated 24 October 1947.

c. This report was prepared by [b6]

Incl: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/amz/Fox Mil 832

b6

Commanding

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7 APR 1955

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 Apr 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. Dr. (Fnu) SCHUMACHER\*, alias "SCHUBERT", is believed to be working in the Gehlen Organization's DARMSTADT 32UMA7525, Germany, office. During World War II, SCHUMACHER, who was at that time a Kripo official, was assigned for a time to the BRESLAU (now Poland) Kripo office. After the war, because of his service in BRESLAU, he was involved in the Stalag III trial. As a result of this trial, [b6] of MEININGEN 32UPB0003, Germany, and the BRESLAU Kripo Chief [b6] (until 1939 WILOTZKY) were given long prison sentences by [b1]

2. In the course of these proceedings, SCHUMACHER was arrested and taken to England, where he was held for a time. At the same time the English were searching unsuccessfully for one [b6], also formerly of the BRESLAU police. A short time later, SCHUMACHER was unexpectedly released by [b1] and appeared soon afterward in HANNOVER 32UND5004, Germany, where he attempted through acquaintances to determine the whereabouts of [b6]. He was suspected of having been released by [b1] for just this purpose. His efforts, therefore, were futile.

3. SCHUMACHER was on the Soviet pick-up list at the time of these incidents. It is felt that [b1] used this as a lever to get SCHUMACHER to do their bidding. Otherwise he would not have acted for [b1] except under such pressure.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

903

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HEADQUARTERS REGION I  
66th COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

FILE NO: I-43476

30 March 1955

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. Reference is made to SOI, Region I, Subject and File as above, dated 18 October 1954.
2. FORWARDED: SOI, Subject and File as above, dated 30 March 1955.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:
  - a. Source: Source is P-908-I.
  - b. How Information was Obtained: Source obtained the information in a conversation with b6
  - c. Date Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 23 March 1955.
  - d. Date Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to b6 on 24 March 1955.
  - e. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.
  - f. Status of Case: Further information on Subject organization will be reported when received.
  - g. The inclosed SOI was prepared by b6
4. REMARKS:
  - a. Region I Registry contains no further information on personalities mentioned in the inclosed SOI not previously reported.
  - b. A copy of the inclosed SOI is being furnished Region III for information only.

1 Incl;  
SOI, dtd 30 Mar 55

TMB/de/STGT Mil 8490

b6

Commanding

Reg I, CIC  
Log 1936

4. APR. 1955

904

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Indicated Otherwise)

CS I-43476

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 240-320-10)

DATE  
30 Mar 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region I, 66th CIC Group, STUTTGART, Germany, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

GEHLEN Organization

32057913

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. During the week of 14 March 1955, [b6] [b6] [b6], presently residing in FRANKFURT (MA 7754), made a brief stay in STUTTGART (NV 1303). On this occasion [b6] had a talk with Georg KOCH, born 16 May 1909 in WEITRODE/Rotenburg (NE 5150), residing at STUTTGART, Schwarenbegstrasse 159, who has been associated with the GEHLEN Organization for approximately six (6) years.

2. [b6] also has been associated with the GEHLEN Organization for a number of years. First he worked for a US Intelligence Agency (probably the Technical Intelligence Branch) and since then he has been active in the GEHLEN Organization. During early March 1955, [b6] returned from Egypt where he allegedly had been engaged in intelligence activity for Subject organization for almost two (2) years. From STUTTGART, [b6] returned to FRANKFURT where he intends to make his home.

(B-2)

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Carded in Section  
Date 5 MAY 1955

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Indicated Otherwise)

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

25 March 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 25 March 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1081-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no connection with Subject organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from b1 b1 on 6 March 1955 and reported the information to b6 on 8 March 1955.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. The identity of b1 is a matter of record at your Headquarters.

b. This report was prepared by b6  
b6

Incl: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/amz/Fox Mil 832

**b6**

Commanding

28 MAR 1955

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906  
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

25 Mar 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The following are miscellaneous items of interest concerning the Gehlen Organization:

a. On 5 March 1955, [b6] who has been reviewing the Gehlen budget on behalf of the Federal Government, turned over to his chief three (3) files with his recommendations concerning the location of Gehlen offices.

b. [b6], who was recently relieved as Gehlen's BONN 32ULB6623, Germany, representative, has been visiting BONN during the week of 3 March 1955. However, as [b6] did not visit his office during this time, it is presumed that his trip was of a private nature.

c. GEHLEN, himself was ill during the latter part of February 1955. He recently returned to duty.

SOURCE: "A"

C-2


2. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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
HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

344 19  
III-34429

23 March 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6



1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 23 March 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no connection with Subject organization.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from b1 whose identity is a matter of record with your Office.

c. Source "A" obtained the information on 20 February 1955 and reported it to b6 on 25 February 1955.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. The person mentioned in the attached Summary of Information, who is in contact with b6 is believed to be an ex-police official who accompanied b6 in 1941 during the latter's short stay in KOWNO, Poland. After 1945, this person was in the BERLIN Kampf Gruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (Fighting Group Against Inhumanity), an organization from which he was expelled because of difficulties during the course of which he gathered material against b6, a KGU leader.

(Continued)

16391

908  
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24 MAR. 1955

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III-34429 34419

23 March 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

b. Complete identification has been requested on this man and will be forwarded as soon as it becomes available.

c. This report was prepared by b6

Incl: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/bmw/Fox Mil 832

b6

Commanding

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE

23 March 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34429 34419

1. It has recently been observed that [b6] still has contact with the Gehlen Organization. It is to be assumed that he is active for [b6], [b6], a former Registrungsrat from the RSHA (Reich Sicherheits Haupt Amt - Central Reich Security Office) in BERLIN 32UUU9322, Germany, who is connected with [b6] also maintains friendly relationship with a man who at this time is not further identified but who is known to have been employed with the Gehlen Organization in the FRANKFURT/M 32UMA7751, Germany, and FRIEDBERG 32UMA8378, Germany, area since 1953.

SOURCE "A"

C-3

2. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757. US ARMY

III-33629

23 March 1955

SUBJECT: Sicherungsgruppe

b6

320529/2

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN; b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 23 March 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1081-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to the target.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from P-1082-III(T) on 14 March 1955 and reported it to b6 on 16 March 1955.

c. There has been a previous report regarding a visit by Gehlen people to the SG. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. Any further information regarding the instruction or identification of instructors from the Gehlen Organization will be forwarded as it is received.

b. This report was prepared by b6

Incl: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/bmw/Fox Mil 832

b6

Commanding

911

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4629

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23 March 1955

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

Sicherungsgruppe

III-33629

1. Effective immediately, employees of the SG (Sicherungsgruppe - Federal Police Office, Security Detachment) will be receiving instruction from employees of the Gehlen Organization on Monday of every week. On Monday, 14 March 1955, [b6] a Gehlen employee, brought two (2) other Gehlen people to the SG headquarters with him. Although both were introduced, only the name of [b6] was distinctly heard.

SOURCE "A"

C-3

2. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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4627



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HEADQUARTERS REGION XI  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 800 US ARMY

b6

21 March 1955

SUBJECT: WINKLER, Werner

RE: GEHLEN Representative at HAMMELBURG Transient Refugee Camp

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. A certain b6 has been working at the HAMMELBURG NA 6352 Transient Refugee Camp since January 1955. It was initially understood by the BAD KISSINGEN NA 7761 Resident Office that SUBJECT was in the employ of the German Federal Government in BONN LB 6624, but SUBJECT, by his own admission to b6 Commanding Officer of the Military Intelligence Service Team at HAMMELBURG, claims to be working for the GEHLEN Organization. SUBJECT's claim to be working for GEHLEN was verified by b6 Administrator for the Transient Refugee Camp in HAMMELBURG.

2. b6 remains at the Refugee Camp from Monday until Friday of each week, and allegedly returns to FRANKFURT/Main NA 7752 for the weekend. While at the Refugee Camp, SUBJECT talks to many of the refugees, however, his interviews are always brief. b6 seems to be interested in the same individuals that are of interest to CIC. b6 states that SUBJECT obtains much information concerning the future plans of the individuals he interviews, i.e., where they plan to settle, what they plan to do, etc.

3. On several occasions, b6 has been accompanied by other individuals whose identity is not known to the personnel at the Refugee Camp. Efforts will be made to identify any personalities that may accompany SUBJECT in the future.

4. b6 is approximately forty (40) years old; 5'8" tall; weighs about one hundred and fifty pounds (150 lbs); has brown hair; and does not have any distinguishing characteristics. Additional information concerning SUBJECT will be forwarded as soon as it is obtained.

DISTRIBUTION:  
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1-File, Region XI

b6

Commanding

b6 /mm/Wuerzburg M324-833

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

21 March 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 21 March 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" ie X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to target. Source "A" obtained the information from b1 who is known to your Office.

b. Source "A" obtained the information on 14 January 1955 and reported the information to b6 b6 on 14 January 1955.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. The personality mentioned in the report has not been identified at this time. CPI data as well as further information concerning the Subject of the report will be forwarded as soon as it becomes available.

b. This report was prepared by b6

Incl: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/bmw/Fox Nil 832

b6

Commanding 9614

914

24 MAR 1955

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4385

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE

21 March 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

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USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The future German Military Police organization will not be attached to the Gehlen Organization, as has been speculated in some quarters. This organization will have a special department, the "Military Criminal Police", which will have about the same relationship to military intelligence (Militarische Abwehr) as the Sicherungsgruppe has to the [b1]

b1

One Herr [b6], formerly of the [b1] is presently active organizing the group. He is also being considered for the post of director.

SOURCE "A"

C-2

2. Personality marked with an asterisk (\*) has been previously reported by this Region.

915

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth para 102, DOD 5200-1R

Stuttgarter Nachrichten dtd 19 Mar 55

Office for the Protection of the Constitution collaborates with GEBLEN  
Federal School planned for 1955-Landes press for reforms

Own report-Stuttgart-18 Mar- For some time already the Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic has been collaborating with the intelligence organization of former General Richard GEBLEN. As became known on Friday in Stuttgart, this collaboration goes back to the fact that GEBLEN's organization which is supported by the Americans, has stopped its work within the Federal Republic and is limiting itself to work in foreign countries.

Last year a conference took place between GEBLEN and the chiefs of the Land Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. The participants gained an "excellent impression" of retired General GEBLEN at this time. In connection with the expected reorganization of the political and military intelligence of the Federal Republic following the ratification of the Paris and London agreements, it is not impossible that GEBLEN will take over the tasks of the departments set up for counter intelligence in the Land Offices for the Protection of the Constitution.

Since Otto JOHN's flight to the East, the Lands of the Federal Republic, as is known, have been pushing for a reform of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. At the demand of the Lands a federal school is to be set up this year for present and future members of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. There one will learn not only the technique of gathering and evaluating information, but also how to handle agents. In addition lectures by jurists and police officials and lectures on communist ideology are planned.

Also at the initiative of the Lands, instructions for better cooperation between the Land Offices and the Federal Office in COLOGNE formerly directed by Otto JOHN have been worked out. On the basis of these instructions political information will be gathered and coordinated through the Federal Office, and in addition the Federal Office will inform the Land Offices of the information obtained in COLOGNE in contrast to the former procedure.

At the conference of the minister presidents last year in MUNICH, the criticism was made that paid double agents delivered the same material to the Federal Office as to the Land Offices. These double agents have not been practically eliminated.

In general, however, the consequences which resulted from Otto JOHN's flight do not yet seem to be overcome. Thus the Lands are pressing for the appointment of a capable successor to JOHN. It has not yet been possible to consolidate the extensive card index registry into a central registry.

The efforts for a reform of the BfV gain special importance because according to the official records, the Soviet Zone intelligence is ten times better than that of the Federal Republic and not only regarding personal (benefits). Paid functionaries of the intelligence in the Soviet Zone receive free housing, free board, free clothing and in addition are considerably better paid than the members of the intelligence in the FR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-376264

SUBJECT: b6

1. b6 was an employee of the GEHLEN Gruppe in 1954, but was seeking employment with the b1 b1 requested a CR check on b6 who also claimed to have worked for American Intelligence in 1949.

M/R: For additional information see D-376264, SUBJECT: b6

320529

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

917

1/3/55

seften delber im dail press vom 17.maerz 1952

hitlers general ist jez jetzt auf dollars aus.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in der naechsten zeit awaere ein name in der oeffentlichkeit zu beachten, der verspricht, einmal sehr viel unannehmlichkeiten zu verursachen.

mit diesem namen ist meiner meinung nach einer der gefaehrlichsten und politisch hochexplosivsten stoffe in westeuropa e verbunden.

der name heist gehen.

vor zehn jahren fand man diesen namen unter hitlers faehigsten generalstabseffizieren. general gehen war der chef der anti-sewjet-spienage-abteilung in hitlers militaerischem geheimdienst. chef der abteilung fuer die fremdlaendischen armeen des estens' war sein offizieller titel.

heute ist gehen der name fuer eine geheimcxx geheim-organisation f von ungeheurer und immer noch wachsender macht.

als hitlers armeen 1945 zusammenbrachen, schaffte es general gehen, sich mit den wichtigsten unterlagen seiner abteilung nach dem westen abzusetzen.

918

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in seiner hand waren die hoch geheimen listen der deutschen agenten , die in der sowjetunion und den oestlichen nachbarstaaten, die bald zu satelliten d von sowjetrussland wurden, arbeiteten.

er hatte den schluessel in der hand zu dem spionagenetz, das durch canaris, himmler und schellenberg aufgebaut worden war.

die amerkaner nahmen gehen gefangen. aber nicht lange. die chiefs des amerikanischen geheimdienstes liessen sich durch die verschlaege und dokumente, die gehen vorzeigen konnte, sehr beeindrucken.

sie bauten fuer ihn ein kl1 kleines buero. er bekam die genehmigung, sich einen kleinen stab fruehrer abwehr-offiziere (admiral canaris' deutscher inteelligence service) zusammenzuasammeln.

die meisten dieser maenner, das braucht nicht erst betont zu werden, waren keine nazis gewesen.

innerhalb von wenigen wochen konnte gehen mit ausgezeichneten berichten ueber sowjetische militaerische und pelitische aktivitaet in der estzone und deutschland aufwarten.

919.

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die amerikaner, die damit sehr zufrieden waren, waren nur zu bereit, ihm die mögliche hilfe zu geben, seinen staffel seinen wirkungskreis zu erweitern.

bei diesem prozess kamen eine menge von früheren nazis, ss, maenner, und sd-leuten in seinen staffel, wo sie vollen schutz genossen.

heute ist gehlen der kopf einer spionage-organisation, die ihre agenten in allen teilen der welt hat. viele 'quellen', die zu hitlers zeiten und schon vor ihm angebohrt worden waren, arbeiteten jetzt wieder - fuer gehlen.

die amerikaner unterstuetzen seine arbeit und geben ihm gehlen jaehrlich 3 500 000 dollar.

durch geschickte geschaeftshandhabung ist gehlen in der lage, diese summe um das vielfache ihres eigentlichen erte wertes zu vermehren, es wuerde mit recht angenommen, dass er sich bereits einen beachtliche reserve besetzt geschafft hat, die es ihm moeglich machen wird, ' seine unabhaengigkeitxxx unabhaengigkeit zu behalten, wenn die amerikaner mit ihrer unterstuetzung aufhoeren sollten.

CONFIDENTIAL

920

CONFIDENTIAL



das material, dassxx das gehen bed beschafft, h erst-  
klassige qualitaet, wurde mir bestaetigt. die interpretation  
des materials, gemacht durch gehen gehens geschickte analytiker  
im hauptquartier in muenchen, hat nicht nur die amerikaner,  
sondern englaender und franzosen ebenso stark beeindruckt.

die gefahr dieser organisation liegt in ihrer zukunft.  
denn gehens netz ist schon heute f in deutschland eine  
ug ungeheure untergrund-macht. die schluesselmaenner der  
organisation sitzen in allen deutschen regierungsstellen,  
in der polizei, in zeitung, radiestationen, gewerkschaften,  
ueberall.

sie sind sogar schon in adenauers neue geheimpolizei, genannt  
bundesverfassungsschutzamt, eingedrungen.

im augenblick benutzt die gehen-organisation ihre macht nur,  
um ihren einfluss zu vergruessern, ihre mitglieder in  
strategische positionen zu lavieren und ex-nazis und ss-leute  
vor einer verfolgung zu decken.

gehen selbst, so wurde mir berichtet, hat keinen ehrgezzx ehrgeit;  
was eine politische macht betrifft. seine hoffnung ist es,  
dechef der exxx der abwehrscheff der europa-armee zu werden.

bu aber es gibt eine ganze reihe von ex-nazis und ausgedienten  
offizieren in seinen reihen, die ehrgeizig sind. sie  
stellen eine wirkliche gefahr dar.

CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

14 March 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 14 March 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to Subject organization.

b1 b1 Source "A" obtained the information from b1 a Gehlen Organization investigator, on 14 February 1955 and reported it to b6 on 16 February 1955.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. b6 in Department II-6 of the b1 is responsible for b1 informants. b1 exact mission in this regard is unknown.

b. The reason behind the b6 request is not known.

c. The Federal Refugee office maintains files on refugees from the Soviet Zone, from which other offices can request information. The fact that the Kaiser Ministry is duplicating such files and identifying former Gehlen Organization sources is considered a security violation by that organization.

(Continued)

922

16. MAR. 1955

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III-34419

14 March 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

d. More information regarding these investigations will be forwarded as it is received.

e. This report was prepared by

b6

Incl: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/bmw/Fox Mil 933

b6

Commanding

923

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

14 March 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The Gehlen Organization representative in the FRANKFURT/M 32UMA7752, Germany, area, [b1], has received instructions to investigate and/or contact the following named individuals:

a. Regierungsrat [b6] Department II-6 of the [b1]

[b1]. The FRANKFURT area representative and [b6] have been acquainted since their residence in HALLE/S 32UZC0707, Germany, where [b6] had been a commissioner in the criminal police section. Prior to the war, [b6] was transferred to MARIENBURG (nca), West Prussia, as a disciplinary action, because his mother had made remarks concerning the Jewish extraction of [b6]. [b6] Also because of that, [b6] was not promoted during the Third Reich.

b. [b6] who is in contact with the International Institute for State Planning and Policy (Staatseozologie- und Politik). The question was also raised as to whether [b6] is in contact with Prof. [b6].

c. Dr. Werner LEIMBACH\*, born 23 May 1909, author of the book "The Soviet Union" (Die Sowjetunion), which deals with scientific material and is supposedly sympathetic to the Soviets. LEIMBACH formerly acted, or still does, as business manager for the "Gesellschaft fuer Osteuropakunde (Society for East European Information) in HAMBURG 32UNE6635, Germany, in addition to which he currently heads an Institute in FRIESDORF 32ULB6917, near BAD GODESBERG, Germany, under the Kaiser Ministry. Included in the Institute is an archive which contains the names of all refugees from the Soviet Zone and the names of sources and informants of the Gehlen Organization who have been forced to flee the Soviet Zone for various reasons.

SOURCE "A"

Date 27 APR 1955 [signature] 80-3

2. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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E X T R A C T

2. MAR. 1955

b6

D-320529

Vol 2

The Frontaufklaerung as a whole in the East worked in the closest co-operation with the General Staff of the Fremde Heere Ost Abteilung, and during the time that it was separated from the Dienst it was in fact directly under this Abteilung.

BAUN himself was in conference with [b6] more than once, but on these occasions they did not go into details about the R-Netze. In broad outline, SUBJECT understood from him that in all the larger territorial districts, especially in the Baltic States, an adequate network had been set up. In general the results of the information could also be said to be adequate. Frequently, too, [b6] [b6] discussed this question with the head of Fremde Heere Ost (General GEHLEN), and he certainly seemed to think that results in the Autumn of 1944 were satisfactory. The results of the common effort of the whole Meldsdienst in covering the Berenov offensive also were still very good, but there was a marked falling-off set in, and this included the R-Netze as well. Events then followed each other too rapidly and there was a further falling-off due to the fact that W/T receiving units were perpetually being moved and as a result contact was lost with agents equipped with W/T. Money did not play a decisive role in the East, since adequate funds were always available.

F-6

Ref: D-1752, Vol. B, Final Report, Appendix XXI  
Sub: [b6]

cs [b6]

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-38614

1 March 1955

SUBJECT: b6

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, ESAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 1 March 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to the SUBJECT.

b. Source "A" received the information from b1  
b1 a Gehlen Organization investigator, on 26 November 1954, and reported it to b6 on 1 December 1954.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. The information contained in the attached Summary of Information is incomplete, but being forwarded as a matter of possible interest. More complete information will be forwarded when it is received.

b. This report was prepared by b6

Incl: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/amz/49-833

b6

*for* Lt Col OrdC  
Commanding

2. MAR 1955

*1845*

926

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE

1 March 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

b6

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

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USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-38614

1. SUBJECT, alleged to be an employs in a Federal Office in BONN 32ULB7623, Germany, allegedly furnishes information to a so-called b6 agent in Sweden. This information was reported by b6 a member of the Gahlan Organization, formerly from OFFENBACH/M 32UMA8350, Germany, and presently residing in Sweden.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

28 February 1955

III-34419

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 28 February 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1081-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to the target.

b. Source "A" obtained the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 from Subsource b1 and that in paragraph 3 from P-1082-III, all on 9 February 1955, and reported it to b6 on 10 February 1955.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. The identity of Subsource b1 is a matter of record at Headquarters 66th CIC Group.

b. This report was prepared by b6  
b6

Incls: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/amz/49-833

b6

*for* Lt Col OrdC  
Commanding

7838

928 2. MAR 1955

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE  
28 February 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419 34419

1. On 9 February 1955, (Fnu) von LOSSOW\*, General Reinhold GEHLEN's\* Federal Chancellory liaison agent, conferred with b6 at the Chancellory, and then departed in a very bad mood.

2. On 10 February 1955, b6, who has been checking GEHLEN's budget, was due to arrive for conference in BONN 32ULB7623, Germany.

3. In the forenoon of 7 February 1955, a representative of the Gehlen Organization gave a talk on Soviet espionage tactics at the Sicherungsgruppe (Federal Police Office, Security Detachment) offices. Outside of leading officials of the SC, only members of the investigative department were present. The speaker, who was introduced by the name of b6 is approximately 5'11" tall, slender, with dark blond hair, approximately forty (40) years of age, has a high forehead, a small mouth, and perfect teeth.

SOURCE: "A"

C-2

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

This Document Has Been  
Classified by b6 Section  
Date 27. APR. 1955 b6

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FEB 04 2003

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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GFM 08

PP RFPF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~  
**PRIORITY**

(2) b6

DE RFPFM 07D

P 23/1600Z

FM G2 USAREUR

TO CO 66TH CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE  
IF DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. CONSULT  
CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION

14-1739

DA GRMC80

CONFIDENTIAL REF NR MIKE DASH ONE SEVEN THREE NINE FOR b6 FROM b6

b6

IT IS DESIRED THAT MEMBERS OF YOUR ORG BE INSTR THAT FUTURE REF  
WITHIN YOUR ORG AND TO OTHER INTEL OFFICES CONCERNING OPR ACTIVITIES  
OF THE SIX SIX CIC GP TOWARDS THE GEHLEN ORG AND THE BLANK OFFICE  
BE REF TO AS QUOTE PERIPHERAL COVERAGE UNQUOTE AND NOT RPT NOT QUOTE  
PENETRATION UNQUOTE OR QUOTE COVERT PENETRATION UNQUOTE PD

23/1700Z

*No action deemed necessary*

*upgraded per*

~~SECRET~~

35385T

*twx Ref m 3903*

*from H. Col Fox*

*24 Feb 55*

~~SECRET~~

3120

RECD 23 FEB 55/1758Z

930

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APO 403, US Army

D-320529  
(CIC File No.)

14 February 1955  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file III-34419  
dated 3 December 1954, subject: GEHLEN Organization

Source: X-1080-III

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 12 (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

Continued reporting is desired on all aspects of the GEHLEN Organization until otherwise notified by this office.

b6

(Analyst)

16. FEB. 1955

931

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

17280

Numerical Value

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0	Worthless-obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
8	Valuable	Late	Low level
9	Valuable	Late	Medium level
10	Valuable	Late	High level
11	Valuable	Timely	Low level
12	Valuable	Timely	Medium level
13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
20	Extremely valuable	Late	Low level
21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

9 February 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 9 February 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION.

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to target.

b. Source "A" obtained his information from [b1] a Gehlen Organization investigator who has contributed to previous reports. Source "A" obtained the information on 14 January 1955 and reported it to [b6] on 1 February 1955.

c. There is no other information affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. Source "A" reported that he has known [b6] since 1934, when they were together in BERLIN, and that [b6] had a bad reputation there. [b6] main function at that time was informing on his fellow policemen.

b. This report was prepared by [b6]

Incls: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/49-833

**b6**

Commanding

935

15. FEB. 1955

Page 1 of 1 Pages

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**SECRET**

2363

7285

**SECRET****SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE

9 February 55

## PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th GIC Group, APO 757, US Army

## SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

## OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. Simultaneous with **b6** taking over Department I of the

**b1** the GO (Gehlen Organization) attempted to place **b6**  
**b6** in the **b1** as deputy to the chief of Department I.  
 The GO was going to release **b6** and work through the Ministry of Interior  
 to have him placed in the **b1** but the plan did not work out.

2. Information regarding present and former members of the GO is now  
 being sought by the **b6**. The **b1** recently obtained derogatory information  
 regarding **b6** from **b6** in KARLSRUHE 320MU2528, Germany.  
**b6** is a former member of the GO who was stationed in COBURG (nea), Germany,  
 but was dismissed "for cause". At the time of his release, the GO did not  
 blacklist **b6** nor did they state the reasons for his dismissal, otherwise  
 he would never have attained his present position with the KARLSRUHE Police.

3. **b6** dismissed from the GO in the Summer of 1954, is caus-  
 ing the GO much anxiety. Despite attempts to surveil **b6** his activities  
 cannot be determined. A STUTTGART 320NV1203, Germany, employee of the GO  
 recently stated that long prior to his dismissal, **b6** had been making excerpts  
 from documents. When asked why he had not reported this sooner, the employee  
 stated that he had been afraid of the consequences.

SOURCE: "A"

139994

C-2

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously re-  
 ported by this Region.

This Document Has Been  
 Carded by C/S Section  
 Date 29 APR 1955 init *Yg*

936

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

9 February 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 9 February 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relation to the target.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from b1 on 17 January 1955 and reported it to b6 on 1 February 1955.

c. There are no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. All of the personalities mentioned in this report have been previously reported. The information contained in the attached Summary of Information is additional information regarding these personalities and their activities. The GO is still interested in the backgrounds and current activities of this group, and GO investigation continues.

b. This report was prepared by b6

Incls: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/49-833

b6

7293

Commanding

15. FEB 1955

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937

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2362

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE

9 February 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A

USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B

FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D

UNRELIABLE . . . . . E

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1

PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2

POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3

DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4

IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Within the GO (Gehlen Organization) of formerly employed by the GO is a group composed of former members of the SD (Nazi Secret Service). The following named persons are a part of the group:

a. b6 was fired from the GO in the Summer of 1954 and since that time has been without work. He is living with his father in STUTTGART 32UNV1203, Germany, with whom he does not get along. b6 receives unemployment compensation, although he was sent by the labor office to the city tax office where he was supposed to get employment. He appeared with a doctor's certificate stating that he is suffering from isolation and since then uses a cane in public. It is assumed b6 is still engaged in intelligence activities.

b. b6, residing in b6 b6, was until 1952 the GO district representative North (8), in HAMBURG 32UNE6553, Germany. b6 was fired from that position in 1952 because of the false certification of travel expense and confidential funds. The GO is positive that b6 worked for b1. Today, b6 is living in WIESBADEN 32UMA4598, Germany, where he is the right hand man to b6, a jeweler. b6 has recently been known to have asked how he could profitably invest 60,000 DM.

c. b6 worked with b6 until 1952 in HAMBURG. Subsequent to b6 release, b6 went to BREMEN 32UND8780, where he was under b6. b6 however he did not remain there long. He was not acceptable to b6, although the exact reasons are unknown. b6 claims to be the only one of the SD group whose background is clear.

d. (Fnu) VAN DER HORST, alias CONNY, was formerly reported to reside in BAD SEGBERG (nca), Germany; however he is now reported to be in the HAMBURG GO office, a printing office at Ballindam 58, and resides at b6. He still maintains contact with SOMANN.

5244 ✓ e. Ernst SCHWARZWELLER, presently residing in HAMBURG, Haynetraese 13, formerly resided in HAMBURG-Volkedorf, Meister Frank Straese 5. SCHWARZWELLER is no longer considered reliable

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**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE  
9 February 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlsen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III- 34419

by the GO since his daughter, employed in a bar in West BERLIN 33UUU9220, Germany, has connections in the East Zone. A surveillance of SCHWARZWELLER during 1954 resulted in the discovery that he trades in US dollars. Surveillance did not determine if the dollars are counterfeits, printed during the Nazi era to be used by the RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt - Reich Main Security Office), Department VI, or genuine.

f. Heinz FELLE\* is the main personality of the persons mentioned above, and it is not to be assumed that their contact with him has been suspended. It is also assumed that Karl SCHUETZ\*, presently active in STUTTGART, maintains contact with this group, by whom he was introduced to the GO. Particular interest now centers around b6 VOLLMER.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

2. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

939

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

7 February 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and  
file as above, dated 7 February 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1081-III, whose evaluation is  
C and who has no relation to the target.

b. Sources "A" obtained the information through  
conversation with Sub-source b1 The information in  
paragraph 1 was obtained on 15 December 1954 and reported  
to handling b6 on 4 January 1955. The  
remainder of the information was obtained on 30 January 1955  
and reported to the same handling agent on 1 February 1955.

c. There is no other data affecting the accuracy  
of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. This is the first information received regarding  
the government interest in the GO budget. The financial  
support of the GO was allegedly taken over by the government  
in June of 1954. The information forwarded to that effect has  
not as yet been confirmed.

b. This report was prepared by b6

Incls: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/49-833 *now*

b6

Commanding

126.120.1335

7226

2106

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

7 February 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gshlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. Inteneivs plane ars being worked out in the Federal Chancellory in BONN 32ULB7623, Germany, for the taking ovsr of the GO (Gshlen Organization) which it ie expected will be accompihed on 1 April 1955. It is not known as yst whether ths GO will come under the control of the Chancellory or ths Ministry of Interior. One of the negotiators from the GO is

b6

2. General Reinhold GEHLEN\* wae due in BONN on 1 February for further negotiations rsgarding the GO being taken over by ths Federal Republic. GEHLEN confere principally with b6 b6 of the Chancsllory, who is heading the planning work. In thie connection, b6 recently visited the President of the Federal Accounting Office in FRANKFURT 32UMA7752, Gsrmany.

3. Three (3) completely sceptable officials are being sought to etudy the GO budget. The offioials to be choeen will not have connections of any kind in the Soviet Zone and their backgrounds will be completely checked prior to thsir being appointed. It is desired that the budget should bs worked out in FRANKFURT initially, although the GO wants it to be done in MUNICH 32UPU9134, Germany, by three (3) examiners under the direction of b6

4. A b6 from the GO headquarters in MUNICH hae taken part in two (2) conferences at the Federal Chancellory.

SOURCE: "A"

C-2

5. Pereonalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by thie Region.

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HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

D- 320529 5

b6  
4 February 1955  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region III, 66th CIC Group  
APO 757, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your region, file III-34419  
Subject: GO Investigations, dated 11 January 1955,  
contributed to by X-1080-III

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index of  
6 (See reverse side for scale).

3. The following comments are submitted for your information and guidance:

a. Source:

- XX (1) appears well oriented  
       (2) appears fairly well oriented  
       (3) appears poorly oriented  
       (4) appears to be provocateur, double agent or fabricator

b. Target Coverage Attained:

- (1) direct coverage or penetration  
       (2) partial coverage or penetration  
       (3) peripheral  
       (4) indirect  
       (5) target not considered covered

c. Operational Direction:

- XX (1) no further reports desired  
       (2) further reports desired  
       (3) answer unfulfilled portions of REI's  
       (4) reorient your source  
       (5) determine future use of source with Technical Specialist

4. Remarks: It was noted that sub-source did not tell you why the three  
(2) individuals mentioned were under investigation.

b6

(Case Officer)

WB Form 188  
25 March 1954

9342-7484

942

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

4/2/55

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Numerical Value

0	Worthless-obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
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12	Valuable	Timely	Medium level
13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
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21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

Since they are of interest to the so-called GO Waldspelle, however, it is presumed they are directly or indirectly involved in security cases of interest to the GO. Any additional information developed on these individuals should be forwarded. There is no record in Central Registry on any of the personalities mentioned in the above-referenced report. In connection with [b6] however a Major a.D. [b6] residing in KSEEN, has been processed by the BLANK Office as a General Staff candidate for the West German army. (B-2)

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

3 February 1955

III-34419

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 3 February 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1081-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relationship to the target.

b. Source "A" obtained the information through conversation with Sub-source b1 on 6 January 1955, and reported the information to b6 on 14 January 1955.

c. There is no other information affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. b1 was not able to further identify b6

b. This report was prepared by b6

Incls: SOI (in quad)  
JTD/amz/49-833

b6

Commanding

7050

944

~~SECRET~~

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
3 February 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
COURTEOUSLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. [b6], secretary to [b6] in the Federal Chancellory, was the recipient of three (3) bottles of Burgundy from the GO (Gehlen Organization) over the Christmas holidays. The bottles were delivered by Werner REPENNING\*, a GO employe who frequently brings [b6] reports. 183410

2. [b6] made the acquaintance of another member of the GO recently, who was introduced to her as [b6] a man about 5'11" tall, wearing glasses, with grey hair and a nice appearance. Subsequent to [b6] departure from BONN 32ULB7623, Germany, to return to MUNICH 32UPU9134, Germany, [b6] inquired about him of REPENNING, who stated that [b6] was known to him under the name [b6]

3. The new budget of the GO has been submitted to the Federal Accounting office by the Federal Finance office for consideration.

SOURCE: "A"

C-2

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

This Document Has Been  
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Date 29 APR. 1955

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-38275

24 January 1955

SUBJECT:

b6

b6

320529/3

TO:

Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 24 January 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C and who has no relationship to SUBJECT.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from b6 a Gehlen Organization member, who has contributed to numerous previous reports. The information was obtained on 26 December 1954 and reported to b6 on 28 December 1954.

c. There is no other data affecting the accuracy of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. The the end of his report, Source "A" stated that, since the time of the submission of the report by FELFE, no action has been taken to determine the validity of the information.

b. Source "A" has never interested himself in SUBJECT, however pro-ADENAUER people speak favorably of him and those opposed to ADENAUER, including b6 and Kaiser Ministry people speak unfavorably of SUBJECT, as well people from national socialist circles, also opposed to ADENAUER.

(Continued)

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III-58275  
SUBJECT:

b6

24 January 1955

c. This report was prepared by

b6

b6

1 Incl  
SOI (in quad)  
JTD/mz/49-833

b6

Commanding

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

24 January 55

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6

III-38275

1. Heinz FELFE\*, a GO (Gehlen Organization) agent, prepared and submitted a report regarding SUBJECT on 26 February 1952. In his report, FELFE claims that SUBJECT was connected with French intelligence and the Saar government, and further, that SUBJECT was guilty of having provided the German public with false information regarding French foreign policy. The report also alleged connections with the political police of the Saar. The source of FELFE's report was b6 of the Kaiser Ministry.

2. As a result of this report, SUBJECT has three (3) cards in the GO registry. Information extracted from the cards is as follows:

a. Personal data:

NAME: Max Wolfgang MUELLER  
DATE OF BIRTH: 15 December 1901  
PLACE OF BIRTH: BAD REHBURG (nca), Kreis  
Nienburg/Weesr, Germany  
OCCUPATION: Chief Editor. Former Army Colonel  
PRESENT ADDRESS: b6  
MARITAL STATUS:

b. Friends:

(1) b6, publisher of the Deutscher Informationsdienst (German Information Service) in BRUEHL 32ULB5333, Germany.

(2) b6, member of Department F-6 (political) of the police in SAARBRUECKEN 32ULB5356, Germany.

(3) Minister President b6 SAARBRUECKEN.

(4) b6 co-worker of b6

4 - Hqs, 66th CIC Grp 1 - Reg III File  
1 - CIC Central File

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24 January 55

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6

III-38275

(5) [b6] CSU (Christlich-Soziale Union Christian Socialist Union), MUNICH 32UPU9134, Germany.

(6) [b6], MUNICH

(7) [b6] BERLIN 33UUU9220, Germany.

(8) [b6] SAARBRUECKEN

(9) [b6] "

(10) [b6] "

(11) [b6] "

(12) [b6] "

(13) [b6] "

(14) [b6] "

(15) [b6] "

(16) Frau (Fnu) [b6]  
[b6] and residing in [b6]  
[b6] suspected of having worked for French intelligence and the Kaiser Ministry.

(17) [b1]  
approximately 45 years of age, and a source of [b1]

c. Former friend: [b6] formerly with the BPA (Bundes Presse Amt - Federal Press Office) in BONN 32ULC7623, Germany, former member of the VVN (Vereinigung der Verfolgter des Naziregimes - Association of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime), later founder and chairman of the BVN (Bund der Verfolgten des Naziregimes - League of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime). [b6] was publisher of the newspaper "Das Freie Wort", in addition to which he published:

a/e

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24 January 55

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

b6

III-38275

(a) Informations-Blatt fuer Consulate (Information for Consulate)

(b) Informationsdienst fuer Chefredakteure (Information Service for Chief Editors) and

(c) Tagliche Nachrichten Protokolle fuer eng-begrenzter Kreis (Daily Information Protocol for limited circle).

3. According to further information in FELFE's report, SUBJECT and b6, subsequent to b6 dismissal from the BPA, were temporarily taken into custody by a Federal office.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

4. Personalities marked with an asterisk have been previously reported by this Region.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-17527

14 January 1955

SUBJECT: [b1] Policy

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 14 January 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is P-1056-III, whose evaluation is B and whose relationship to the target is known to your Headquarters.

b. Source "A" obtained the information during the period 19 December 1954 to 9 January 1955. Source "A" reported the information to [b1] on 9 January 1955.

c. There have been previous reports which indicated that General CERLEN would possibly officially take over the positive intelligence in the Federal Republic. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. Additional information regarding the activities of this group will be forwarded as it is received.

b. This report was prepared by [b6]

[b6]

Incls: SOI (in quod)  
JTD/amz/49-833

[b6]

Commanding

7 JAN 1955

6447

956

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**SECRET****SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE

14 January 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

b1 Policy

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A

USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B

FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D

UNRELIABLE . . . . . E

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1

PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2

POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3

DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4

IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-17527

1. Within the [b1] there


[b1] is a group of undetermined size, although including [b6] of the firm conviction that General Reinhold GEHLEN\* will be assigned the military and positive intelligence effort under the Blank Office (Proposed West German Defense Ministry) as soon as the question of German rearmament is settled. This same group believes that when this takes place, the [b1] will be left in the political field only, thereby facing a reduction in personnel.

2. Although the group is casting about for a means of presenting reasons for maintaining all of their current targets, such reasons would have to be presented in writing to a higher authority and, by the same token, submitted through channels and through [b1] officials whose positions would hardly be affected by such a change. Therefore, although this group continues to plan such action, they are in reality, facing a stone wall, and it is doubtful that they will be heard.

SOURCE: "A"

B-2

3. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.



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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-38108

12 January 1955

SUBJECT: b6

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

1. REFERENCE: Letter, Region III, 66th CIC Group,  
Subject: Gehlen Organization, File III-34419, dated 28  
September 1954.

2. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and  
file as above, dated 12 January 1955.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is X-1080-III, whose evaluation is C  
and who has no relation to SUBJECT.

b. Source "A" obtained the information from b1  
b1 a Gehlen Organization investigator, on 21 October 1954.  
X-1080-III then reported the information to b6  
b6 on 30 September 1954.

c. There is no other data affecting the accuracy  
of the information. This case is pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. The referenced report tied SUBJECT in more as  
part of the Gehlen Organization, however this report is more  
closely concerned with SUBJECT himself.

b. This report was prepared by b6

Incls: SCI (in quad)

JTD/amz/49-833

This Document Has Been

Carded by CIR Section

Date 10/7/56 Init 320

~~SECRET~~

b6

17 JAN. 1955

LT Col. *[Signature]*

6412

Lt Col OrdC  
Commanding

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

12 January 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

b6

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

I11-38108

1. SUBJECT\* is an employee of the firm Erbsloeh in DUESSELDORF 32ULB4576, Germany, Kaistrasse 5, and simultaneously a reliable employee of the GO (Gehlen Organization).

2. Subsequent to SUBJECT's having been approached by an as yet unidentified former Abwehr officer, the individual proceeded to the [b1] in

[b1] Germany, where he made contact with the [b1]. From there, the individual proceeded to SAARBRUECKEN 32ULV5356, Germany, where he came in contact with a representative of the [b1] service. He notified [b1] that he had sought out SUBJECT at the request of Soviet intelligence who have an interest in him, which information [b1] sent to the [b1]. By this time, the GO and the [b1] have worked out a plan for the immediate arrest of the next person who should attempt to contact SUBJECT in the future. The [b1] set up a special case officer for the job.

3. SUBJECT's closest co-worker at the firm where he is employed is one [b6] who SUBJECT believes is working for US intelligence. SUBJECT also believes that he has been surveilled by [b6]. SUBJECT based this presumption on the following situation: A former Colonel, who like SUBJECT, is also a former Soviet prisoner, has for some time published articles for the National Front, in which he has blasted the monopolistic capitalists and the American war mongers. One of these articles was found in BREMEN 32UND8780, Germany, by a representative of the firm for which SUBJECT works, signed by one [b6] former Colonel. The representative, in the mistaken belief that the author of the article could be [b6] [b6] sent the article to DUESSELDORF, where the mistake was clarified.

4. SUBJECT had smuggled a small notebook out of the Soviet prison upon his release which was filled with many notations and which he continued to use until 1949, since it could be resupplied with pages. At the end of 1949, SUBJECT procured an identical book in which he made notations until June of 1954. At this time the book disappeared, and SUBJECT suspected [b6] since he was the only one who had knowledge of the book and the

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

12 January 55

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

b6

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

### OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

### OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-38108

only person with ready access to the part of the firm in which he and SUBJECT worked. That act alone corresponded exactly with the attitude of b6 and SUBJECT was convinced that b6 was in the employ of American intelligence. b6 wife was at that time employed for an American office in MEHLEM 32ULB7214, Germany, where, as b6 himself often stated, they both took part in social gatherings. SUBJECT assumed from this that both b6 and his wife were in American intelligence employ. b6 is the son of a teacher in FRANKFURT/M 32UMA7752, Germany, where he was for a time employed by the Provost Marshal's office. b6 has been employed with the firm Erbsloeh for four (4) years.

5. Recently, SUBJECT was questioned by the courts in DUESSELDORF regarding a former MARBURG 32UMB8329, Germany, high school teacher, one b6 and about b6 actions in a Soviet prisoner of war camp. b6 had belonged to the organization "Freies Deutschland" and had obtained advantages for himself by means of continual acts of traitorism regarding his comrades. One of the court's questions was: "Can you tell us if b6 was responsible for the punishment of anyone?" SUBJECT replied that b6 continually gained favors and was always in or out of the office of the political officer of the camp. At the same time, many comrades were always being punished. A General Staff officer, who served in the prisoner of war camp together with b6 was sentenced and is still in the Soviet Union. There was naturally no one present when b6 is alleged to have made the traitorous statements. SUBJECT's remarks appeared insufficient to the court to initiate proceedings against b6

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

6. Personalities marked with an asterisk (\*) have been previously reported by this Region.

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

III-34419

11 January 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization Investigations

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: b6

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1. FORWARDED: Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 11 January 1955.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A" is X-1080-III.
- b. Evaluation of Source: Source is evaluated C.
- c. Relationship of Source to Target: None
- d. How Information was Obtained: The information was obtained from b1 an investigator for Subject organization.
- e. Date Information was Obtained: The information was obtained on 15 October 1954.
- f. Date on Which Information was Reported to Agent: The information was reported to the b6 on 20 October 1954.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None
- h. Statue of Case: Pending.

3. REMARKS:

a. Source did not in this case, nor has he in the past, determined exactly in what respect the Gehlen organization is interested in the various persons they investigate.

(Continued)

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III-34419

11 January 1955

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization Investigations

b. This report was prepared by b6

b6

b6

1 Incl  
SOI (in quad)  
JTD/mz/49-833

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
11 January 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization  
Investigations

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

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USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
PARTLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-34419

1. The following named person are currently under investigation by the Gehlen Organization:

a. b6, formerly a resident of b6 together with her mother. b6 now resides in b6, and is allegedly employed by the Polish Trade Commission in FRANKFURT/M and a contributor to the Soviet-Polish news organ "Nowe Wiadomości Półki". b6 von Wajnsztein b. b6, born in b6 b6, and currently believed to be residing in b6 FRANKFURT/M. Easin

c. Professor b6 residing in OBERURSEL 32UMA7061 near FRANKFURT/M. b6 is the author of the book "Rasse und Seele", which appeared in 1942.

SOURCE: "A"

C-3

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APO 403, US Army

D- 320529  
(CIC FILE NO.)

31 December 1956  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, regional file b1  
dated 19 Nov 56, subject: b1 (S)  
Source: b1

2. The above-referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of 8 (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks:

Confirmation of the reported budget and personnel employment  
of the b1 from official publications or documents, if available, is  
desired by this Office.

b6

(Analyst)

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4. JAN. 1957

10131

WB Form 315  
17 Jan 1955  
(C/S)

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0	Worthless-obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
8	Valuable	Late	Low level
9	Valuable	Late	Medium level
10	Valuable	Late	High level
11	Valuable	Timely	Low level
12	Valuable	Timely	Medium level
13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very Valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
20	Extremely valuable	Late	Low level
21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

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b6

5 Dec 56

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

8 DEC 1956

*File*  
D- 320529 *im*

SUBJECT: b1 (c)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US ARMY  
ATTN: G2CIC3

1. REFERENCE: (UNCLASSIFIED) ICY 7-55

2. REMARKS: (CONFIDENTIAL)

- a. (X) Contents of inclosure have not been disseminated to any other agency.
- b. ( ) Contents of inclosure have been passed to:
- c. (X) Source(s) of the inclosed report was (were): as stated.
- d. (X) Date of the information was: as stated.
- e. (X) Investigation is continuing.
- f. ( ) Investigation is considered closed.
- g. (X) Information contained in the attached report may not be released in its present form to other intelligence agencies.
- h. (X) General GNM von Mollenthin, as identified in attached Office Memorandum, is possibly identical to Horst Alexander Alfred Paul von Mollenthin, born 31 July 1898 in Hannover. Horst von Mollenthin was reported in May 1954 as business manager of the Studiengesellschaft zur Förderung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten G.m.b.H. (B-2) In November 1952 Horst von Mollenthin was reported to have been with the SDE. (B-2) In December 1954 a General Alexander von Mollenthin was reported as a former GNMEN man who is "pro-Amt Blank" and who tries to play the role of an unofficial advisor to Amt Blank, although he is not employed there. (F-G) In August 1954 Horst von Mollenthin was the subject of a b1 request for information regarding screening of employees for the Bundeskanzleramt-Dienststelle Blank-Stabsoffiziere. (B-2)

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL upon  
removal of SECRET inclosures.

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FORM 3-54 3

FILE  
17594

~~SECRET~~

D-320529

SUBJECT:

b1

(2)

1. (X) Colonel FNU Repening, as identified in attached Office Memorandum is possibly identical to [b6] [b6] was reported in February 1954 as permanent liaison man from the GERLEN Organization to the Bundeskanzleramt. (P-2) In April 1954 Warner Repening was the SUBJECT of a [b1] request for information regarding screening of employees for the Bundeskanzleramt-Dienststelle Blank-Stabsoffiziere. (B-2)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl: Memo,

b1

b1

b1 (S) (dupe)

b6

Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 7484  
GEM/tee

~~SECRET~~

"Classified SECRET by authority of [b6] Inf, Hq, 66th CIC."

2

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Page	8	of	2	Pages
	3		3	Columns



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**SECRET** NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**  
 BY AUTHORITY OF CO, 66TH CIC GROUP

TO : CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
 Attn: CICOP

FROM : George D. Swerdlin, OGA, American Embassy

SUBJECT: **b1**

DATE: 4 October 1956

1. Reference is made to para. 5 of Operations Memorandum 21/55.
2. The **b1** representative in WASHINGTON, D.C. is (General) (fnu) von MELLENTHIN who has occupied this position at least since May 1956. MELLENTHIN was formerly Reinhold GEHLEN's deputy in the Gehlen Organization. During the war he served as chief of the Attache Section of the German High Command. He recently made a visit to BONN.
3. The chief of the **b1** office in BONN is **b6** who has occupied this position for the past five years.
4. **b1** presently **b1** is a source of the **b1**. When his son, **b6** was temporarily suspended from receiving a security clearance to attend a United States air cadet course, GEHLEN personally wrote a letter to the chief of OGA, American Embassy, asking intercession in behalf of **b6**.
5. GEHLEN has queried a former employee of his organization, now on active duty in the Federal Defense Ministry, whether a way could be found to have the **b1** make BDC checks on certain personalities, apparently members of their own organization, without tracing the requestor. It is the practice for the **b1** to "slip in" its requests with bulk requests made to the BDC by the Federal Ministry of the Interior; however, this procedure is not considered "safe" enough for the particular circle of persons that GEHLEN wanted to check.

6. Comments:

a. This report has been marked for "Limited Distribution" inasmuch as most of the information has been obtained **b1**

**b1** In the case of von MELLENTHIN, I met him recently during a social gathering at which time he was introduced to me as the **b1** representative in WASHINGTON.

b. The publication "Rangliste des Heeres 1944/45" (German Army Register) lists two individuals by the name of von MELLENTHIN. One was a general-major in 1943 and assigned to the Attache Dept. of the Army High Command who was promoted to general-lieutenant on 1 July 1944 and general of artillery on 16 Mar 45; the other one was a colonel in 1943 with peace time assignment to the IIIrd Army Corps who was promoted to the rank of general-major on 1 Dec 44. It appears, therefore, that the **b1** personality is the former of the two generals. A check with the Office of the Army Attache reveals that von MELLENTHIN was at one time considered for recall to active duty in the rank of lieutenant in the Dundeswehr to become senior German military representative in WASHINGTON. It appears that this plan was dropped. It appears therefore that MELLENTHIN is addressed as general in deference to his former World War II rank.

**COPIES HAVE BEEN PREPARED ON THE NAMES CONTAINED IN THIS**

**SECRET**

cy filed in 8-397497  
 2 cys forwarded to G2 - 9/12/56

INITIALS **376**

5/8/56

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10 OCT. 1956

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

c. In the case of b6 it is also unknown whether he is presently serving on active duty in the Bundeswehr in the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel. Reference material available to this office, including files of the Army Attache, did not contain any information concerning him. An attempt will be made to ascertain his present status.

C

4-1-7

21/55 (GDS)

b1

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~~SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTTO : CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: CICPO

DATE: 6 December 1956

FROM : George D. Swerdlin, OCA, American Embassy

SUBJECT:

b1

1. Reference is made to the following:

a. Para 5 of Operations Memorandum 21/55 ✓

b. Office Memorandum, this office,

b1

b1

d. Office Memorandum, this office,

b1

b1

2. The full name of the b1 representative in BONN is b6.  
He resides b6 in the immediate vicinity of the  
American Embassy. He is married (wife's first name is inac) and has three  
children ages 1 1/2, 12 and 14 years.

3. In addition to b6 the b6 family  
are on close personal terms with b6 and his wife  
b6  
and b6 know each other well from their MUNICH days when they both worked  
for the Gehlen Organization there. When the b6 came to BONN in 1956  
they stayed with the b6 family before finding a place of their own.

copy to  
183410

DML  
for George D. Swerdlin

10. DEC. 1956

74426

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4-1-7  
21/55 (GDS)

C. P. I. CARDS HAVE BEEN  
PREPARED ON THE NAMES  
CONTAINED IN THIS  
DOCUMENT.  
INITIALS

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b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US ARMY

DEC 1 1956

AEUC-OCE  
D-320524

SUBJECT: West German Intelligence Agencies (U)  
(S)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: CE Division

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) Reference: Operational Memorandum 21/55,  
your Headquarters, dated 23 December 1955.

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Forwarded: Summary of Information, Region  
IV, subject and file as above, dated 26 November 1956.

3. (U)  
(SECRET) Control of Information: Information contained  
in the attached report was obtained during the course of personal  
contact between [b6] of the Gehlen Organization and the reporting  
agent, [b6] Region IV.

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl: SOI dtd 26  
Nov 56 (S)

b6

Commanding

[b6] /emcc/LuftM 625-79

4. DEC. 1956

2-809

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date DEC 14 1956 Init 328

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

Page 1 of 1 Pages  
Copy 1 of 3 Copies

979

~~SECRET~~

427

CONFIDENTIAL

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 26 November 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

West German Intelligence Agency

(S)  
(U)

D-320524

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(U)  
(SECRET) Stenko Vinicky, born 11 November 1901 in Zagreb cna, Yugoslavia, scoresman-interrogator at the Gehlen Organization office at BfAN (Bundesammelleger fuer Auslaender in Murnberg - Federal Assembly Camp for Foreigners in Murnberg), Murnberg 32UPV5178, Germany, who formerly maintained quarters at BfAN, has recently moved to Wielendetrace 32, Murnberg, where he occupies a large single room. On occasions when b6 (CN), the Gehlen representative in charge of the BfAN office, remains overnight in the Murnberg area he also utilizes Vinicky's room. (B-2)

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date DEC 1 1956 Init 34

980

DISTRIBUTION

1 - Headquarters 66th CIC Group

1 - Region IV File

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

Ind. 2

CONFIDENTIAL

426

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

1 DEC 1956

D-86368

SUBJECT:

b1

b1

(c)

TO:

Commanding Officer  
Region XII, 66th CIC Group  
APO 227, US Army  
ATTN: S2

1. Attached Office Memorandum is forwarded strictly for the personal information of the Liaison Officer. Liaison Officer will not discuss contents of attached Office Memorandum with representatives, DAD repeat DAD or representatives of any other agency, American or foreign.

2. b1

b1

It is de-

sired that the Liaison Officer be especially alert for any such development or indications thereof.

3. b6 cannot be further identified in the files of this Headquarters.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl: Memo, BW56-391,  
Amcongen, dtd 21 Nov  
56, Subj as above (E) (u)  
(dupe)

b6

Captain, MI (Armor)  
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt W11 7484  
GEN/tee

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

981

2

2

D-301814/4

16772

**CONFIDENTIAL****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**TO : CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: CICPO

DATE: 19 November 1956

FROM : George D. Swerdlin, OCA, American Embassy

SUBJECT: b1*F X: XE 320529*

1. Reference is made to para 5a(4) of Operations Memorandum 21/55.
2. The following notice, in small print, appeared in the 12 November 1956 issue of the "Generalanzeiger", a local BONN area newspaper, in connection with the hearings presently being held in the Bundestag on Federal appropriations:

The estimated expenditures for the b1  
(Gehlen Organization) amount to DM 23.1 million. The intelligence service which is attached to the Office of the Federal Chancellor employs, according to the budget, 1,245 persons not counting informants.

*GASwerdlin*23. NOV. 1956  
17907*to G2*

9843

C  
21/55 (GDS)  
4-1-7b1

985

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Office Memorandum **CONFIDENTIAL** UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: CIGOS DATE: 19 November 1956

FROM : George D. Swerdlin, OCA, US Embassy

SUBJECT: Developments in Sub-Departments IV/C and IV/I, Federal Ministry for Defense

1. Reference is made to para 5a(1) of Operations Memorandum 33/55.

2. Pending realization of the plan (previously reported by this office) to take Sub-Department IV/I out of the Federal Defense Ministry and re-establish it as a field agency of the Ministry, other plans are being made to combine some functions of these two sub-departments.

a. [b6] has already approved a recommendation by [b6] Head of Section 7 in Sub-Dept. IV/I) to the effect that promising personnel in MAD be switched into G-2 and attach careers. [b6] (deputy chief of Sub-Dept. IV/I) is not very happy about this plan since he feels that he might lose too many capable MAD officers.

b. Existing MAD training facilities in REMSDORF near NEUWIED will probably be enhanced to accommodate training of German G-2 officers as well. [b6] are visiting the MAD school on 16 Nov 56 in order to assess any additional construction work that may be required. Systematic training of G-2 personnel may commence in February 1957 provided proper facilities will have been created by then in the REMSDORF school.

3. On/about 12 Nov 56 [b6] placed [b6] on detached service to Section 4 (Potential of Eastern Armed Forces), Sub-Dept. IV/C, as assistant to section head [b6]. The purpose, in [b6] words, is "to liven up [b6] shop". I was informed in this connection that [b6] during his previous service with the Gehlen Organization, has had experience in the military evaluation field. It is not quite clear whether [b6] assignment is temporary until [b6] will be transferred to that section at the end of March 1957 (Note: Ref Office Memorandum, [b6]). At the same time, [b6], who is nearing the end of his probationary tour, is undecided whether he wants to accept a permanent commission in the Bundeswehr because of the freeze on promotions since he still has lucrative business interests in BIELEFELD. [b6] had hoped to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel fairly soon.

4. The direct teletype link between [b1] headquarters and Sub-Dept. IV/C is already in existence.

5. According to [b6] [b6] has only four officers, one NCO and one clerk-steno assigned to his section. [b6] is faced with the dual problem of obtaining authority for more T/O slots in that section and if and when approved, finding capable personnel to fill those slots.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

23. NOV. 1956  
1-3116

b1



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

6. The above was mentioned during personal, off-the-record conversations [redacted] on 14 Nov 56.

*Q.D. Division*

00000

C  
38/55(GDS)  
4-1-8-a  
4-1-8-c  
pers-KALCKREUTH

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CONFIDENTIAL

b1

**SECRET**001- CR RECM  
2d Nov 56**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**TO : CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: CICPO

DATE: 6 November 1956

FROM : George D. Swerdlin, OCA, American Embassy *gds*SUBJECT: Cooperation between b1 and Federal Defense Ministry1. Reference is made to the following: *XE 330539*

- a. Para 5c of Operations Memorandum 21/55
- b. Para 5a(3)(a) of Operations Memorandum 38/55
- c. Messages this office, O-2071 and O-2116

2. The following remarks were made to me b6 on 2 Nov 56 with regard to the military collection effort b1 in behalf of the Federal Defense Ministry:

a. b6 intends to use the military collection effort of the b1 as his tool to satisfy the requirements of the military intelligence evaluation section ("Potential of Eastern Armed Forces") of Sub-Dept. IV/C. This concept did not clearly exist in the past. b6 said verbatim that this aspect of b1 activities will be under his command as far as requirements are concerned ("... ich werde auf diesem Gebiet kommandieren was ich brauche...").

b. In order to facilitate speedy transmittal of strategic military information from b1 to Sub-Dept. IV/C in the Federal Defense Ministry, a direct teletype link is being established and will probably be put into operation during the week 5-9 Nov 56. b1 cryptographic devices will be employed for the time being. In the past, urgent information intended for the Defense Ministry was being transmitted from b1 headquarters to the b1 BONN Liaison Office in MEHLEM which in turn notified Sub-Dept. IV/C to send a messenger. This system is considered too cumbersome by b6 (who expressed considerable amazement that a direct teletype link had not been previously established).

3. Comments: With reference to para 2a above, it is pointed out that b6 had made a business trip to MUNICH on 29 and 30 Oct 56 and presumably had a conference with Rhsinhold GEHLEN there in connection with his new duties.

C  
4-1-7  
4-1-8-o  
38/55 (GDS)  
21/55 (GDS)

*by to CE 4-12-56  
to G2 5-12-56*

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**SECRET**b1

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

19 OCT 1956

17 October 56

AFUC-OCE D-320529

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization Intelligence Summaries <sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, United States Army  
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, (G2CICE)

1. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ Reference is made to the following Gehlen organization intelligence summaries received via the DAD LO, this Headquarters: (Copies of which are believed to have been furnished your office.)

ECP-148 dated 12 September 1956, Subject: Activities of Eastern Intelligence Services.

ECP-149 dated 24 September 1956, Subject: Activities of Eastern Intelligence Services.

2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(SECRET)~~ On page 2 of Annex 2 of each of the above reports are contained detailed ESI of hostile services against "Agencies and Installations of Western Armed Services". Some of these ESI are specifically directed against CIC, as well as other US Army units. Because of the sanitized wording of the ESI, it is not possible to positively identify each of the cases and determine if full details of same have ever been previously referred to this Group by SDU or other agencies.

3. ~~(SECRET)~~ Your attention is invited to the following:

a. No agreement has ever been brought to the attention of this Headquarters which obligates the Gehlen organization to bring to the attention of the US Army hostile agent efforts against US Army installations. If such information is being furnished SDU (American Element), it would appear highly unlikely that SDU would not bring such information to the attention of your office or this Headquarters.

b. Authority exists for the Gehlen organization to conduct double agent operations. The question arises as to what channel exists for the clearance (if any) of Spielmaterial to be furnished hostile agents with missions against US Army installations. Although very detailed "gentlemen's agreements" have been reached between CIC and the b1 in this regard, no such agreement is known to exist with the Gehlen organization.

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

~~SECRET~~ 989

Page 1 of 2 Pages  
Copy 3 of 6 Copies

CIC FILE

MO  
LOG NR 11966

~~SECRET~~

AFMAG-GERM; D-320529

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization Intelligence Summaries (U)  
(C)

c. An obligation exists on the part of the Gehlen organization to make full details of such cases available to US authorities. (Article 4, Part 1 of CROFFENBERG.)

d. Should it be established that the Gehlen organization is   and are permitting sources to fulfill such   without clearance, a basis for appropriate legal charges against the responsible Gehlen agent is considered to exist in Section 3, Title I of Annex A to CROFFENBERG.

4. (~~SECRET~~) It is recommended that this matter be referred to b1 by your office to ascertain JGU (American Element) knowledge of the specific cases cited in the referenced publications. It is further suggested that full details of all cases be obtained and furnished this Headquarters. If desired, this Headquarters can instruct CIC Liaison Officers at ACHLEM to effect liaison with the Gehlen Liaison Office at BORN to take up the problem at that level and to establish a channel for the notification of cases involving US Army interests as well as to provide a channel for obtaining the clearance of your office on Spielmaterial to be passed to Gehlen double agents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

b6

Adjutant

Telephone: Regt. 3244  
DTG/ALB

M/R: Gehlen summaries. Contain detailed enemy EEI against US military targets. b1 Cases cannot be identified in our files on basis sketchy info.

Classified SECRET by authority of b6 Inf., Hq 66th CIC Gp.

990

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE
Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 108, US Army		2 October 1956
PREPARING OFFICE		
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
West German Government (U)	OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
Intelligence Agencies (S)	COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
	USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
	FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
	UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>The Gehlen Organization has recently re-opened an office at BfAN (Bundesessammellager fuer Auslaender in Murnberg - Federal Assembly Camp for Foreigners in Murnberg), Murnberg (32UPV5178), Germany. The office, although generally known as an official German agency, is not known, except in official circles, as a Gehlen Organization office. It is listed on the refugee processing schedule as "Boero I-C-5" (Office I-C-5) and is commonly referred to by either that designation or simply as "Room 21" since it occupies that room in the administration building of BfAN. The office is operated under the general supervision of a Gehlen representative locally known as [b6] who is usually present one or two days per week, normally during the latter part of the week. (E-2) [b6] is married, has four children and resides with his family in Munich (32UPU9135), Germany, from where he carries on his work. (F-3) [b6] has been addressed by name [b6] on a number of occasions at BfAN and has responded to this name which is the German form of the Hungarian name [b6] (C-2) [b6] uses as an official identity document a card which identifies him as a employee of the Statistical Division of the Historical Research Institute and which has the serial number [b6]. The document lists the telephone number of this organization as being Bad Toelz 2362. (E-2) [b6] was born in [b6] lived there most of his life, served with the German Army during World War II and, during this latter period, was engaged in intelligence activity. (F-6) His present field of activity seems to be centered on Czechoslovakia although his office is making general debriefings of refugees from all communist dominated countries. (E-6) [b6] has indicated that should the BfAN office of agency "A-IV" desire to contact him at any time that he was not present at BfAN, a telephone call to Munich 25883 and the use of the phrase "Herrn [b6] duerfte nach Murnberg kommen" without further comment or identification, to the woman who answered the phone would result in a contact with him in a relatively short time and his personal appearance in Murnberg within 24 hours. (E-2) [b6] intimated although he did not state so, that this telephone number was located at his home. (F-6) The office at BfAN is under daily routine operation by Stanko Vinicky, a political refugee of Yugoslavian origin who resides at BfAN in quarters set aside for employees of the various German agencies at the camp. (E-2) Vinicky was born 11 November 1901 in Zagreb (Cna), Yugoslavia. He is married although his wife, [b6] is presently residing in [b6]. Vinicky is a merchant by profession who entered Germany illegally from Salzburg (Cna), Austria on 4 November 1955. (F-6) It is expected that within the next two months a Czech linguist will be added to the staff of the office and that this man</p>		
DISTRIBUTION <i>to [unclear] eval (12) 1023</i>		
1-M, 66th CIC Gp		1-Region IV

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN  
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by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~SECRET~~ 024

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

IV-D-320529

DATE

2 October 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

West German Government (U)  
Intelligence Agencies (S)-

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

will serve as the representative of [b6] at laast during the antioi-  
pated hoepitalization of [b6] for a gallstone operation. (P-3)

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

"THIS DOCUMENT CLASSIFIED SECRET BY AUTHORITY OF [b6]  
LT COLONEL, COMMANDING OFFICER, REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP"

DISTRIBUTION

1-Hq, 66th CIC Gp

1024

1-Region IV

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

~~SECRET~~ INFORM

~~SECRET~~

DAD-8410

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DETACHMENT  
APO 757  
US ARMY

9 October 1956

SUBJECT: Activities of Eastern Intelligence Services

TO : Commanding Officer  
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, United States Army  
ATTN: S-3

Forwarded herewith for your information and retention  
are two (2) copies each of the following information reports,  
Subject as above, originating with b1  
b1

EGP-148 dated 12 September 1956 - date of information  
May, June 1956 - with 3 annexes.

EGP-149 dated 24 September 1956 - date of information  
July, August 1956 - with 2 annexes and one copy of the German-  
language text.

b3 Per CIA

DAD Liaison Officer

STGT: 8467

- 3. OCT. 1956

1790

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 01-01-2000  
EXEMPTED FROM  
General Declassification  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

1025

~~SECRET~~

GID 96 -0427

21 August 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, G-2, Hq. USAREUR, APO 403, U. S. Army

b1

b1

(S)

1. (S) The headquarters of the [b1] [b1], otherwise known as the Gehlen Organization or "Gehlen Gruppe", is located presently in the PULLACH area south of MUNICH. The compound complex, designated under the code name of [b6], lies astraddle a main public thoroughfare, the individual sections being separately enclosed. Two main entrances to the compound are listed as Gate Grosshesselohe and Gate Pullach. The headquarters consists of approximately 460 individuals located in 46 known buildings and/or areas with at least 191 different telephone connections available for the use of these offices. Besides the normal office accommodations, a small number of permanent residents are billeted within the compound.

2. (S) The chief of the [b1] Heinhard GEHLEN, born 4 March 1905 at ERFURT, Germany, with the known alias of [b1] maintains his office in Building #36 of the PULLACH compound. His executive secretary, [b6] shares this office. [b6] Also located in the building but with unknown duties, are the following individuals listed according to telephone number (all names are believed to be aliases):

Tel. No. 861

[b6]

Tel. No. 844

[b6]

(U)  
3. (S) Building #38 houses the Chief of the Administrative Directorate, [b6] and the Chief of the [b6] [b6]. The latter is known also to have an office in Building #17. An individual identified only as [b6], a probable cover name, is listed as being available in the offices of both [b6] and [b6] in Building #38. Although the exact nature of their duties is uncertain, the following personalities, all located in Building #38, possibly are concerned with administrative procedure since their telephone number is listed as a post locator: [b6] (All names are probably aliases.). A FrI. [b6] possibly a cover name, also is located in this building although her duties are unknown.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

Not releasable to foreign nationals, except... NONE.

DOWNRADIO DATA CANNOT BE REPRODUCED

b6

Date 21 August 56

1027  
~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

21 August 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, G-2, Hq. USAREUR, APO 403, U. S. Army

b1

b1

(S)

(U)

4. (S) Heinz Danko HERRE, aka HERDAHL, born 23 January 1909 at ST. AVOLD, France, Chief of the Evaluation Division, has his office in Building #28. His deputy, Ali SCHREIBER, aka SCHUMANN, also is located in this building. A (fnu) b6 probably an alias but otherwise unidentified, apparently is connected with b6 office. Former chief of the Transportation and Supply Section within the Evaluation Division, Johannes Heinrich Phillip HAERTEL, aka HELLER, born 16 June 1908 at BROCKAU (?), Silesia, who occupied an office in this building, has been commissioned as a Colonel in the new German Army and transferred to the Federal Defense Ministry as of 28 June 1956. HAERTEL has been replaced by b6 a former Supply Evaluation expert also occupying office space in Building #28. A Frau b6 possibly the wife of HAERTEL, and a b6 a possible alias, probably were employed as secretaries to HAERTEL and b6 respectively. b6 and a b6 probably b6 secretary, are on the Rail Transportation Desk in this building.

(U)

5. (S) The Chief of Army Evaluation Section, b6 b6 is located in Building #26. Also in this building are b6 at b6 b6 assistant. Apparently connected with b6 is a b6, a probably cover name but otherwise unidentified. A group of individuals listed under the same telephone number in Building #26 is b6 b6 Since b6 has been identified as b6 b6 an analyst on the GSFC OB Desk, it is assumed that the other individuals have similar duties, and also are represented by cover names. Another group so listed in this building is b6 b6 all considered aliases. A b6 has been identified by this alias as being Chief of the Press and Documents Evaluation Desk and may be identical with the listed b6

(U)

6. (S) The Vehicle Numbers Evaluation Desk is located in Building #24. This office is composed of b6 b6 a probable alias, and a b6 possibly identical with b6 b6 received an Army commission with the rank of Colonel on 1 February 1956, and was assigned subsequently to the Defense Ministry. Building #24 also houses the KVP Evaluation Desk, whose Chief is b6

1028-  
~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

21 August 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, G-2, Hq. USAREUR, APO 403, U. S. Army

b1

b1

b6 Apparently associated with b6 and the KVP Desk are Frau b6 Frau b6, and Frau b6 possibly all employed as clerk/secretaries and listed under cover names. b6 works on the Satellite OB Desk also located in this building. A b6 not further identified, has an office in Building #24, and may be connected with one of the above desks.

(U)  
7. (S)

b6

b6 Chief of the Political Evaluation Section, occupies an office in Building #27 along with b6, who has been identified by this alias as also being connected with the Political Section. Another group in this building is composed of b6 b6 and Frau (fnu) b6, under this alias, has been identified as an associate of Political Evaluation. b6 is probably b6 wife of b6 b6, Deputy Chief of the Evaluation Division. b6 is unidentified, but apparently is attached to the Political Section. A (fnu) b6 identified by this alias as being employed by the Political Evaluation Section, and Frau b6 possibly b6 secretary, also are located in Building #27. A b6 and an individual listed as b6 are known by their respective aliases as associates of the Political Section in this building. A "HERBER II" is unidentified but may be connected with Political Evaluation.

8. (S) Building #23 houses the Economic Evaluation Section, headed by

b6

b6 near b6. Closely associated with b6 and the Economic Section are b6 and b6 both cover names. b6 located in this building, is known by this alias to be connected with Economic Evaluation. A b6 and Frau b6 possibly related but listed with cover names, are known Economic Section employees in Building #23.

9. (S) The former chief of the Air OB Section.

b6

b6 has since received a commission in the German Air Force, and has been assigned to the Defense Ministry in BONN. No replacement for b6 in the b1 is known. Also employed by the Air Section are b6 and (fnu) b6 identified only by their aliases. Possibly connected with the Air Section are b6 and b6 all located in Building #22 and listed under presumed aliases. The following individuals, unidentified except by probable cover name, have office space in this building and are listed according to telephone number:

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21 August 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, G-2, Hq. USAREUR, APO 403, U. S. Army

b1

b1

(S)

Tel. No. 686

b6

Tel. No. 633

b6

Tel. No. 696

b6

Frau [b6] is probably the wife of [b6], formerly employed by the [b1] under the alias of [b6] and now Deputy Chief of the Military Security Service (MAD) in the Defense Ministry.

10. (S) Building #31 apparently contains the Naval OB Section. The former chief of this section, [b6] [b6] presently with the Defense Ministry, was located in this building. A [b6] identified by this alias, is a known Naval Section employee. Others associated with [b6] and listed by presumed cover names are [b6] [b6] occupying in Building #31 an office previously maintained by the former Deputy Chief of the [b1] [b6] is an individual identified only by the name [b6]

11. (S) The Chief of the Counterintelligence and Counterespionage Division (at one time designated Department III F), [b6]

[b6] is located in Building #101. Closely associated with [b6] and presumed to be working on CI/CE, are [b6] and Frau [b6], probably both aliases. Also occupying an office in this building are [b6] [b6] probably cover names of CI/CE personnel since [b6] was formerly a coworker of [b6] [b6], born [b6] a known [b1] CI/CE specialist in 1955. Located in Building #101, but with unknown duties, are the following personalities listed by telephone number and under probable aliases:

Tel. No. 665

b6

Tel. No. 837

b6

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21 August 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, G-2, USAREUR, APO 403, U. S. Army

b1

b1

(S)

Tel. No. 665 (cont.)

b6

Tel. No. 691

b6

Tel. No. 715

b6

Tel. No. 836

b6

Tel. No. 841

b6

Tel. No. 845

b6

Tel. No. 874

b6

Tel. No. 879

b6

Tel. No. 806

b6

12. (U) (S) The teletype and communications center is housed in Building #32. The Chief of Communications, Leo Phillip Franz HEPP, aka HOMBEL, born 15 August 1907 at ULM (?), Germany, has his office in this building. More recent information indicates HEPP may also have an office in the BONN, Germany area. Assigned to the teletype center, but listed under probable aliases are the following: BODE I, b6, and b6. Also present in Building #32 but with unknown duties are (according to telephone number and probable cover names):

Tel. No. 809

b6

Tel. No. 682

b6

Tel. No. 813

b6

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21 August 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq. USAREUR, APO 403, U. S. Army

b1

b1

(S)

13. (U) It is indicated that Herr (fnu) DILLBERG and [b6] occupy Building #14. DILLBERG's true name is believed to be Hans Juergen DINGLER, born 30 March 1904 at NIKOLAIKEN, Prussia. A reported cousin of Reinhard GEHLEN, DINGLER has recently been described as head of Staff and Agent Handler Training. [b6], apparently associated with the individual DILLBERG, has not been identified.

14. (S)

b6

[b6] transferred this year to the Report Screening and Agent Evaluation Section, has his office in Building #16. Associated with [b6] and probably employed as his secretary is a Frau [b6]. Other personalities listed as working in Building #16 can not be identified and are listed below according to telephone number.

Tel. No. 822

b6

Tel. No. 704

b6

Tel. No. 705

b6

Tel. No. 888

b6

Another group of [b1] employees not definitely identified as being connected with Building #16 are [b6] Dipl. Ing. [b6] and Frt. [b6] all listed under the telephone number 859. A [b6] by this cover name, has been mentioned as being concerned with scientific and technical evaluation, and may be identical with the above person.

15. (U) (S)

[b6] The Chief of Intelligence Directorate and Operations Division, (see Para. 3) has an office in Building #17 as well as in #38. The nature of this office, however, is unknown. The following individuals, all names believed to be aliases, are listed as occupying office space in Building #17, but are otherwise unidentified:

Tel. No. 701

b6

Tel. No. 728

b6

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CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USARMC, APO 403, U. S. ARMY

Bund. [b1] (S)

Tel. No. 713

[b6]

Tel. No. 803

[b6]

Tel. No. 716

[b6]

Tel. No. 877

[b6]

16. (U) (S) The occupants of Building #103 can not be identified other than by listed aliases and telephone extension.

Tel. No. 684

[b6]

Tel. No. 838

[b6]

Tel. No. 687

[b6]

Tel. No. 839

[b6]

Tel. No. 694

[b6]

Tel. No. 729

[b6]

Tel. No. 885

[b6]

Tel. No. 817

[b6]

Tel. No. 818

[b6]

Tel. No. 824

[b6]

Tel. No. 892

[b6]

A [b6], with the known alias of [b6] has been reported as being Deputy Chief of the Political Evaluation Section, and may be identical with the person listed under telephone number 885.

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27 Aug 56

CI Branob, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USAREUR, APO 403, U. S. Army

b1

b1

(U)  
17. (S) The office of

b6

b6 presently Chief of Personnel, is located in Building #8. A group of individuals, assigned to this building, may be concerned with personnel duties or administrative procedure since one of the group is designated as being in the "Verwaltung" or Administrative section. These individuals by alias, apparently working in one office, are b6 b6 Verw.). A similar group in Building #8 consisting of b6 cannot be identified according to duties. Possibly located in this same building are b6 without further identification.

(U)  
18. (S) Building #10 contains, among others, the office of a b6 and a b6 may be identical with b6 who presently holds the position as Chief of the Administrative and Finance Division under the Administrative Directorate. b6 cannot be identified. Further confirmation of the possibility that Building #10 contains administrative offices is found in the fact that a b6 probably covers names and listed as being located in this building, is designated as concerned with "Verwaltung". The following individuals, listed according to telephone number in Building #10, are not further identified:

Tel. No. 736

b6

Tel. No. 852

b6

Tel. No. 896

b6

(U)  
19. (S) The following groups of persons, listed according to their aliases and telephone numbers, are to be found in Building #25, but otherwise cannot be positively identified:

Tel. No. 607

b6

Tel. No. 629

b6

Tel. No. 674

b6

1034  
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27 Aug 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USAREUR, APO 403, US ARMY

b1  
b1 (S)

A b6 has previously been identified by this alias as being on the Economic Evaluation staff, and may or may not be the same person listed above.

(U)  
20. (S) Building #30 contains the following groups of persons not further identified:

Tel. No. 730

b6

Tel. No. 742

b6

Tel. No. 830

b6

Tel. No. 850

b6

Fritz POLECK, born 8 November 1905 at LISSA, Poland (?), with the known alias of POHL, was former head of the Personnel Section within the Administrative Directorate until transferred to BONN in February 1956. It is unknown if POLECK, aka POHL, is identical with the above listed POHL.

(U)  
21. (S) At least one administrative office may be located in Building #33 since one of its telephone extensions is listed as a telephone control office to be referred to in cases of certain long distance calls. Occupying this office are b6, probably both cover names. Other occupants of Building #33 cannot be identified according to duties and are listed below by alias and telephone number:

Tel. No. 625

b6

Tel. No. 881

b6

Tel. No. 804

b6

Tel. No. 820

b6

(U)  
22. (S) The building designated as #1c in the Pullaoh Compound may house the office of the Headquarters Commandant, b6

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27 Aug 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USAREUR, APO 403, US ARMY

b1

b1 (S)

at [b6]. A [b6] is listed as occupying an office in this building, and may be identical with the known [b6] although it is noted that in this case no cover name has been utilized. The following persons, all located in Building #1c, cannot be identified:

Tel. No. 657

b6

Tel. No. 685

b6

Tel. No. 717

b6

(U)

23. (S) Building #2 is identified as the Dispensary for the headquarters area and the following persons located there are presumed to be medical personnel:

b6

(U)

24. (S) The vehicle drivers' quarters are contained within Building #5.

(U)

25. (S) The following persons are known to occupy Building #6, but cannot be further identified:

Tel. No. 676

b6

Tel. No. 886

b6

26. (S) The office of the Guard Supervisor is located in Building #7 with the following names listed under that telephone number: [b6]  
[b6] The other occupants of Building #7 cannot be positively identified and are listed below according to telephone extension:

Tel. No. 623

b6

Tel. No. 858

b6

Tel. No. 630

b6

The Frl. [b6] listed above, may be identical with [b6] born c. 1934, daughter of Reinhard GEHLEN. Known to be employed by the [b1]  
[b6] allegedly worked in an operational section of the Organization.

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27 Aug 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USAREUR, APO 403, US ARMY

b1

b1

(S)

(U)

27. (S) The nature of business carried on in Building #9 is unknown, and the following individuals, located in the building, are otherwise unidentified:

Tel. No. 642

b6

Tel. No. 890

b6

Tel. No. 677

b6

Tel. No. 898

b6

(U)

28. (S) At least one office in Building #11 may be concerned with administration of supplies. A b6, possibly a cover name, may be reached in this building, as well as in Building #A, which is designated by "Laden" (store or commissary). Associated with b6 in Building #11 are Herr b6. Other persons working in this building are only identified as follows:

Tel. No. 613

b6

Tel. No. 867

b6

Tel. No. 735

b6

Tel. No. 855

b6

(U)

29. (S) A b6 has been newly appointed as Chief of the Translating Section, and is listed as being located in Building #12. The Translating Section's primary duty is the preparation of all reports in English. Frau b6 is a possible alias, apparently is associated with b6 and may be employed as his secretary. Also located in Building #12, but otherwise not positively identified, are the following individuals:

Tel. No. 811

b6

Tel. No. 876

b6

The Frau b6 listed above, is probably identical with b6

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CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USAREUR, APO 403, US ARMY

b1

b1

(S)

b6

wife of b6 (See Para. 13).

30. (U) (S) Building #15 contains the Club House which apparently is serviced by a Frau b6 Located in the building under the telephone number 649, but otherwise unidentified are b6

31. (U) (S) The personnel of Building #18 cannot be identified other than by probable alias and telephone extension, and are as follows:

Tel. No. 637

b6

Tel. No. 724

b6

Tel. No. 667

b6

Tel. No. 810

b6

Tel. No. 707

b6

Tel. No. 832

b6

Tel. No. 723

b6

Tel. No. 828

b6

It is noted that the person b6 is listed under two (2) telephone numbers, 707 and 828.

32. (U) (S) Building #19 contains the following personnel, not otherwise identified:

Tel. No. 621

b6

Tel. No. 875

b6

1038

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27 Aug 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USAREUR, APO 403, US ARMY

b1  
b1 (S)

Tel. No. 695

b6

Tel. No. 882

b6

Tel. No. 853

b6

(U)

33. (S) The identity of persons assigned to Building #20 cannot be ascertained, and the listed names are as follows according to alias and telephone extension:

Tel. No. 710

b6

Tel. No. 865

b6

Tel. No. 734

b6

Tel. No. 866

b6

Tel. No. 808

b6

Tel. No. 870

b6

Tel. No. 826

b6

Tel. No. 887

b6

(U)

34. (S) The following persons are known to occupy Building #21, but cannot be further identified:

Tel. No. 618

b6

Tel. No. 738

b6

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27 Aug 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USAREUR, APO 403, US ARMY

b1

b1

(S)

Tel. No. 672

b6

Tel. No. 871

b6

Tel. No. 680

b6

Tel. No. 878

b6

(U)  
35. (S) Known to be occupants of Building #29, but otherwise not identified are b6 and b6

(U)  
36. (S) The following individuals are identified with Building #34, but no further description of their duties is available:

Tel. No. 868

b6

Tel. No. 835

b6

(U)  
37. (S) Building #35 contains the following personnel, not identified except by probable alias:

Tel. No. 688

b6

Tel. No. 851

b6

Possibly also located in this building are b6

(U)  
38. (S) A Maintenance Shop and Barber Shop are located in Building #39 with a b6 listed as being assigned there.

(U)  
39. (S) The following personalities are listed as occupying Building #100 with no description of their duties available:

Tel. No. 666

b6

Tel. No. 834

b6

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CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USAREUR, APO 403, US ARMY

b1  
b1 (S)

Tel. No. 692

b6

Tel. No. 893

b6

Tel. No. 889

b6

(U)

40. (S) Building #102 is listed as a billet for guard personnel.

(U)

41. (S) A duty clerk (Schreibkraft von Dienet) and the Guard Supervisor after duty (Wachfuhrer nach Dienetechluss) are located in Building #104.

(U)

42. (S) The personnel associated with Building #105 cannot be identified other than by telephone extension and probable cover name.

Tel. No. 631

b6

Tel. No. 604

b6

Tel. No. 843

b6

Tel. No. 689

b6

Tel. No. 846

b6

Possibly connected with Building #105 are the following individuals listed under

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27 Aug 56

CI Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USARZUR, APO 403, US ARMY

b1

b1

(S)

the telephone number 719: b6

(U)  
43. (S) Separately designated as Building #105a, this office area is listed as containing the permanent Duty Officer (Mitarbeiter von Dienst). Also connected with this building are the following persons, not otherwise identified: b6

(U)  
44. (S) Building #107 is unidentified according to business nature, with only one known listed personality, b6 located there.

(U)  
45. (S) The Motor Pool area lists the following assigned personnel: Herr b6 Of these, b6 is identified as the vehicle dispatcher. The Fire Guard also is located in this area.

(U)  
46. (S) Assumed to be guard personnel, the following persons are listed as being maintained in the b6 b6

(U)  
47. (S) The following individuals cannot be associated with any particular building or office, and are not otherwise identified except by telephone number and probable cover name:

Tel. No. 602

b6

Tel. No. 653

b6

Tel. No. 610

b6

Tel. No. 658

b6

Tel. No. 615

b6

Tel. No. 683

b6

Tel. No. 616

b6

Tel. No. 815

b6

Tel. No. 622

b6

Tel. No. 827

b6

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27 Aug 56

Cf Branch, Assistant, Chief of Staff, Hq USAREUR, APO 403, US ARMY

b1

b1

(S)

Tel. No. 628

b6

Tel. No. 636

b6

Tel. No. 651

b6

Tel. No. 827 (cont.)

b6

Tel. No. 891

b6

(U)

48. (S) The individual listed as b6, under the telephone number 751, has been identified as a staff member of SDU/American element.

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Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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Page(s) *1046-1060*

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 320-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT <b>West German Government Intelligence Agencies (S)</b>		2. DATE SUBMITTED <b>31 July 1956</b>
		3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER <b>IV-D-320529</b>
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS		
<p>On 12 July 1956, during routine liaison contact with [b6] [b6] members of [b1] [b1] in NURNBERG, Agent "A-IV" was introduced to [b6] date and place of birth unknown, a representative of the Gehlen Gruppe. [b6] stationed in MUNICH, was in contact with [b1] NURNBERG on an operational matter, and during general conversation revealed the following information:</p> <p>All Gehlen agents, when once assigned to an operational matter, follow all leads personally. [b6] stated that his investigations have included travel over all of West Germany, plus trips to Austria and France. As of 12 July 1956, [b6] stated that he had twenty motive cases and had not spent a weekend at home in three weeks. [b6] did not reveal the address of his MUNICH headquarters, however, he gave the MUNICH telephone number 25883, at which he can usually be reached. [b6] is friendly, witty, and a good conversationalist. He invited Agent "A-IV" to call him when in MUNICH.</p> <p>[b6] is approximately 40 years of age, 5' 6" to 5' 8" tall, dark complexion, brown eyes, black hair, partially bald, and medium build. [b6] is married and resides in MUNICH.</p>		
9. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT [b6] 66TH CIC GROUP		8. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT [b6]

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Hq 66th CIC Group, ATTN: S-3

DATE: 6 August 1956

FROM : [b6] [b1] LO Berlin

SUBJECT: Alleged Nav Secret Office (Bundeswehr) in the  
Emergency Reception Procedure (NAV - Notaufnahmeverfahren)  
BERLIN, Marienfelde Refugee Camp

1. The following unevaluated information was received from [b6] acting chief of [b1] B I Berlin:

e. On 6 April 1956, [b6], then chief of [b1] B I, was questioned by telephone by [b6], the chief of the NAV (Notaufnahmeverfahren) BERLIN, whether the establishment of a new "Bundeswehrstelle" (Federal Secret Office) in the NAV was known to him.

h. Two newspaper reporters had asserted this to [b6] Allegedly, the editorial offices received such information from a refugee.

c. After the reporters had been instructed (advised) and sent away, they entered the office in Bloc H 4, room 20 a, Marienfelde Camp without authorization, since the alleged Bundeswehrstelle was said to be located there.

d. Officially, room number 20a located a [b1] B I office, but actually it is being used by interrogators of the GEHLEN organization.

e. In the office of the acting chief of [b1] B III, a department which is still in the process of formation, the reporters met an interrogator who could barely convince them that the statement of the refugee was wrong -- so that the planned report in the press has not been published.

2. [b6] discussion with [b6]

After this incident, a discussion was held on 7 April 1956 at the request of [b6]

a. How could these events be possibly prevented in principle?

b. What possibilities exist to accelerate the processing of refugees in order to meet the wishes of the Senate of BERLIN?

c. How could it be arranged to decrease the same interrogations which were usually made seven or eight times but from different points of view and concerning different targets (which were not or could hardly be noticed by the refugee) without injuring the security interests or the interests of intelligence?

d. In spite of all endeavors of the Individual Refugee Screening Team chiefs and their superior agencies, the question of making offices available has not been solved. The Senate offices are hardly interested in it. How can this matter be arranged? At the present time, the [b1] B I Berlin does not have enough rooms available. The [b1] B III requested additional rooms (15-20 rooms) and also the [b1] B II plane to enlarge its offices.

Reg VIII

[b1]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~IMPERSONAL SUBJECTS CARDED INIT. *OP*

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Concerning 2a and 2d, [b6] stated that -- according to his opinion it would be desired, although he understands the necessity of interrogation activity quite well -- that [b1] B III should no longer carry out its interrogation activity in the frame of the HAV (Emergency Reception Procedure - Notaufnahmeverfahren) but outside of the camp so that hereby -- also for optical reasons -- the Federal Intelligence Service does not come to someone's attention. He had no objections to a small screening team group (Sichtungsgruppe) which consists only of a few persons as it did before.

[b6] promised [b6] that he would have appropriate discussions with the participating agencies for the time being and -- as far as it is possible -- to clarify in the meantime the matter concerning the most necessary needed space.

The administration of the HAV made the proposal to remove from the present Bloc (Building) H 1 and H 2 the Refugee Screening Team groups B I, II and III and to place instead Bloc B 1, 2 and 3 at their disposal. The objection was made that thru such a complete move considerable costs would arise and it was proposed to put at least the rooms on the third floor of Bloc H at our disposal. The matter could not be clarified thus far and the question of rooms is still pending.

3. Discussion with Representatives of the Federal Intelligence Service:

a. During a discussion concerning the necessary reimbursements, [b6], the representative of the GEHLEN organization, who supervises the Refugee Screening Team [b1] B III, was asked to join the meeting in order to inform him about the difficulties concerning the procurement of rooms. At the same time, discussions were made, which result from daily experiences, how the difficulties (mentioned under 2 a-d) could be removed as far as possible.

b. Results:

(1) Representative G. (organization GEHLEN) stated that in spite of the fact that he brought the matter to the attention of the Bundesbevoll-machtigten (Federal Authority) in BERLIN and other agencies he does not see any possibility to solve the question of rooms in a suitable manner.

(2) A partial improvement would be possible (abolition of various office rooms) if B I, B III and L 50, the office of the [b1] Berlin, work in office community.

(3) It would be better to create a central interrogation office which has already been aimed at, and this under the hitherto-existing name "Vorpruefung B".

The experiences which have been made so far with central interrogation offices are not known to [b6] [b6] suspended chief of [b1] B I, Berlin. Management and organization remains the task of the [b1] B I since, according to the GEHLEN representative, the Federal Intelligence Service does not want to put in an appearance as it does in the Federal Republic, and, if possible, also not under the name [b1] B III - with regard to the special

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political situation of BERLIN-- because unmasking would be inevitable. Adequate considerations have been made by the GEHLEN organization for some time.

(4) An intensified interrogation would produce better results than before. Hereby, a quicker circulation of files would be possible as was requested by the [b1] one should eventually avoid to separate the refugee files in A and B. At the present time only the B-files are being submitted to the Refugee Screening Team B.

(5) Establishment of a Pre-Screening Office would be possible (two persons work in a shift with the Allied Screening Office and two persons with Pre-Screening B).

(6) Should these ideas be taken into consideration by the supervising agencies, additional proposals will be made from practical experiences, i.e. organization and staff of the new agency, either

(a) uniform personnel staff and technical equipment of [b1] B I, partial reimbursement of costs by the GEHLEN organization directly to the [b1]

(b) or only strong office community, GEHLEN personnel and equipment will only be included into the office administration.

(c) Separation of the subjects of interrogation according to regional points and points of view concerning the facts.

(d) Completion of aims of interrogation by GEHLEN.

(e) Collected mail (reports, information etc.) will be sent to the [b1] as before, it will be distributed there to [b1] and GEHLEN; eventually copies will be sent to GEHLEN organization.

(7) The interrogators would direct all persons who will be considered for an approach to these agents (Anbahner) who work with the Refugee Screening Team B and who are responsible for this special case and all this without stopping the quick file circulation.

(8) Provided the decision by higher authorities, GEHLEN advocated such a solution and will submit a respective report.

4. Discussion with Regierungsrat [b6], Chief Department II, [b1] Berlin:

a. On 11 April 1956, a similar discussion took place concerning the [b1] office "L 50" in the NAV.

b. [b6] also agreed to it completely - provided Regierungsdirektor [b6] agrees to it. He is also willing to establish L 50 in the [b1] B I, if a better solution cannot be found.

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Aktennote

A. Angebliche neue Bundesabwehrstelle im NAV.

Am 6.4.56 wurde der Unterzeichnete durch den Leiter des NAV in Berlin, [b6] telefonisch befragt, ob ihm von der Einrichtung einer neuen "Bundesabwehrstelle" im NAV etwas bekannt wäre. Dies ist [b6] gegenüber von 2 Reportern behauptet worden. Die Redaktionen haben angeblich durch einen Flüchtling entspr. Mitteilung erhalten.

Nachdem die Reporter [b6] belehrt und abgewiesen worden sind, haben sie unberechtigt den Dienstraum im Block H 4, Zimmer 20a, aufgesucht, da sich dort diese angebliche Bundesabwehrstelle befinden sollte.

Das Zimmer 20a ist hier als Dienstzimmer von BI offiziell ausgewiesen, wird aber durch Befrager der ORG. GEHLEN benutzt.

Die Reporter trafen dort einen Befrager an, der, wie der kom. Leiter der in Entwicklung begriffenen neuen Vorprüfungsgruppe B III nachträglich ermittelte, die Reporter nur mit Mühe von der Unrichtigkeit der Flüchtlingsbehauptung überzeugen konnte, so daß die beabsichtigte große Pressemeldung hierüber bisher unterblieben ist.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

B. Rücksprache bei [b6]

Nach diesem Vorfall erfolgte am 7.4.56 hierzu eine von [b6] veranlassete Rücksprache.

B. Rücksprache bei b6

Nach diesem Vorfall erfolgte am 7.4.56 hierzu eine von b6 veranlasste Rücksprache.

- a) wie kann man solche Vorfälle nach Möglichkeit grundsätzlich verhindern,
- b) welche Möglichkeiten gibt es, den Durchlauf der Flüchtlinge noch zu beschleunigen, um damit auch dem Senat von Berlin entgegenzukommen,
- c) wie kann die 7 - Strophe meist gleiche Befragung der Flüchtlinge, die zwar nach verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten und Schwerpunkten erfolgt (für den Flüchtling gar nicht oder kaum erkennbar), zweckmäßig verringert werden, ohne die Sicherheitsinteressen oder die nachrichtendienstlichen Gesamtinteressen zu benachteiligen,
- d) wie kann die bisher trotz aller Bemühungen der einzelnen Vorprüfungsgruppenleiter und übergeordneten Dienststellen noch immer ungeklärte Raumfrage geklärt werden, an der die Senatsdienststellen kaum interessiert sind. B I ist e.Zt. noch nicht ausreichend versorgt, B III hat einen ergänzenden Raumbedarf von etwa 15-20 Zimmern angemeldet, auch B II will sich erweitern.

zu c) u. d) bemerkte b6, es sei e. B. sehr erwünscht - bei allem persönlichen Verständnis

1068

für die Notwendigkeit der Befragungstätigkeit -, daß B III nicht mehr im Rahmen des NAV. sondern ausserhalb des Lagers diese durchführen müßte, damit u.a. auch aus optischen Gründen hierbei der Bundesnachrichtendienst nicht in Erscheinung träte. Gegen eine kleine Sichtungsguppe - wie bisher - von wenigen Personen beständen keine Bedenken.

Ich sagte b6 zu, vorerst nur informatorische Gespräche mit den beteiligten Stellen zu führen, und, soweit es mir möglich ist, zwischenseitlich den notwendigen Raumbedarf zu klären.

Hierbei sei bemerkt, daß von der Verwaltung des NAV vorgeschlagen wurde, den jetzigen Block B1 und B2 von den Vorprüfungsgruppen B I, II u. III zu räumen und dafür den Block B1, 2 u. 3 zur Verfügung zu stellen. Hiergegen wurde eingewandt, daß durch einen solchen vollständigen Umzug nicht unbeschliche Kosten entstehen würden und vorgeschlagen, uns wenigstens in Block B die Zimmer des 3. Aufganges zuzubilligen. Klärung konnte hierzu noch nicht erfolgen, also blieb insofern die Raumfrage wieder in der Schwebe.

#### C. Besprechung mit Vertreter des Bundesnachrichtendienstes.

Bei einer Besprechung über notwendig gewordene Deckungszusagen usw. wurde der der Vorprüfungsgruppe B III übergeordnete Vertreter der ORG. GEHLEN (KEMERICH) hinzugebeten, um ihn über die Schwierigkeiten betr. Raumbeschaffung pp. zu unterrichten. Gleichzeitig wurden aus den Erfahrungen der täglichen Praxis heraus Erörterungen darüber angestellt, wie die aufgezeigten Schwierigkeiten

10 169



zu 2 e-d möglichst weitgehend behoben werden könnten.

**Ergebnis:**

- 1.) Vertreter G. - kurz als G. bezeichnet - erklärte, daß er trotz Inanspruchnahme des Bundesbevollmächtigten in Berlin u.e. Stellen keine greifbare Möglichkeit sieht, die Raumfrage einer gewünschten Lösung zuzuführen.
- 2.) Eine teilweise Verbesserung ist möglich (Wegfall von verschiedenen Gesch. fteizimmern), wenn B I, B III und L 50 etwa in einer Art Bürogemeinschaft arbeiten würden.

- 3.) Besser wäre Schaffung der schon verschiedentlich angestrebten Zentralen Befragungsstelle, gedeckt unter der bisherigen Bezeichnung Vorprüfung B.  
Die bisher mit Zentralen Befragungsetellen gemachten Erfahrungen sind hier nicht bekannt.

Leitung und Organisation bleibt bei B I, da, nach G., auf Grund der besonderen politischen Situation Berlins der Bundesnachrichtendienst hier nicht wie im Bundesgebiet in Erscheinung treten möchte, auch möglichst nicht unter der Bezeichnung B III, denn die Enttarnung würde unvermeidlich sein. Entsprechende Überlegungen werden bei G. schon seit einiger Zeit angestellt!

- 4.) Straffung der Befragung würde allgemein noch wesentlich bessere Ergebnisse als bisher bringen.

Der vom [b1] geforderte verstärkte Durchgang an Akten würde dann möglich werden, evtl. Aufhebung der Teilung der Flüchtlingsakten in A u. B., evtl. werden nur die B-Akten an die Vorprüfungsgruppe B geleitet.

- 5.) Einführung der Vereichtung, (2 Personen im Schichtdienst bei der alliierten Sichtungsstelle und 2 Personen in der Vorprüfung B) wäre dann auch möglich.
- 6.) Sollte diesen Überlegungen von den vorgesetzten Stellen näher getreten werden, sollen weitere Vorschläge aus der Praxis gemacht werden, und zwar Organisation und Personal-Soll der neuen Stelle, entweder
- a) einheitliches Personal u. technische Ausstattung von B I, Teilkostenersatzung von G. unmittelbar an [b1]
  - b) oder nur etraffe Bürogemeinschaft, G-Personal u. Ausstattung wird lediglich in den Dienstbetrieb eingeordnet.
  - c) Aufgliederung der Befragungsgebiete nach regionalen oder sachlichen Gesichtspunkten
  - d) Ergänzung der Befragungsziele durch G.
  - e) Sammelpost wie bisher an [b1] dort Verteilung für [b1] und G; evtl. gleich Durchschriften für G.
- 7.) Die Befrager würden nach der Zuständigkeitsabgrenzung alle Personen, die für Anbahnungen in Frage kommen könnten, den unmittelbar bei der

Vorprüfung B mit sendem "Anbahnern" zuweisen,  
ohne daß der schnelle Aktenlauf dadurch be-  
hindert wird.

8.) G. war vorbehaltlich höherer Entscheidung für  
eine solche Lösung, will sofort entspr. berichten.

D. Besprechung mit EK Schröder vom b1

Am 11.4.56 eingewandt ähnliche Besprechung zur Besei-  
tigung der b1 Dienststelle "L 50" in NAV.  
Ansichte sich gleichfalls völlig zustimmend, vorbe-  
haltlich der Entscheidung Reg.Dir. Wichmann.  
Auch bereit, evtl. L 50 in B I einzubauen, wenn  
größere Lösung nicht angängig.

B. Mit B II wurde hierüber noch nicht gesprochen.

b6

CIA PERM

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 54 US ARMY

AEUC-OCE; D-320529 AM

27 July 1956

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Gruppe (8)

CIG FILE 7

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: Counter Subversion Division

1. (u) (SECRET) REFERENCE:

ICM-7-55-CI:AE:CS, SUBJECT: West German Government - Defense, Security, and Intelligence Agencies (S), dated 21 October 1955, file: 333.5 (CI:AE:CS (A-390)).

2. (u) (SECRET) REMARKS:

- a. Contents of inclosures have not been disseminated to any other agency.
- b. Sources of the inclosed reports were as indicated in the reports.
- c. Investigation is continuing.
- d. This information may not be released to other allied or non-allied intelligence agencies.
- e. Information contained in attached Summaries of Information was obtained during a routine investigation of b6 for a visa to enter the United States.



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**SECRET**

AZUC-008; D-320529 (U)  
SUBJECT: GPHLEN Gruppe (S)

27 July 1956

f. [b6] was the SUBJECT of a [b1] request for screening  
of employees for the [b1]

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl

1. SOI dtd 13 Jul 56 (trip)
2. SOI dtd 13 Jul 56 (trip)

[b6]

Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8244  
DER/GRB/dt

Classified SECRET by authority of [b6] Inf,  
Hq, 66th CIC Group.

1074  
**SECRET**

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: S-3 Section

DATE: 26 July 1956

FROM : George D. Swerdlin, OCA, US Embassy *GB*

SUBJECT: b1

1. Reference is made to para 5c of Ops Memo 21/55.


2. I recently learned from b6 that the b1 is responsible for all aspects of security in German diplomatic missions abroad, including electronic countermeasures.

30. JUL. 1956

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*C/R PERM*  
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JUL 21 1956

CIC FILE

*file*  
ARUC-ORCS  
D-320529 II; D-286084

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization Personality  
Re: b6 (2) (u)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: G2CI

1. (SECRET) Reference Letter, Office Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, file ARAGB-C(AE) 350.05 GB, Subject: b1 - German Intelligence Service (Gehlen Organization) (S) (A-691), dated 13 July 1956, paragraph 3, the following information is forwarded.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) On 19 July 1956 the records of Headquarters, 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group, APO 154, US Army were checked for available information on Hans F. RICHTER. The records produced the following information:

a. RICHTER was born 21 March 1901 in LEIPZIG, Germany. Personal data on SUBJECT is as follows: Sex: Male; Height: Approximately 178 cm; Build: Slender; Age: 55 years; Hair: Thin, light blond; Distinguishing Characteristics: Extremely well-dressed, speaks English, Spanish, and French; Medical Characteristics: Defective vision and Emphysema moderate, class b. (Evaluation B-2)

b. SUBJECT's former addresses are: 1909-1933, BERLIN; 1933-1937, SIDNEY, Australia; 1938-1945, BERLIN; 1945-1950, MÜNCHEN nca, Nordrhein/Westfalen, Germany; January 1951-March 1952, MUNICH, Walhallastrasse 7; March 1952-July 1952, OBERGIESS nca, Germany, Dellenderfstrasse 83; July 1952-August 1953, MUNICH/Pullach, Klosterstrasse 34. (Evaluation B-2)

c. SUBJECT's father, Felix RICHTER, is deceased, and his mother, Anna RICHTER, nee MUELLER, is believed to be residing in BERLIN. SUBJECT's wife is b6

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*D-320529*

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 757 US ARMY

D-320529

13 July 1956

SUBJECT: West German Government Intelligence Agencies  
Re: GEHLEN Gruppe (S)(u)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: AEUC-OCE

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ REFERENCE: Ops Memo 21/55 and Agent Report of Subject Interview, Refugee Relief Act, subject: [b6] file FF-624067

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) FORWARDED: Summaries of Information, dated 13 July 1956, subject and file as above.

3. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: Source "A" is [b1]  
[b1] Source "B" is [b1]  
[b1]

b. Evaluation of Sources: Both Sources are evaluated F.

c. Both Sources were employed by GEHLEN and obtained information in routine performance of duty.

d. All other elements of Control of Information are as outlined in the attached reports.

4. ~~(SECRET)~~ REMARKS:

a. Information contained in attached Summaries of Information was obtained during a routine investigation of [b6] for a visa to enter the US.

b. The files of the Regional Registry revealed no information on personalities mentioned in the attached reports.

1 Incl  
2 SOIs, dtd 13 July 56

[b6] etw/Ofb M11 802

Regrading data cannot  
be predetermined

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Date JUL 31 1956  
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Commanding 9 JUL 1956  
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**SECRET**

**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE

13 July 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-320529

SUBJECT

West German Government Intelligence  
Agencies (61)(GEHLEN Gruppe)  
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Modus Operandi

1. West German Intelligence Service: GEHLEN

2. Region or office: BREMEN

3. Source: [b1] was interviewed concerning his employment for GEHLEN. Source obtained information from 1951 to 1956 [b1]  
[b1]

4. Date Source Reported Information: 8 June 1956

5. Evaluation of Source: F-6

6. GEHLEN Modus Operandi:

a. The SIEGERT Company, 2 Am See, BREMEN ND8780, Germany, a firm dealing in building and construction materials, was used as a cover name and address during the period 1951 to 1952 for GEHLEN, a West German Intelligence Agency. The firm is now defunct having gone out of business in 1952.

b. The NORDDEUTSCH INTERESSEN UND ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT FUER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITISCHE PLANUNG (North German Commerce and Labor Group for Economic Planning - NIAG), 9 Franz Schuetze Allee, BREMEN, is currently the cover name and address for GEHLEN.

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1 - Region III

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
13 July 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-320529

SUBJECT

West German Government Intelligence  
Agencies (8) (X) (GEHLEN Gruppe)  
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . .	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .	C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .	4
UNRELIABLE . . . . .	E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . .	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Modus Operandi

1. West German Intelligence Service: GEHLEN
2. Region or Office: BREMEN ND8780, Germany
3. Source:

b1

4. Date Information Reported: 8 June 1956
5. Evaluation of Source: F-6
6. GEHLEN Modus Operandi:

b1

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(FILE)

MARY OF INFORMATION  
(58 390-320-10)

GID 76 -0697

DATE  
13 July 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Office of the ACofS, G2, Headquarters USAREUR, APO 403, US Army

SUBJECT

Gehlen Organization Personalities  
Re: b1

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 according to his own business card, is the manager of the Studiengesellschaft zur Forderung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten M. B. H. (Research Corporation for the Advancement of Scientific Works, Ltd.), located at Munich-Pullach, Klosterstrasse 34, telephone number 793495. (B-2)

b1 has been identified as a member of the b1

b1

required by the b1 such as office supplies, operational equipment, food for the headquarters mess, etc., but is not otherwise known to be involved in b1 operations. The cover firm of which he is manager appears as the purchaser on all such commercial contracts. (B-2)

b6 father, not further identified, is reportedly an executive of a Munich banking firm, and, as such, allegedly performs certain financial transactions for the b1 (B-6)

1082

DISTRIBUTION 2 - 66th CIC Gp, APO 154, US Army  
1 - A&E File, CI Branch

DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47,  
1 Dec 1951 DA AGO) which may be used.

(Not Classified Unless  
Data Enclosed)

AGL (1) 9-54-3034-40310

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154,  
 Attn: S-3 Section

DATE: 18 June 1956

FROM : George D. Swerdlin, OCA, US Embassy

SUBJECT: Influence of Ex-General CEHLEN on Defense Ministry Intelligence Matters

1. Reference is made to para 5o(5) of Ops Memo 21/55.
2. The information presented below was imparted to me by [b6] deputy chief of MAD, during an informal dinner at the Embassy Club on 8 Jun 56, and during another recent conversation.
3. Negotiations were conducted in late fall of 1955 between Federal Defense Minister [b6] and CEHLEN concerning the assistance to be rendered by the [b1] to the Defense Ministry in the field of military intelligence and counter-intelligence. During these negotiations CEHLEN agreed to provide the Defense Ministry with positive military intelligence information, both strategic and combat (Frontaufklaerung), demanding in return, among other things, that the ICF be dissolved.
4. Discussing the military counterintelligence organization, [b6] requested CEHLEN to provide key officers for that service, to which CEHLEN consented. (Note: [b6] did not touch upon [b6] in this connection and it is not clear whether CEHLEN demanded [b6] removal as part of a general "package deal" or merely as condition for the assignment of CEHLEN officers to MAD). During the month of December 1955 CEHLEN discussed possible transfers to MAD with several of his officers, apparently settling on [b6] as chief due to General SPEIDEL's warm indorsement. [b6] however, did not feel sure of himself because of lack of experience in the security field and agreed to take the position of MAD chief only if [b6] would come along as his deputy. [b6] likewise had misgivings about accepting the MAD assignment, much preferring to re-enter upon active duty with troops. CEHLEN, however, convinced both of them to accept the assignments during a joint conference at his home shortly before Christmas 1955.
5. After arrival in BONN in January 1956, [b6] had a conference with [b6] during which the latter promised that MAD would be raised to the status of a permanent sub-department in the Defense Ministry (the old MAD division was only a section (Referat)), [b6] personal aide, [b6] who is also a personal friend of [b6] took an active part in this conference, as well as in some other talks that [b6] had with CEHLEN.
6. [b6] is personally not convinced that the [b1] will be in a position to furnish effective support to the German Armed Forces in the field of combat intelligence in spite of the assignment to tactical units of German officers serving with the [b1] which is planned on mobilization day. [b6] intends to discuss this matter with CEHLEN in the near future.

C  
 5c(5)(GDS)

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psnl [b6]

psnl [b6]

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HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

AEUC-OCE; D-320529

7 June 1956

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Gruppe (u)(s)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, United States Army  
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch (G2CICE)

1. (u)(s) REFERENCE:

ICM-7-55-CI:A&E:CS, Subject: West German Government —  
Defense, Security, and Intelligence Agencies (s)(u) dated 21 October  
1955, file: 333.5(CI:A&E:CS(A-390)).

2. (u)(s) REMARKS:

- a. Contents of inclosure have not been disseminated to any other agency.
- b. Source of the inclosed report was as indicated in report.
- c. Investigation is continuing.
- d. This information may not be released to other allied or non-allied intelligence agencies.
- e. The name of the source of the attached information is believed to spelled b1 and not b1

3. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

Opr Memo #H-296-56 dtd 17 May 56  
(dupe)

b6

Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8244  
DER/EGM/pc

M/R: Fwd G2 info re GEHLEN Gruppe.

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b6

66TH CIC CP.

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**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154,  
Attn: S-3 Section, CS Division

DATE: 5 June 1956

FROM : F. C. Hughes, Jr., OJA, US Embassy

SUBJECT: [redacted] b1

Re:

b1

1. Reference is made to paragraph 5c(3)(e) of Operations Memorandum 38/55, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. An informal liaison contact between the [redacted] b1 and the recently established [redacted] b1

[redacted] b1 has existed since at least 1951 when the [redacted] b1 was still the unofficial, American financed group generally known as the "GEHLEN Organization." Although no member of the [redacted] b1 ever took pains to explain to the Liaison officer the nature and extent of this contact (it was generally avoided) it became apparent from various remarks made over a period of time by [redacted] b1 personnel that the [redacted] b1 liaison contact with the GEHLEN organization was of some proportion, consisting of visits by officials of the two organizations to offices of the other, general briefings for one another on the operations of the respective organizations, the exchange of intelligence reports and intelligence information. During the period in which the GEHLEN organization still remained an unofficial one GEHLEN and his organization were referred to internally by the [redacted] b1 under the code name of [redacted] b6

3. With the establishment of the GEHLEN group as the [redacted] b1 [redacted] b1 the liaison relationship between the [redacted] b1 and the [redacted] b1 has become an official one. Contact is maintained by routine postal communication, by recurring visits between officials of the two organizations and by contact through the medium of the [redacted] b1 BORN liaison office. I have not been informed of the BORN address of this liaison office, nor of the identity of its personnel, but both [redacted] b1 Vice President Albert RADKE and [redacted] b1 official [redacted] b6 have mentioned its existence to me in the course of remarks on other subjects.

4. On 21 May 1956 [redacted] b1 Vice President RADKE mentioned to me (in the course of a discussion on the field of activity of the Defense Ministry's Military Counter Intelligence Service (MAD) viz-o-viz [redacted] b1 operational responsibilities) that the [redacted] b1 has reached an agreement with the [redacted] b1 which provides that the [redacted] b1 will not engage in any internal counter espionage operations, a field which is the sole responsibility of the [redacted] b1. This means, RADKE said, that counter espionage security operations will not be conducted by the [redacted] b1 within the territory of the Federal Republic; the [redacted] b1 will turn over to the [redacted] b1 any case of hostile espionage directed against targets in the Federal Republic. It has been agreed, however, according to RADKE, that the [redacted] b1 may recruit and handle agents whose purpose will be to penetrate "eastern" intelligence services. In some cases these agents may be doubles, that is doubled agents of an eastern intelligence service, although the understanding is that the [redacted] b1 will report to the [redacted] b1 its use of any doubled agents.

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5c(3)(e)-f

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**SECRET**

12 JUN 1956

b1

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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AEAGB-C(AE) 350.05 CB

APD 403

(U)  
SUBJECT: Cehlen Organization (S)

22 MAY 1958

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
Attn: CS

(U)  
1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Forwarded herewith for your information and retention is information pertaining to personalities of Subject organization.

(U)  
2. (CONFIDENTIAL) The attached reports were obtained from SDU (American) element files.

(U)  
3. (CONFIDENTIAL) It is desired this office be furnished any information available in Central Registry which is not included in the attached Cehlen personality reports.

(U)  
4. (CONFIDENTIAL) It is further desired no further distribution of the attached personality information be accomplished outside your organization.

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) Downgrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

Date 8/9/58 320

19 Incl (U)  
Personality Rept, 1 cy (S):

- 1.
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Chief, CI Branch

Special Handling Required

Not releasable to foreign Nationals except NONE

By authority

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date 18 MAY 58

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AEAGB-C(AE) 350.05 CB (U)  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization (S)

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Tp: Heid Mil 7864

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Lka: b6

oa. brown hair (thining), blue eyes, over shaped face, average build

married: three children

Religion: Protestant

EDUCATION: 1922-25 Volkeshule, Glewitz  
1925-31 Mittelechule, Halle  
1931-34 Privateschule, Koeln  
1934-35 Privatschule, Berlin  
1935-36 Oberrealgymnasium, Stettin

MILITARY: 1936 4 Dec Entered Army - 5th Inf Regt  
1937 ?? Went to Poland on leave  
1937 16 Oct Kriegsschule  
1938 31 Aug 2nd Lt  
1940 14 Sep 1st Lt  
1943 19 Feb Pz Gren Regt 5 of 258 Inf Div  
1943 10 Mar Capt  
1944 15 Dec Kreigsakademie  
1945 ?? Gen Staff officers course in Bavaria  
1946 1 May --  
1951 31 Jan US Forces in Bad Tolz and Langgries area

Holde Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class and east medal

GEHLEN Org. Position: 1953 Sovzone OB  
1956 125B

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Lka: Bad Toelz, Rehgraben 1 ('52)  
Muenchen, Implerstr 56/II ('53-54)

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ca. dark brown hair, small build

married; three children

EDUCATION: prior 1939, Tuebingen U. (2 years)

MILITARY:

POST WW II: officer (?)

GEHLEN Org. Position: 1956 125H

ASSESSMENT: Pleasant, easy to meet

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Lka: Estate "Schuffenhof," vic. Coburg, Franconia

os. 5'11", 175 lbs., black hair, oval-shaped face, well built

married: two children

Religion: Protestant

EDUCATION: Served in Reichsarbeitsdienst (six mos. prior to Army)

MILITARY: Details unknown

GEHLEN Org. Position: S8a, Aide and Personal Adjutant to UTILITY

ASSESSMENT: Speaks good English, better French, friendly to Americans but cannot be classified as pro-American; hobbies - riding, skiing, swimming

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Lka: b6

ca. detaile unknown

three dependents

EDUCATION: Detaile unknown

<u>MILITARY:</u>	1932	Entered Army
	1932-1933	OCS and Inf. School, Leipzig
	1934	Rifle company
	1935	Instructor at regimental OCS
	1936-1938	Mortar Company, became adjutant
	1939	Assigned Kriegsakademie - did not get there because of war

GSC list: Obstlt., Chief, Section Ib, Field  
Trans Br, Chief of Transport Army Gen Staff;  
GSC service from 24 Dec 42, PW, West

GEHLEN Org. Position: 125 Transportation

ASSESSMENTS: Detaile unknown

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Lka: b6

ca. 182 lbs.

married; no children

EDUCATION: Details unknown

MILITARY: Details unknown

GEHLEN Org. position: 125 H

ASSESSMENTS: Details unknown

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1094  
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DINGLER, Hans Juergen  
b. 30 March 1904 Nikolaiken/Germany  
Lka: Munich N 12, Justinus Koernerstr 26

© DILLBERG

ca. 5'8", blue eyes, dark blond hair, finger on r. hand missing, slender build

married, 3 children

EDUCATION: details unknown

MILITARY: Kav; Ic/A.O. Engl. Dolm. 1. Schl. Rsgt.  
1 Oct 1934: Chef IO/R.R. Gera  
1 " 1935: Kriegsakademie  
1 Aug 1937: Gen. Kdo VIII A. K. (Kdo z. Gen Stab, 31 Mar 1939)  
1 Apr 1939: In dsn Gen. Stab versetzt  
26 Aug " : Gen. St. Stellv. Gen. Kdo, VIII A.K.  
15 Oct " : Gen. St. 86 Inf. Div.  
6 May 1940: Gen. St. d.H. (Heerwesenabt.)  
3 Dec " : Gen. St. 3 Inf. Div., kdt.  
20 Jan 1941: Gen. St. 3 Inf. Div. (mot)  
22 Dec 1942: Gen. St. H. Gr. Don (Ia/P) kdt.  
1 Feb 1943: Oberst  
1 Mar " : Kriegsakademie (Lehrer)  
12 Feb 1944: Chef Gen. St. LVIII Res. Pz. Korps  
6 Mar 1945: Kdo 9 Pz. Div. (Wkdr)  
-----  
1945-1946: POW

GERLEN Org. Position: Chief of Training

6 Feb 56

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~~SECRET~~  
HAERTEL, Johannes Heinrich Phillip

© HELLER, Johannes

b. 16 June 08, Brockau b. Breslau, Germany

TITLES: Col

Lka: Hamburg 13, Sohluterstr 4

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: Ht. 174 cm. blue eyes, brown hair (thinning, greying), bushy eyebrows, scar left side neck, oval-shaped face, noticeably hoarse voice, military bearing

married; no children

EDUCATION: Details unknown -- see comments below

<u>MILITARY:</u>	1926	Joined Army as Transportation expert
	1943	General Staff Officer, promoted to Lt Col, later to Col.
	???	Last known appointment -- Chief, Planning Branch, Chief of Transport, Army Gen staff
	1945-46	PO in America - working with the German Mil Documents Center, Washington while at Camp Ritchie

Originally trained as a salesman of locomotives and heavy railroad equipment. Extensive experience and detailed knowledge rail nets in Balkans and Eastern Europe based on WW II on-the-spot activity

GEHLEN Org. Positions:

Chief of Transportation/Supply Eval. Section

ASSESSMENTS:

Avid skier, nervous, smokes a lot, good sense of humor

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Lke: b6

oa. Details unknown

Religion: Protestant

EDUCATION: 1923-26 Grundschule, Stuttgart  
1926-35 Gymnasium, Stuttgart

MILITARY: 1935: Oct entered Inf. Rgt. 56 (or Jaeg. Rgt. 56)  
Schuetze (Rifleman)  
Dec Deutsches Sportabzeichen in bronze  
1936: Apr Fahnenjunker (cadet captain)  
Oct Gefreiter (Private 1st class)  
Dec Unteroffizier (non-commissioned officer)  
1937: Jan Kriegsschule, Dresden  
Jun Fahnenrich (officer candidate)  
Sept Oberfahnenrich  
Kriegsschule-Lehrgang  
Oct Waffenlehrgang, Inf. Schule  
1938: Jan Leutnant  
Apr Oberleutnant  
1939: Aug-Feb  
1940: Nachr. Offs.b.St.  
Sep-Jan  
1940: Zugfuehrer  
1940: Feb Inf. Rgt. 507  
Ord. Offz, Rgt. Stab  
Oct Kp. Chef, Inf. Rgt. 507  
1942: Mar O.K.H., Fuehrer Reserve  
Mar-Dec Deputy Gen. Xdo XX A.K. (Danzig)  
Jul Hauptmann (Captain)  
Oct Inf. Ersetz, Btl. 120  
Oct-Nov Inf. Schule, Paris  
Dec  
1943: Mar Inf. Div. Grossdeutschland  
Rgt. Adj  
Mar-May Btl. Fuehrer  
Jun Generaletabausbildung  
1944: Feb Kriegsakademie  
Jul Major  
Aug 42 Jaeg. Div., Gen. St. (It)  
member German General Staff  
1945: Jan XIV Panzer Korps, (Italy), Gen. St.

GEHLEN Org. Position: 125 KVP

ASSESSMENTS: Soldierly appearance. Direct, youthful, honest character, temperamental, not yet mature personality. Good tactical understanding.



Fully proved before the enemy. Has shown himself in employment as cool, quiet, intrepid and coldblooded. Especially industrious and conscientious; not always fortunate in the handling of subordinates. Healthy ambition. Absolute positive attitude toward National Socialist idea. Does not always know how to organize his thoughts clearly, however, his desultory thinking sometimes leads to acute ingenuity. Adroit in speech, however, not always logical in his thoughts. Intellectually gifted. Quick in comprehension.

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1098

HEPP, Leo Phillip Franz

@ HOEBL, Leo

b. 15 Aug 07, Ulm/Wuerttemberg or Tuebingen

Lka: Tuebingen, Riesingerstr 14

Muenchen 9, Naupliastr 52 ('54-

oa. 182 cms., 80 kg., brown eyes, dark brown hair, narrow-shaped face,  
tall and slender build

married, three children

Religion: Catholic

EDUCATION: 1913-1915 attended Elementary School at Ulm  
1915-1916 " Vorechule, Ulm  
1916-1920 " Gymnasium, Ulm  
1920-1925 " Gymnasium, Stuttgart - received "Maturitaet"  
certificate

MILITARY: 1925-1926 entered Army; Sergeant and radio operator with  
5th Sig. Div at Stuttgart-Cannstatt  
1926-1927 attended Infantry School in Dresden as Officer  
Candidate  
1927-1928 attended Infantry School in Jueterbog as Officer  
Candidate  
1929 commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant  
1929-1934 served with 5th Sig. Div. Stuttgart; promoted to  
1st Lt.  
1935-1937 attended "Kriegsacademie," Munich; promoted to  
Captain  
1937-1939 attended "Kriegsacademie," Berlin and subsequently  
Gen Staff Teacher at Gen Staff School, Chief of  
Staff of German Sig Corps. Deputy Chief of Commo  
in German High Command  
1940 served in France; promoted to Major  
1941 served in Bulgaria and Greece  
1942-1943 served with 9th Inf. Div. in Russia, Poland,  
Rumania and Crete, promoted to Lt. Col.  
1943-1944 attended Kriegsacademie in ?, promoted to Col (G.S.C.)  
1944 served with 5th Army Corps in Italy; on 25 Jun 44,  
cracked-up due to strain of campaign. Recommended  
transfer to hospital.  
1945 according to PRQ was Chief of Army Intell Service

POST WW II: 1945-1947 POW by U.S.

GEHLEN Org. Position: Chief, Communications

ASSESSMENTS: Excellent horseman; above average skier, enthusiastic interest  
for military history. Vivacious, affable, interesting man,  
possessing superior ability, he is a tireless, independent  
worker, strong mature personality, talented in tactics and  
organization, above average.

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TITLES: Col.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: 140 lbs., blue eyes, blonde, straight hair (thinning), long, narrow-shaped face, slender, srsc build, extremely nervous

married, four children

Religion: Protestant

EDUCATION: 1915-1918 tutored privately in Soltau  
1918-1922 Gymnasium, Eisenach  
1922-1925 Gymnasium, Heidelberg  
1927 Matriculation certificats in Weimar  
1939 Russian Interpreter's Certificats

MILITARY: 1927, 1 Apr joined the Reichswehr (Reiter-Rgt 13, Hannover)  
1931, 1 Mar Second Lt.  
1933, 1 Sep First Lt.  
1934, 1 Sep Trans. to Eng. Batl, Hann. Munden (Com. Ldr)  
1936, 1 Sep Trans. to Mount. Eng. Batl, 54 Kittenwald (Comp. Ldr)  
1937, 1 Sep Captain, trans. to Gen. St. Academy  
1939, 20 Aug Trans. to Gen. St. XXVI, A.C. (G2)  
1940, 1 Jun Trans. to Gen. St. 6. Mountain Div (G4)  
1940, 10 Jul Trans. to Gen. St. XVIII, Mountain A.C. (G4)  
1940, 26 Oct Trans. to Gen. St. XXXIX, Mountain A.C. (G3 and tempor. Chief of Staff)  
1941, 1 May Major  
1942, 1 May Trans. to H.Q. Gen. St. of Army (Section F.H.O.)  
1943, 23 May Trans. to Gen. of Volunteers (Chief of Staff)  
1943, 1 Jan Colonel, Lt.  
1944, 1 Jun Colonel  
1944, 16 Jul Trans. to 232 Inf. Div. (G3 and Tempor. C.G.)  
1944, 10 Nov Trans. to Gen. of Volunteers (liaison to Wlasow Army)  
1945, 20 May American Captivity (26.3.46-1.7.46 Fort Hunt, Georgia)

GERMAN Org. Position: Chief, Evaluation Group

ASSESSMENTS: Avid mountain climber and skier; Russian fair, Italian fair, good English; photographer; excellent judgment; energetic and reliable. Has carried out the tasks of Chief of Staff for the Gen. of Eastern troops with extraordinary diligence and skill. Self-assured in appearance his attitude toward life corresponds to precepts of National Socialism. Sharp intellect, clear perception, untiring energy.

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1100

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b. unknown  
Lka: Munich area

married b6

BOB: 1 January 1955 as Referent in Sec 125

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b. unknown  
lka; Munich area

EOD: 15 April 1955 as a Sachbearbeiter in Seo 125

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b. [b6]  
Lka: Wiesbaden, Tannusstr 7/III ('53)  
Ammerland nr. Muenchen ('54-55)

TITLES: Oberstlt.

[b6]

PERSONAL DESCRIPTION: 5'10", 175 lbs. blue eyes, dark brown hair, thinning;  
small, thin face, sallow complexion, slender build

Married, three children

Religion: Protestant

EDUCATION: 1930 Abitur, Althoff-Oberrealschule, Nowawes b. Potsdam  
1952 Staatsexamen Pharmazeutische Chemie, Studium an der  
Universitat Hamburg

MILITARY: 1930-1934 German Army  
1934 German Air Force  
1939 " " " : Western Front  
" " " : Battle of England  
1940-1945 Generalstab d. Luftwaffe  
1945 Mar Oberstlt i.G. KIENITZ, 5 Abt (10) (Intelligence) on  
Chief Ops Staff under Chief of Air Staff/ORL  
Last rank: Oberstleutnant i.G.  
Duty: Leiter Fremde Luftwaffen Oet. d.V. Abt. des  
Generalstabs

POST WWII: 1945-1946 PW in England: "Special Prisoner"

GERLEN Org. Position: Chief, Economic Sec. (Chemist)

ASSESSMENTS: Shy and uncertain on first impression, but upon association  
relaxes and is most cosmopolitan and amenable to change. Has  
a good sense of organization and efficiency and is not easily  
ruffled. His weak English hampers him, understood virtually  
everything but was a marked effort for him, is very self-  
conscious about making errors when speaking. Very socially  
inclined, appears to hold liquor well. Misses his children  
who are with his divorced wife.

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TITLES: Lt Col.

Like:

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PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: 5'7", 170 lbs. brown eyes, brown hair (receding forehead), full square-shaped face; average build

married, one child

Religion: Protestant and Catholic

EDUCATION: Details unknown

MILITARY:

1941	24 Oct	GSC service
1944	Sep	81st Inf Div (East)
1945	Jan	Officer pool OKH
		Staff Army Group Vistula, at disposal of RF-SS (East)
		PO (West)

ASSESSMENTS: Speaks English

GERLEN Org. Position: Analyst

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TITLES: Colonel

b. [redacted] b6

aka: [redacted] b6

PERSONAL DESCRIPTION: Ht. 179 cm, grey eyes, black hair, oval-shaped face, scar above left eye, slightly deaf, quick nervous smile.

Single

Religion: Catholic

EDUCATION: -- Humanistisches Gymnasium  
1930 Abitur Ostern in Brieg

MILITARY: 1937-1945 German Wehrmacht, Colonel PZ Corps

GENLEN Org. Position: Chief of Operations

ASSESSMENTS: He is one of the more pro-American of the top ZIPPER staff members. But would be cautious if asked questions of German interests. He has a keen mind, considerable drive in spite of the fact that he tires rather easily and an infectious enthusiasm for his work. He is at best when dominating a large group or taking charge of a meeting where a little push is in order. In capacity as chief of the strategic intelligence work he has the confidence and good will of his colleagues. He is well read and discusses art, books and music with enthusiasm and knowledgeability. Commanded a Combat Command of V Panzer Army under Von Manteuffel in Operation 1944-1945. High regard for Von Manteuffel. Knows a good wine when he tastes one.

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Serial 15



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Lka: b6

TITLES: Lt Colonel

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: Ht. 6', 170 lbs., blue eyes, dark blond hair, oval-shaped face, scar left side of face - ear to chin, medium, barrel-chested build, long nose, blinky eyes.

married; two children

Religion: Protestant

EDUCATION: Details unknown.

MILITARY: Liaison officer from Chief, Armed Forces Signal Communications to Armed Forces Opns Staff, OKW.

GSC service from 1 Apr 44

POST WW II: FW (West) 10 Oct 50

GERMAN ORG. Position: Analyst - 1955 Nov - Succeeded b6 as Chief of 125 H (Army Evaluation)

ASSESSMENTS: Speaks fair English, friendly and sociable.

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Lka:

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married; one child

Religion: Protestant

GENLEN Org. Position: 1952 EOD, Section 50 (now 124) as sifter  
1954 May trans. to Section 125  
1956 Mar 15 Gate pass cancelled (entered German Army  
as Major)

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Lka:

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TITLES: Captain

Muenchen-Solln, Friedastr 17 (early '53)  
Gauting, Leo-Putz-Str (1953)

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: 6'1", 185 lbs., brown eyes, blond hair, thin build, ruddy complexion

married; three children

Religion: Protestant

EDUCATION: Abitur Humanistisches Gymnasium  
University of Marburg, and its law school

MILITARY: 1937 Oct Entered German Army in III/AR 23  
1939 Oct Arty School  
1940 Apr 2nd Lt  
1942 Apr 1st Lt  
1942 Apr 10 trans. to OKH, Pfr. Rec. Abt., Fremde Heere Ost  
1942 Jun OKH/Gen St. d. H Abt, Fr. H. Ost  
1943 Capt.  
1944 Mar trans. to Arty Regt 23  
1944 Dec Kriegs Akademie

POST WW II: Entered university in Marburg, then law school, received degree

ASSESSMENTS: Very talented young officer, mature for age, whose work is characterized by initiative, quick thinking, reliability and good judgment, well rounded personality. Open manner, self confident, spirited and motive. Courage proved in battle, has good philosophy of life.

"hard to handle" independent, not too cooperative, reluctant to speak English but actually speaks it quite well.

GEHLEN Org. Position: Political Evaluation Officer in Sec 125

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Lka: Muenchen, Augustenstr 54 (154)

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PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: Details unknown.

married, three children

EDUCATION: Details unknown.

MILITARY: Details unknown.

POST WW II: Details unknown.

GENLEN Org. Position: Referent

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
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Serial 19

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GID 76 -0697

ALIASES OF KNOWN GEHLEN ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATES

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Headquarters, 68th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army D-320539 Volume 3; D-90635

DINGLER, Fnu  
aka DILBERG, Fnu (U)  
aka OILLBERG, Fnu  
aka DINTER, Fnu

(U)  
(SECRET) SUBJECT, a relative of General Reinhard GEHLEN, has been variously described as a nephew or a cousin of the latter. In September 1954 it was reported that SUBJECT had recently returned from South Africa. At this time SUBJECT allegedly was considered the third ranking man in the Gehlen Organization. In December 1954 SUBJECT reportedly was personnel chief of the Gehlen Organization. SUBJECT's correct name is DINGLER. (F-3)

(U)  
(CONFIDENTIAL) A trace is held on a Hans Juergen DINGLER, whose address in 1948 was given as FRANKFURT/Main, Klaus Groth Strasse 40. On 1 January 1948 DINGLER was identified by Headquarters European Command, Technical Intelligence Branch, APO 767, US Army, as a German civilian connected with TIB. It was stated that DINGLER was on a special mission and was authorized to carry a locked briefcase or suitcase with confidential material which was not to be opened by anybody. (B-2)

(U)  
(CONFIDENTIAL) A trace is held on a Hans Juergen DINGLER, born on 30 March 1904 in NIKOLAIKERN, Kreis Sensburg, Prussia, the son of Max and Helen DINGLER. Max DINGLER, born on 26 March 1872 in STALLUPOENEN, East Prussia, was listed in the 1935 edition of Degener's Wer ist's? as President of the Landesfinanzamt WUERZBURG. Hans Juergen DINGLER was married in WUERZBURG on 19 December 1938 to Margarete MEISSNER, born on 22 February 1910. He is the father of Jutta DINGLER, born on 1 July 1938 in BRESLAU. (B-2)

(U)  
(CONFIDENTIAL) DINGLER attended school from 1910 to 1923, obtaining his Reifezeugnis in October 1923. Entering the German Army on 1 November 1923 as a member of the 5 Preussisches Reiterregiment, DINGLER was commissioned a Lieutenant on 1 December 1926. DINGLER subsequently was promoted to Oberleutnant on 1 February 1930, Rittmeister on 1 April 1935, Major on 1 August 1940, Oberstleutnant on 1 April 1942, and Oberst on 1 February 1943. (B-2)

(U)  
(CONFIDENTIAL) DINGLER performed the following service during World War Two:

1 Aug 37 - 14 Oct 39: Gen.Stab.Stellv.Gen.Kdo.VIII A.K.  
15 Oct 39 - 8 May 40: Ia/86 Inf. Div.  
8 May 40 - 2 Dec 40: OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Heeresabteilung  
3 Dec 40 - 20 Jan 43: Ia/3 Inf.Div. (not)  
21 Jan 43 - 28 Feb 43: assigned to Heeresgruppe Sud  
1 Mar 43 - 11 Feb 44: attended Kriegsakademie  
12 Feb 44 - : Chef d. Gen. St. LVIII Res. Pz. Corps. (B-2)

(U)  
(CONFIDENTIAL) DINGLER passed a Dolmetscherpruefung (Interpreter's Examination) in English in 1936. (B-2)

1113

2 - AGofs, G2

1 - CIC File

1 - CIC Central File

1 - D-90635

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3d

Headquarters, 86th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army D-32059 Volume 3; D-90635

DINGLER, Fnu  
aka DILBERG, Fnu  
aka DILLBERG, Fnu  
aka DINTER, Fnu (U)

(u)  
(CONFIDENTIAL) At the end of World War Two, DINGLER was interned by the US Army for an undetermined period of time. (B-2) His last address was then given as Burg Bleszen, LECHENICH bei KOELN. (F-6)

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4 February 2009

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

2 - Asaf8, G2

1 - CIC File

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1 - CIC Central File 1 - D-90635

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NOFORN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CO, Hqs, 6th CIG Group, USAREUR, APO 154,  
Attn: 3-3 Section

DATE: 16 May 1956

FROM : George D. Swerelin, OCA, American Embassy

SUBJECT: Planning for Intelligence Officers in the Bundeswehr  
(German Armed Forces)

1. The information presented below was imparted to me by [b6] and deputy chief, in the course of a conversation about this topic.

2. So-called security officers (Sicherheitsoffiziere) are being assigned to units and installations of the Bundeswehr. The functions of these security officers are roughly comparable with those of US Army G-2's in non-tactical units and installations. Unit commanders in the Bundeswehr will have full responsibility for the security of their commands; the security officer will be a member of the commander's staff to advise him on the measures required to maintain the desired level of security in the unit or installation. The security officers will be drawn from the personnel of the unit and will be under the direct supervision of the unit commander; they will not fall under the assignment jurisdiction of MAD.

3. Tentative plans existing at present further call for security officers on the staff of Bundeswehr divisions to carry out functions roughly comparable to those of a US Army G-2 officer. They will be field grade officers. Their responsibilities will not only include security matters but combat intelligence (Kampfaufklärung) as well. To assist them in carrying out their assigned duties, the divisional security officers will have assigned to them a security team (Sicherheitsgruppe) drawn from personnel of the division and remaining under the assignment jurisdiction of the commanding general. Security troops may engage in routine security investigations and inspections and also may cooperate with MAD operatives in MAD controlled investigations.

4. Neither the unit nor the divisional security officers will be authorized to engage in any covert operations in the counter-intelligence and security field. They will have no confidential funds and will not be authorized to contact local investigative agencies on intelligence matters. If a case or incident develops within the unit requiring further investigation or operational measures (operative Behandlung) it will be their duty to coordinate with the local MAD detachments. In similar fashion, the security officers will be the point of contact for operatives of the military district MAD detachments on all CI matters affecting the unit concerned.

5. The formation of organic CI detachments in Bundeswehr divisions, as is the case in the US Army, is not foreseen for the next two years or so. MAD chief [b6] is afraid that otherwise the meager resources in trained and competent personnel available to MAD will be depleted. It is further felt by MAD that the divisions will take greater pains to assign competent personnel to the security teams knowing that they will completely belong to the division rather than being placed under the assignment jurisdiction of MAD. MAD, however, off the record regards these security teams and the

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security officers as a reservoir of trained personnel from which selected individuals may be transferred to MAD at the opportune moment sometime in the future.

6. MAD will assume certain responsibilities in the training of the security officers and personnel assigned to the security teams when they are established. The first two day orientation course for unit security officers is being held at the MAD training center in Rengsdorf on 22/23 May 56. The question of training tactical security officers in the various phases of combat intelligence is completely up in the air at present since the Bundeswehr does not have its own military intelligence units and no plans exist for such units now. Mobilization plans envisage, however, the assignment of active officers presently serving in the b1 (Gehlen Organization) to military intelligence positions in the Bundeswehr. b6 explained in this connection that a number of former officers in the b1 have been recalled to active duty and are drawing military pay but have been detached (abkommandiert) to the b1 somewhat in the fashion of US military personnel serving a tour of duty in CIA. b6 further explained this by citing his own position; at the time when he was being recalled to active duty he had the choice of remaining in the b1 rather than donning uniform and serving in MAD. It is further contemplated to rotate these active officers assigned to Gehlen to military assignments sometime in the future for tours of approximately two years even in peace time. It is not settled, however, whether such tours will be served in MAD, military intelligence assignments, or troop duty.

7. Comments: Since the entire subject involving the role played by the b1 in Bundeswehr military intelligence is still a rather touchy matter and fraught with politics, this memorandum has been classified SECRET - NOFORN.

cc to:  
CO, 66th CIG Group, USAREUR  
Attn: Liaison Div., S-2 Sect.

C  
4-1-8  
4-1-8-a

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b1

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GID 36-0811

APD 403

MAR 16 1956

ASAC-0(F) 350.09 GB

SUBJECT: Establishment of German Intelligence Service (S).  
(U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Seventh Army, APO 46, US Army  
Commanding Officer, 66th CIC Group, APO 154, US Army  
Commanding Officer, 513th MI Group, APO 757, US Army  
Commanding Officer, 522d MI Battalion, APO 757, US Army

Quoted below is information contained in letter received by this office from [b6] Coordinator and Special Advisor to the US Ambassador to Germany. This information was submitted to [b6] by SBU and is forwarded for your information.

"The decision made in the 12 July 1955 meeting of the Cabinet of the Federal Republic regarding the establishment of a German Intelligence Service contained the following four points:

"(1) The Federal Republic would establish a Service.

"(2) The German organization headed by former General Reinhardt GEHLEN which had been financially supported and, with the approval of the Federal Republic government, held in 'trusteeship' by U.S. authorities, would be accepted as the nucleus of such an organization.

"(3) The German Intelligence Service would be subordinated to the Chancellery of the Federal Republic.

"(4) The budget submitted by GEHLEN and reviewed by the Comptroller (Bundesrechnungshof) of the Federal Republic government was approved.

"Items (1) and (2) received immediate parliamentary committee approval prior to the adjournment of the government for the 1955 summer holiday. Item (3) received the necessary political support from all major parties, including the opposition SPD, early in 1956. Although a regular budget for a German Service will appear only in the new Federal Republic budget commencing 1 April 1956, the government has assumed already almost full responsibility for the current cost of the project.

19 MAR. 1956  
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PAGE 1

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ASACB-O(F) 350.02 CB

SUBJECT: Establishment of German Intelligence Service (B)

"The Government of the Federal Republic has informed us that there will be neither an executive order nor a public announcement dealing with the establishment of a German Intelligence Service. It has been generally agreed that legislation on this subject will be introduced during the next year.

"No final decision has been reached with regard to the civil service or military status of any individual or any staff position in the organization. It appears that the head of the Service will be a civil service position although a high percentage of the staff positions will be filled by officers of the Bundeswehr on detached service to the intelligence service.

"Pending the establishment of a German Intelligence Service by legislative action, the title b1 is being utilized in official documents."

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

b6

Chief, Operations Branch

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1R Plum

CIC FILE

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

MAR 15 1956

13 March 1956

D-320529

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Gruppe (U)  
(C)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, United States Army  
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch (G2CICS)

1. (U) ~~(SECRET)~~ Reference is made to Intelligence Collection Memorandum 7-55-CI:AA&E:CS, Subject: West German Government — Defense, Security, and Intelligence Agencies (S/Y) dated 21 October 1955, file 333.5 (CI:AA&E:CS (A-390)).

2. ~~(SECRET)~~ Forwarded are the following:

a. Region I Agent Report dated 2 February 1956, Subject: West German Government Intelligence Agencies (S/Y) Re: GEHLEN Gruppe, file I-320529.

b. Summary of Information dated 13 March 1956, Subject: [b6] file D-1314, which contains available information concerning an individual who may be identical to the Herr (Fnu) [b6] mentioned in the attached Region I Agent Report.

3. ~~(SECRET)~~ Source "A" is [b1]  
[b1] Source "A" is evaluated "F". [b1]  
[b1] Source "A" is visited by a liaison officer of the GEHLEN Gruppe and speaks as if he has friendly relations with the GEHLEN liaison officer.

4. (U) ~~(SECRET)~~ The information volunteered by Source "A" was obtained in confidence. Source "A" did not enlarge upon the details of his relations with [b6] nor did he state whether or not [b6] has liaison to other Police or Security agencies in the STUTTGART area.

5. (U) ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ [b6] son could not be identified by a check of Central Registry.

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HQ  
101

~~SECRET~~

DER/ROM/p 'Mgt Mil 6244

13 March 1956

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

b6

(c) (U)

D-1314

SUBJECT was arrested on 13 May 1945 at BISCHOFHEIM by the Third Division CIC when he reported to the town commandant as a captain of the GFF (Gefolge Feldpolizei). SUBJECT stated after arrest that he was willing to make a complete confession of his activities and instructions received regarding future operations. SUBJECT was brought to Seventh Army CIC on 18 May 1945. (B-2)

SUBJECT was born 10 April 1894 at EICHMANN-Hessen where he finished a high school education. He moved to RAGUN bel NESSAN in 1906 and worked for his father in the roofing business until he was inducted into the German Army in 1914 - 1919. In 1921 he joined the police force there. SUBJECT never had any special training except eight weeks training in 1927 in BERLIN for the Gemeindepolizei. SUBJECT joined the NSDAP in 1934. In December 1934 SUBJECT was put in jail by the Gestapo for firing on a group of drunken SA and SS men but was acquitted and commanded into the Gestapo Stelle DESSAU (Abt. II S, homosexuality) as Kriminal Oberassistent and in 1938 was promoted to Kriminal Sekretar. In 1939 he was inducted into the Army (GFF) as Feldpolizeisekretar (Lieutenant). SUBJECT was with Oberst von KLOGE's Fourth Army in the invasion of Poland in 1939, whereafter he returned to the West and accompanied the same unit during the conquest of France. In September 1940 he returned again to WARSAW with GFF Gruppe 570 and remained there until May 1941 when he was promoted to Feldpolizeikommissar on the recommendation of von KLOGE and sent to GFF school ALTENBURG-Thuringen to be assigned to a new unit. SUBJECT was then assigned to GFF Gruppe 726 which went to the Russian front in July 1941, Romania in March 1944, and Hungary in August 1944. Gefolge Feldpolizei 726 was designated for protection and security of Army Headquarters, apprehension of enemy agents and armed civilian sabotage groups, and counter-espionage. (F-6)

SUBJECT admitted that he and one b6 Feldpolizeikommissar (Chief of Group 726), gave orders for executions of 50 - 60 unknown Soviet nationals at KIROVOGRAD, Russia, in September or October 1941. (B-2) Orders allegedly existed from higher headquarters to shoot all Partisans. SUBJECT claimed that persons shot were espionage agents or armed civilians. Also "Versteckte Vernehmungen" (interrogations with force) occurred. Russian nationals were beaten and mistreated. Orders were to use sticks for Versteckte Vernehmungen. SUBJECT stated that he did not beat anyone, but admitted freely that interrogators did. SUBJECT was Executive Officer to SCHUELKE. (F-6)

NOTE 1: The agent of the 307th CIC Detachment who wrote an interrogation report dated 5 June 1945 indicated that SUBJECT was exceptionally cooperative in giving information. SUBJECT gave information concerning the organization and tasks of

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

(Continued)

3 cys - 02  
1 cy - CIC File  
1 cy - CIC Central File

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UZR/EDP/nc/Stgt Mil 8244

13 March 1956

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

b6

U-1314  
(Continued)

the Geheime Feldpolizei, names of members of the Geheime Feldpolizei, and names of members of the SD and the Gestapo.

NOTE II: A publication of the DACHAU Detachment, War Crimes Group, Judge Advocate Division, United States Forces European Theater, dated 29 July 1946, entitled Identification of Prisoner, stated that SUBJECT was of War Crimes interest and should not be released without notification and approval of that organization. The aforementioned document also contains a stamp reading, "Cleared this date, 25 Jan 47."

Information dated July 1950 revealed that two persons employed by the Special Detachment had been recruiting ex-Gestapo personnel in the STUTTGART area since December 1949 to cover KPD targets in Land Muerrenberg-Baden. Several sources or former sources of this Headquarters were approached by these two individuals who claimed to be recruiting personnel for the [b6]. The person who was apparently in charge of recruitment in the STUTTGART area was Georg Emil ZANDER, born 10 April 1894 in DUESSEN and residing in LUWIGSBURG, August Bebelstrasse 4. ZANDER was identified through the local Special Detachment representative as an active informant of that detachment. The other person, whom ZANDER alleged to be his superior, was a certain [b6], reportedly living in AUGSBURG. [b6] had been observed by CIC agents driving a blue Volkswagen, license number [b6]. This vehicle was traced to Special Detachment. (B-2)

In July 1951 it was revealed that a person using the name of [b6] was engaged in attempting to collect information concerning the East Zone police. (P-6) It could not be determined if [b6] and Emil Georg ZANDER, born 10 April 1894 at ESCHWEDE and residing at LUWIGSBURG-Eggenheim, August Bebelstrasse 4, an SED source, were the same individual. (B-2)

(Page 2)

3 cys - G2  
1 cy - CIC File  
1 cy - CIC Central File

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D-320529

13 March 1956

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Gruppe (U)  
(C)

6. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl

1. AR, Rgn I, dtd 2 Feb 56  
(trip)
2. SOI dtd 13 Mar 56 (trip)

b6

Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M11 8244  
DER/RTV/po

M/R: Rgn I AR revealing that one Herr (Fnu) ZANDER is GEHLEN L/O to  
STUTTGART D-8 and SOI of CR info on one August George Emil ZANDER fwd  
G2 per ICM 7-55.

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File 320529 "SECRET"

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-370-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

b6

2. DATE SUBMITTED

8 March 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

VI-D-320529

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 22 February 1956, Wolfgang MENZEL, born 18 April 1905 in FRANKFURT (32UMA7749), Germany, whose permanent home address is 288 Tegernseerlandstrasse, MUNICH (32UPU9030), Germany, and who occupies a temporary room during week days at 210 Oppelnerstrasse, NURNBERG, was contacted during a routine liaison visit. During this visit, MENZEL, who is the Chief of the Refugee Screening Team of b1

b1 at BRAU (Bundesammellager fuer Auslaender - Federal Assembly Camp for Foreigners) in NURNBERG, revealed the following information:

The Chief of the Gehlen Gruppe in NURNBERG is b6 b6 a former Colonel in the German Counter Intelligence Corps. b6 is listed as a factory owner and is not gainfully employed. However, he actually operates an office for the Gehlen Gruppe. He can be reached over telephone number NURNBERG 52844. However, he can only be reached after the caller has been completely identified. (C-3)

AGENT'S NOTES: The above information was given by MENZEL during a query as to the identity of another person allegedly engaged in intelligence activity for the German Government in NURNBERG. MENZEL did not know the man and called b6 and asked if he knew him. MENZEL requested that the information regarding b6 not be made a matter of official record.

*Original filed in D-48717*

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66TH CIC GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 211, JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30093

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GID 26-0919

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~~THIS DOCUMENT CLASSIFIED SECRET BY~~  
~~AUTHORITY OF [b6] CMCL~~  
~~CO. 66th GID GP~~

16 February 1956

Memorandum Report

Subject: GEHEIM Organization

1. Most of the difficulties which had delayed transfer of the GIS (German Intelligence Service - [b1]) to control and support of the Federal Government were overcome recently, and effective 1 February 1956, the Government assumed financial responsibility for the organization.

2. Reinhold GEHEIM was appointed Chief of the GIS with the Civil Service rank of Ministerialdirektor as of 1 February.

3. Members of the GIS will be integrated gradually into the German Armed Forces (Streitkräfte) as officers or into the Civil Service. Only those personnel with former commissions will go into the Armed Forces, but, obviously, there will not be a sufficient number of military berths for all of them.

4. Studies are presently in progress for determining position vacancies and salary structure for the GIS.

5. Personnel problems, in regard to replacement, are becoming more acute as can be discerned from the following recent changes.

a. [b6] was transferred from Deputy Chief of Evaluation to Chief of Personnel, replacing [b6], who has been assigned to Bonn. [b6] replaced [b6]

b. [b6] former Chief of the GSPC OB Desk, is being transferred to the "Richtung" Section (report screening and agent evaluation) to replace [b6], who has been assigned to Bonn as an officer in the Transportation Section of the Defense Ministry. [b6] will replace [b6]

c. [b6] leaves the Vehicle Numbers evaluation section on 1 April 1956 to accept appointment in the Army as a Major.

d. [b6] leaves the Satellite Desk on 15 March 1956 to accept appointment in the Army.

e. [b6] will be transferred from the WVP to the Satellite Desk.

f. [b6] will handle the WVP Desk alone for the time being, but will not issue reports. He will prepare weekly and monthly summaries only.

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S. [b6], will be alone in the Vehicles Numbers Section, at least temporarily. No replacements for [b6], who left 1 February 1956, and [b6] who leaves 1 April, are in sight. The production of this section will be drastically reduced until replacements have been found.

(B-2)

1 Incl. - Organizational Chart

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
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

8 February 1956

Evaluation Section  
of the  
CIS



NOTE: All names utilized are cover names.

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AEUC-CRES, D-320529 II; D-286084

SUBJECT: Gehlen Organisation Personality re: RICHTER, Hans F. (U) (S)

RICHTER has two (2) children, [redacted] b6 and [redacted] b6 (Evaluation B-2)

d. SUBJECT lists his occupation as merchant and is the manager of the Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten M.B.R. located at MUNICH/Pullach, Klosterstrasse 34, telephone number 793495. A second firm, Richter und Co. - Industrieabteilung Gmb H (Industrial Section) was located at MUNICH, Walhallastrasse 7, from 26 October 1950 until its dissolution on 16 December 1952. RICHTER was the sole representative and business manager of this firm and at the time of its disbanding, he was named liquidator. (Evaluation B-2)

(U)  
3. (SECRET) On 20 October 1950, Hans RICHTER attempted recruitment of a Counter Intelligence Corps source in FRANKFURT/Main. RICHTER stated that the organization for which he was recruiting was to have over 4000 members and the funds were to be supplied by Bund Government and the U.S. State Department. RICHTER told source that he (RICHTER) had lived for many years in foreign countries, including Argentina and Chile, and that he had not been a soldier during the war. SUBJECT further stated that he had made at least 150 trips to LONDON since the war's end. RICHTER told source that he maintained a close association with lawyer [redacted] b6, mentioned at that time for possible candidate for the President of the German Security Agency. RICHTER also stated that he knows a [redacted] b6 presently employed as an editor of the FRANKFURT "Neue Zeitung" and soon to be press attache in Italy at the German General Consulate. (Unevaluated)

(U)  
4. (SECRET) In an application made with the American Consulate for a non-preference immigration visa to the United States, RICHTER listed the following as his references: [redacted] b6

[redacted] b6  
was named as sponsor for this trip and paid RICHTER's passage. [redacted] b6 was [redacted] b6 and earns more than \$20,000 yearly.) On 7 August 1951, [redacted] b6 signed a notarised statement wherein she agreed that her husband could immigrate alone to the United States. On 13 August 1951, the MUNICH City Council issued RICHTER German Passport [redacted] b6 valid until 12 August 1953. On 5 September 1951, the American Consulate in MUNICH issued RICHTER Immigration Visa No. [redacted] b6 Some time after this date, RICHTER departed by plane for NEW YORK from the MUNICH/Riem Airport. The purpose of the visit was listed as

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AEUC-ORES, D-320529 II; D-286084 (U)  
SUBJECT: Gehlen Organization Personality re: RICHTER, Hans F. (S)

business. The exact dates of his departure for NEW YORK and of his return to MUNICH are not recorded. Since 1945, RICHTER has also been in LONDON, England, on business, and in BERLIN to visit his mother. (Evaluated B-2)

(U)  
5. (SECRET) The American Consulate in SIDNEY and the LEIPZIG and MUNICH City Councils files contained no derogatory information on RICHTER when last checked in June 1953. SUBJECT possesses Kennkarte (Identity Card) No. [b6] and has been cleared by the Denatification Court. According to a statement made in his own handwriting, RICHTER was a member of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront - DAF (German Labor Front) from 1940 to 1945. RICHTER has an uncle, [b6] a manufacturer, residing in the Eastern Zone of Germany at ANNABERG near, Erzgebirge, Germany. (Evaluated B-2)

(U)  
6. (SECRET) It is assumed that the statement by RICHTER that he intended to remain in NEW YORK meant that SUBJECT would visit no other area in the United States other than NEW YORK. Files, dated 23 June 1949, reveal that a Hans RICHTER was the first chairman of the GDJ Bundesleitung Bavaria; it is not known whether this is the same Hans RICHTER born 21 March 1901 in LEIPZIG, Germany. The Studiengesellschaft zur Foerderung Wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten M.B.H. located at MUNICH/Pullach, according to other files, is an alleged cover organization for the Gehlen Gruppe. (Unevaluated)

7. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Telephone: Stgt Mil 7443  
PSK/DWA/dhs

[b6]  
Adjutant

M/R: The above satisfies request from C2 for a records check on SUBJECT.  
Coordinated with [b6] Asst S3, [b6] Research, [b6]  
of CE, and [b6], of Tech Spec. DWA/dhs.

Classified SECRET by authority of  
[b6]

Inf, Hq, 66th CIC Group.

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GID 26-0670

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

AEAGB-C (AE) 350.5 GB

APD 403

FEB 15 1956

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army

1. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ Forwarded for your information and file is  
SOI, subject: GEHLEN Organization, file A-891, dated 14 February 1956.

2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ It is requested that no distribution of this  
information be made outside of US Military Intelligence channels.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

b6

1 Incl: <sup>(U)</sup>  
SOI (2 cy) ~~(S)~~

Colonel GS  
Chief, CI Branch

15. Feb. 1956

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Tp: Heid Mil 7681

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(Not Classified Unless Date Entered)

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GID 26-0670

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION  
(SR 380-320-10)

DATE  
13 Feb 1956

File: A-891

PREPARING OFFICE

A&E Section, CI Branch, G-2, USAREUR

SUBJECT

GEHLEN Organization (U)  
(C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The German Intelligence Service (GIS - known as the GEHLEN Organization) was officially established on 2 February 1956 by an executive order emanating from the West German Federal Chancellery.
2. GIA support of the GIS will continue for the future in the following areas of interest:
  - a. All present support in Berlin.
  - b. SATURN program, including SATURN Base on Dachauerstrasse in Munich.  
(Note: SATURN program unidentified)
  - c. GARTAGE (war plans).
  - d. Baumholder Base Station.
  - e. Specific items of administrative support to continue by agreement for a specific period / legalization of the GIS ("L" Day).  
after
  - f. Communications equipment procurable only in the United States.
  - g. Financial support of operations and activities to be agreed upon.
3. Reinhold GEHLEN, approved as Chief of the GIS, anticipates that the Federal Government budget will be adequate to cover administrative and operational costs of the GIS. Evaluation B-2

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DISTRIBUTION

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DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47,  
1 Dec 1951 DA AGO) which may be used.

(Not Classified Unless Date Entered)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~



CP Rem

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

CIC FILE

Re

D-320529

14 Feb 56

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Gruppe (u)  
(G)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, United States Army  
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, (O2CICE)

1. (SECRET) Reference is made to Intelligence Collection Memorandum 7-55-CI:IA&E:CS, Subject: West German Government - Defense, Security and Intelligence Agencies (S), dated 21 October 1955, file 333.5 (OI:IA&E:CS (A-390)).

2. (SECRET) Forwarded for your information is the following report of a recent conversation between [b6], [b1] Liaison Officer, and [b6] of the [b1] as reported by [b6].

During a recent conversation, [b6] of the [b1] casually remarked that one [b6] was a GEHLEN organization representative (Vertreter) in BONN. In referring to [b6] stated that [b6] had recently represented GEHLEN at a discussion with [b1] officials concerning the conduct of operational intelligence activity with respect to the Soviet Embassy in ROLANDS ECK near BONN. [b6] said, represented the viewpoint that the GEHLEN organization should be competent for any operational intelligence activity in connection with the Soviet Embassy or Soviet Embassy personnel because the Soviet Embassy would be "extra-territorial" and, as such, a foreign target and thus not fall within the competence of the [b1]. The [b1] view-point was, however, that the [b1] was that Federal Government agency responsible for internal security and that since the activities of the Soviet Embassy would undoubtedly pose a threat to internal security, the [b1] would have to assert its competence for operational activity to counter any threat to internal security which might emanate from the Soviet Embassy.

3. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

b6

Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8244  
DEN/ROM/bjn

M/R: G2 informed of an official conversation between GEHLEN and [b1] representatives ref coverage of Sov Embassy in BONN.

**SECRET**

Copy 2 of 6

22907

CONFIDENTIAL

(Not Classified Unless Entered)

~~SECRET~~

13-086087

GID 26-0670

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 320-320-10)		DATE 13 Feb 1956
PREPARING OFFICE A&E Section, CI Branch, G-2, USAREUR		File: A-891
SUBJECT  GEHLEN Organisation (U) (C)-	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
	OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . A USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . B FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . D UNRELIABLE . . . . E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . F	OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES .1 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .2 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .4 IMPROBABLE . . . . .5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . .6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>1. The German Intelligence Service (GIS - known as the GEHLEN Organization) was officially established on 2 February 1956 by an executive order emanating from the West German Federal Chancellery.</p> <p>2. CIA support of the GIS will continue for the future in the following areas of interest:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. All present support in Berlin.</li> <li>b. SATURN program, including SATURN Base on Dachauerstrasse in Munich. (Note: SATURN program unidentified)</li> <li>c. CARTAGE (war plane).</li> <li>d. Baumholder Base Station.</li> <li>e. Specific items of administrative support to continue by agreement for a specific period // legalization of the GIS ("L" Day). after</li> <li>f. Communications equipment procurable only in the United States.</li> <li>g. Financial support of operations and activities to be agreed upon.</li> </ul> <p>3. Reinhold GEHLEN, approved as Chief of the GIS, anticipates that the Federal Government budget will be adequate to cover administrative and operational costs of the GIS. Evaluation B-2</p>		
<p style="text-align: right;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on FEB 04 2009 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NOT to be destroyed O.C. 20 July 56</p> <p>1162</p>		
DISTRIBUTION		

DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47, DA AGO) which may be used

(Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

CONFIDENTIAL-~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154,  
Attn: Liaison Div., S-2 Section DATE: 2 February 1956

FROM : T. C. Hughes, OCA, Embassy

SUBJECT: GEHLEN, General Rheinhard

Re: b1

1. Reference is made to your classified letter of 25 Nov 1955, file AEUC-OE, Subj: GEHLEN, General Rheinhard.

2. Attached, hereto, are five copies of a translation of an interesting press comment on the take-over of the GEHLEN Organization by the Federal Government. This article appeared in the 1 Feb 1956 issue of the German language newspaper "Neue Rhein Zeitung".

3. For your information.

1 incl a/s (5 cys)

*TC Hughes*  
8. FEB. 1956

Control copy to:  
Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
Attn: b6, Ln Div. S-2 Sect.

C  
4-1-7f

1163

CONFIDENTIAL

b1

TRANSLATION

Neue Rhein Zeitung  
1 February 1956

".....that is such a dirty business"

Hans Globke holds on to the threads

Intelligence-Organization Gehlen subordinated to the  
Federal Chancellery

Bonn. The tug-of-war which went on for years for the "Organization Gehlen" has been decided: The intelligence-apparatus, which is to collect military and certain political information for the Federal Government, will be subordinated to the Federal Chancellery. Consequently, State Secretary Hans Globke, the chief of this office, has a new instrument of power at his disposal. How is the situation now?

This trade is so dirty that only the cleanest men should control it. This phrase on the work of intelligence agents is supposed to have been coined by Reinhard Gehlen, the chief of the intelligence organization. It clearly shows how obscure this work is and how difficult to control.

The officers in the Federal Ministry of Defense who for years have tried to get the "Organization-Gehlen" under their "management" are therefore not displeased that it did not work out after all. They say: In the course of the last few years espionage and counter-espionage have become more and more political". Henceforth the Ministry of Defense will only evaluate military information obtained by Gehlen, but not political information.

Altogether four agencies are to participate in the evaluation of the intelligence material:

the Federal Chancellery,  
the Ministry of Defense,  
the Foreign Office,  
the Ministry of the Interior.

First of all, however, all information goes to the Federal Chancellery. State Secretary Hans Globke, the Bonn "Grey Eminence", whose threads are everywhere, will thus be able to "steer" the information.

This entails a genuine increase in power for Globke. He, who once as Ministerialrat in the "Reich Ministry of the Interior", collaborated in the publication of the commentaries to the Nuremberg Racial Laws and whose influence today in Bonn is so great that there is little that can happen against his will, in future will have at his disposal one of the best intelligence services in the world.

Not Controlable

1164

It is difficult to control the work of this apparatus. Thousands of so-called V-men (confidential agents), often shady types, form part of it. They are sitting in all countries of the world, mainly, however, behind the Iron Curtain. For instance, the Budget Committee of Parlia-

ment will never be able to check exactly how Globke and Gehlen will spend the 30 million DM which they require per year. Neither will it be possible now to dismiss all of Gehlen's "Employees" who are politically not unobjectionable, for "...that is a dirty business", and the "Employees" know too much.

Reinhard Gehlen, at the end of the war Major General and Chief of the Department "Foreign Armies East" in the General Staff of the Army, was asked by US General Patton immediately after the war, to set up an intelligence service. The Americans financed the organization until recently. They mostly asked Gehlen for information on developments in the East. Gehlen was a specialist in this work, and not even the British "Intelligence Service" is superior to his expert opinion in this connection.

Many new "tasks" are presenting themselves to Gehlen: watching the Soviet Zone "People's Army", observing the activities of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn and the control of KP activities within the Federal Territory.

It remains to be seen how often and in how far Gehlen's work will overlap with the work of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. It also remains to be seen, what use State Secretary Globke will make of his new instrument..... H.M.

2

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS REGION I  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

FILE NO: I-320529

2 February 1956

SUBJECT: West German Government Intelligence Agencies (S)  
Re: Gehlen Gruppe

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: CE Division

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 21/55,  
Headquarters 66th CIC Group, dated 23 December 1955, paragraph 50,  
sub-paragraph (5).

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) FORWARDED: Agent Reports, Subject and  
file as above, this Region, dated 2 February 1956.

3. (U) (SECRET) CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source "A" is [b1]  
[b1]  
[b1] Source "A"  
is evaluated "F".

b. Relationship of Source to Target: Source "A" is

[b1]

c. How Information was Obtained: Source "A" had interest  
in [b6] Subject of [b1] This case has now been  
closed by CIC. When the [b6] case was closed, Source "A" volunteered  
the following information: That Source "A" had informed the Liaison  
Officer for the Gehlen Gruppe, Herr Fnu [b6] that [b6] would  
travel to Poland in December 1955.

4. (U) (SECRET) REMARKS:

a. The information which is forwarded was obtained in  
confidence from Source "A". Source "A" did not enlarge upon the  
details of his relations with [b6] Neither did Source "A" state  
whether or not [b6] has liaison to other Police or Security agencies  
in the STUTTGART area.

Carded by C.I. Section  
Date APR 3 1956 Init 237

7. FEB. 1956

REGRAIDING DATA CANNOT  
BE PREDETERMINED

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

FILE NO: I-320529

SUBJECT: West German Government Intelligence Agencies (U)  
(S)

b. Although the information which is forwarded dates from August 1955, it is presumed that ZANDER is still the Liaison Officer of the Gehlen Gruppe to D-8.

c. In the absence of b6 who is on leave until 11 February 1956, the Agent Reports were signed by the CE Team Chief to facilitate and expedite forwarding of reports.

b6

Continuing

1 Incl

2 ARs dtd 2, Feb 56

*[Signature]*  
FBR/IT/rab/STGT 9342 - 8491

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4 February 2009

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 360-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

West German Government Intelligence Agencies (U)  
Re: Gehlen Gruppe (S)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

2 February 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

I-320529

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 22 August 1955, Source "A" was interviewed and stated that Herr Fnu ZANDER is the Liaison Officer of the Gehlen Gruppe to the D-8 (Political) Section, STUTTGART (NV 1303), Germany, City Police. ZANDER has a son, name not stated, born about 1920, who also is employed by the Gehlen Gruppe. ZANDER'S son was a German officer during World War II, and plans to apply for the new German Army. (F-6).

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

1168  
b6

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-2004-30063

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

West German Government Intelligence Agencies (S)  
RE: Gehlen Gruppe

2. DATE SUBMITTED

2 February 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

I-320529

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 23 January 1956, examination of the records of the Regional Registry, Region I, 66th CIC Group, STUTTGART (NY 1303), Germany revealed the following information concerning a person who might be identical with the Fnu ZANDER mentioned in this report:

A CPI card mentions Dossier I-24908, Subject: ZANDER, August Georg  
b6 This Dossier was forwarded to Central Registry, b6  
CIC Group in March 1955. ZANDER resides at b6  
10/II, and is allegedly employed by the Gehlen Organization. Further references to ZANDER are contained in Files I-22004 and I-22000, which were forwarded to Central Registry; and File D-284322, SOI dated 26 May 1954, Region I, Subject:

b1

(C-3).

*12-1314*  
*11/19: 23.2.56; CH had no record of I-22004 and I-22000.*  
*1772*

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

Region I, 66th CIC Group

b6

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-62-200M-30093

1169  
SECRET

*To C. Div.*  
**CONFIDENTIAL****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154,  
Attn: Liaison Div., S-2 Sect.

DATE: 1 February 1956

FROM : T. C. Hughes, OCA

SUBJECT: b1

1. Reference is made to your classified letter of 25 Nov 1955, file AEUC-OE, Subj: GEHLEN, General Rheinhard.

2. Attached, hereto, are five copies of translation of an article concerning the GEHLEN Organization which was published in the 31 January issue of the German language paper "Westdeutsche Allgemeine." This article reports that the Federal Government is planning the establishment of the b1 with the take-over of the GEHLEN Organization within the next few days.

3. For your information.

1 incl a/s (5 cys)

*T. Hughes*

6. FEB. 1956

Control copy to:  
CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
Attn: b6 Ln Div., S-2 Sect.

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23 April 2008  
by USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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4-1-7f

*1170*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**b1

Ch. Fern

Stuttgarter Nachrichten dtd 1 Feb 56

File  
D-320529  
Vol 2

# **Haushaltsausschuß will Stellenbesetzung der Organisation Gehlen prüfen**

(dpa) BONN, 31. Januar

Der Haushaltsausschuß des Bundestages hat bisher von der Bundesregierung noch keine Vorlage über eine Übernahme der Organisation Gehlen erhalten. Der Vorsitzende des Ausschusses, Erwin Schoettle (SPD), betonte in Bonn, daß die etatmäßigen Voraussetzungen für die Übernahme durch den Bund noch nicht gegeben seien. Er nahm damit zu Behauptungen Stellung, daß die Organisation Gehlen bereits am 1. Februar in einen Bundesnachrichtendienst umgewandelt werden soll. Der Haushaltsausschuß habe sich das Recht vorbehalten, alle Stellenbesetzungen durch Angehörige der Organisation Gehlen vorher zu überprüfen. Bei allen Vorbesprechungen über die künftige Verwendung der Organisation Gehlen sei stets festgehalten worden, daß eine globale Übernahme nicht erfolgen solle und daß der Ausschuß in jedem Fall ein Prüfungsrecht habe.

1171

TRANSLATION

Westdeutsche Allgemeine  
31 January 1956



Organization Gehlen to be taken over by the Bund within the next day  
Bundestag factions in agreement - Gehlen becomes Ministerialdirektor

by our Bonn Office


Schu Bonn, 30 January

The Federal Government is going to take over the Organization Gehlen within the next few days and will thus possess its own Federal Intelligence Service. The former General Reinhard Gehlen is to receive the rank of a Ministerialdirektor. His organization is to be directly subordinated to the Federal Chancery.

According to Bonn reports on Monday, all Bundestag factions agree to the taking-over of the organization which comprises approximately 2500 persons. A Committee of representatives of all factions, however, will in particular examine the political past of the leading members of the organization. It can therefore be expected that some of the members of the Gehlen-Service will not be taken over.

A resolution by the Budget Committee is expected within the next days to safeguard the financing of the organization with approximately 30 million DM per year. A similar amount had so far been paid by the American Occupation Power for Gehlen's services.

As has been repeatedly reported, Gehlen after the war had built up a Foreign Intelligence Service by order of the Americans, the personnel of which was chiefly composed of former members of German Military Intelligence. After the Federal Republic became sovereign, the Americans decided to break off their relations with Gehlen, however, continued to finance his organization during the transition period.



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~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154,  
TO : Attn: Liaison Div., S-2 Section

DATE: 27 January 1956

FROM : T. C. Hughes, OCA

SUBJECT: b6

Re: GEHLEN Organization Personnel

X. During a recent conversation b6 of the b1 casually remarked that one b6 was a GEHLEN organization representative (Vertreter) in BONN. In referring to b6 stated that b6 had recently represented GEHLEN at a discussion with b1 officials concerning the conduct of operational intelligence activity with respect to the Soviet Embassy in ROLANDS ECK near BONN. b6 said, represented the viewpoint that the GEHLEN organization should be competent for any operational intelligence activity in connection with the Soviet Embassy or Soviet Embassy personnel because the Soviet Embassy would be "extra-territorial" and, as such, a foreign target and thus not fall within the competence of the b1. The b1 view-point was, however, that the b1 was that Federal Government agency responsible for internal security and that since the activities of the Soviet Embassy would undoubtedly pose a threat to internal security, the b1 would have to assert its competence for operational activity to counter any threat to internal security which might emanate from the Soviet Embassy.

2. For your information.

b6

1. FEB. 1956

3261

Control copy to:

CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR

Attn: b6 Ln Div., S-2 Sect.

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section

Date APR 3 1956 Init 237

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~~SECRET~~

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b1

### The New Federal Intelligence Service

The Gehlen Organization which finally, with the consent of the opposition, will perform the counter espionage missions for the Federal Republic as a federal intelligence service, under the immediate supervision of the Federal Chancellor. The Defense Ministry will not have any rights for a direct instruction of the organization. In addition thereto the new military attaches will not take over any counter espionage missions while on their posts abroad. The financing of the Gehlen Organization is now also principally a matter of the Federal Republic and supervised by the Bundesrechnungshof.

("Exklusiv-Dienst", Bonn, January 22, 1956)

*IR perm*  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

D-320529

20 January 1956

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Gruppe <sup>(u)</sup>  
(c)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: Counter Intelligence Branch (G2CICE)

1. Reference is made to Intelligence Collection Memorandum 7-55-CI:A&E:CS, dated 21 October 1955, file 333.5 (CI:A&E:CS(A-390)).

2. Forwarded for your information is the text of a United States Embassy Press Review Report of an article which appeared in the 12 January 1956 issue of the German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau. The report, which was forwarded this Headquarters by the CIC Liaison Officer, MEHLEN, reads as follows:

"GEHLEN Organization to be Taken Over by Federal Republic 1 February 1956 . . . . . Thursday's Frankfurter Rundschau (FR) led with a report that the Federal Republic will establish an intelligence organization of its own by taking over the GEHLEN Organization. FR said that since conclusion of the PARIS Treaties the US Army has severed its relations with the organization, but has continued to finance it. With the approval of his US superiors, GEHLEN has been closely cooperating with the German government for years.

FR said GEHLEN will continue as head of the organization and will answer directly to the Chancellor and Federal Chancellery Undersecretary GLOBKE. FR said the organization thus will have much the same position as have similar organizations in the US and UK. The intelligence organization's functions will consist of supplying foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence and counter espionage and will not overlap with those of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. FR said the Defense Ministry has agreed with other German agencies that future German military attaches abroad will not be given counter-intelligence tasks. FR said the Bundestag Budget Committee is currently dealing with appropriations for the intelligence organization in the 1955 supplementary budget. FR said beginning 1 February 1956 the GEHLEN Organization probably will no longer get any American subsidies and will discontinue supplying the US Army with intelligence.

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HQ 307

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

(S3)

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REF NR 69 D CFF PFCI LIDP ... IS REBEL ORGANIZATION ...  
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PAGE TWO RUEFFC OLY

WITH THE GERMAN GOVT FOR YEARS PD PARA FR RPT FR SAID DEHSEL WILL CONT  
AS HEAD OF THE ORGANIZATION AND WILL ANSWER DIRECTLY TO THE CHANCELLOR  
AND FEDERAL CHANCELLERY UNDERSECRETARY GLIBKE RPT CLOKE PD FR SAID  
THE ORGANIZATION ITUS WILL HAVE MUCH THE SAME ACCTING AS HAVE SIMILAR  
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE US AND UK BUT UK PD THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS  
FUNCTIONS WILL CONSIST OF SUPPLYING FOREIGN INTELL AND COUNTER DASH  
INTELL AND COUNTER ESPIONAGE AND WILL NOT OVERLAP WITH THOSE OF THE  
OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO BE SAID THE  
DEFENSE MINISTRY HAS AGREED WITH OTHER GERMAN AGENCIES THAT FUTURE USE  
MILITARY ATTACHES AND WILL NOT BE GIVEN COUNTERTELLIGENCE TASKS  
HAREMER SAID THE BUDGETARY BUDGET COMMITTEE IS CURRENTLY TALKING WITH  
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NEW ORGANIZATION IT TO FIVE AND SOME FURTHER  
BUDGET PD FR SAID BUDGETING ONE FID CONP CON THE NEW ORGANIZATION  
PROBABLY WILL BE FIVE FID TO A FID FID SUBSIDIES AND FID FID FID FID  
SUPPLYING THE ORGANIZATION WILL BE FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID  
PLANNED TO ISSUE FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID  
REPRESENTATIVE OF FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID  
THE ORGANIZATION'S ACTIVITIES TO FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID FID

b6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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Page 1 of 1  
Copy 1 of 1

*CIR psm*  
~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY  
*10 Jan 56*

D-320529 Volume 3; D-90635

SUBJECT: b6 (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 408, US Army  
ATTN: G2CICS

(U)  
1. (SECRET) Reference is made to Message, file M-2917, your office, dated 30 December 1955, subject as above, which requested a Central Registry check on SUBJECT, who was described as a cousin of Reinhard GEHLEN.

(U)  
2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Forwarded herewith is a Summary of Information on SUBJECT, based on the records of Central Registry. Your attention is invited to mention of one b6 who was identified as an employee of the Technical Intelligence Branch in 1948. This information was obtained from a letter sent by Headquarters European Command, Technical Intelligence Branch, APO 787, US Army, dated 1 January 1948, subject: Carrying of Confidential Material by Traveling Civilian Employee. Addressed to the "ETO and Whom It May Concern", a copy of the letter was received by the 430th CIC Detachment, APO 541, US Army.

(U)  
3. (SECRET) It is requested that the information concerning SUBJECT's position in the Gehlen Organization, as given in paragraph 1 of the attached Summary of Information, be restricted to military channels.

(U)  
4. (CONFIDENTIAL) It is requested that this Headquarters be informed of any additional data obtained by your Office on SUBJECT. This will aid in the maintenance of Central Registry records on SUBJECT.

HQ 9676 LOG

*1184*  
~~SECRET~~

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4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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D-320629 Volume 3; D-90636

SUBJECT: b6 (U)

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermind.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl: SOI, file: D-320629  
Volume 3; D-90636, This Mq,  
dtd 9 Jan 56, Subj as above  
(dupe) (~~SECRET~~)(U)

b6

Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 7484  
ABR/jd

M/R: Self-explanatory

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~~SECRET~~

10 January 1956

Headquarters, 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group

D-320529

GEHLEN Organization <sup>(U)</sup>  
~~(S)~~

CC FILE

(U)

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ GEHLEN, General Reinhard aka Dr. SCHNEIDER:

a. GEHLEN was born 3 April 1902 in ERFURT. GEHLEN's father, Walter GEHLEN, was a publisher and a former director of the FERNAND-HIRTH Publishing House in BRESLAU. GEHLEN attended the classical Gymnasium in BRESLAU, completing the course in 1920. GEHLEN then became a "Fähnleutnant" (Officer-Aspirant) of the First Battery of the Artillery Regiment 6, located in SCHWEIDNITZ. GEHLEN was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant in 1923, 1st Lieutenant in 1928, Captain in 1934, Major in 1936, Lt. Colonel in 1941, Colonel in 1942 and Brig. General in December 1944. In 1926 GEHLEN attended the Cavalry School located in HANNOVER. From 1929 to 1933 GEHLEN was with Artillery Regiment #3, located first in SCHWEIDNITZ and later in FRANKFURT/O. From 1933 to 1935 GEHLEN attended War College (in 1934 the Military Academy in BERLIN), and in 1935 GEHLEN became Adjutant to the Oberquartiermeister 1 (Deputy Chief of the General Staff). In 1936 GEHLEN was permanently appointed to the General Staff, and in 1937 he served with Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East). GEHLEN then became Adjutant for Generaloberst HALDER, Chief of the General Staff of the Army. In 1940 GEHLEN had served as liaison officer with the Army High Commands and Groups under Generals GUDERIAN, HOTH and BUSCH. After 1942 GEHLEN was head of the Intelligence Division in the Fremde Heere Ost Section. (B-3)

b. After the war GEHLEN was an Allied POW who was interned by the US Army. In the summer of 1945 GEHLEN was sent to WASHINGTON, D. C., where his services for US intelligence were accepted, with certain stipulations regarding control and organization of the staff that SUBJECT was to create and lead. Headquarters for the GEHLEN organization were originally located in FRANKFURT/M, and then were moved to MUNICH/Fullech (also reported as MUNICH, Senefelderstrasse 8). In 1955 the GEHLEN organization was reportedly being taken over by the German Government. (B-3)

c. On 10 September 1931 GEHLEN was married to Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, born 17 April 1904, the daughter of Friedrich Wilhelm von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, an Oberleutnant a. D., residence (undated) listed as GLOGAU, Neue Kallestrasse 18. (B-3)

2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(SECRET)~~ (fnu) KUHNE (alias):

<sup>(U)</sup>  
(CONFIDENTIAL) One Karl KUHNE, born 27 July 1903 in KIEL, residing in 1952 at KIEL, Obleusenstrasse 19, who may or may not be identical with (fnu) KUHNE, was a member of the NSDAP after 1 May 1937. KUHNE has been a member of the

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SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organisation (S)

BLANK Office since at least 1952 and was listed in August 1954 as an employee of Abteilung I/2 of the BLANK Office. (B-2)

3. (~~SECRET~~) HERRE, Heins aka HERDAHL, Heins:

a. (CONFIDENTIAL) One Heins Danko HERRE, born 23 January 1909 in ST. AVOLD, Kreis Metz, Prussia, was married in BERLIN on 22 March 1934 to Christa von WEDEL, born 17 October 1910; children were born in June 1939 and October 1936. HERRE attended school in SOLTAU from 1915 to July 1918, in EISENACH from July 1918 to November 1922, in HEIDELBERG from November 1922 to August 1925, and in WEIMAR in 1927. HERRE entered the German Army in April 1927 and was commissioned a Lieutenant in March 1931. HERRE was promoted to Oberleutnant in 1933, Hauptmann in 1937, Major in 1941, Oberstleutnant in 1943 and Oberst in June 1944. In 1936 HERRE traveled in Russia to study the language and in 1937 HERRE planned to visit Estonia and Finland. There is no indication that HERRE made the trip to Estonia and Finland. In August 1939 HERRE was assigned to the General Staff, and until June 1940 he was Ic Officer on the staff of the Generalkommando of the 26 Armee Korps. From June 1940 to October 1940 HERRE was Ib Officer for the 6 Gehirgsdivision and the Generalkommando of the 18 Armee Korps. From October 1940 to April 1942 HERRE was Ia Officer on the staff of the 49 Armee Korps, and after April 1942 he became a member of the Abteilung "Fremde Heere Ost" of the OKH, attaining the position of Gruppenleiter. In May 1943 HERRE was assigned to the staff of the General der Ostgruppen, serving in 1943 and 1944 with the Fuehrerreserve of the OKH and the 232 Infanteriedivision. After November 1944 HERRE served with the 1st Russian Division as 2 Fuehrer der deutschen Aufstellungsetab. (B-2)

(U)  
b. (~~SECRET~~) Heins HERRE, a former Colonel, was reported to be head of the Evaluation group of the Intelligence Directorate and to have joined the GEHLEN organisation in 1946. HERRE was an Allied POW until June 1946. In 1944, HERRE was German Army Liaison Officer to the VLASSOV Army. (B-3)

(U)  
4. (~~SECRET~~) [b6]

(U)  
a. (~~SECRET~~) [b6] was a member of the German Army in World War II. [b6] joined the GEHLEN organisation in April 1947 and was reported to be executive secretary to GEHLEN. (B-3)

(U)  
b. (CONFIDENTIAL) [b6] attended the Deutschen Realgymnasium in the HAAG (Holland) from 1925 to 1927. During 1939-1940 [b6] was Zugfuhrer and Adjutant for A. A. 5, and in 1942 [b6] was chief of A. A. 5. During 1943-1944 [b6] was Adjutant for the Aufkl. u Kav. Schule, BROMBERG. (B-2)

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D-320529 (10 Jan 56)

SUBJECT: GERMAN Organization (U) (S)

5. (~~SECRET~~) b6

(U)  
a. (~~SECRET~~) The name of one b6 age thirty-six (36) in 1952, appears on a list of names of persons allegedly in the SDE (Special Detachment EUCM). b6, a former Lt. Colonel, joined the General Staff on 1 April 1944, his last military assignment being with b6 (Unvaluated)

(U)  
h. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) In 1936 b6 at b6 became a Lieutenant; in 1939 a 1st Lieutenant; in 1942 a Captain and in February 1944 a Major. b6 military assignments were as follows: 1939-1941 - Adjutant, Arm. Necht, Fhr., A.O.K.; 1941-1942 - Ep Chef and Aht. Fhr.; 1943- Fhr. Rec., C.K.H., and then Kriegsschule; and 1943 - 82 Inf. Division. (B-2)

(U)  
6. (~~SECRET~~) b6

(U)  
a. (~~SECRET~~) The name of one b6 age thirty-seven (37) in 1952, appears on a list of names of persons allegedly in the SDE. b6 a former Major, joined the General Staff on 1 April 1944, his last military assignment being with the IIIaFhr Det. (Unvaluated)

(U)  
h. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) One b6 was promoted to Lieutenant in 1936, 1st Lieutenant in 1938, Captain in 1942 and Major in 1943. In 1942-1943 b6 was assigned to CHH Gen St d.H., in 1943 he attended Kriegsschule, and in 1944 he was assigned to 23 Pz. Division. (B-2)

(U)  
7. (~~SECRET~~) b6

(U)  
a. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) One b6 residence (undated), but prior to July 1953, listed as b6 b6 served in France, Belgium, Holland, Russia and the Baltic States in the German Army in World War II. b6 was captured and held as a POW by Allied Forces at WISCHENLOOF near HOF in June and July 1945. b6, who speaks fair English and French, attended school in BERLIN and POTSDAM from 1920 to 1933. After 1934 b6 was in military service, attaining the rank of Major by the end of the war. In b6 was employed by b6 b6, lawyer, at b6 and at the same time b6 attended the BERLIN Academy for Political Science. After May 1953 b6 was employed by the Senate of the City of BERLIN, Police Administration. (F-6)

b. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) In 1955, b6 then an employee of the b1 was transferred from BERLIN to COLOGNE. (B-2)

c. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) In 1953, the name of one b6 residence listed as b6 no other identifying date available, appeared on a list of b1 employees. In 1954 the name of one b6 residing in

~~SECRET~~

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[b6] was submitted by the [b1] for screening as a potential employee of the BLANK Office. (S-2)

(U)  
8. (SECRET) HEPP, Leo aka Leo MOBL:

(U)  
a. (SECRET) Leo HEPP, born 15 August 1907 at OIM, Germany, was reported to be the head of the Office of Communications of the GEHLEN Gruppe in 1954. HEPP, a former Colonel, entered military service in 1925, serving until the end of World War II. From 1937-1939 HEPP held the post of deputy Chief of Communications of the German High Command. HEPP joined the GEHLEN organization in April 1948, and in 1954 HEPP was reportedly directly subordinate to GEHLEN, having both staff and command responsibilities. (S-3)

(U)  
b. (CONFIDENTIAL) HEPP was promoted to Lieutenant in 1929; 1st Lieutenant in 1933; Captain in 1936; Major in 1941; Lt. Colonel in 1942 and Colonel in 1944. From 1939-1940 HEPP was assigned to Stab. 86; from 1940-1941 with Stab. AOK 12; from 1941-1942 with 218 J. B.; and in 1942-1943 with Fuhr. Res. OKH (Wehrkr. III). (S-2)

(U)  
c. (SECRET) The name of one Leo HEPP, age forty-five (45) in 1952, appears on a list of names of persons allegedly in the SDE. HEPP, a former Colonel, joined the General Staff on 20 April 1940, his last military assignment being with GHNf. (Unevaluated)

(U)  
9. (SECRET) [b6]

(U)  
a. (SECRET) The name of one [b6], age forty-one (41) in 1952, appears on a list of names of persons allegedly in the SDE. [b6], a former Major whose last military assignment was with Ia XXXIX, joined the General Staff on 1 June 1944. (Unevaluated)

(U)  
b. (CONFIDENTIAL) One [b6] [b6] (?), was promoted to Lieutenant in 1937; 1st Lieutenant in 1940; Captain in 1942 and Major in 1944. His military assignments were as follows: 1939-1942 Adj. and Htr. Chf in A.R. 28 and 104; 1942-1943 Ord. Officer, Stab OKH; 1943 Gen St Ausb., Stab 11 Pz Division; 1943-1944 Kriegsakademie; and after February 1944, Ib, 11 Inf. Division. (S-2)

(U)  
10. (SECRET) [b6]

(U)  
a. (CONFIDENTIAL) Information exists on one [b6] [b6] a trace. [b6] a former Lt. Colonel on the General Staff and an authority on Soviet motor vehicle numbering systems, received schooling in MUNICH (undated), and then entered the German Army in

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April 1932. [b6] was a Battalion Commander on the Russian Front in 1941 and was on the General Staff College Faculty in 1942. [b6] was an Allied POW, who was at Fort HUMT, where he wrote training data on the German Army for the Pentagon. (U) (Unvaluated)

b. (CONFIDENTIAL) In 1947 a letter from the Deputy Director of Intelligence, EUCOM, stated that the United States authorities had no objection to [b6] being employed by the Bavarian Civil Service Ministry. (B-2) (U)

c. (SECRET) The name of one [b6] age thirty-nine (39) in 1952, a former Lt. Colonel whose last military assignment was with Ch. St. Ausb. (possibly ChStaub or ChStasab), entered the General Staff on 20 April 1943. (Unvaluated) (U)

11. (SECRET) HESS, Wilhelm aka Wilhelm HEROLD: (U)

a. (CONFIDENTIAL) One Wilhelm HESS, born 8 February 1898 in BAYREUTH, Kreis Ober Franken, Bavaria, residing (undet) at Kulmbacherstrasse 28, BAYREUTH, was a member of the NSDAP after 1934 and a member of the Wehrmacht from 1937 to 1945, attaining the rank of Colonel. (Unvaluated) (U)

b. (CONFIDENTIAL) HESS was captured in FRIEDENFELS, Germany, in April 1945 and interned in HEIDESHEIM, Germany; AITICHI, France; BOMMILLI, France; NEUSTADT, Germany, and after October 1945 in Camp 78. HESS was reported to be of War Crimes interest by the War Crimes Branch, Judge Advocate Section, Headquarters, Seventh Army, and was not to be released without notification and approval of the War Crimes Branch. No additional information is available on HESS. (B-2) (U)

12. (SECRET) [b6] (U)

a. (CONFIDENTIAL) One [b6] was interned in [b6] residing in 1955 at [b6] was interned in 1947 as a POW, but was scheduled to be released from internment in July 1947 (as a member of Group V - exonerated). In May 1954 [b6] name (with residence then listed as TAUFKIRCHEN, Vils Obb) appeared on a list of persons to be screened for employment with the BLANK Office as staff officers in the future German Army. In April 1945 his name was submitted to this Headquarters by DAD/LO for a Central Registry Check. Reason listed was that [b6] [b6] was of operational interest to DAD. (B-2) (U)

b. (CONFIDENTIAL) [b6] a Captain, held the following military assignments: 1939-1942, Adjutant and Battery Chief (no unit indicated); 1942, Vorbereitung zur San St Ausbildung; and 1942-1943, 299 J.D. (B-2) (U)

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SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization (S)

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13. (U) (SECRET) [b6]  
(U)

(CONFIDENTIAL) In April 1954 the name of [b6]  
[b6] residence listed as [b6] appeared on  
a list of names of persons to be screened for employment with the BLANK Office  
as staff officers in the future German Army. In February 1955 [b6] name  
(with residence then listed as MUNICH, Minerviastrasse 13/III) was submitted  
to this Headquarters by DAD/LO for a Central Registry Check. Reason listed for  
the check was that [b6] was of operational interest to DAD. [b6] is married  
to [b6] nee (?), [b6] [b6] was a student at  
TUMSINGEN University for two years prior to 1939 as a theological student and  
BLOCK reportedly ran a taxi business in B/D TOELZ in 1952. [b6] was a World  
War II Officer. (B-2)

14. (U) (SECRET) [b6]  
(U)

a. (CONFIDENTIAL) One [b6] occupation listed as profession-  
al soldier, a former Lt. Colonel on the German General Staff, a trace, was  
arrested in December 1945 as an automatic arrestee (general staff member).  
[b6] was interned at the German Military Hospital 2001, HERRSCHING. (B-2)

b. (U) (SECRET) The name of one [b6] age thirty-nine (39) in  
1952, appears on a list of names of persons allegedly in the SD. [b6] a  
former Lt. Colonel whose last military assignment was with CH INF TrP, entered  
the General Staff on 24 December 1942. (Unavaluated)

15. (U) (SECRET) HAERTEL, Johannes aka Johann HELLER:  
(U)

a. (U) (SECRET) The name of one Johannes HAERTEL, age forty-four (44)  
in 1952, a former Colonel in the German General Staff, appears on a list of  
names of persons allegedly in the SD. HAERTEL, whose last military assign-  
ment was with ChP1 TrP, entered the General Staff on 20 October 1941. (Unavaluated)

b. (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) One Johannes HAERTEL, born 16 June 1908 at BROCKAU,  
Kreis Breslau, home address listed as HAMBURG-Harburg, Postweg 66 (undated), was  
arrested in October 1946 at DACHAU as an automatic arrestee (General Staff  
member). HAERTEL was deemed not to be a security risk in 1946, and his recom-  
mended disposition was to be that normal for General Staff Officers. HAERTEL  
was not a member of the NSDAP. HAERTEL was listed as a specialist in transport-  
ation. (B-2)

c. (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) HAERTEL was promoted to Lieutenant in 1933; 1st  
Lieutenant in 1934; Captain in 1939; Major in 1942; Lt. Colonel in 1943 and  
Colonel in 1944. HAERTEL had the following military assignments: 1939, 20th  
Infantry Division; 1940, JKH/Chef Transportation; 1941, Stra West and Trsp.  
Kdr. Oppeln; 1942, W. Trsp. Lt. Det; and 1943, 36 Inf Division and Chaf  
Trspw. (B-2)

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SUBJECT: OEHLEN Organization (S)

16. (U) (SECRET) [b6]

a. (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) In 1954 the name of [b6]  
[b6] residence listed as [b6]  
[b6] appeared on a list of persons to be screened for employment  
with the BLANK Office as staff officers with the future German Army. (E-2)

b. (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) [b6] a former Captain, held the follow-  
ing military assignments; 1940, I.S. 486 (262 I.D.); 1940, GEM Gen Qu, Bel-  
gium and PARIS; 1941-1942, 4 Pz. Division; and 1942, GEM Gen Qu 1 and 3. (E-2)

17. (U) (SECRET) [b6]

a. (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) In July 1954 the name of [b6]  
[b6] residing in [b6]  
appeared on a list of persons to be screened for employment with the BLANK  
Office as staff officers in the future German Army. In March 1955 [b6]  
name was submitted to this Headquarters by DAD/LO for a Central Registry Check.  
Reason listed for the check was that [b6] was of operational interest to DAD.  
[b6] resided in March 1955 at PULLACH b. MUNICH, Gartenstadt, Muensterstrasse  
7, and was married to Erika nee (?), born 5 August 1906 at ALEN (or BIE). (E-2)

b. (U) (CONFIDENTIAL) [b6] was promoted to Lieutenant in 1934, 1st  
Lieutenant in 1937; Captain in 1940 and Major in 1944. [b6] held the follow-  
ing military assignments: 1940-1941, Arko 108; 1942-1943, Arko 301; 1943, 23  
Pz. Division; 1943-1944, A. R. 320; and 1944, GEM/Jnz Kdt. (E-2)

M/R: Co-ordinations: All names co-ordinated with [b6], GE,  
10 Jan 56, and with [b6] S-3, 10 Jan 56, by [b6]

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CONFIDENTIAL

WEEHUNG/mlf

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE  
19 December 1957

## PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Munich, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

EE-399972

## SUBJECT

b1

(S)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
 USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
 FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
 UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1  
 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 2 December 1957 SOURCE A-FOMUN stated that the Gehlen organization had reassumed their military ranks.

SOURCE: A-FOMUN

B-3

## DISTRIBUTION

1 - Hq, 66th CIC Gp 1 - CS FOMUN

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

17 DEC 1957

XE 320529

CO, 66th CIC Gp, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Army  
Attn: AEUC-SCCS

b1

(c)

b6

16 Dec 57

b6 bpo/MC299607

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) On 5 Dec 57, [b6] gave a cocktail party for six (6) [b1] officials at the residence of [b6] at [b6]. [b6] were the only Americans present. [b6] had previously met all the invited officials at various conferences. [b6] had previously met only the first three (3) listed below.

2. (~~SECRET~~) The following [b1] officials were present at the party which lasted from 1900, 5 Dec 57, to 0130, 6 Dec 57. All names by which the guests were introduced are believed to be cover names. Information provided below was obtained at the party or in previous contacts with these officials. All name spellings are phonetic.

a. [b6] - Real name may be [b6]. During World War II served as an Artillery Battalion CO, serving first in France and later on the Eastern Front. He also served as a liaison officer to the Vlassow Army. Speaks fluent English, with a British accent, and is a fluent Russian linguist. He presently functions as the [b1] liaison officer to all American agencies. He is believed to be an Assistant Operations officer on the overt side. He drank a fair amount but remained sober.

b. [b6] - Real name may be [b6]. During World War II was probably a Colonel and General Staff officer. He was assigned to the OKA (Ober Kommando Army) in Italy, and he once briefed Rommel. He understands English. He is believed to be the highest ranking person at the party. It may be that he is the Assistant [b1] Operations Officer for covert activities. Whenever business was discussed, he continually tried to change the subject. Drank moderately.

c. [b6] - Probably, together with [b6] the lowest ranking person at the party. He was the only German at the party who did not discuss his background. Drank moderately and had practically nothing to say all evening. He speaks some English. He is believed to have an administrative assignment in covert operations.

d. [b6] - Real name may be [b6] (according to Oberstaatsanwalt [b6] Bavarian Ministry of Interior). Presently functions as [b1] Liaison Officer to the German agencies. Primarily deals with the [b1]. Believed to have office space in the [b1]. Drank fairly heavily and showed effects. Was an infantry officer in World War II, probably company grade. Speaks fair English. Kicked by his colleagues as a typical back-slapping, wise-cracking extrovert: Liaison Officer type. Somewhat indiscreet when under the influence of alcohol, but his 'indiscreet' comments are usually in the "safe" part of the "game".

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comments may have been calculated. He took part in the French campaign and was later severely wounded in Russia.

e. [b6] - Real name may be [b6] Served in World War II as an Air Force pilot. Rather reserved and drank very little. May possibly work for [b6] Will probably play an important role in setting up [b1]

f. [b6] - Probably, with [b6] the lowest ranking person at the party. Drank excessively and was "loaded". Served in World War II as a tank CO and was formerly a cavalry officer. Was somewhat bitter about CIC "falsely" imprisoning him at the end of the war. He is believed to have an administrative assignment with the [b1]

3. (SECRET) The following points of interest were discussed:

a. [b6] [b1]  
The subject was introduced by [b6] who stated that [b6] was extremely difficult to deal with because he handled so many cases himself and was too interested in politics. He gave an animated description of [b6] visiting the President of the [b1] all smiles and sweet talk across the table while he kicked the President of the [b1] in the groin under the table. [b6] also took part in the discussion of [b6] and they were of the same opinion. [b6] is considered an excellent intelligence officer, but more interested in himself than in the mission of the [b1] According to [b6] is still suffering from the fact that his first wife was twenty (20) years older than he. [b6] brought out the fact that [b6] is the [b1] channel for liaison in Bavaria and that if he desired to visit the Ministry of Interior he must obtain [b6] permission and [b6] would undoubtedly want to go along in order to know exactly what was to be discussed. [b6] superior in the Ministry of Interior, was described as a conscientious official whose lack of intelligence background had made it possible for [b6] to do just about as he desired. It was felt that recently [b6] was beginning to see [b6] in his true light. [b6] and [b6] all felt that something should be done about [b6] and that [b6] should be thoroughly briefed by the [b1] regarding [b6] [b6] again emphasized that he could not go to [b6] without [b6] permission and then hinted that maybe someone could arrange things so that he happened to be together with [b6] socially.  
(COMMENT: [b6] indicated that this might be possible but then dropped the subject. Later in the evening, [b6] and [b6] were invited to an OCA party on 10 Dec 57 where [b6] will also be present. Unfortunately [b6] will also be at the party. [b6] will also plan another party so that the [b1] and [b6] [b6] can get together without [b6] presence.)  
[b6] then repeated a comment reportedly recently made by [b6] new Bavarian Minister of Interior. [b6] reportedly stated: "There are three things Bavaria can do without - [b6] the [b1] and the SPD [b6] is FDP).

It appeared to be the opinion of the [b1] that with [b6] known attitude, if [b6] could be convinced that [b6] was primarily interested in [b6] - then it might be possible to arrange

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

for a new [b1] President.  
(COMMENT: It is the intent of [b6] to do everything possible to support the [b1] behind the scenes, in their attempt to have [b6] replaced.)

b. [b6] new MAD CO, MUNICH.  
[b6] after the alcohol had begun to have its effects, spent approximately two (2) hours belaboring his problems in obtaining an apartment for the new MAD CO. He was ridiculed by [b6] and, to a lesser degree, by [b6] on his inability to find an apartment. [b6] obviously felt that [b6] with his liaison contacts, should have been the person to obtain the apartment. [b6] stated that it would have been no problem for him but now that [b6] had "fouled it up" it might be more difficult. [b6] continually tried to change the subject. [b6] finally came right out and said that this was neither the time nor place for this discussion and "let's talk about [b6] [b6] also attempted to change the subject. [b6] was drunk by this time and paid little attention to [b6] or [b6]. The whole conversation appeared to be very serious to [b6] but [b6] and the others treated it as a joke and ribbed [b6] unmercifully. [b6] said things like "Liaison people do nothing but talk and never accomplish anything. I do not believe in beating around the bush." [b6] comments to statements of this effect were "that's why you didn't accomplish your mission."  
(COMMENT: On 2 Dec 57, [b6] MAD, had remarked to [b6] [b6] that in the previous week a [b6] [b1] had visited [b6] in his office and that when he had to drive [b6] home at about 2000, [b6] was so drunk he could barely walk. [b6] and the "Col" from [b1] had been drinking Kirchwasser all afternoon in the office.)

c. [b1] Operations Officer  
The Operations Officer of the [b1] is known as [b6]  
Whether this is a cover name or real name is unknown.

d. [b1] policy regarding social contacts  
In answer to a query, [b6] stated that [b1] personnel could attend social gatherings if the persons had been previously contacted officially and if the maintenance of contact was of value to the [b1]. It was explained that the reason the [b1] had not been included in persons invited to OCA Christmas parties was that we had been under the impression that they would not be permitted to attend these parties.

e. The [b1] as a liaison channel for the [b1] in Bavaria.  
It appears that [b1] liaison in Bavaria must be channeled through [b6] [b6] had previously informed [b6] and [b6] that this was the case). It was also apparent that this arrangement is not satisfactory to the [b1] and that they prefer direct liaison.

4. (SECRET) It is the intention of [b6] to maintain social and operational contact with the [b1] through [b6] whenever possible and appropriate. For the information of the LO, how has the [b1] been conducting their CR checks? If [b6] should be requested by the [b1] for a file check would it be honored? For the information of the LO, why is it not desired nor permitted that the [b6] maintain open liaison with the [b1] Would not CIC liaison with [b1] to include processing their CR checks, be of definite value to CIC?

1202  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. (~~SECRET~~) Further contacts with and information received from b1 officials will be reported. It should be noted that the party was held at the LO's residence (a FO MUNICH operational house) because the b1 officials preferred a place with as much privacy as possible. Even with the privacy, b6 parked their cars over a block away from the house.

6. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

b6

CIC LO, OCA BAV

1203  
~~SECRET~~

111

JOINT MESS. <del>ET. M</del>				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
<div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">03 100</div>		<div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">05/1400</div>		<div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">DEC - 5 1957</div>	
PRECEDENCE <b>ROUTINE</b>		TYPE MSG (Check) BOOK <input type="checkbox"/> MULTI <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL <b>DA</b>	
ACTION		INFO		ORIG. OR REFERS TO <b>H-1870</b>	
FROM: <b>CO, 66th CIC Group, Bad Cannstatt, Ger.</b>				<div style="border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 50%; width: 100px; height: 100px; margin: 0 auto; position: relative;"> <div style="position: absolute; top: 0; right: 0; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">2</div> <div style="position: absolute; bottom: 0; left: 0; font-size: 0.8em;">             1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31           </div> </div> <p style="font-size: 0.8em; margin-top: 5px;">CLASSIFICATION OR REFERENCE</p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em; margin-top: 5px;">SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p>	
TO: <b>G2, USAREUR, Heidelberg, Ger.</b>					
<b>F-66025</b> Opr for ARAGB-OSA from AEUC-SC ref your msg <b>M-1870.</b>					
<p>On 12 Nov curr, <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 10px;">b6</span>, Ops Off, <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 10px;">b1</span>, queried OGA to detm if a VW Transeporter, license nr <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 10px;">b6</span> with a radio xmit using the call K/244 belonged to Am intel. A check of appropriate Am intel agencies revealed that the VW belongs to <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 10px;">b1</span></p> <p>-----</p> <p>M/R: Above ans req from G-2.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">NAW/at/5 Dec 57</p>					
DATE <b>05</b>		TIME <b>1000Z</b>		MONTH <b>10</b>	
YEAR <b>1957</b>		SIGNATURE <b>b6</b>		TYPE <b>b6</b>	
PHONE <b>8371</b>		PAGE NR. <b>1</b>		NR. OF PAGES <b>1</b>	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>		RELEASED BY <b>b6</b>		(Inf) <b>Chief, CE Division</b>	



FILE-XE 320 329

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM		CLASSIFICATION: <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>	
TO: 13100Z NOV 57	TCR: 14025Z	CODE CLERK	FEH
FROM: CO F/O MUNICH		PRECEDENCE:	<b>ROUTINE</b>
TO: CO 66TH SIG GP		REFERENCE NR:	D-0454
AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.			

FROM b6 FOR AENC SPCS.

5-3

SUBJ IS b1 ON 12 NOV 57, b6 ORS OFF, b1  
QUER OCA TO DETERMINE IF A VV TRANSPORTER, LICENSE NR b6 WITH  
A RAD TRANS USING THE CALL E/244 BELONGED TO AMER INTELL. A CK OF  
APPRO AMER INTEL AGEN REVEALED THAT THE VV BELONGS TO THE b1  
ON 13 NOV 57, THE b1 b1 CANCELLED THEIR QUERY PRIOR TO HAVING  
REC AN ANSWER FROM OCA.

08382

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103

REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED	
CLASSIFICATION: <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

# AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

CR Perm

320529

## 1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

b6

Alien

DOB: b6

POB: b6

## 2. DATE SUBMITTED

6 November 1957

## 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

DE-360546

## 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 28 October 1957, examination of the records of the b1

b1 by b6 liaison officer from b1

to Militärischer Abschirmdienst b1

verified that b6 born b6

b6 Residence: b6

b6 is employed by the Gehlen organization in an unspecified capacity.

## 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66th CIC Group

## 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WO AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30093

CONFIDENTIAL

101

1214

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR AND SPECIAL ADVISOR  
American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

G2 USAREUR Liaison Office

5 November 1957

TO : CO, Hq 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
ATTN: S-3 Section, G3 Division, Liaison Branch

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr.

SUBJ: Cooperation and Coordination between FRG POLICE and  
Security and Intelligence Agencies.

1. Reference is made to Operations Memorandum 6/57,  
Headquarters 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. From various liaison contacts it has been learned that  
an "Arbeitstagung der Kriminalpolizei des Bundes und der Laender in  
Staatschutzsachen (Working Meeting of Federal and State Criminal  
Police with regard to matters involving State Security)" occurred  
in GOSLAR on 24, 25 and 26 October 1957. The meeting was held under  
the auspices of the Federal Interior Ministry and the Federal Criminal  
Police Agency ("Bundeskriminalamt") acted as host. [b6]  
[b6] head of the Security Group ("Sicherungsgruppe") of  
the [b1] organized the program and acted as chairman throughout  
the meeting.

3. The meeting was primarily intended to provide an oppor-  
tunity for the various levels of criminal police who are concerned  
with the investigation of "political offenses", i.e. treason, sub-  
version, espionage, etc., to meet together and discuss mutual problems  
of cooperation and coordination. Invitations to attend were tendered  
by the Federal Interior Minister to the State Interior Ministers, who  
are responsible for internal security affairs within the several  
states. General attendance at the meeting was thus governed by the  
wishes of the Interior Ministers. In most cases, I am told, State  
participation in the meeting included representatives of the State  
Interior Ministries, the State Criminal Police Agencies ("Landes-  
kriminalaemter") and the [b1]

[b1] Liaison con-  
tacts specifically stated that the heads of the [b1] SCHLESWIG-  
HOLSTEIN, HAMBURG, LOWER SAXONY, NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA, BREMEN  
and BERLIN attend the meeting. Other [b1] also sent represent-  
atives to the meeting.

4. In addition to the foregoing, representatives of the

[b1]

[b1] and the Military Counter Intelligence Service  
("Militaerische Abwehrdienst") also attended the meeting and parti-  
cipated in the program.

5. The three-day program opened on Thursday 24 October with  
a series of lectures by members of the participating organizations  
which were followed on Friday, 25 October, by a visit to the [b1]  
border and inspection of various border control facilities. The  
meeting was concluded on Saturday, 26 October, with a visit to the  
CAMP FRIEDLAND refugee processing camp.

6. Lectures were given by [b1] NC chief, [b1]  
[b6] [b1] officials, [b6] and [b6]  
[b6] General GEBLER of the [b1] [b6] of MAB, [b1]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
EXC PT. [b1]  
BY AUTHORITY OF CO. 66TH CIC GROUP  
DATE [b1]

1215  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[b1]

Cr Perm

XB-320529

JOINT MESSAGE AM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		CONFIDENTIAL					
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER											
<div>19</div>				TYPE MSG (Check) BOOK MULTI SINGLE		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL DA		ORIG. DR. REV. AS TO I-2639		CLASSIFICATION OR REFERENCE	
PRECEDENCE ACTION PRIORITY											
INFO											
FROM: CO 66th OIC Group, Bad Oannstatt, Ger								SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS  AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION. PHYSICALLY RE-MOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP FOR TO DECLASSIFICATION NO UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION. THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.			
TO: G2, USAREUR, Heidelberg, Ger											
F-60100 Opr from AEUC-SCCS for AEAGB-COA. Ref I-2639.											
1. Subj is Gehlen Lecture in Goslar/Harz Area in the Fed Republic (U) (C).											
2. On 23 Oct curr Regierungsdirektor [b6] Chief of [b1] informed this LO that he will attend a meeting in Goslar on 24 Oct curr, at which the main speaker will be General Reinhard Gehlen, Chief of Ger Positive Intel. Herr [b6] added that undoubtedly there will be many Ger Intel Specialists at this meeting as well as Fed Criminal Officials and Fed Border Police Officials.											
3. The exact Subj of Gehlen's speech is unk to this LO; However, it must be assumed that if Fed Criminal and Border Police Officials will attend the meeting, that its purpose will be to co-ordinate Ger positive intel operations with fed executive authorities.											
W/R: Forwarding info to keep G2, abreast.											
DATE 24 MONTH 1430 YEAR											
SYMBOL AEUC-SCCS				[b6]				[b6]			
[b6]				[b6]				[b6]			
PHONE Stgt Mil 7232				PAGE NR. 1		NR. OF PAGES 1		[b6]			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL								83			

cr Perm

XE 370529 ~~03~~ 4

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM		CLASSIFICATION <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	
TOO: 231545Z OCT 57	TOR: 231648Z	CODE CLERK FEH	
FROM: CO CIC RGN VIII		PRECEDENCE: <b>PRIORITY</b>	
TO: CO 66TH CIC GP		REFERENCE NR: 1-2639	
AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.			
OPR FROM AEUC SOLD FOR AEUC SOCS. <span style="float: right;">5-3</span>			
SUBJ IS GEHLEN LECTURE IN GOSLAR/HARZ AREA IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC <span style="float: right;">(u)</span>			
1. ON 23 OCT CURR REGIERUNGSDIREKTOR <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">b6</span> , CHIEF OF <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">b1</span> INFORMED THIS LO THAT HE WILL ATTEND A MEETING IN GOSLAR ON 24 OCT CURR, AT WHICH THE MAIN SPEAKER WILL BE GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN, CHIEF OF GER POSITIVE INTEL. HERR <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">b6</span> ADDA <sup>E</sup> THAT UNDOUBTEDLY THERE WILL BE MANY GER INTEL SPECIALISTS AT THIS MEETING AS WELL AS FEDERAL CRIMINAL OFFICIALS AND FEDERAL BORDER POLICE OFFICIALS.			
2. THE EXACT SUBJ OF GEHLEN'S SHEECH IS UNK TO THIS LO; HOWEVER, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT IF FEDERAL CRIMINAL AND BORDER POLICE OFFICIALS WILL ATTEND THE MEETING, THAT ITS PURPOSE WILL BE TO COORINATE GER POSITIVE INTEL OPERATIONS WITH FEDERALEX <sup>2</sup> ECUTIVE AUTHORTTIES.			
3. ANY ADDITIONAL INFO OBTAINED WILL BE FWD ASAP			
MR/Forwarding information to keep G2 abreast			
reaction 1840 Bec			
<span style="font-size: 2em;">107</span>			
REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED			
CLASSIFICATION <span style="font-size: 1.5em;">1218</span>	PAGE 1	OF 1	PAGES COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cr Perm

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR AND SPECIAL ADVISOR  
American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

G2 USAREUR Liaison Office

XE 320529

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154  
Attn: S-3 Section, CS Division, Liaison Br

16 October 1957

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr.

SUBJ:

b1

Re: Personnel

SCHULZ, Karl, born 9 Dec 1903 in FULDA

1. Reference is made to paragraph 50(2)(a) of Operations Memorandum 6/37, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. Karl SCHULZ has been employed by the [b1] since 1951 as the chief of the [b1] Central Files. Prior to service with the [b1] SCHULZ was an employee of the so-called "GEHLEN Organization," the American sponsored intelligence organization of General GEHLEN which subsequently evolved into the current [b1]

3. SCHULZ' service with the [b1] has been considerably less than distinguished and he has often been criticized by other [b1] personnel for what they have described as the poor condition and organization of the [b1] Central Files. I have recently been informed by [b1] contacts that SCHULZ has now resigned from the [b1]. Reason for the resignation is said to be his dissatisfaction with the constant criticism being expressed about his management of [b1] files. He has apparently now actually left the [b1] and is said to have found another job with the [b1]

C  
50(2)(a)-TCH-f

penl SCHULZ, Karl-f

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
12 Oct 57  
16 OCT 57

b1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR AND SPECIAL ADVISOR  
G-2 USAREUR Liaison Element

American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

FILE  
XE 320529  
or Peroni

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154  
Attn: S-3 Section, CS Division

23 September 1957

THRU: Liaison Division, S-2 Section

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr.

SUBJ: [b1]

Re: Personnel [b6]

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraph 50(2)(a) of Operations Memorandum 6/57, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. [b6] born [b6] is a former employee of the [b1] and has been the subject of previous reports by this office. In this connection, reference is made to my report of [b1]

[b1]

3. Subsequent to [b6] leaving the [b1] various [b1] personnel indicated that he had obtained a job with the [b1]. Recently the DAD liaison element of OCA, Bonn, queried this office as to the identity of a [b1] employee formerly employed by the [b1] who claimed to have known me from his [b1] service and who was described as about 40 years of age, approximately 5'6" tall, somewhat stocky, blonde, roundish face, good teeth and a clear, hard manner of speech. This individual, DAD said, was using the cover name of [b6] at the [b1]. This description seems to fit [b6] and tends to confirm the statements of [b1] staffers to the effect that [b6] is now with the [b1]

[b6]

Information Copy to:  
Liaison Division, S-2 Section  
Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR

C  
AMZ-psul-f

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NOT RELEASED TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
None  
23 Sep 57

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[b1]

OF THE COORDINATOR AND SPE  
American Embassy, Bad Godes.

ADVISOR **FILE**

G-2 USAREUR Liaison Office

4E320529

**SECRET**

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154  
Attn: S-3 Section, CS Division

22 August 1957 91

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
EXCEPT *None*

SUBJ: b1

AUTHORITY OF CO, 66TH CIC GROUP  
DATE *22 Aug 57*

Re: b1

1. Reference is made to paragraph 5e(3)(e) of Operations Memorandum 6/37, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. Reference is also made to my report of 18 July 1957, file b1  
b1 SUBJECT as above, which reported an 11 July 1957 visit of four b1 CE officers to the b1. As reported, the visit was to return a previous visit by b1 CE officials to the b1 CE Section in MUNICH/Pullach. The purpose of the exchange of visits was to attempt to effect a closer working relationship between the b1 CE staff and their opposite numbers at the b1.

3. Subsequent to submission of the report referenced in paragraph 2, above, I requested the DAD liaison elements of OCA, BOMM, to determine through DAD channels all available identifying information pertaining to the b1 visitors who had been identified to me by b1 personnel only as (fmr) b6 an unidentified b1 CE evaluation case officer and an unidentified b1 case officer responsible for maintaining a library of "build-up-material" at the b1 for use in double-agent cases. Under date of 13 Aug 1957, the DAD liaison element of OCA furnished me with the following additional identification of the b1 personnel concerned:

CARDED

a. EISMANN, Hans Georg  
born 2 June 1909 in MEDEL, Germany,  
address: MUNICH/Germaring  
formerly a career army officer who attained the rank of Colonel (Oberst) in the German Army in WW II; has been with the GEHLEN organization since 1951 and is currently Deputy Chief of the CE Section of the b1.

CARDED b.

b6  
born b6  
address: MUNICH/Lochham,  
joined the German Army in 1934, rose to the rank of Major and was with the German General Staff in 1945; now holds the rank of Lt. Colonel (Oberstleutnant) in the new German Army (Bundeswehr); has been with the GEHLEN organization since 1950 and is currently Chief of the CE Evaluation Section of the b1.

CARDED c.

b6  
born b6 b6  
address: MUNICH  
service in the former German Army extended from 1936 through 1939 when he was released because of heart trouble and status as a student; served in various capacities during the war, including "Hilfs-Kriminalkommissar" at "Kripoloitstelle," DRESDEN, and was a member of "Ant VI Bdz Holland (Operation NORPOL)"; has been with the GEHLEN organization since 1952 and is presently a b1 desk officer specializing in RIS double agent cases.

06014

**SECRET** 1256

b1



~~SECRET~~

- d. b6  
no biographic data available;  
handles "Build-up material" for the b1

4. COMMENT:

a. It is recommended that a copy of this report also be brought to the attention of the CE Division of your Hq as a matter of possible interest.

b. The foregoing information is not suitable for inclusion in the periodic, widely distributed 66th CIC Group Monthly Report of Liaison with Official German Agencies. Further distribution of the information contained herein should be confined to CIC and OACofS, G-2, USAREUR, channels.

Information copy to:  
Liaison Division, S-2 Section  
Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR

C  
5d(3)(e)-TCH-f

1257

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~~SECRET~~

b1

~~SECRET~~

b6

22 July 57

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY.

AEUC-SCUS-XC-320529

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization b1 (G)

TO: Commanding Officer  
Munich Field Office  
66th CIC Group  
APO 108, US Army

(U)

1. (SECRET) Reference is made to this Headquarters' Operational Memorandum No. 6/57, dated 20 June 1957, paragraph 3b (3) and 5c.

(U)

2. (SECRET) Enclosed is a list which provides vehicle license numbers observed within the Pullach Headquarters compound of the Gehlen Organization.

(U)

3. (SECRET) It is desired that attempt be made to identify the license numbers with the owners of the vehicles, if you have available any such listing of license numbers. Great care must be taken to avoid compromise in this search, and any inquiry identified with an interest in the Gehlen Organization must not be made to German authorities.

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl: List Ger License plates,  
G2 USAREUR, dtd 3 July 57  
(1 cy) (X)(U)

b6

Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 7484  
WDG/tee

M/R: The list of license numbers was received from G2 USAREUR. Attempt is being made to get some idea of who has been in contact with the GO.

This document classified SECRET by authority of

b6

Inf, Hq, 66th CIC.

1264  
~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

10 July 1957

SUBJ: b1

Re: Linson with [b1]

2. Reference is also made to my report of b1  
SUBJECT as above.

4. At the [b1] the [b1] party was given an orientation by [b1] CE staffers (evaluators only) on [b1] CE operations and [b1] CE activity. This was followed by visits to the various branches of the [b1] CE Evaluation Section (IV/A) where the [b1] were given an opportunity of talking to and exchanging views with [b1] CE case officers.

6. COMMENT: The foregoing is an indication of expanding operational contact and coordination between the [b1] and the [b1] in the CE field. However, the presence of the official [b1] liaison representative to the [b1] [b6] indicates that the [b1] at least is not yet ready to completely remove its former channel of communication and contact with the [b1] in favor of direct personal contact between case officers and operational personnel of the two services.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
EX-111 None  
AIR MAIL 1000 CO. 601 100 9103

$$\gamma_2(s)(u) = \gamma_2(u) - f$$

b1

CONFIDENTIAL

287025 XE 320529

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

15 July 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Stuttgart, 66th CIC Group, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

ICM-CI-Installations 1-55(U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 15 July 1957, LSO-2 (LS 1st

b6

CARDED

b6

Labor Service Serial Number

91317, Executive Office, 4072nd Labor Service Guard Company, Fliegerhorst Kaserne, Boeblingen (NU 0192), West Germany, will resign from Labor Service ostensibly to enter into the fishing business with his brother-in-law in the Algaeu area. b6 who is an expert in the photography field, actually will be employed by the b1 (Gehlen Organization) in Munich (PU 9035), West Germany. It is believed that b6 will be employed by the Gehlen Organization in the photography field.

(Source: A-POSTGT)

(B-6).

DISTRIBUTION

1-Hq., 66th CIC Grp.

1-File

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS

U. S. ARMY, EUROPE

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

CIO 77-0624

AEACB-C (QA) 350.05 GB

APD 403

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization b1  
Re: Vehicle Registration Numbers

13 JUL 1957

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army

(U)

1. (~~SECRET~~) Forwarded for your information is an SOI, subject as above, dated 20 March 1957, which provides vehicle license numbers observed within the Pullach Headquarters compound of the GEHLEN Organization.

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Downgrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

1 Incl:  
SOI, subj as  
above in dup

**b6**

Chief, CI Branch

18 JUL 1957

6808

05020

*List to  
FOM in  
for attempted  
identification*

1267  
~~SECRET~~

74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Not Classified Unless Date Entered)

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 308-320-18)		DATE 5 Jul 57
PREPARING OFFICE G2 Division, O&A Section, Hq USAREUR, AFO 403		
SUBJECT GEMLEN Organization	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . A USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . D UNRELIABLE . . . . . E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES .1 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .2 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .4 IMPROBABLE . . . . .5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . .6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION  16 April 1957 (Cont'd)  STA A 606 M DD 149 M * AM 479 M * AC 467 M AC 895  M AO 438  17 April 1957  STA D 257 M * AL 936 M AN 736 M * DW 503 STA C 660  STA C 645 STA* H 443		
* Indicates vehicles which have appeared previously.		
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 4 February 2009 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R		
1268 70		
DISTRIBUTION	2 - 66th CIV 1 - A-891	

DA FORM 568 (Formerly DA AGO) Replaces WD AGO Form 548, 1 Jun 47, which may be used.

(Not Classified Unless Date Entered)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 30-320-10)				DATE July 5 1957														
PREPARING OFFICE G2 Division, O&A Section, HQ USAEUR, APO 403																		
SUBJECT GEHLIN Organization		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION																
		<table border="0"> <tr> <td>OF SOURCE:</td> <td>OF INFORMATION:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . O</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE . . . . . E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6</td> </tr> </table>			OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . O	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4	UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																		
<u>11 April 1957</u>																		
STA H 443	M AM 479	M AC 848	B 633723	STA A 655														
STA D 471	WOR E 498	M AA 172	M ED 564	M AC 950														
B 444813																		
<u>12 April 1957</u>																		
M AL 592	STA B 506	STA * D 471	A 688693 B	M HC 151														
B 567238	STA D 599	M DA 935	B 515316															
<u>15 April 1957</u>																		
M AC 467	M AN 736	STA * D 471	STA D 787	B 547238														
B 988677	M ET 914	M AL 480	M AD 421	STA* E 443														
M DW 835	M L 998																	
<u>16 April 1957</u>																		
M * DW 835	M EW 336	STA * D 471	M AC 767	M AC 150														
M AC 763	M AA 981	M D 262	STA * H 443	WOR* E 498														
DISTRIBUTION		1269																
2 - 60th CIG Group 1 - A-891																		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 308-370-10)		DATE 3 July 1957
PREPARING OFFICE G2 Division, CI Branch, O&A Section, Hq USAFEUR APO 403		
SUBJECT  GEHLEN Organization	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . A USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . D UNRELIABLE . . . . . E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<u>4 April 1957</u>		
M L 750*	M AC 767*	B 495329  STA C 677  M DW 503*
M AA 782	M AM 479	M AA 319  M AX 795
<u>8 April 1957</u>		
FFB K 101	M DR 935	M C 405  STA A 655*
M AX 795*	M DW 835	M AC 571  STA C 645
<u>9 April 1957</u>		
STA C 645*	M AL 480*	M AL 895*
M GW 141	M L 405	STA A 598*
<u>10 April 1957</u>		
M AA 781	STA D 599	STA A 655*
STA D 471*	STA D 257	M AL 936
M AC 307*	M AL 179	B 485850  B 508579
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 4 February 2009 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R		
DISTRIBUTION	2 - 66th CIC Gp 1 - A-891	

05020

1270

72

DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47.  
1 Dec 1951 DA AGO) which may be used.

(Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



4 February 2009

by USAINSCOM FOLPA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Not Classified Ma-  
1999 Date Entered)

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SP 360-370-10)		DATE 3 July 1957																																																			
<b>PREPARING OFFICE</b> G2 Division, CI Branch, O&A Section, Ho USAREUR, APO 403																																																					
<b>SUBJECT</b> GEHELEN Organization		<b>CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION</b> <table border="0"> <tr> <td><b>OF SOURCE:</b></td> <td><b>OF INFORMATION:</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE . . . . . E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6</td> </tr> </table>		<b>OF SOURCE:</b>	<b>OF INFORMATION:</b>	COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4	UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6																																				
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<b>SUMMARY OF INFORMATION</b>  The following German vehicle license plates have been observed within the Headquarters compound of the GEHELEN Organization on the dates indicated:  <div style="text-align: center;"><u>29 March 1957:</u></div> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>B 518077</td> <td>STA D 257</td> <td>M AA 126</td> <td>M AL 895</td> <td>M HV 795</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M A 404</td> <td>M AX 913</td> <td>M AL 911</td> <td>STA A 655</td> <td></td> </tr> </table> <div style="text-align: center;"><u>1 April 1957:</u></div> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>M AL 680</td> <td>STA D 471</td> <td>M AC 767</td> <td>M AC 153</td> <td>M AX 713</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M AC 307</td> <td>M ED 333</td> <td>M AC 895</td> <td>M AC 950</td> <td>M AL 469</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M AL 911*</td> <td>STA A 598</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table> <div style="text-align: center;"><u>2 April 1957:</u></div> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>M ET 914</td> <td>FFB K 101</td> <td>M AV 424</td> <td>STA D 787</td> <td>B 526413</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M AL 469*</td> <td>M DW 503</td> <td>B 518077</td> <td>M AD 615</td> <td>M CM 339</td> </tr> <tr> <td>B 515316</td> <td>M DD 149</td> <td>M AC 848</td> <td>M AL 480</td> <td></td> </tr> </table> <div style="text-align: center;"><u>3 April 1957:</u></div> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>M DX 696</td> <td>M EM 678</td> <td>STA D 471*</td> <td>M L 750</td> <td>M AC 307</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M CM 339 v</td> <td>B 634850</td> <td>M L 750</td> <td>M AC 307</td> <td>STA A 655*</td> </tr> </table>				B 518077	STA D 257	M AA 126	M AL 895	M HV 795	M A 404	M AX 913	M AL 911	STA A 655		M AL 680	STA D 471	M AC 767	M AC 153	M AX 713	M AC 307	M ED 333	M AC 895	M AC 950	M AL 469	M AL 911*	STA A 598				M ET 914	FFB K 101	M AV 424	STA D 787	B 526413	M AL 469*	M DW 503	B 518077	M AD 615	M CM 339	B 515316	M DD 149	M AC 848	M AL 480		M DX 696	M EM 678	STA D 471*	M L 750	M AC 307	M CM 339 v	B 634850	M L 750	M AC 307	STA A 655*
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<b>DISTRIBUTION</b> 2 - 66th CIC Gp 1 - A-891																																																					

05020

1271

73

EXPERN

18  
HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
SECRET  
XZ 320529/01-012793 of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 1 Jul 57

GID 77-0501  
APO 403

D-  
(CIC File No) Evaluation Sheet

SUBJECT:

TO : Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

- 8 Jun 57 as above  
W/Ger Government Intel Agencies Re: b6 (u)  
(0)
1. Request is made to report, your group, file  
dated , Subject:  
Source:
  2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of (See reverse side for scale).

3. It is of interest to determine how b6 identified himself or by whom he was introduced to US authorities. A physical description would also be of value. It is possible that b6 is identical with b6 residing at b6 in 1954, former chief of the GO Munich field office. b6 has been tentatively identified as Hans Helmut KUTZ, born 25 Oct 1906 at Ulm.

04842

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

b6

DOWNGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

SECRET

69

(Analyst)

AEUC FL 188-1 (L)  
18 DEC 56

1272

EDITION OF 17 JAN 55 MAY BE USED.

EVALUATION LETTER

Numerical Value Scale:

0	Worthless - obviously false		
1	Of very doubtful value		
2	Slight value	Out of date	Low level
3	Slight value	Out of date	Medium level
4	Slight value	Out of date	High level
5	Slight value	Timely	Low level
6	Slight value	Timely	Medium level
7	Slight value	Timely	High level
8	Valuable	Late	Low level
9	Valuable	Late	Medium level
10	Valuable	Late	High level
11	Valuable	Timely	Low level
12	Valuable	Timely	Medium level
13	Valuable	Timely	High level
14	Very valuable	Late	Low level
15	Very valuable	Late	Medium level
16	Very valuable	Late	High level
17	Very valuable	Timely	Low level
18	Very valuable	Timely	Medium level
19	Very valuable	Timely	High level
20	Extremely valuable	Late	Low level
21	Extremely valuable	Late	Medium level
22	Extremely valuable	Late	High level
23	Extremely valuable	Timely	Low level
24	Extremely valuable	Timely	Medium level
25	Extremely valuable	Timely	High level

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OACofS, G-2, USAREUR, APO 403, US Army  
Attn: O & A Sec, CI Branch

14 June 1957

George D. Swordlin, OCA, American Embassy

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

KLEIHAMP, Pnu (Ex-General, German Army) EXCEPT None

BY AUTHORITY OF CO, 66TH CIC GRO.

DATE: 14 Jun 57

1. Reference is made to para 4c of IOM 1-57.

2. SUBJECT is at present the [b1] representative in Land Schleswig-Holstein, which position he has occupied since early 1956. Prior to that time, he was the Gehlen Organization representative in Berlin, using the cover name "Kleiber" (phonetic). He is a former General-Major, and was assigned to the Personnel Dept. of the German Army High Command during World War II.

3. SUBJECT has his office within the section of the Military Area Command I building in Kiel which is occupied by MAD, and receives administrative support from MAD. This, however, is merely a matter of convenience and SUBJECT does not use MAD as cover.

4. When the Gehlen Organization "legalized" itself and became the [b1] the question became acute as to how the former Gehlen representatives for each Land who operated clandestinely before, would now set up official offices. Reinhold Gehlen then suggested that MAD office space might be a practical solution since that would obviate lengthy negotiations for office space with each Land government. Similar arrangements have been made in Hannover, i.e. Land Lower Saxony, and other places, but not in Munich. Initially, this caused objections on the part of some Land Ministers of the Interior, who feared "undue [b1] control over and amalgamation with, MAD," but was finally approved during a Ministers of Interior conference.

5. The above information was imparted to me by [b6] in the course of casual conversation during a recent visit in my home.

6. Comments:

a. Reference is made to several reports by [b6] AMCONGEM Stuttgart, with respect to the role played by [b1] representative [b6] in MAD Detachment V. It is not believed, however, that SUBJECT's activities can be compared with those of [b6] because Sak stated that SUBJECT is officially known as the [b1] representative in Land Schleswig-Holstein and does not use MAD as cover.

b. The German Army Register 1944/45 lists SUBJECT as being the chief of Section P-5 (general staff officers) in the Army Bureau of Personnel as of 1 Aug 1944, in the rank of Colonel, General Staff. He was promoted to the rank of General-Major on 1 Jan 1945.

Information copies to:

[b6]

Hq, 66th CIC Gp

Attn: CS Div

1283 C

4-1-7

21/55 (GDS)

American Consulate General,

Stuttgart, Reports Section, APO 154 Hq, 66th CIC Gp

Attn: Liaison Div

[b1]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

34197

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CR

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

D- XE-320529  
(CIC File No)

7 June 1957

SUBJECT: Evaluation Sheet

AP0 403

TO : Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 154, US Army

1. Reference is made to report, your group, file as above  
dated 8 Apr 57, Subject: b1 Re: Budget,  
Source: OCA (c)

2. The above referenced report has been given an evaluation index  
of twelve (12) (See reverse side for scale).

3. Remarks: None.

b6

(Analyst)

1287

1287  
DOWNGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

57

AEUC FL 188-1 (L)  
18 DEC 56

EDITION OF 17 JAN 55 MAY BE USED.

EVALUATION LETTER

JOINT MESSAGE 7M				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>		AB-320529 <i>CR Perin</i> <i>tech spec</i>	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER							
PRECEDENCE ACTION <b>DEFERRED</b> INFO		TYPE MSG (Check) BOOK MULTI SINGLE X		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL DA		ORIG. OR REFERS TO ORIG	
FROM: OO 66TH CIC GROUP 8AD CANNSTATT GER						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. MAY 16 1957	
TO: CIC LO HEIDELBERG GER  <b>F31698</b> OPR FROM AEUC-SCCS FOR AEAGB-COA PD REF LTR AND SOI CMM YR OFFICE QM DATED TWO SIX AND TWO ZERO MAR RESPECTIVELY PD SUBJ CLW CEHLEN ORGANIZATION PAREN BND PAREN PAREN CONFIDENTIAL PAREN PD INFO OF TYPE CONTAINED IN ABOVE REF REPT OF INTEREST TO THIS GROUP PD REQ ALL FURTHER INFO BE PASSED TO THIS GROUP AS OBTAINED BY YR OFFICE  ----- M/R: C2 forwarded SOI on license numbers of <b>b1</b> vehicles, which had been observed entering and leaving <b>b1</b> Compound in Pullach. FO Munich indicated per D-3802 that such info. of value to them.  <div style="float: left; width: 100px; text-align: right;">5 5 5 5 5 5</div>						AC PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR RECLASSIFICATION BY BUREAU OF ORIGINALLY MOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION-NO UN- CLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.	
SYMBOL AEUC-SCCS <b>b6</b> PHONE Stgt Mil 7484 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>						DATE TIME 1330Z MONTH 6 MAY 1957	
WRITER <b>b6</b> 1 NR. OF PAGES 1						RELEASEE <b>b6</b> <b>b6</b> S3 1291  55	

5-2

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM		CLASSIFICATION C
TOO: 131430z MAY 57	TOR: 131436z	CODE CLERK: A <i>CS</i>
FROM: F/O MUNICH	PRECEDENCE: R	
TO: CO 66TH CIC GP	REFERENCE NR: D-3802	

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

OPR FROM AEUCSCCS FOR AEUCSCCS.

*File: XE 300507*

SUBJ IS GEHLEN ORGANIZATION (CONF), XE32529, REF LTR DTD 7 MAY CURR. INFO OF TYPE CONTAINED IN REPORT FWD IS OD INTEREST TO CS TEAM MUNICH FO. REQ STEPS TO ASSURE CONTINUED SUPPLY OF SUCH INFO THROUGH G2 CHANNELS.

*Write G2 expressing interest - all further reports received from G2 should be sent to Munich, JGM*

32291

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

*CP Germ*

*1292*

*1845  
motion  
AL*

*54*

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED		
CLASSIFICATION	PAGE <i>1</i> OF <i>1</i> PAGES	COPY <i>1</i> OF <i>3</i> COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

AEUC-SCCS-XE-320529

SUBJECT:

b1

Re: Budget (C)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: AEAGB-C (OA)

1. REFERENCE: ICM 1-57

2. REMARKS:

- a. ( ☒ ) Contents of inclosure have not been disseminated to any other agency.
- b. ( ) Contents of inclosure have been passed to:
- c. ( ☒ ) Source( ☒ ) of the inclosed report was ( ~~XXXX~~ ): as stated.
- d. ( ☒ ) Date of the information was: as stated.
- e. ( ☒ ) Investigation is continuing.
- f. ( ) Investigation is considered closed.
- g. ( ☒ ) Information contained in the attached report may not be released in its present form to other intelligence agencies.
- h. ( ☒ ) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl: SOI, File: b1  
OCA, b1 Subj as  
above (dupe)

b6

Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 7484  
CEN/tee

WB FL 2-6 (L)  
29 NOV 55

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

**CONFIDENTIAL**



~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

X

DA

O-2583

~~SECRET~~

CO 66TH CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT OER

CO CIC REGION XII KAISERSLAUTERN OER

OPR FROM AEUC\*SCCS FOR AEUC-SCCS PD REP  
LIMA DASH ZERO ONE TWO SIX PD

SUBJ IS POLICY COMMITTEE FOR GERMAN INTEL COMMUNITY PAREN  
SECRET PAREN IT IS FELT THAT THE POL INFO AND COMMENT CMM  
WHICH WAS REC FROM LNOB CMM MAY TEND TO CLARIFY INFO REPT IN  
ABOVE REFERENCED MSO CLM ALFA AT A SEVEN FEB CURR MEETING BETWEEN

[b1] IN COLOGNE THE [b1] SLASH MAD DELIMITATION AGREEMENT  
CMM WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED BY [b1]

[b1] AND [b1] CMM HAN INTO STRONG  
OPPOSITION ON PART OF SOME [b1] WHO WOULD NOT ENDORSE AGREEMENT  
PD SUBSEQUENTLY CMM MATTER WAS PLACED ON AGENDA FOR TWO ZERO  
FEB CURR CONFERENCE OF FED AND STATE INTERIOR MINISTERS WHO  
CMM HOWEVER CMM DID NOT GET AROUND TO THIS AGENDA ITEM PD  
PAREN FOR FURTHER DETAILS SEE AEUC DASH LNOB REPT DID TWO  
TWO MAR CURR CMM FILE BRAVO VICTOR DASH FIVE SEVEN DASH ONE  
THREE ZERO SEVEN CMM SUBJ [b1] REP [b1] SLASH [b1] DELIMITATION  
AGREEMENT PAREN PD BRAVO AT INSTIGATION OF LAENDER AND WITH  
CONCURRENCE OF FED AGENCIES DECISION WAS THEN MADE TO REVIEW  
BOTH [b1] SLASH [b1] AND [b1] SLASH MAD DELIMITATION AGREEMENTS  
AT A BORN CONFERENCE TO BE ATTENDED BY REP OF FED INTERIOR

REGARDING DATA SUBJECT OF PREDETERMINED

AEUC-SCCS

[b6] /tee

[b6] 7484

1

3

[b6]

~~SECRET~~

Classified ~~SECRET~~ by authority of

[b6]

Inf, Rq, 66th CIC.

14352  
47

~~SECRET~~

CO 66TH CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT GER

MINISTRY AND [b1] CMM FED DEF MINISTRY AND [b1] CMM FED CHANCELLER  
AND [b1] CMM AND STATED INTERIOR MINISTRIES FOR [b1] PAREN  
NOTE CLN IT IS POSS THAT [b1] REP CMM INCLUDING KAESBENGER CMM  
MAY HAVE ALSO ATTENDED MEETING PAREN IT IS KNOWN THAT [b1] VICE  
PRESIDENT RADKE ATTENDED A MEETING IN BONN FOR ABOVE PURPOSE ON  
FOUR AND SLASH OR FIVE APR CURR PD RADKE INFORMED AEUC DASH  
LNOB THAT PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO REVIEW [b1] SLASH MAD  
DELIMITATION AGREEMENT AND THAT RESULT OF MEETING MIGHT BE  
SCRAPPING OF PREVIOUS [b1] SLASH [b1] AND [b1] SLASH MAD DELIMITATION  
AGREEMENTS IN FAVOR OF A SINGLE DELIMITATION AGREEMENT APPLYING  
TO [b1] CMM [b1] PD RESULTS CMM IF ANY CMM OF THIS  
MEETING ARE NOT YET KNOWN PD CHARLIE ALTHOUGH NOT IMPOSSIBLE IT  
APPEARS IMPROBABLE THAT COMMITTEE REFERRED TO BY [b6]  
IS TEMPORARY IN NATURE AND CMM RATHER THAN FORMAL COMMITTEE  
CMM CONSISTS OF DELEGATES OF MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES INVOLVED  
FOR PURPOSE OF FORMULATING MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY DELIMITATION  
AGREEMENT PD THIS VIEW IS HELD BY LNOB CMM IN ABSENCE OF ANY  
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE TO CONTRARY CMM BECAUSE OFFICIAL INTEL AND  
SECY POLICY AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR GER INTEL AND SECY  
COMMITTEE ALREADY EXISTS AND CMM IN FACT CMM HAS EXISTED SINCE  
FALL OF FIVE FOUR PD THIS COMMITTEE IS THE SO CALLED QUOTE  
STATE SECRETARIES COMMITTEE UNQUOTE PAREN STA TSS-KRETAER  
AUERSCHUSS PAREN PD THIS COMMITTEE INCLUDES REP OF FED  
CHANCELLERY CMM INTERIOR MINISTRY CMM DEF MINISTRY CMM ECONOMICS  
MINISTRY CMM [b1] PD EX OFFICIO MEMBERS OF THIS  
COMMITTEE ARE REPT TO BE STATE SECRETARIES [b6] PAREN  
CHANCELLERY PA-EN CMM [b6] PAREN INTERIOR PAREN [b6]  
PAREN FINANCE PAREN CMM [b6] PAREN ALL GERMAN AFFAIRS PAREN  
CMM [b6] PAREN FOREIGN OFFICE PAREN CMM RUST PAREN DEF  
PAREN CMM [b6] PAREN ECONOMICS PAREN AND PRESIDENTS GENLEN  
OF [b1] AND SCHREIBERS OF [b1] PD PARA FURTHER INFO ON NATURE OF

REMARKS: ... DETERMINED

AEUC-SCCS

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**SECRET**

CO 66TH SIG GROUP BAD GARTSTATT GER

BODY ENGAGED IN FOUR AND FIVE APR CURR DISCUSSIONS IN BONY AND  
RESULTS OF THAT MEETING WILL BE FORWARDED TO THIS HQ BY LNOB  
AS THIS INFO CAN BE DEVELOPED PD FURTHER INFO RELATING TO SUBJ  
CMM AS WELL AS INFO ON DELIMITATIONS AGREEMENTS CMM WILL BE  
FWD TO US PCN UPON REC BY THIS HQ PD IT IS DESIRED THAT THE  
LO CMM UR PCN CM. ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN FURTHER CLARIFYING  
DETAILS ON SUBJ FROM b6

-----  
M/R: LO R/P reported alleged formation of German Central  
Policy Committee to coordinate efforts between German Agencies,  
and set out high-level policy. Such info was forwarded to  
LNOB for info and comment. LO R/P being informed in above msg  
of LNOB answer. C2 USANBUE is being informed of all info.  
Coordinated with b6

REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

AEUC-SCCS

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45  
**SECRET**

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ROUTINE

X

DA

O-2583

~~SECRET~~

CO 66TH CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT GER

CIC LG HEIDELBERG GER

*F-32777* OPR FROM AEUC-SCCS FOR AEAGC-COA PD REF  
FOXTROT DASH THREE TWO ONE FOUR ONE PD

SUBJ IS POLICY COMMITTEE FOR GERMAN INTEL COMMUNITY PAREN  
SECRET PAREN IT IS FELT THAT THE POL INFO AND COMMENT CMM WHICH  
WAS REC FROM LNOB CMM MAY TEND TO CLARIFY INFO REPT IN ABOVE  
REFERENCED MSG CLE ALFA AT A SEVEN FEB CURA MEETING BETWEEN

[b1] IN COLOGNE THE [b1] SLASH MAD DELIMITATION AGREEMENT  
CMM WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED BY FED DEF MINISTRY FOR  
MAD AND FED INTERIOR MINISTRY FOR [b1] CMM RAN INTO STRONG  
OPPOSITION ON PART OF SOME [b1] WHO WOULD NOT ENDORSE AGREEMENT

PD SUBSEQUENTLY CMM MATTER WAS PLACED ON AGENDA FOR TFC ZERO  
FEB CURR CONFERENCE OF FED AND STATE INTERIOR MINISTERS WHO  
CMM HOWEVER CMM DID NOT GET AROUND TO THIS AGENDA ITEM PD  
PAREN FOR FURTHER DETAILS SEE AEUC DASH LNOB REPT DTD TWO  
TWO MAR CURR CMM FILE BRAVO VICTOR DASH FIVE SEVEN DASH ONE  
THREE ZERO SEVEN CMM SUBJ [b1] REF [b1] SLASH MAD DELIMITATION  
AGREEMENT PAREN PD BRAVO AT INSTIGATION OF LAENDER AND WITH  
CONCURRENCE OF FED AGENCIES DECISION WAS THEN MADE TO REVIEW  
BOTH [b1] SLASH [b1] SLASH MAD DELIMITATION AGREEMENTS  
AT A BONN CONFERENCE TO BE ATTENDED BY REP OF FED INTERIOR

REGARDING CMM CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

AEUC-SCCS

b6

Stgt Mil 7484

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b6

Classified SECRET by authority of

b6

Inf, Hq, 66th CIC.

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CO 66TH CIC GROUP BAD CONSTAT GEE

MINISTRY AND [b1] CHM FLD [b1] CHM FED CHANCELLER  
AND [b1] CHM AND STATED INT HIGH MINISTRIES FOR [b1] PAREN  
NOTE CHM IF IS POSS THAT [b1] REP CHM INCLUDING HAESBESGER CHM  
MAY HAVE ALSO ATTENDED MEETING PAREN IF IS KNOWN THAT [b1] VICE  
PRESIDENT [b6] ATTENDED A MEETING IN LONN FOR ABOVE PURPOSE ON  
FOUR AND SLASH OR FIVE APR CURR PD RADKE INFORMED AUC DASH  
KNOW THAT PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO REVIEW [b1] SLASH MAD  
DELIMITATION AGREEMENT AND THAT RESULT OF MEETING MIGHT BE  
SCRAPPING OF PREVIOUS SPV SLASH [b1] AND [b1] SLASH MAD DELIMITATION  
AGREEMENTS IN FAVOR OF A SINGLE DELIMITATION AGREEMENT APPLYING  
TO [b1] CHM [b1] PD RESULTS CHM IF ANY CHM OF THIS  
MEETING ARE NOT YET KNOWN PD CHARLIS ALTHOUGH NOT IMPOSSIBLE IT  
APPEARS PROBABLE THAT COMMITTEE REFERRED TO BY [b6]  
IS TEMPORARY IN NATURE AND CHM RATHER THAN PERMANENT COMMITTEE  
CHM CONSISTS OF DELEGATES OF MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES INVOLVED  
FOR PURPOSE OF FORMULATING ANNUALLY SATISFACTORY DELIMITATION  
AGREEMENT PD THIS VIEW IS HELD BY LNOB CHM IN ABSENCE OF ANY  
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE TO CONTRARY CHM BECAUSE OFFICIAL INTEL AND  
SECY POLICY AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR GER INT-L AND SECY  
COMMITTEE ALREADY EXISTS AND CHM IN FACT CHM HAS EXISTED SINCE  
FALL OF FIVE FOUR PD THIS COMMITTEE IS THE SO CALLED QUOTE  
STATE SECRETARIES COMMITTEE UNQUOTE PAREN STAATSEKRETAER  
AUSSENWISSEN PAREN PD THIS COMMITTEE INCLUDES REP OF FED  
CHANCELLERY CHM INTERIOR MINISTRY CHM DEF MINISTRY CHM ECONOMICS  
MINISTRY CHM [b1] PD EX OFFICIO MEMBERS OF THIS  
COMMITTEE ARE KEPT TO BE 5 VICE SECRETARIES [b6] PAREN  
CHANCELLERY [b6] CHM [b6] INTERIOR [b6]  
PAREN FINANCE PAREN CHM JUSTICE PAREN ALL GERMAN AFFAIRS PAREN  
CHM RALLSTEIN PAREN FOREIGN OFFICE PAREN CHM MUST PAREN DEF  
PAREN CHM [b6] PAREN ECONOMICS PAREN AND PRESIDENTS COUNCIL  
OF [b1] AND [b6] OF [b1] PD PARA FURTHER INFO ON NATURE OF

REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

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~~SECRET~~

43

**SECRET**

CO 66TH CIC GROUP-BAD CANNSTATT GER

BODY ENGAGED IN FOUR AND FIVE APR CURR DISCUSSIONS IN BOMB  
AND RESULTS OF THAT MEETING WILL BE FWD TO THIS HQ BY LNOB AS  
THE INFO CAN BE DEVELOPED PD ALL FURTHER INFO WILL BE FWD TO  
UR OFFICE IMMEDIATELY UPON REC BY THIS HQ PD PARA THE LO  
RHEINLAND SLASH PFALZ HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN  
FURTHER CLARIFYING DETAILS ON SUBJ FROM b6

-----  
M/R: LO R/P reported alleged formation of German Central  
Policy Committee to coordinate efforts between German Agencies,  
and set out high-level policy. Such info was fwd to LNOB  
for info and comment. O2 being informed in above message of  
LNOB answer. Coordinated with b6

REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

AEUC-SCCS

1303

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**SECRET**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: S-3 Section

8 April 1957

FROM: George D. Swardlin, OCA, American Embassy

*G.D. Swardlin*

SUBJ: b1

Re: Budget

1. Reference is made to para 5a(4) of Operations Memorandum 21/55.
2. Introductory comments:

a. The b1 budget is submitted by the Federal Chancellor as part of the budgetary detailed plan (Einzelplan) number 04 pertaining to the "field of authority of the Federal Chancellor and Office of the Federal Chancellor," which is divided into the following three chapters (Kapitel):

04 01 Federal Chancellor and Personal Office of the Chancellor  
04 03 Press and Information Office of the Federal Government  
04 04 Federal Intelligence Service

b. Chapter 04 04 of the federal budget for the German fiscal year 1957 (1 April 1957 to 31 March 1958) which is before the Bundestag now, contains the following notation:

"Neither the budgetary estimate for the fiscal year 1957, nor the organizational plan for the b1 have yet been submitted by the office of the Federal Chancellor. The appropriations of last year have, therefore, been repeated in this year's estimates.... A revised and corrected estimate is to be submitted by the Federal Minister for Finance...."

The information contained in the preliminary budget estimate thus reflects the b1 budget for German fiscal 1956. However, it may still be of interest for comparison purposes after the revised budget has been submitted.

3. There follows the listing of the items of expenditures. Most of the items are supported by more detailed comments in the form of footnotes. Only such comments as appear of intelligence interest have been quoted in this memorandum and are contained in para 4 below.

Title	Purpose	DM
I. RECEIPTS		
<u>Recurring Receipts</u>		
1	Rents and leases of real estate, buildings, installations and equipment.	14,300
2	Profit from sales of depreciated or obsolete equipment and furnishings.	5,900
14	Profit from sales of unusable papers, office stationery and similar materials	500
45	Retirement of debts.	50,000
Total continuing receipts		100,700
<u>Non-Recurring Receipts</u>		
75	Profit from sales of motor vehicles	57,100
Total non-recurring receipts		57,100

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*24,254*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1308

b1

Title	Purpose	DM
II. EXPENDITURES		
<u>Recurring Expenditures</u>		
<u>Personnel</u>		
101	Salaries of civil service officials (Beamten) in authorized positions (including those on probationary service)	6,807,300
	Authorized positions	
	Pay grades	
	B 4 1 President <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">b1</span> He also receives a personal allowance of DM 2,400 per annum.	
	B 7 a 1 Vice-President <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">b1</span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">b1</span>	
	A 1 a 8 Leitende Regierungsdirektoren. 1 incumbent receives additional pay equal to the difference between pay grades A 1 e and B 8.	
	A 1 b 25 Regierungsdirektoren	
	A 2 b 70 Oberregierungsraete	
	A 2 c 2 101 Regierungsraete	
	A 2 d 6 Regierungsoberamtsmänner	
	A 3 b 9 Regierungsamtsmänner	
	A 4 b 1 103 Regierungsoberinspektoren	
	A 4 c 2 118 Regierungsinspektoren	
	A 5 b 71 Regierungsobersekretäre	
	A 7 a 27 Regierungsssekretäre	
	Total 520	
104	Salaries of civilian employees (not Beamte)	
	a) Employees	5,855,100
	b) Laborers	382,500
106	Benefits for Beamte, employees and laborers	24,900
107	Loans, as authorized in the basic assistance law, for Beamte, employees and laborers	156,000
108	Reimbursement for expenses incurred in the course of work, family separation allowance, travel pay, subsistence allowances; also travel allowances for family visits of Beamte, employees and laborers where families live elsewhere.	568,000
Total expenditures for personnel		13,793,800
<u>Material</u>		
200	Business expenditures	115,000
201	Maintenance, replacements and modifications of office equipment and furnishings:	
	a) Maintenance	12,100
	b) Replacements	98,600
	c) Modifications, individual items not to exceed DM 5,000	23,000
202	Library	38,100
203	Postal, telephone and telegraph fees, cost of communications installations and radio fees	192,500



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Title	Purpose	DM
204	Building maintenance	157,900
205	Minor structural changes and enlargements of buildings, as well as purchase of real estate	166,300
206	Administration of official premises and offices	1,119,400
208	Operation of official vehicles These funds are mutually interchangeable with funds allocated under Title 215 a.	297,500
215	Travel pay and per diem a) Domestic travel (see Title 208) b) Foreign travel	810,000 53,000
217	Movement of household goods, moving assistance	180,000
218	Expert consultants' fees	36,000
219	Legal and related expenditures	10,000
240	At the disposal of the President of the <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">b1</span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">b1</span> for extraordinary representation on special, official occasions.	2,400
298	Contribution to restaurant fund	209,200
299	Miscellaneous administrative expenses	23,700
Total Material Expenditures		<u>3,544,700</u>
<u>General Expenditures</u>		
300	General intelligence operations (Aufgaben). These funds are transferrable. These funds may also be used for personnel and material expenditures for the purpose of intelligence collection. The annual accounting of the expenditures allotted under this Title is only subject to examination by a sub-committee of the Budget Committee of the Bundestag and the Comptroller General. Statements by the sub-committee and the Comptroller General form the basis for relieving the Federal Government of further accountability.	4,900,000
Total General Expenditures		<u>4,900,000</u>
<u>Non-recurring expenditures</u> - Total		867,900
<u>BALANCE</u>		
Recurring Receipts		100,700
Non-Recurring receipts		57,100
Total receipts		<u>157,800</u>
Personnel expenditures		13,793,800
Material expenditures		3,544,700
General expenditures		4,900,000
Non-recurring expenditures		867,900
Total expenditures		<u>23,106,400</u>
Appropriation		<u><u>22,948,600</u></u>

1310

4. Comments and footnotes:

Title 75:

Profit from sales of	
13 Volkswagen - export	20,800
19 Volkswagen - standard	26,300
5 Opel - Olympia	7,500
1 Truck	<u>2,500</u>
DM	57,100

Title 101:

Basic salaries	5,013,200
Rental allowances	902,000
Children allowances	272,200
Representation allowances and special pay	534,900
Foreign service differential for officials of the Foreign Liaison Service (Auslandsverbindungsdiensst).	<u>85,000</u>
Total	DM 6,807,300

Title 104:

Requirements for employees not on Beamten status

a) Employees

Pay grade - Special	1
I	10
II	14
III	52
IV	21
V a	6
V b	61
VI a	3
VI b	151
VII	205
VIII	103
IX	13
X	<u>1</u>
	<u>641</u>

b) Laborers

64

Total 705

Distribution of employees between the grades of Vb and X:

Pay Grade	Typing	Pers. Secy.	Corresp. in foreign lang.	Admin.	Switchboard, Teletype
Vb	-	-	-	19	1
Vfb	-	2	10	32	4
VII	27	-	17	53	14
VIII	61	-	-	9	70
IX	-	-	-	-	2
X	-	-	-	-	-

(Note: The following item is taken from a detailed breakdown of personnel expenditures for non-Beamten status employees, which includes overtime, social security, sick pay, old age pay, etc.):

Foreign service differential for employees of the Foreign Liaison Service (Auslandsverbindungsdiensst) ..... DM 73,000.

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Title 108:

(Note: The footnotes contain a further breakdown of the expenditures, including the following notation):

Official separation allowance (Beschaeftigungvergutung)  
for 20 detached Beamte and employees ..... DM 50,000

Title 202:

Procurement of books, maps and other publications	21,900
Procurements of newspapers, periodicals, etc.	16,200
Total	DM 38,100

Composition of the library

Politics	50 percent
Economics	30 percent
Military	10 percent
Reference	10 percent

Title 203

1. Postage	15,000
2. Telephone and telegraph fees	161,800
3. Non-recurring installation charge for movement of communications facilities	10,000
4. Communications facilities not owned by Deutsche Post	—
5. Radio fees	1,680
Total	192,480

5. Comments:

a. In summation, the [b1] employed approximately 1,245 Beamten, employees, and laborers in the past German fiscal year. Its total budget was approximately DM twenty-two million, of which approximately seventeen million went for overhead and five million for operational intelligence expenditures.

b. Attention is invited to the overhead expenditures in connection with foreign tasks. A total of DM 158,000 is allocated for foreign service differential for personnel employed in the Foreign Liaison Section (of which I never heard before). Also, 27 employees are engaged in correspondence in foreign languages.

c. The footnote to Title 108 which mentions 20 [b1] employees on detached service, also appears to be of interest. This probably includes positions like the [b1] representative in BONW and in WASHINGTON. Under German civil service law, a person who performs permanent duty away from the location of his home office receives additional pay. Foreign service differential is added to the domestic separation allowance.

d. This office will attempt to obtain the revised [b1] budget for German fiscal year 1957.

e. For your ready reference, herewith are the approximate German military equivalents of the Beamten positions listed in Title 201 (based on pay grades);

1312  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President  
Vice-President  
Leit. Regierungsdirektor  
Regierungsdirektor  
Oberregierungsrat  
Regierungsrat  
Regierungsoberamtmann  
Regierungsamtmann  
Regierungsoberinspektor  
Regierungsinspektor  
Regierungsobersekretär  
Regierungssekretär

Lt. Gen.  
Brig. Gen.  
Colonel  
Between Col. and Lt. Col.  
Lt. Col.  
Major  
Between Capt. and Maj.  
Capt.  
Between 1st Lt. and Capt.  
1st Lt.  
Master Sgt.  
Sgt. 1st class

Information Copy to:

Liaison Division

Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US ARMY

C  
21/55 (GDS)  
4-1-7

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b1

~~SECRET~~  
HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

AREA OB-0 (OA) 350.05 GB

APO 403

SUBJECT: GEHLEN Organization b1 (C)  
Re: Vehicle Registration Numbers

28 MAR 1957

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army

1. Forwarded for your information is an SOI, subject as above, dated 20 March 1957, which provides vehicle license numbers observed within the Pullach Headquarters compound of the GEHLEN Organization.

2. Request this Office be informed as to whether this information is of operational value to your Group.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

1 Incl:  
SOI, dtd 20 Mar  
57, subj as above  
(in dup)

b6

Chief, CI Branch

28 MAR 1957

23065

*SOI & ltr to FO Munich asking them whether this  
is of value to them*

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED  
This information is to be controlled, except: NONE

By authority of

b6

Date: 26 March 1957.

DOWNGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOLPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

BRIEF SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 300-320-10)		DATE 20 March 57		
PREPARING OFFICE G2 Division, CI Branch, O&A Section, Hq USAFEUR, APO 403				
SUBJECT GEHLEN Organization		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		
		OF SOURCE:                      OF INFORMATION:		
		COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A      CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . . . 1		
		USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B      PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2		
		FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C      POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3		
		NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D      DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4		
		UNRELIABLE . . . . . E      IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5		
		RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F      TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION				
The following German vehicle license plates have been observed within the Headquarters compound of the GEHLEN Organization on the dates indicated:				
<u>14 January 1957</u>				
M AD 987	M AL 936	FFB H 795	STA D 222	A B 98 6133
A B 98 877	B 29 4307	M DR 935	M D 527	A B 55 7418
M DW 244	B 52 5025	M D 262	B 45 4395	A B 68 7825
STA D 257	B 98 3497	A B 68 7548		
<u>15 January 1957</u>				
TS AA 41	M DW 300	M AC 210	M AD 398	STA D 635
B 97 3744	M AC 153	M AD 987	B 63 3243	M CS 403
A B 54 7843	M AD 694	B 45 3357	M AL 592	A B 98 6133
M AM 479	STA D 222	M AC 947	STA A 655	VOR A 692
<u>16 January 1957</u>				
B 63 3744	B 98 3457	STA D 257	B 45 3357	STA D 482
M A 936	A B 54 7843	M AC 325	M AN 736	STA A 606
DISTRIBUTION      2 - 66th CIC Group 1 - A-891				

DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47, which may be used.)

(Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

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(Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 380-920-10)		DATE 20 Mar 57	
PREPARING OFFICE G2 Division, CI Branch, O&A Section, Hq USAREUR, APO 403			
SUBJECT  CKHLEN Organization		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . A USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . .B FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . .C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . D UNRELIABLE . . . . .E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.1 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .2 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .4 IMPROBABLE . . . . .5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<u>16 January 1957</u>			
STA O 563	DAH C 156		
<u>17 January 1957</u>			
M AD 235	M CS 529	B 53 6555	B 29 4307
WOR A 692	FTB B 795	M AL 936	M CS 403
M AL 592	M DN 717	M DW 244	M AM 736
<u>18 January 1957</u>			
B 51 7178	M AA 981	B 53 5655	STA D 257
STA D 471	B 44 4191	M AL 936	M CS 529
M AO 947	STA C 645	M AL 219	M CL 936
<u>21 January 1957</u>			
A B 98 6133	A B 55 7418	A B 97 5732	A B 99 7555
B 29 4307	DAH C 156	STA D 599	STA C 677
STA C 680	B 51 8077	A B 68 4824	M CH 100
		M AD 694	
		M DD 149	
		M AM 479	
DISTRIBUTION 2 - 66th CIO Group 1 - A-891		1320	

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ARY OF INFORMATION  
(SR 380-330-10)

DATE  
20 Mar 57

PREPARING OFFICE

G2 Division, CI Branch, O&A Section, Hq USAFEUR, APO 403

SUBJECT

GEHLEN Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . .2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . .3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . .4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . .5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

21 January 1957

STA  
D 257                      B 49 7897

22 January 1957

B 63 3243	A 55 7418 B	M DX 696	M AC 179	B 52 8405
B 63 3744	M DM 717	STA * D 471	M AN 736	B 63 3514
B 55 3293	STA A 606	WOR * A 692	STA * C 680	STA C 645
B 52 6773	B 45 4395	B 52 5025	M AL 130	

23 January 1957

A 56 4876 B	M A 172	M AC 153 *	M AM 472	M DW 300
B 45 4656	M AL 129	B 63 4306	M AD 448	M CX 921

24 January 1957

M AM 479	A 98 8677 B	M CM 339	M D 879	FFB H 22
B 54 6310	M AC 698	M AC 246	B 45 3357	M DX 696
M * DW 244	M AN 736	STA * A 655	FFB * H 795	B 97 3744

DISTRIBUTION

2 - 66th CIC Group  
1 - A-891

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DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47,  
1 Dec 1951 DA AGO) which may be used.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 340-320-10)		DATE 20 Mar 57
PREPARING OFFICE G2 Division, CI Branch, OMA Section, Hq USAEUR, APO 403		
SUBJECT  GERLEN Organization	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
	OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D UNRELIABLE . . . . . E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2 POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4 IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<u>24 January 1957</u>		
M AA 319	M AC 698	
<u>25 January 1957</u>		
M AA 172	M CS 529	M DW 244
STA A 655	FFB H 795	M AC 736
STA D 471	M AL 521	M CL 936
M AA 126	M AC 848	M DW 300
M DL 495	M DR 935	
<u>28 January 1957</u>		
M AA 126	M AM 479	M OC 500
M AD 987	B 55 7418	B 54 8187
B 48 5850	B 54 6310	B 48 5850
M AO 886	M DR 935	STA C 645
<u>29 January 1957</u>		
M AC 246	M AC 153	M CM 339
		M AC 521
		STA D 787
		M DI 696
DISTRIBUTION 2 - 66th OIC Group 1 - A-891		

DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 45, DA AGO) which may be used.

(Not Classified Unless Date Entered)

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(Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on

4 February 2009

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

MARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 380-320-10)

DATE  
20 Mar 57

PREPARING OFFICE

62 Division, CI Branch, O&A Section, Hq USAREUR, APO 403

SUBJECT

GEHLEN Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

29 January 1957

M  
AD 694

M \*  
D 879

M \*  
DX 696

M \*  
CS 529

STA  
C 562

M  
AD 235

B 45 4656

STA \*  
C 645

B 34 4609

5 February 1957

STA \*  
A 606

M  
AC 469

A 68 7009  
B

M  
AX 795

M  
AC 571

B 53 6555

\* Indicates vehicles which have appeared previously.

DISTRIBUTION

2 - 66th CIC Group  
1 - A-891

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DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47, DA AGO) which may be used.

(Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FIELD OFFICE HEIDELBERG  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 403 US ARMY

320529

19 March 1957

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF THE CEHLEN ORGANIZATION (U) (S)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. Forwarded here is Summary of Information, Subject same as above, dated 19 March 1957.
2. Source of information is CISC, evaluated "B".
3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

SOI re SUEJ  
dtd 19 Mar 57

WHE/jmr/Heid Mil 8027

b6

Officer in Charge

21 MAR 1957

22467

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62  
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21  
Doc No.  
573

# SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION

DATE: 15 Jan 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Heidelberg, 66th CIC Group, APO 403, US Army

SUBJECT

ACTIVITIES OF THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION (u)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE	OF INFORMATION
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
USUALLY RELIABLE	PROBABLY TRUE
FAIRLY RELIABLE	POSSIBLY TRUE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	DOUBTFULLY TRUE
UNRELIABLE	IMPROBABLY TRUE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 29 January 1957, an article regarding SUBJECT appeared in the Leipziger Volkszeitung, official newspaper of the Leipzig (US 1891), East Germany, District of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Social Unity Party of Germany). (B-2)

2. An English translation of the article is as follows (a copy of the newspaper is included as EXHIBIT 1 to the original only of this report):

GEHLEN ORGANIZATION IN LEAGUE WITH HUNGARIAN SS  
Spies utilized / Caritas aids Armed Revolutionaries

Budapest (ADN/LVZ) As we previously reported in our Sunday edition, a number of spies captured in Hungary have made sensational revelations concerning the participation of numerous Western secret services in the preparation of counterrevolutionary activities. We are now in the position to report further details.

Among the organizations which had been preparing counterrevolution for a long time before the October events in Hungary occurred are the American espionage organizations CIC and Military Intelligence Service, as well as the West German Gehlen Organization, which has set up a special "Hungarian Department" under the command of a certain Colonel Kollenyi. 1st name: Gyorgy

It was learned from these disclosures that years ago the Putsch had been planned down to the last details. The so-called League of Hungarian Fighters, with General Emil Juszti at the head, is taking orders from the CIC in Western Europe. This League of former fascist officers and soldiers organized assault battalions and went over the border to Hungary after 23 October. The American financed "Hungarian Office" was engaged in the same activities and sent armed emigrants to Hungary from Salzburg and the Burgenland.

The so-called Aid Organization Caritas organized transportation for armed personnel who had been training in camps in West Europe for months before. On 20 October the committee "Free Europe" collected numerous former members of the Hungarian SS in the Trautman Training Camp, and on 25 and 26 October sent them in Red Cross vehicles across the Hungarian border.

The leader of the general staff of the counterrevolutionaries is said to have been the American Colonel Bell, who preached the overthrow of the people's government on Radio Free Europe during the counterrevolution. During the October Putsch, "Free Europe" also sent Captain Lajos Somogyvari and four others to Győr. They had the mission of leading the uprising there, seizing

DISTRIBUTION

1 cy - Hq 66th CIC Group  
1 cy - File

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON JAN 2 1980

BY DET CDR USAINSCOM ERI/PO

AUTH Para 1-603 000 5200

WD AGO FORM 568  
1 JUN 47

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION

19 March 1957

the radio station, and forming a counterrevolutionary government.

THE ESPIONAGE CHIEF TAKES OVER PERSONALLY

Significant statements were made at the press conference by the agent Sandor Visnycy, who was in the pay of first American and later West German espionage organizations from 1948 until his arrest on 9 December 1956. His last assignment was with the so-called Hungarian Department of the Gehlen organization, which was led personally by Gehlen himself.

According to the words of Visnycy, the Hungarian Department was concerned with recruiting Hungarian refugees for espionage and sabotage purposes. Visnycy stated that in the summer of 1956 Kolleny gave the Department indications that action would soon start in Hungary, and that their work would be strengthened. A special mission was to trace down military concentrations and arms dumps. He said that by October most of the arms dumps were known. He specifically stated: "After the outbreak of the counterrevolution, the workers of the Gehlen organization were continually held in readiness at the Austro-Hungarian border."

To hide his activities Visnycy used the cover of a journalist. He possessed a press pass from the "Society of German Newspaper Publishers, Inc." which he received from Kollenyi. The press pass had the number ZV 532. The Munich authorities validated his journalistic activity by stamping the pass "State Administration of the State Capital of Munich, Office of Public Order."

Visnycy concluded that the Gehlen Organization worked very closely with American espionage agencies, especially with the CIC, and that it received much of its financial support from American offices. There are so-called American liaison officers with the Gehlen organization. Until 1949, one of them was Captain Bromberg. He was later replaced by Ringer, Kelly, and Fischer, who at that time headed the Hungarian sections of the Salzburg espionage offices of the CIC and the Military Intelligence Service.

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON JAN 2 1990  
BY DEP CDR USAINSCOM FDI/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DDD 5200

G. P. I. CARDS HAVE BEEN  
PREPARED ON THE NAMES  
CONTAINED IN THIS  
DOCUMENT.  
INITIALS 376  
16. APR. 1957

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19

b6

/27 Feb 1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

XE-320529

SUBJECT: Federal Intelligence Service b1 (c)

TO: Officer in Charge  
Bonn Liaison Office  
OCA, Box 105  
APO 80, US Army

1. Reference is made to Office Memorandum, File: b1, your Office, dated b1 Subject as above.
2. Confirmation of the reported budget and the number of personnel employed by the b1 from official publications or documents, if available, is desired by this Headquarters.
3. Regrading date cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

b6

Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 7484  
OSM/hmc

M/R: LO reported info on SUBJECT from Bonn newspaper. G2 requested effort be made to confirm information.

1329  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

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01386

26-508

CIC RV  
JF

HEADQUARTERS

4K Perm

56TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

D- XE-300523/70-202212

SUBJECT: b1  
Re: Official Title of Rheinland Section (X)

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: A-10-C (CA)

1. REFERENCE: C 7-55.

2. REMARKS:

- a. (X) Contents of inclosure have not been disseminated to any other agency.
  - b. ( ) Contents of inclosure have been passed to:
  - c. (X) Source(s) of the inclosed report was (were): as stated.
  - d. ( ) Date of the information was: as stated.
  - e. (X) Investigation is continuing.
  - f. ( ) Investigation is considered closed.
  - g. (X) Information contained in the attached report may not be released in its present format to other intelligence agencies.
  - h. (X) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.
- FOR THE COM AICR:

1 Incl: O, File: b1  
OCA, dtd b1, Subj  
as above (dupe)

b6  
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt 11 7434  
(AFM/umc)

00103

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OK 254

b6

7 Feb 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
HEADQUARTERS

56TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

D- IE 394948/AF 330529

SUBJECT: b1  
b1 (e)

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Army  
ATTN: A-103-C (OA)

1. REFERENCE: ICM 7-85

2. REMARKS:

- a. (x) Contents of inclosure have not been disseminated to any other agency.
- b. ( ) Contents of inclosure have been passed to:
- c. (x) Source(x) of the inclosed report was (were): as stated.
- d. (x) Date of the information was: as stated.
- e. (x) Investigation is continuing.
- f. ( ) Investigation is considered closed.
- g. (x) Information contained in the attached report can not be released in its present form to other intelligence agencies.
- h. (x) All available information in the files of this Headquarters on persons mentioned in attached report has previously been forwarded to your Office.
- i. (x) Reporting data cannot be predetermined.

BY: [Signature]

00704

1 Incl: Memo, files: b1  
GCo, dtd 25 Jan 57, Subj as  
above (dupe)

b6  
Captain, 1st (Armed)  
Adjutant

Telephone: At 711 7424  
J. V. Co

1334

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WB FL 206 (L)  
29 NOV 55

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CS

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

7-34  
TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: S-3 Section, CS Division

DATE: 31 January 1957

FROM : T. C. Hughes, Jr., OCA, American Embassy

SUBJECT: b1Re: Official Title of Rheinhard GEHLEN

1. Reference is made to Operations Memorandum 21/55.
2. According to "squibs" which appeared in various German language newspapers on or about 27 January 1957, the official title authorized by the Federal Government for the position of head of the b1 is b1  
b1
3. For your further information, I have learned in conversation with various b1 officials that SUBJECT's official pay-grade in the Federal Government's civil service grade structure is that of "Ministerialdirigent."
4. Thus, GEHLEN has been given an official title and status equal to that of the b1  
b1 who is also in the pay-grade of a "Ministerialdirigent."
5. The military equivalent of the rank of "Ministerialdirigent" is that of Brigadier General.

*TC Hughes*

4 FEB 1957

18644

*to G2*C  
21/55-GDS

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date FEB 20 1957 Init 363

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C  
C~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1337b1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*1/R Palm*

CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154, US Army  
Attn: S-3 Section

25 January 1957

George D. Swerdlin, OCA, American Embassy

Personnel Changes, **b1** and Sub-Dept. IV/C,  
Federal Defense Ministry for Defense

*File: XE 320529* **b1** GEHLE

1. Reference is made to para 5a(2)(a) of Operations Memorandum 38/55 and para 5b(1) of Operations Memorandum 21/55.

2. According to a confidential, off-the-record remark made by **b6** to **b6** outgoing chief of the Attache Section in Sub-Dept. IV/C, the new chief of the Attache Section will be **b6** (at present **b1** representative in BONN) is a former lieutenant colonel in the German Air Force who is at present serving with the **b1** in a civilian capacity. **b6** expects to be recalled to active duty in the rank of lieutenant colonel in March or April 1957 at which time he will assume charge of the Attache Section. This information was further confirmed by another officer assigned to the Attache Section of Sub-Dept. IV/C during a conversation with the US Army Attache.

3. **b6** head of the Section "Potential of Eastern Armed Forces" in Sub-Dept. IV/C is leaving the Defense Ministry and will return to the **b1**. **b6** is being replaced by **b6**. This information was obtained when **b6** said good-bye to **b6**.

4. Comments: Reference is made to previous reports submitted by this office with references to anticipated changes in Sub-Dept. IV/C. It is not known whether **b6** assignment in Sub-Dept. IV/C is permanent or not. I believe that **b6** still favors **b6** in this slot although **b6** is highly regarded and considered a competent officer. He has had experience in military intelligence during his prior service with the Gehlen Organization and as G-2 officer during World War II.

*162 - J  
(See original  
in D-294948)*

C  
21/55 GDS  
38/55 GDS  
4-1-8-c

1341  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**b1**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6 /30 Oct 58

~~XXXX~~ Forces

AEUC-SCCS-271/46  
IE-281890-Vol 12/IE-320529

SUBJECT: Concurrence re CISO Material to the b1 (e)

TO: Liaison Officer  
Department of the Army Detachment  
APO 154, US Forces

26 OCT 1958

- (U)
1. (C) Reference is made to your letter dated 28 October 1958, Subject as above and your conversation with b6 clarifying paragraph 1 of your letter to refer to "satellite trade missions".
  2. (U) (C) This Group does not have the authority to state to whom CISO material may be released.
  3. (C) However, this Group does not concur in your proposal that the material now being collected by the CISO on satellite trade missions in the Frankfurt area should be released to the b1. This material is of extreme sensitivity in German eyes, and it is believed that for security reasons this material should continue to receive the careful supervision which it is presently receiving.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

b6

Telephone: Stgt W11 8346  
WDG/JNJ/mmk

Executive Officer

M/R: This letter written at direction of S3.

DISC FILE XE-320529

LOG NR 251052

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1373

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DETACHMENT  
APO 757

US ARMY

28 October 1958

XE 320529

SUBJECT: Concurrence re [b1] Material for the [b1]

TO : Commanding Officer  
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group  
APO 154, United States Army  
ATTN: [b6]

1. The [b1] has requested that they be provided with the information being collected by the [b1] [b1] on trade missions in the Frankfurt area of hostile nations. DAD is of the opinion that this request should be granted, as is the USAREUR [b1] officer, and requests the concurrence of your Group in this matter on the basis of the following reasons.

a. Current negotiations with the Germans on the new intercept agreement would seem to make it advisable.

b. Provision of this material in return for the [b1] support of the American Intelligence community appears to be logical and unavoidable.

2. It would be greatly appreciated if your reply would be available by noon Friday 31 October 1958.

( [b3 Per CIA]  
DAD Liaison Officer )

Stgt Mil 8467

1374

182

TO : CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154  
Attn: S-3 Sec, CS Div, Liaison Branch  
T. C. Hughes, Jr., G2 USAREUR Liaison Office  
FROM: OCA, American Embassy, Box 105, APO 80

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS  
EXCEPT NO RE  
BY AUTH CO, 66TH CIC GROUP  
DATE 28 OCT 58

SUBJ: b1  
Re: Personnel

*XE 320529*  
*24*

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraph 5d(2)(e) of OM 6/57, HQ, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

**CARD** 2. Dr. Hans Hermann OTTO,  
born 11 May 1921, in GIESSEN

*21: 5477*

has been an employee of the b1 since 1953. For the past three years he has been serving as the b1 Director of Training, with responsibility for formulation, coordination, and interpretation of all b1 b1 training at the b1 COLOGNE Training School.

3. Dr. OTTO has long been dissatisfied with not only what he considers to be insufficient b1 support for the b1 Training Program, but also with his personal status. On the one hand, he has felt, with some justification, that the b1 directorate has not sufficiently supported the b1 training program as a means by which the b1 could extend its influence over the b1 as well as a means to raise the professional standards of both b1 personnel. On the other hand, his personal status as that of a "civil service employee" (Angestellter) rather than an "official" (Beamter) has been a constant source of dissatisfaction, since he has felt that b1 has not sufficiently asserted itself to obtain for him a promotion to the "Beamten" status. For these reasons, he has been casting about for another job and had come to an understanding with the b1 b1 providing that b1 would give him a job effective 1 January 1959.

4. The b1 offer, however, fell through. OTTO says that it was withdrawn as a result of a decision made by the Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt), made at the request of the Federal Interior Ministry, that the b1 should no longer proselytize b1 personnel, since the practice, if continued, might make serious inroads into the b1 staff. Nevertheless, OTTO, who is of the opinion that the b1 over-all training program for 1959 is inadequate, asked the b1 directorate to relieve him of his assignment as Training Director and employ him elsewhere because he no longer wishes to associate himself with the "thankless and unrewarding task" of implementing the training program in view of the lack of effective support of the program. His request was granted and he will be assigned, as of 1 January 1959, to the position of a desk officer in Section V/4 (Industrial Security of Department V, Security).

**CARD** 5. Johann Gottlieb HERMENAU,  
born 7 October 1909, in KOENIGSBERG,

formerly deputy director of b1 Department V, will replace Dr. OTTO as b1 Training Director. HERMENAU has already been relieved of his duties in Department V and assigned to the b1 training staff in order that he may acquaint himself with his new duties prior to Dr. OTTO's assumption of his new duties on 1 January.

b1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
APO 403 US Forces

GB 108-1335

*YE 320529*

AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 GB

24 OCT 1958 *gy*

SUBJECT: b1 *yes*

*AK 5355*

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
Attn: CS Division

1. ~~(S)~~ Forwarded for your information and retention are personality briefs on nine officials of the b1 This information was provided by DAD upon request of this Office.
2. (U) It is requested that CR checks be conducted on these individuals and any additional information available be forwarded to this Office.
3. (U) May be regraded Confidential 22 October 1961.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

b6

9 Incl:

Personality Briefs (S)

Colonel

GS

Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

10384

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*1381*

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES  
COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

*175*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US FORCES

XE-320529

SUBJECT: b1 (u) m/c 5042

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
ATTN: ABUC-3003

C  
R  
F

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 3 October 1958.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source A-IV is b1  
b1 evaluated B, who personally observed the notation on 1 October 1958. The preparing agent for this report was b6  
b6

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) REMARKS: A check with the OSI, Munich Consulate General, revealed that the name and telephone reported upon were unknown to that office. It is assumed that the number is used by KB-2 to check on arrested persons who claim affiliations to SUBJECT.

4. Regraded CONFIDENTIAL when separated from SECRET inclosure.

1 Incl: u  
SOI dtd 3 Oct 58 (3)  
(1pg)  
Tel: MM 8560/JS/VHM/elf

b6  
Major, MI (Sig C)  
Commanding

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~SECRET~~

Page 1 of 1 Pages  
Copy 2 of 3 Copies

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Noform~~

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
EXCEPT N O N E  
By Authority of CO, 66th CIC Group  
Date: 11 September 1958

TO : CO, Hq 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
ATTN: S-3 Section, CS Division,  
Liaison Branch

FROM : T.C. Hughes, Jr., G2 USAREUR Liaison Office,  
OCA, American Embassy, APO 80

SUBJ : b1

Re: b6

XE 320529

8/

2/c

4689

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraph 5c(2)(a) of O.N.  
6/57, Headquarters 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. Reference is also made to my report of b1  
b1 SUBJECT as above, which furnished your  
Headquarters with certain information concerning SUBJECT who  
is the chief of the BORN, Germany, base of the FRG b1  
b1

3. Through DAD staff members of OCA, BORN, it has been  
learned that SUBJECT's first name is b6 and that he used  
the academic title of "Doctor".

4. b6 Officer in Charge, G2  
USAREUR Liaison Office, OCA, BORN, has a slight acquaintance  
with b6 b6 has volunteered the  
following additional information concerning him, information  
obtained from personal observation and during conversation with  
b6

age : approximately 43 years of age (born 1915)  
height : approximately 5' 8"  
weight : approximately 160/170 lbs.  
build : medium  
eyes : light in color (probably blue)  
hair : blonde

other characteristics:

- 1) wears glasses,
- 2) blinks nervously when talking, speaks  
rapidly, is closemouthed;

address : b6

TC Hughes

C  
5d(3)(a)-TCH-f  
TCH/fg/Mehlen 3236

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~Noform~~

b1

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00065



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154  
Attn: S-3 Sec, CS Division, Liaison Br.

8 September 1958

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr., G2 USAREUR Liaison Office  
OCA, American Embassy, Box 105, APO 80

SUBJ: b1

*XE 320529*

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraph 5c(2)(a) of OM 6/57, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. In conversation with representatives of the DAD liaison element of OCA, BONN, this office has learned that b6 is Chief of the b1 BONN Liaison Office and that one b6 is the CE liaison officer of the BONN b1 office. Dates and places of birth of these two individuals is unknown and in any case the names are undoubtedly aliases.

3. For your information.

*TC Hughes*

C  
5d(3)(e)-TCH-f

TCH/lcm  
Telephone: MEHLEM 3236  
3162

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
EXCEPT N O K E  
BY AUTHORITY OF CO, 66TH CIC GROUP  
DATE 9 September 1958

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date SEP 30 1958 Init *3/3*

*TOG-2*

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR AND SPECIAL ADVISOR  
American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

C2 USAREUR Liaison Office

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals  
EXCEPT F O F E  
BY AUTHORITY OF CO, 66th CIC GROUP  
DATE: 11 June 1958

TO : CO, Hq 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
ATTN: S3 Section, CS Division

FROM : T.C. Hughoe, C2 USAREUR Liaison Office, OCA, American Embassy,  
Box 105, APO SO

SUBJ : [b1]

Re: Conflict with the [b1]

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraphs 5d(3)(a) and 5d(3)(g) of OM 6/57, Hq. 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. On 6 June 1958 [b1] Department Director [b6] informed me in extreme confidence that the conflict between the [b1] and the [b1] is continuing. [b6] not only generally confirmed that information contained in my report of [b1] [b1] but also told me that the [b1] [b1] had submitted through the Federal Chancellery, to which it is subordinated, to the Federal Interior Ministry a claim that the [b1] rather than the [b1] should represent the Federal Republic on the NATO Special Committee.

3. The NATO Special Committee is a permanent committee which meets quarterly in Paris and which, together with the NATO Security Committee, is subordinated organizationally to the NATO Security Bureau. Whereas the NATO Security Committee deals with matters pertaining to NATO security regulations and those of member nations, the Special Committee is one established for the exchange between member states of information pertaining to subversion, primarily communist, within their national territories. The [b1] has long represented the Federal Republic on the NATO Special Committee not only because it is the internal FRG Federal Security Agency but also because it is responsible for coverage of subversion within the Federal Republic.

4. [b6] said that he could not imagine why the [b1] had made such a claim, since it is clearly not competent to represent the FRG in the field with which the Special Committee is concerned, but can only assume that it was made out of [b1] ignorance as to the true nature and interest of the committee. At any rate, [b6] said, the Federal Interior Ministry has rejected the claim in an answering communication to the Chancellery. As a sop to the [b1] however, it was permitted to send observers to attend the last meeting of the Special Committee. The meeting was held in Paris during the week of 26 May 1958. [b1] President [b6] attended as the regular FRG representatives. The [b1] sent two observers.

5. The information contained in this report is highly sensitive. It is requested that extreme discretion be observed in its handling and further dissemination in order to avoid any embarrassment to the [b1] and/or source.

C  
5d(3)(a)-TCH-f  
5d(3)(e)-TCH-f

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR AND SPECIAL ADVISOR  
American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

G2 USAREUR Liaison Office

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
Except N O N E  
By Authority of CO, 66th CIC Group  
DATE: 10 June 1958

TO : CO, Rq 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
Attn: S-3 Section, CS Division

mc 3200

FROM : T.C. Hughes, Jr., G-2 USAREUR Liaison Office,  
OCA, American Embassy, Box 105, APO 80

SUBJ : b1

Re: Conflict with the b1

1. Reference is made to subparagraphs 5d(3)(a) and 5d(3)(g) of OM 6/57, Headquarters 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. Reference is further made to my report of b1

b1

3. On 6 June 1958 b1 CE Department b6 informed me in extreme confidence that the conflict between the b1 and the b1 re operational jurisdiction in the CE field has worsened. The immediate cause was a recent protest lodged by General GERLEN of the b1 with the Federal Interior Ministry to the effect that the b1 was not adhering to the provisions of the delimitations agreement on CE operations. The complaint was accompanied by a list of specific alleged violations of the agreement by the b1. The immediate result of the complaint was the arrangement of a meeting between representatives of the two agencies at the Federal Interior Ministry.

4. The date of the meeting was not stated, but the indication was that it occurred three or four weeks ago. GERLEN was present with an aide or two. b6 represented the Interior Ministry and b6 Vice President RADKE and GERKEN represented the b1. According to b6 the b1 representative addressed themselves to each of GERLEN's specific complaints and clearly proved that they were unfounded. Then, b6 said, GERLEN addressed himself to the delimitations agreement and said that it had been unfairly imposed upon the b1 and was to its disadvantage. The b1 rejoinder was that the delimitation foreseen by the agreement was similar in every respect to that applying between the security and intelligence services in almost every NATO country. GERLEN then allegedly indicated that this was because the b1 had influenced other NATO countries, apparently grandly ignoring the fact that similar agreements existing in other NATO nations predate the PRG agreement. The meeting ended, said b6 without any gain for GERLEN and obvious dissatisfaction on his part.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. [b6] also said that the [b1] had subsequently learned that GEHLEN had evidenced to others an antipathy toward himself, [b6] and a bitterness toward RADKE, whom he has described as having been "disloyal" to him, because of their rigid opposition to [b1] claims in the CE field. The appellation "disloyal" was undoubtedly used in a personal sense in view of the fact that RADKE was a member of the then GEHLEN Organization prior to coming to the [b1] in 1950.

6. COMMENT:

a. The foregoing seems to have been the most recent development in the dispute between the [b1] and the [b1] as to their respective competence for CE operations. There will no doubt be more. For the present at least the [b1] seems to be holding its own.

b. We will continue to watch developments as they occur in this area and report them as they become known.

7. The information contained in this report is highly sensitive. It is requested that extreme discretion be observed in its handling and further dissemination in order to avoid any embarrassment to the [b1] and/or source.

*A. Hughes*

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR AND SPECIAL ADVISOR  
American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

G2 USAREUR Liaison Office

*h/c 3066*  
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
EXCEPT NONE  
BY AUTHORITY OF CO, 66th CIC Group  
Date: 10 June 1958  
*XE 320 529*

TO : CO, Hq 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
ATTN: S3 Section, CS Division

FROM : T.C. Hughes, Jr., G2 USAREUR Liaison Office, OCA  
American Embassy, BONN

SUBJ : b1

Re: Attitudes toward cooperation with Allies

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraphs 5c(2)(s), 5c(3)(g) and 5d(3)(g) of OM 6/57, Headquarters 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. Two highly placed liaison contacts within the b1 Department Directors b6 and b6, have confidentially informed this reporter, independently of one another, that approximately four to five weeks ago General GEHLEN of the b1 suggested to b6 of the b1 that the latter organization might be furnishing the Allies to the Federal Republic, i.e. b1 b1 with too much information pertaining to matters of German interest only and not of direct interest to the Allies. The remark was allegedly made in a slightly critical tone on the occasion of a personal meeting between the two agency heads. Neither of my sources were present at the meeting and learned of the remark later from b6 at an internal b1 staff conference. The sources were unable, or unwilling, to state what rejoinder, if any, b6 made to GEHLEN's remark. b6 said, however, that when b6 informed him of GEHLEN's statement he said to b6 that for his part he felt that on the one hand the b1 received more information from the Allies than it furnished to them and on the other the cooperation between the Allies and the b1 was far better than between the b1 and the b1.

3. Asked by me for his opinion as to the reason for GEHLEN's remark, b6 surmised that it may have been an evidence of what is, in his opinion, GEHLEN's eventual aim of setting the b1 up as an arbiter or overall FRG coordinator of liaison between German intelligence and security agencies and similar Allied services. He was, however, unable to relate the remark to any specific subject or field of interest.

4. When asked the same question, b6 said that GEHLEN's reason may have been a jealous one, that he may very well be envious of the quality of b1 material furnished to the Allies, as compared to b1 information -- particularly in the CE field, and that he may resent the fact that b1 information often compares unfavorably or disadvantageously to b1 information. He reasoned further that GEHLEN may have been attempting to cause friction between the b1 and the Allies to his own advantage. b6 too, however, was unable, or unwilling, to specifically state the reason for the remark.

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## 5. COMMENT:

a. Neither [b6] identified the occasion of the meeting between [b6] and GENLEN at which the remark was allegedly made. [b6] said only that GENLEN said it personally to [b6]. [b6] said it occurred at a meeting at which only the two were present ("Unter vier Augen"). Other contacts have reported that [b6] made a trip to MUNICH four weeks ago. The remark may have been made on that occasion.

b. It is almost impossible for this observer to report on the background and circumstances surrounding GENLEN's alleged statement in the absence of further information at this time. Nevertheless there is some reason to surmise that it may have been made with regard to liaison between the [b1] and the Allies in the CE field. There is ample evidence that the [b1] and the [b1] are engaged in a continuing skirmish with respect to jurisdictional competence for CE operations. The [b1] may very well resent the fact that Allied liaison with the [b1] in this area is excellent and that, on some occasions at least, the [b1] has either denied to the [b1] knowledge of or refused to pass to the latter information on this subject which it had made available to Allied security agencies. The reason for this behavior on the part of [b1] is, essentially, antagonism and resistance toward what it regards as [b1] encroachment upon its mission in this area.

6. The information contained in this report is highly sensitive. Extreme discretion must be observed in its further handling and dissemination in order to avoid embarrassment to the [b1] and/or the individuals involved.

*22 Aug 50*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~C  
5d(3)(e)-TCB-r~~SECRET~~

1426

b1

CR. P. 200

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US FORCES

21 MAY 1958

AEUC-SCCS-274/46  
XE-281890 Vol 2 / XE-320529 / XE-399972 Vol A

SUBJECT: [b1] (C) CS 4.2.2

TO: See Distribution

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Reference is made to letter this Headquarters dated 12 May 1958. Subject: [b1] (C), file: XE-281890 Vol 2 and inclosure.

2. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Inclosed for your information is a copy of a report from the Liaison Officer Bonn dated 8 May 1958, Subject and file as above, which adds certain information to that contained in the inclosure to the letter under reference.

3. (~~SECRET~~) [b1]

b1

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl: Memo, File: [b1]  
OCA, dtd 5 May 58, Subj as  
above (C)

b6

Major, MI (CS)  
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 7232  
WDQ/tee

DISTRIBUTION:

b1

b1

b1

THIS DOCUMENT CLASSIFIED SECRET BY AUTHORITY OF  
COLONEL JEFF CLAY IN INF HQ 66TH CIC GROUP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1430

~~SECRET~~

Page 1 of 1 Pages  
Copy 10 of 24 Copies

LOG NR 135794

CC FILE

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~~SECRET~~  
XE 3205 29

A MEMO for the RECORD

20 May 1958

SUBJECT: The Gehlen Organization

(u)  
(C)

On 1 May, 1958, [b6] G2 USAREUR Liaison Officer to the Gehlen Organization, visited this Headquarters and gave a briefing in the S-3 Office.

According to [b6] the GO originally obtained its financial support entirely from CIA (SDU) and all activities of the GO had to be known to CIA. Until about one and one-half years ago the CIA was located in the same compound at Pullach, near Munich, with the GO. At that time Gehlen somehow managed to get CIA out of the compound and they are now located in McGraw Kaserns, Munich. The CIA (SDU) presently has from 40 to 60 persons working in this field.

Although the SDU no longer hovers over the GO, the relationship between the two organizations is still very close. However, it is believed that practically all the money for the GO now comes from Bonn and the SDU no longer has any financial grip on the organization such as it had formerly. It is believed that CIA still furnishes incentive goods to the GO on a vast bulk scale.

At the present time a man named [b6] (DAC) is Chief of the SDU function, while the [b6] of the entire CIA function is [b3 Per CIA] [b6] was formerly a CIC man in Austria. The SDU Liaison Officer to the GO is at present a [b3 Per CIA]

The G2 USAREUR Liaison Officer is limited in his activities with the GO by directives and among other duties has the following:

- a. To screen reports from the GO on OB and send to C2
- b. To expedite requirements or requests of G2
- c. To brief the SDU Liaison Officer
- d. To clear all information from C2 to the GO with the SDU

In other words the G2 Liaison Officer must not work with the GO without the knowledge of SDU and he must not engage in any operational matters or convey any USAREUR requirements direct to the GO.

It is believed about 700 persons are now working in the Pullach Compound of the GO. This compound is divided into two areas, one on either side of the main street. On one side is the overt area and the other side contains facilities for covert operations. On the

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SUBJECT: The Gehlen Organization (S)

covert side, is a heavily wooded area where observation is extremely difficult and security is the most extreme. The G2 Liaison Officer has never entered this side.

Gehlen is believed to have bases of operations in the following places: Bonn, Berlin, Cologne, Ulm, Nuremberg, Frankfurt, Spain and Rome. It is known that Gehlen's brother is the responsible officer for the Rome operation.

Following Gehlen's visit to this Headquarters on 21 April, 1958, [b6] was a participant in a conversation during the return trip to Munich, in which Gehlen's assistant made the remark that it would be a good idea to have a CIC Liaison Officer at Pullach. One of the CIA (SDU) men then remarked that this "would have to be discussed", the implication being with the CIA.

Gehlen has several places of residence. One being in the Pullach Compound, another known to be in Bonn. His family lives and spends most of its time at his residence in Starnberg, south of Munich, where Gehlen often visits.

Owing to the good treatment Gehlen received following the War from the United States including the great financial help he obtained from the CIA, he was described as being, to this date, extremely pro-American.

[b6] /mark  
20 May 1958

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February-2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

*Encls:*

*Copies of:*

1. Chart of Gehlen's Org. (S)
2. Chart of Lichab's Org. (S)
3. Sketch of Pullach Compound (S)
4. Telephone Directory, Pullach (S)
5. Chart of G2 Liaison Administration (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
1432

126

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s): *(b)(3) PER CIA*

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.
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Page(s) *1433-1440*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR & SPECIAL ADVISOR  
American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

G2 USAREUR Liaison Office

XE 320529

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154  
Attn: S-3 Section, CS Division

8 May 1958

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr.

SUBJ: b1

Re: Budget

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraph 5d(1)(f) of OM 6/57, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. The published budget for the b1  
b1 for FY 1958 is included in the over-all budget of the Federal Chancellery, to which it is subordinated. Attached are two copies of the original German text of that portion of the budget of the Chancellery which pertains to the b1. Also attached, hereto, are one ozalid master copy and one carbon copy of a translation thereof.

3. The budget does not provide any detailed breakdown of the expenditures foreseen for the b1 for FY 1958. It is limited, for security reasons, to a statement of the all-inclusive sum requested for the b1. This sum is 41,489,100 DM, an increase of 12,303,500 DM, or a 42 percent increase over that requested for FY 1957.

*Thugher*

2 incls

- 1) b1 Budget for FY 1958 (2 cys)
- 2) Translation of incl #1 (2 cys)

C  
4-1-7-f

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
EXCEPT NO FE  
BY AUTHORITY OF CO, 66th CIC Group  
DATE 8 May 1958

*OK PERM*

*Tick 2*

b1

1445  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

04446

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0404

b1

Item	Purpose	Amount for 1958 DM	Amount for 1957 DM
------	---------	-----------------------------	-----------------------------

0404

b1

II Expenditures

Recurring Expenditures  
General Expenditures

300

Allocation to the b1 ..... 41,489,100  
b1

The funds will be administered in accordance with a financial schedule approved by a sub-committee of the Budget Committee of the Federal Parliament which is binding for the administration with regard to job positions and individual commitments.

The funds are transferable insofar as they are designated as such in the financial schedule.

The annual audit of income and expenditures on the basis of the financial schedule may be made only by the sub-committee of the Budget Committee of the Federal Parliament and by the President of the Federal Audit Agency; the certifications of the sub-committee and the President of the Federal Audit Agency constitute the basis for relief of the Federal Government from accountability.

Total of General Expenditures.. 41,489,100

29,185,600

T r a n s l a t i o n

04446

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

	Zweckbestimmung	Betrag für 1955 DM	Betrag für 1954 DM						
0404	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">b1</div> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>II. Ausgabe</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Fortdauernde Ausgaben</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Allgemeine Ausgaben</b></p> <p>300 Zuschuß an den <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 10px;">b1</div></p> <p>Die Mittel werden nach einem durch einen Untersuchungsausschuß des Haushaltsausschusses des Bundestages genehmigten Wirtschaftsplans bewirtschaftet, dessen Planstellen und Einzelansätze für die Verwaltung bindend sind.</p> <p>Die Mittel sind übertragbar, soweit sie im Wirtschaftsplans als übertragbar bezeichnet sind.</p> <p>Die Jahresrechnung über die Einnahmen und Ausgaben auf Grund des Wirtschaftsplanes unterliegt nur der Prüfung des Untersuchungsausschusses des Haushaltsausschusses des Bundestages und des Präsidenten des Bundesrechnungshofes; die Erklärungen des Untersuchungsausschusses und des Präsidenten des Bundesrechnungshofes bilden die Grundlage für die Entlastung der Bundesregierung.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Summe Allgemeine Ausgaben ....</p> <p>*) Vorjähriger Zuschuß:</p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 80%;">Einnahmen .....</td> <td style="text-align: right;">124 900 DM</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ausgaben .....</td> <td style="text-align: right;">29 310 500 DM</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Zuschuß .....</td> <td style="text-align: right;">29 185 600 DM</td> </tr> </table>	Einnahmen .....	124 900 DM	Ausgaben .....	29 310 500 DM	Zuschuß .....	29 185 600 DM	41 489 100	29 185 600*)
Einnahmen .....	124 900 DM								
Ausgaben .....	29 310 500 DM								
Zuschuß .....	29 185 600 DM								
		41 489 100	29 185 600						

Beiläuterungen

Zu Kap. 0404 TIL 300

Es sind veranschlagt:

Einnahmen .....	207 700 DM
Ausgaben .....	41 696 800 DM
Zuschuß .....	41 489 100 DM

1449

128

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR & SPECIAL ADVISOR  
American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

C2 USAREUR Liaison Office

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
EXCEPTION N O S E  
BY AUTHORITY OF CO, HQ 66TH CIC GROUP  
DATE 5 May 1958

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC GROUP, USAREUR  
Attn: S-3 Section, C3 Division

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr.

SUBJ: [b1]

Re: Delimitations Agreement between the [b1] the [b1]  
the [b1] MAD and the Police

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraphs 5b(3)(a), 5b(3)(e), 5c(3)(a), 5c(3)(d), 5c(3)(f), 5d(3)(a) and 5b(3)(e) of OM 6/57, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. Reference is also made to the following previous reports on this subject:

a. report dated [b1] re

[b1]

b. report dated [b1] re

[b1]

c. report dated [b1] re

[b1]

d. report dated [b1]

[b1]

e. report dated [b1]

[b1]

3. [b1]

[b1]

[b1], the Military Security Service (MSS) and police authorities. After prior approval by the [b1] and the Federal Interior Ministry, the [b1] and the Federal Chancellery, and MAD and the Federal Defense Ministry, it was given final approval by the State Interior Ministers at a conference of Federal and State Interior Ministers held at LINDAU on 10 April 1958.

4. Attached as inclosure #2 is a copy of translation of the German text of a previous delimitations agreement which was approved by the Federal and State Interior Ministers at a conference held in UNKEL on 8 October 1954 and which broadly outlines the functions of the [b1] and the police and the nature of the cooperation existing between them. It is this agreement which is referred to in Article 4 (1) and (2) of inclosure #1.

5. The original German text of these agreements was furnished to me at my request, by [b6] of the [b1] on 22 April 1958.

text is classified CONFIDENTIAL only, I have granted it to SECRET and the MSS obtained on the basis of it is believed that [b1] knowledge of our result a considerable embarrassment to the [b1]

[b1]

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

6. The German title of inclosure #1 is "Richtlinien fuer die Zusammenarbeit <sup>b1</sup> Militaerischen Abschirmdienst und Polizei." This agreement replaces previous similar agreements between the <sup>b1</sup> the <sup>b1</sup> and the MAD and supplements the provisions of the UNKEL agreement of 8 October 1954 between the <sup>b1</sup> and the Police.

7. The German title of inclosure #2 is "Grundsatze ueber die Zusammenarbeit zwischen <sup>b1</sup> und Polizei." It remains valid, as supplemented by the provisions of inclosure #1.

8. COMMENT:

a. These two documents contribute considerably toward a clarification of the functions of the various services and their interrelation with one another. They do not, of course, achieve absolute delimitation between the services for each and every conceivable case and do, in fact, admit that there are certain overlaps. Nevertheless, they provide for the frequent exchange of information of mutual interest and for increased liaison to all the coordinating gears.

b. The text of Articles #1 and #2 of Section I of the <sup>b1</sup> MAD Police delimitations agreement is perhaps of particular interest since it seems to more adequately define the roles of the <sup>b1</sup> and the <sup>b1</sup> in the CE field. It gives to the <sup>b1</sup> responsibility for the conduct of defensive-type covert CE operations in addition to their basic responsibility for covert counter subversive operations within the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone. The <sup>b1</sup> is on the other hand responsible for offensive-type CE operations having as their purpose the penetration of foreign intelligence services and for defensive-type CE operations where the <sup>b1</sup> is the target of the opposing intelligence service.

c. The intent of Article #3 of Section I of inclosure #1, which states that MAD is responsible for security within the military area, seems to be to confine all covert MAD operations to military installations. Indeed, <sup>b6</sup> said to me that MAD's security responsibility "stops at the camp gates (heurt am Kasermentor wuf)."

d. There is some indication that the <sup>b1</sup> is attempting to extend the terms of these agreements to establish the <sup>b1</sup> as an "arbiter" with the privilege of determining whether the <sup>b1</sup> or the <sup>b1</sup> should conduct any particular CE operation. Both <sup>b1</sup> President <sup>b1</sup> and <sup>b1</sup> CE staffers have mentioned this to me. What the <sup>b1</sup> seems to be asking is the requirement that all CE type cases be referred to the <sup>b1</sup> for <sup>b1</sup> determination as to whether they are suitable for <sup>b1</sup> offensive-type CE operations as defined in Article #2 (2) of Section I of the agreement. In other words, as one <sup>b1</sup> CE case officer put it, the <sup>b1</sup> seems to want to indiscriminately take over all cases in contact with foreign intelligence services in an effort to capitalize on all penetration possibilities, however remote. The Federal Interior Ministry, which is very zealous with regard to its responsibilities for internal security, and the <sup>b1</sup> have thus far resisted the <sup>b1</sup> on this and, for the present at least, the provisions of the present agreement remain valid.

2 incs a/a

1. Translation of <sup>b1</sup> MAD/Police Delimitations Agreement (2 cys)
2. Translation of <sup>b1</sup> Police Delimitations Agreement (2 cys)

114280

d(3)(a)-TCH-f w/inclo  
d(3)(c)-TCH-f

1449

b1

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT  
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 1450-1454



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in Person

HEADQUARTERS  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE C .PS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US FORCES

AEUC-SCCS-274/16  
AE-320529

SUBJECT: b1 (6)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Forces  
ATTN: AEAGS-CI (SA)

1. REFERENCE: ICM CI102A1CS 1-57

2. REMARKS:

a. ( ☒ ) Contents of inclosure have not been disseminated to any other agency.

b. ( ) Contents of inclosure have been passed to:

c. ( ☒ ) Source( ☒ ) of the inclosed report was ( ~~xxxx~~ ): LO Bonn

d. ( ☒ ) Date of the information was: as stated

e. ( ☒ ) Investigation is continuing.

f. ( ) Investigation is considered closed.

g. ( ☒ ) Information contained in the attached report may not be released in its present form to other intelligence agencies.

h. ( ☒ ) There is no previous record in Central Registry records on b1

i. ( ☒ ) Regraded CONFIDENTIAL upon separation from classified inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl: Memo, File: b1  
OCA, dtd 25 Mar 58, Subj as  
above (dup)(8)

b6  
Major, MI (CS)  
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 7232

WB PL 206 (L)

29 NOV 55 PREVIOUS EDITION

OBsolete

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 1 of 1 Pages  
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1455

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR & SPECIAL ADVISOR  
American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

C2 USAREUR Liaison Office

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154  
Attn: S-3 Section, CS Division

25 March 1958

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr.

SUBJ: b1

MC 1552

Re: Liaison with the FRG Foreign Office ("Auswaertiges Amt")

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraph 5a(3)(f) of Operational Memorandum 6/57, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. Reference is also made to my report of b1 b1 SUBJECT as above, which reported that one (fnu) von GOETZ und SCHWANENFLIES, a former member of the b1 had received an appointment as FRG Foreign Office ("Auswaertiges Amt") Security Officer.

3. Inquiry made by this office of the DAD liaison element of OCA, BONN, has developed the following information concerning the identity of von GOETZ und SCHWANENFLIES:

CARDED

"SUBJECT's full name is Joerg von GOETZ und SCHWANENFLIES, born 1 May 1909 in MACDEBURG. As late as November 1954, he resided in b6. He is 171 cms tall, grey eyes and thin. His wife b6 was born b6. His daughter, b6 was born b6. b6 was associated with the b1 from August 1946 and worked primarily in CI/CE matters with one of the Field Offices. He resigned from the b1 to accept a position as FRG Foreign Office Security Officer."

*TC Hughes*

C  
4-1-7-f

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

NO INDEXING REQUIRED FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS,

None

66th CIC GROUP

25 MAR 58

1552

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b1

02897

*To 62*

*1466*

AEUC-SCCE; 274/46

25 March 1958

SUBJECT: [b1] 105

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 403, US Forces  
ATTN: AEAGB-CI(SAA)

(XE3 20529)  
10

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) Reference is made to your letter, Subject as above, file AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 GB, dated 11 February 1958.

2. (SECRET) The following additional information was obtained as the result of a Central Registry check on Subject individuals:

a. [b6] - No further information.

b. [b6] - No record.

c. [b6] - See attached translated statement of personal history.

d. HUMPHIL, Theodor Franz - Appears on a list of names dated July 1950 submitted for Central Registry check by Department of the Army Detachment dated 13 July 1950. The list was composed of names of applicants for German Consular and Trade Missions.

e. [b6] - Information dated 8 February 1954 lists [b6] as being employed by Technical Intelligence Branch (TIB) in June 1946. [b6] was working for a branch of TIB [b1] [b1] He was traveling as an instructor going frequently to MUNICH. He was connected with Operation RUSTY. In January 1948, the group was compromised and disbanded.--

f. [b6] - No further information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

This document classified SECRET by  
authority of [b6] Inf,  
171 63th CIC Group.

1 Incl  
Trans of Stmt of Personal  
History [b6] (trip) (U)

[b6]  
Major, MI(CR)  
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M11 8371 REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED  
DER/DEB/ps 1467

M/R: Above xmit results of CR check on [b1] Personalities per G2 req.

Page 1 of 1 Pages  
Copy 3 of 6 Copies

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

~~SECRET~~

HQ  
LOG NR 8604

1203  
AEUC-SCCE  
183/58

GFMO6  
PP UUFPO  
DE UUFPOG 13G  
P 011450Z  
FM G2 USAREU  
TO CO 66TH CIC GP  
DA GRNC  
BT

RFNR 194. FOR AEUC SAC FM AEAGB CI(P)

REQUEST TRANSMIT MSG F-2519 TO MUNICH FO WITH INSTRUCTIONS  
PASS  FOR  TRANSMIT PRIORITY PRECEDENCE.

MSG MUST BE DELIVERED  PRIOR 0900 HRS 2 APR 58

BT

CFN 194 F-2519 0900 2 58  
01/1500Z

*to Miller*

*done by my letter*

02934

NNNN  
RECD 01 MAR 58/1504Z

1478

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XE 3052

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GB 18-1336

~~SECRET~~  
HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

APD 403

11 FEB 1958

AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 GB

SUBJECT: b1 (P)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Army  
Attn: CS Division

1. ~~(C)~~ Forwarded for your information and retention in Central Registry are photostat copies of DAD reports on key b1 personalities presently engaged in establishment of Joint Interrogation Centers b1.

(U)  
2. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ It is requested that CR checks be conducted on these individuals and the results forwarded to this Office.

(U)  
3. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ Due to the sensitivity of these reports, it is desired that neither the reports nor the information contained therein be released to any other agency.

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) Downgrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

b6


6 Incl:  
a/e

Colonel CS  
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

112 FEB 1958

1484

787



SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED:  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS EXCEPT NONE

BY AUTHORITY OF \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FORN~~

Personality Sheet

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GB 18-1336

NAME: Hans Juergen von DAMANS  
ALIAS: DAHLKE  
DOB/POB: 9 August 1907, Freiburg, Germany  
RELIGION: Protestant  
DESCRIPTION: 5' 8" tall; grey-blue eyes; graying blond hair; round face.  
FATHER: Julius von DAMANS  
MOTHER: Bertha von DAMANS  
WIFE:  
RESIDENCE: b6

MILITARY SERVICE: Served with the German Luftwaffe 1937 to 1945. Last rank was colonel. He appears on the roster of senior officers for the German Air Force. His last job was on the staff of OKL, Air Force High Command, serving in the supply and administration section.

INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE: b1 since September 1951 in various capacities. He has been primarily engaged in liaison activities with officials of the West German Government on intelligence and administrative matters. During an interim period (1954-1956) he was assigned to the Training Staff. Most recently he has been assigned to liaison with the Defense Ministry.

~~NO FORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1485

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FORN~~

GB 18-1336

Personality Sheet

NAME: [b6]  
ALIAS: [b6]  
DOB/POB: [b6]  
RELIGION: Protestant - Lutheran  
DESCRIPTION: Ca. 5' 7"; 160 lbs.; brown eyes; black hair, almost bald on top; poor teeth; dumpy build; heavy jaw.  
FATHER: [b6]  
MOTHER: Margaret [b6]  
WIFE:  
CHILDREN:

RESIDENCE:

b6

MILITARY SERVICE: Entered the Army April 1928, Inf. Regiment 5;  
Apr 1933 commissioned 2nd Lt.;  
Apr 1934 promoted 1st Lt.;  
Jun 1938 Captain;  
Jan 1942 Major;  
Mar 1943 Lt. Col.;  
Dec 1944 ordered to Kriegsakademie as instructor;  
PW, US.

INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE: [b1] since March 1949. He worked in the so-called "Sichtung" office within [b1] headquarters until 1953. His function was to provide headquarters guidance on military and economic information collection operations. Since 1954 he has been with the Satellite Positive Intelligence Collection Section as deputy for administration. He supervises reports production, finances, and operational support.

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FORN~~

1486

40

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN~~

GB 15-1486

Personality Sheet

NAME: Lothar [b6]  
ALIAS: KERTENS  
DOB/POB: 20 April 1908, Wuerzburg, Germany  
RELIGION: Catholic  
DESCRIPTION: Medium build; thin graying hair; ca. 5' 9"; ca. 170 lbs.  
FATHER: Maximilian [b6]  
MOTHER: Anna (nee REUSS) [b6]  
CHILDREN: [b6]  
WIFE: [b6]  
RESIDENCE: [b6]

MILITARY SERVICE: Entered Army April 1926, Artillery Regiment;  
1927 to Artillery School and Infantry School;  
1930 commissioned 2nd Lt., 1st Battalion;  
1933 promoted to 1st Lt., Adjutant of 1 Abt.;  
1934 to Amberg;  
1937 Capt., Kr. Akademie;  
1939 transferred to 20th Division;  
1940 Abt. Foreign Armies West of Gen. St.;  
1941 Major;  
1943 Lt. Col.;  
Dec 1944 Kr. Akademie;  
May 1945 Colonel

INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE: [b1] since October 1948. Prior to January 1952  
he was a case officer specialist in Soviet I.S.  
and SSD matters. He then replaced [b6] as  
deputy chief of the CE Section. His particular  
responsibility was dealing with the [b1]. Then he,  
in 1956, was made deputy chief of operations in  
charge of positive operations. In 1957 he replaced  
the chief of operations. Thus, by a series of  
rapid steps he has had a meteoric rise.

~~NOFORN~~

SECRET

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39



~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GB 18-1336

Personality Sheet

NAME: RUMPEL, ~~for~~ Theodor Franz  
ALIAS: BOTH  
DOB/POB: - 26 March 1897 in Hamburg.  
RELIGION: -  
DESCRIPTION: Co. 6' tall; hair gray and thinning; shoulders hunched forward; arms appear crippled (probably war wounds); eyes are pale, watery blue; face is gaunt and drawn.  
FATHER: -  
MOTHER: -  
WIFE: - Johanna nee de SORTE  
CHILDREN: -  
RESIDENCE: - Oberursel/Tamms, am Eichenwäldchen  
  
MILITARY SERVICE: During the war he was with the German Air Force, believed to have held the rank of Colonel; probably in a supply capacity. - Commanded Oberursel installation during WWII when it was Luftwaffe intelligence center. Former German Chief Interrogator in Oberursel for G-2. Sept. 1948 to June 1949  
COMMENT: (We would appreciate such information as available to you regarding his experiences at Camp King and such information regarding him as came to your attention during his employment there.)  
  
INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE: A very new employee, he has been with the [b1] only since 2 May 1957. His primary responsibility is the establishment of the Joint Interrogation Centers [b1] in Stuttgart and Kassel. He will later be in charge of the activities in Land Heese only.

Note: Addition by USARAF-G2 on 10 Feb 1958 - DUL -

~~NO FORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1488

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FORN~~

GB 18-1336

Personality Sheet

NAME: [b6]  
ALIAS: [b6]  
DOB/POB: [b6]  
RELIGION: Protestant  
DESCRIPTION: Thin; ca. 5' 11" tall; approximate weight 160 lbs.;  
smiles often.  
FATHER: -  
MOTHER: -  
WIFE: -  
CHILDREN: [b6]  
RESIDENCE: [b6]

MILITARY SERVICE: He was a Major, Liaison Officer for Supply  
Liaison Staff to 600th (Russian) Infantry  
Division (East); GSC Service from 1 June 1944;  
PW of the US; he was released in 1945.

INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE: [b1] since September 1946. He was, at first,  
the deputy chief of a field office. He later  
moved to headquarters where he took over the  
exploration of overt channels to intelligence  
collection. His present assignment is as deputy  
to the former chief of operations who is now  
chief of personnel, security, and training. He  
is responsible for negotiations with Land and  
Federal authorities in all "overt" fields as an  
outgrowth of his former experience.

~~NO FORN~~

~~SECRET~~

1489

37

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FORN~~

Personality Sheet

GB 18-1336

NAME: [b6]  
ALIAS: [b6]  
DOB/POB: [b6]  
RELIGION: Evangelical church  
DESCRIPTION: 176 cms tall; blue eyes; brown receding hair; wears dark horn-rimmed glasses.  
FATHER: Maximilian [b6]  
MOTHER: Alexandra [b6]  
WIFE: [b6]  
RESIDENCE: [b6]

MILITARY SERVICE: Joined the German Army in 1934. He was a Lt., artillery in 1936; Major in 1944; member of the General Staff on 1 Aug 1944. Prior to WW II he served with a mountain division; during WW II he served in the Polish campaign and was on the western front during the lull; he also served with line units in the campaigns in Norway and Russia. He served as chief evaluator, western Europe, for the intelligence branch of the General Staff, OKH. Shortly before the end of WW II he was G-2 of Sixth Army. Captured by Americans on 3 Aug 45 and he was released on 1 May 47.

INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE: [b1] member since May 1947. In 1948 he was made head of a CI/CE evaluation section. In 1950 he was made deputy chief of the [b1] CE office. Later he was transferred to the Positive Intelligence field where he has become deputy chief of the Soviet Branch. He, in addition to his other duties, is the official [b1] representative to DRG, Frankfurt.

~~NO FORN~~

~~SECRET~~

1490

36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR & SPECIAL ADVISOR  
American Embassy, Bad Godesberg

C2 USAREUR Liaison Office

TO : CO, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154  
Attn: S-3 Section, CS Section

4 February 1958

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr.

XE 320529

SUBJ: [b1]

Re: Liaison with the FRG Foreign Office

1. Reference is made to sub-paragraph 50(3)(f) of Operational Memorandum 6/57, Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. It has been learned from a [b1] staff member that, contrary to expectation, a former [b1] employee rather than a [b1] official has received an appointment as the Security Officer ("Sicherheitsbeauftragter") of the FRG Foreign Office ("Auswaertiges Amt"). As previously reported, it has long been expected that [b6] a member of the [b1] Security Department, was in line for transfer to the Foreign Office to succeed to the job of Security Officer there upon retirement of the incumbent. However, as reported, [b6] who had actually been introduced to some Foreign Office personnel as the incoming Security Officer, did not get the job.

3. The new FO Security Officer is instead one [b6]  
[b6] (phonetic), a former member of the [b1]

4. COMMENT:

Appointment of a former "GEHLEN-man" to the job of Security Officer in the FRG Foreign Office is not surprising inasmuch as it is commonly known that GEHLEN, whether by chance or design, has been successful in placing former members of his organization in several important security and/or intelligence jobs in other organizations. Evidence of this is found in the presence of ex-GEHLENites on the staff of the [b1] the Military Counter Intelligence Service (MAD) and [b1]

[b1] However, appointment of a GEHLEN protege to the position of Security Officer in the Foreign Office tends to confirm previously reported remarks which have come to the attention of this office to the effect that the [b1] rather than the [b1] is responsible for the security of FRG embassies and consulates abroad. Needless to say, appointment of an officer from the [b1] to the FO security job would considerably enhance cooperation between the [b1] and the FO, both in the security and intelligence field.

01067

4-1-7-f

Hughes 3366

320

none

4 Feb 58

1514

b1

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS	
1 NAME OR TITLE	b6	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION		DATE	COORDINATION
2	S 3		FILE
			INFORMATION
3	b6		NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS			
<p>Your attention is called to the last paragraph of attached report. What do we tell Mr. b6</p> <p>G-2 advised that b6</p> <p>Approach Gen Gellan, when the Gen visits us in the near future, for direct liaison. Until that, tell b6 to lay off as it might foul us up.</p> <p>Gellan was supposed to have visited us last Tues, but due to sickness in the family couldn't make it. and 53</p>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE	LnBr b6	DATE	15-1-58
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION		TELEPHONE	

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95

Replaces DA AGO Form 10, 1 Apr 47, and AGO Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

AGL (1) 7-55-6X-4403

1530

INCOMING MESSAGE FOR

CLASSIFICATION

TOO: 421627Z JAN 58

TOR: 421627Z

CODE CLERK BLH

FROM: CC FO "UERZ

PRECEDENCE:

TO: CC 66TH CIC GP

REFERENCE NR:

K-133

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-PHYSICALLY  
REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION  
NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

OPR FROM 4TUC SCCE FOR AEUC SCCE.

SUBJ IS HUGO RENNINGER, BORN 18 JUL 47 IN OBERNDORF NA 5642,  
CURR RESIDES HEIDINGSFELD, AM PFAFFENBERGVEG AND EMPLOYED BY FIRM  
MOEBEL NEUBERT IN HEIDINGSFELD. ON 19 DEC CURR b6 BORN  
b6 STATED THAT SUBJ HAD APPROACHED HIM ON  
NUMEROUS OCCASIONS TO RECRUIT SUBJ FOR AN UNIDEN ORGN WHICH ALLEGEDLY  
IS TO BECOME AN UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE GP IN EVENT WEST GER IS  
OVERRUN IN FUTURE. b6 STATES SUBJ CLAIMS MEMBERSHIP IN THIS ORGN  
AND b6 EXPRESSED BELIEF THE ORGN MAY BE GEHLEN. b6 CURR  
RESIDES IN b6 AND IS EMPLOYED AS SALESMAN  
FOR FIRM HAUS DRESDEN IN MARKTREDWITZ TR 9143. REQ CR ON BOTH  
PERSONALITIES. LEAD INITIALLY FURN THIS OFF BY b6 OF  
7982 LN GP. FURTHER REQ ANY SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS REGARDING SUBJ.  
NAR.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

HE 013070

1535

REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

AEUC FORM 173(L)  
28 NOV 56

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

00013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SIC Personalities

1. USAMVOT  
 Mr. Subackewitz  
 JED Division  
 AUSA, US Forces

Intelligence Division  
 USAMVOT  
 AUSA, US Forces

20 May 1953

1. Reference is made to SIC USAMVOT 30603, dated 14 October 1953. The appended information on [b1] personalities was obtained and collected by the undersigned and, to a lesser extent, extracted from USA files. It is believed that additional information on these personalities could be ascertained from SIC, A-2 USAMVOT [b6], and 7000th Support Wing [b6].

2. Biographical sketches on the key members of the JIC Section, [b1] were written by the undersigned and are predicated on personal contact and observation. The biographical sketches on the two members of the former Woonagh Field Office (which has since been relocated at Nuremberg) were written by [b6] of the 7000th Support Wing, who functioned as screener at that installation and has continued in this capacity at Nuremberg. It should be noted that some of the information on these two subjects is obsolete as the result of the recent move to the Nuremberg installation at Kuethe-Hollwitz Strasse.

3. In addition to the [b1] personnel described in the appended material, the undersigned has met [b6] senior and junior [b1] liaison officers, respectively, with JARI Bavaria. He has also met [b6] replacement [b6]. (Note: These are all cover names.) Because of infrequent contact and the consequent lack of opportunity to effect a meaningful observation, no attempt was made to describe these officials in detail. The undersigned was also apprised of the existence of Herr [b6] who functions as the administrator of real estate rented by the JIC Section. [b6] is a regular civil servant (Beamter) with the administrative knowledge required for the performance of this duty.

4. [b1]

b1

b6

Int Div USAMVOT Rep  
 JARI Bavaria/AACongGen Munich

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1547

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~COVER NAME: Herr GLAS - *1st Lt. [redacted]*ORGANIZATION: Aussementelle Woonach, Sobra [redacted]RANK: Chief of the Aussementelle Woonach, subordinate to Herr BULL (Chief of JT. Munich) for administrative matters. Has a civilian rank, which is equivalent to a captain in the Bundeswehr. Expected to be promoted in the near future (early 1963) to the equivalent rank of major.TRUE NAME: UnknownADDRESS: Unknown. He lives in a two-story Bavarian-style country house in a small village near RAB AIRLINO. He has rented the entire upper story. The name of his landlady is [redacted] b6 Her husband died in 1952 and was a former Austrian.AGE: About 48 yrs old (in 1962).LOC: BOHNA near LEITZIG, Saxony.TELEPHONE: RAB AIRLINO 6723. (Not listed in telephone book).BND SERIAL NUMBER: T-3267.PERSONAL APPEARANCE: About 6'1" tall, well built, has blond hair and blue eyes, wears glasses.FAMILY BACKGROUND: Is married and has one daughter, about 13 yrs old. She will reside in England for two years as a nursemaid at the home of a British diplomat. After her return, the daughter of another [redacted] b1 official, [redacted] b6 from HAD REICHERMANN will take her place at this home.PERSONAL BACKGROUND: Herr GLAS joined the [redacted] b1 in approximately 1965 at BERLIN. At the time, he worked almost exclusively with American agencies in BERLIN. In approximately 1967, he moved from BERLIN to the newly-established office of the BND in CAMP PEBLIS, where he worked as a screener and interrogator of refugees passing through this camp. When the [redacted] b1 Aussementelle Woonach for the collection of Yugoslav Order of Battle was established in 1969 at that camp, Herr GLAS worked as principal interrogator for this office. In 1962, when the Aussementelle Woonach was moved to Munich, he became its chief. During World War II, Herr GLAS was a pilot in the German Air Force and was captured by American troops. He spent some time in US prison camps. Herr GLAS speaks Russian almost fluently, English well, French well, and is presently learning Serbo-Croatian. Drives automobile Ford Taurus, 17-18, black-yellow, 1961 color. GLAS has many hobbies. He collects stamps and trades them with dealers located in India, Burma, etc. He inherited about 10,000 in the United States, but can not obtain the money, because it is held by the Alien Property Custodian, under a law recently voided by Congress. His wife is often sick and stays frequently at convalescent homes. He appears to have additional duties in ROSENHEIM, where another section of the [redacted] b1 is located. He is in Woonach only every second week. He smokes and drinks more than moderately.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1548



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~COVER NAME: Herr GLASORGANIZATION: Ausseestellungs Moosach, Refra MunichNAME: Chief of the Ausseestellungs Moosach, subordinate to Herr Hall, (Chief of JIC Munich) for administrative matters. Has a civilian rank, which is equivalent to a captain in the Bundeswehr. Expected to be promoted in the near future (early 1963) to the equivalent rank of major.TRUE NAME: UnknownADDRESS: Unknown. He lives in a two-story Bavarian-style country house in a small village near BAY REISING. He has rented the entire upper story. The name of his landlady is [b6] Her husband died in 1942 and was a former Antenna.AGE: About 40 yrs old (in 1962).LOC: BORNHA near LEIPZIG, SaxonyTELEPHONE: BAY REISING 8723. (Not listed in telephone book).BND SERIAL NUMBER: V-3267.PERSONAL APPEARANCE: About 6'1" tall, well built, has blond hair and blue eyes, wears glasses.FAMILY BACKGROUND: Is married and has one daughter, about 10 yrs old. She will reside in England for two years as a nursemaid at the home of a British diplomat. After her return, the daughter of another [b1] official, MOLNAR, (aka LACHNER) from BAD REICHENHALL will take her place at this home.PERSONAL BACKGROUND: Herr GLAS joined the [b1] in approximately 1948 at BERLIN. At the time, he worked almost exclusively with American agencies in BERLIN. In approximately 1957, he moved from BERLIN to the newly-established office of the [b1] in CAMP PITING, where he worked as a screener and interrogator of refugees passing through this camp. When the [b1] Ausseestellungs Moosach for the collection of Yugoslav Order of Battle was established in 1959 at that camp, Herr GLAS worked as principal interrogator for this office. In 1962, when the Ausseestellungs Moosach was moved to Munich, he became its chief. During World War II, Herr GLAS was a pilot in the German Air Force and was captured by American troops. He spent some time in US prison camps. Herr GLAS speaks Russian almost fluently, English well, French well, and is presently learning Serbo-Croatian. Drives automobile Ford Taunus, 17-4, black-yellow, 1961 model. GLAS has many hobbies. He collects stamps and trades them with dealers located in India, Burma, etc. He inherited about 250,000 in the United States, but can not obtain the money, because it is held by the Alien Property Custodian, under a law recently voided by Congress. His wife is often sick and stays frequently at convalescent homes. He appears to have additional duties in ROSENHEIM, where another section of the [b1] is located. He is in Moosach only every second week. He smokes and drinks more than moderately.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1549

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOFORN

Cover Name: REFUGEEName: Unknown.Rank: Unknown, presumably the BfV equivalent of a Regierungsrat.Function: Inspector General (Inspector) of the Refra (JIC) system.Organization: BfVDOB: Unknown. Subject appears to be in his middle or late thirties.POB: Not known. Judging by his emigration, subject is a North German.Address: Subject owns a house in Stuttgart.Telephone: Not known.Personal Appearance: Height: approx. 5'8". Weight: approx. 155 lbs. Has a fairly slender build and very erect posture. Is somewhat horse-faced and smiles rarely. His sparse white hair is parted on the right. He is a very neat and conservative dresser.Personal Characteristics: Very care of himself. Is somewhat stand-offish and less reliable than his colleagues. His rather underdeveloped sense of humor is typically Teutonic. He seems to be very competent and knowledgeable in his field of endeavor.Personal and Professional Background: Nothing is known about his pre-[b1] employment. Prior to his present assignment, he was head of the Stuttgart JIC. Upon his transfer to Headquarters [b1] he received permission from his chief, Herr DILLMANN, to retain his residence and office at Stuttgart. Because he is removed from the office routine and paper shuffling at full-on, subject is often entrusted with the writing of special studies and position papers which require concentration and time.

In his capacity as Inspector, subject periodically visits all the Refras in order to check on operations and insure their uniformity (a sometimes difficult task because of the Federal structure of the BfV, which results in the different operating procedures in the various Landes). Subject also inspects Refra facilities and makes suggestions for improvement.

In addition to his primary duty, subject also runs a course for interrogators (Kurs fuer Befragter) in the vicinity of Stuttgart. The course is held for both novices and experienced interrogators. Novice interrogators initially spend some time undergoing their seniors at a specific Refra and are subsequently sent to the Interrogators' Course.

NOFORN 1550

NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Profile:

Interview:

Miscellaneous information:

Notes:

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOFORN

1551

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Cover Name: SCHMIDT

Grade: Unknown.

Rank: Unknown.

Function: Official in charge of Miss (Schneider) and  
Maintenance of records (Schmidt/Verteilung).

Organization: b1

Age: Unknown. Subject is 37 or 40 years of age.

POB: Berlin

Address: Unknown

Telephone: Not known.

Personal Appearance: Height: approx. 5'3". Weight: approx. 155 lbs. Of fairly slender  
build. Is rather handsome and distinguished looking. Has slightly wavy hair.

Personal Characteristics: Appears to be very pleasant and cultured.

Personal and Professional Background: No details known. Subject is believed to have  
been a professional Army officer.

Family: Subject is a bachelor.

Miscellaneous Information: In addition to the functions noted above, subject also handles  
queries on reports (received mostly from b1) and clarifies  
obscure points. - SCHMIDT is an avid tennis player and,  
considering his age, appears to possess amazing endurance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET 1552

NOFORN  
CONFIDENTIALCover Name: DALBERG Not knownName: UnknownRank: Presumably holds the equivalent rank of a Regierungsrat in the [b1]Function: Chief of Procurement for the JIC Section (Beauftragter der Beschaffungsstelle)  
(Note: It is considered possible that [b1]'s responsibilities in the procurement field transcend the province of the JIC Section and extend to other [b1] sections.)Organization: [b1]DOB: 1906 (?). Subject is believed to be in his late fifties.POB: Hamburg (?)Address: Unknown.Telephone: Not known.Personal Appearance: Height: Appr. 5'6". Weight: Appr. 165 lbs. Is somewhat portly, but not obese. His straight white hair is parted on the right. He frequently displays a benign smile, which shows evidence of considerable dental work on his teeth. He wears gold-rimmed glasses. His attire is always impeccable.Personal Characteristics: Very affable and accommodating. Has a flexible mind and takes an interest in many topics which are outside the province of his responsibilities. Has a good sense of humor. Known among his colleagues as a very active man who gets things done. On some occasions, he has been known to perform tasks which had not as yet left the thinking stage, as far as his colleagues were concerned. Has a good command of Polish and a fair knowledge of English.Personal and Professional Background:

Subject was a long-time resident of Hamburg. Some time during the pre-war years, he moved to Warsaw, where he represented a Hamburg firm that imported eggs from Poland. He was later inducted into the Wehrmacht and rose to the rank of Feldwebel (?). Nothing is known about his activities during the immediate post-war period until he accepted employment with the [b1]. In his present capacity, DALBERG serves as a Mädchen fuer Alles (jack-of-all-trades) in the JIC section. He handles procurement and other logistical problems, is concerned with organizational matters, compiles the monthly statistical report on "Refugee Movement across the Demarcation Line", and appears to have some responsibility for the physical security of buildings housing the various JIC's.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Family:

Subject is married and has a daughter, approximately twenty years of age. Frau DALLBERG, a portly, yet rather handsome and vivacious blonde in her early fifties, is an ethnic German, born at Warsaw, Poland. She has a fluent command of the Polish language. After the collapse of the Eastern front, she and her daughter made a harrowing escape from Poland to Germany. As a result of this ordeal, the daughter developed a hip deformity and had to submit to a great many operations before this condition was corrected. At present, the daughter has a secretarial position with an unidentified firm.

Miscellaneous Information:

DALLBERG has a cold heart condition, which, however, does not prevent him from taking an annual camping trip to the Tyrrhenian Coast of Italy. He claims that his state of health is not impaired by the hot sun and salt water.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on  
4 February 2009  
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-IR

NOFORN 1554

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Cover Name: RYDENHAY Val covered

Name: Unknown.

Rank: Holds the equivalent rank of a Regierungsrat or Oberregierungsrat in the [b1]

Function: Deputy Chief, JIC Section

Organization: [b1]

DOB: Unknown. Subject is believed to be 53 or 54.

POB: East Prussia, exact location unknown.

Address: Subject lives in a side street intersecting with Karerstrasse near the Alte Pinakothek in Munich.

Telephone: Not known.

Personal Appearance: Height: Appr. 6'. Weight: Appr. 165 lbs. Has a slender build and cadaverous appearance. Subject is balding; what little hair he has, is greyish, and combed straight back. He has a fairly prominent pointed nose and small eyes. His clothes are neat and in good taste, though not noted for their elegance.

Personal Characteristics: Very amiable and endowed with an excellent sense of humor. Eminently sensible and level-headed; has a good grasp of detail and seems to be fully conversant with his job. Good conversationalist and social mixer.

Personal and Professional Background:

Subject was a professional artillery officer prior to and during World War II and reached the rank of lieutenant colonel. During the war, he saw considerable service at the Eastern Front. At the time of the re-activation of the German Army during the post-war years, subject applied for reinstatement, but was rejected (presumably because of his age). He subsequently accepted employment with the [b1] and rose to the position of Chief of the Inspektion Bafra before he was transferred to Headquarters [b1] at München-Pullach.

Family:

Subject is married and has at least one son, 19 or 20 years of age. His wife is believed to be in her early forties.

Miscellaneous Information: Subject is an ardent skier, although he took up this sport rather late in life. He does not own a car and values to work. He obtained his present apartment, because he was able to pay for the renovation cost (with the help of a loan granted by the [b1]). However, he plans to buy a house, where he hopes to live after retirement.

~~NO FORN~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1555



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Cover Name: DANIEL

Name: Hans von DANANS

Rank: Colonel, Luftwaffe

Function: Chief, J17 Section

Organisation: b1

DOB: Unknown. Subject appears to be in his middle fifties.

POB: Not known, possibly Berlin.

Address: Subject owns a home at Starnberg near Munich.

Telephone: Not known.

Personal Appearance: Height: Appr. 5'7". Weight: Appr. 170 lbs. Has stocky build and ruddy complexion. Has a full face with blue eyes and white hair, parted on the right side. Dresses well and in good taste.

Personal Characteristics: Very jovial and affable. Has a very good sense of humor and a ready laugh. Good speaker and conversationalist, but appears to lack profundity. Does not have a very good grasp of detail and relies on his subordinates to provide it. Well liked by his subordinates because of his genial personality and concern for their welfare.

Personal and Professional Background: Subject was a regular Luftwaffe officer during World War II.

Family: Subject is married and has at least one daughter. Frau von Danans is an attractive, distinguished looking lady in her early fifties. She is of medium height, well built, has graying hair, and a slightly aquiline nose. Unlike her husband, she has a fair command of English. Subject's daughter is married to a former b1 operative, who was apprehended in East Germany and spent 8 (?) years in captivity. He is presently on active duty as a captain (?) with Group VI, MAD, at Munich.

Miscellaneous Information: Subject presides at the Central Commission Meetings, held on a semi-annual basis and attended by senior members of the overt collection agencies of ECSE, A-2. b1 and SDCE.

CONFIDENTIAL 1556



MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS	
1 NAME OR TITLE Chief, CE	DATE	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION			COORDINATION
2 Chief, Source Control			FILE
b6			INFORMATION
3 Liaison Div, in turn, <del>SECRET</del>			NECESSARY ACTION
		X	NOTE AND RETURN
4 Chief, Central Registry			SEE ME
(dossier strengthening)			SIGNATURE
REMARKS This report helps point out the extent of the calculated risk that we have been forced to take thru the years in sharing our secrets with German agencies.			
<div style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">EXPEDITE</div>			
Add attached reports to the dossier, XE-320529.			
Betty this is the successor to the GEN. GETTLEN Group			
FROM NAME OR TITLE	DATE		
b6	11 Jan 62		
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	TELEPHONE		
1596			

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95 Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used. AGL (1) 11-60-451-79288

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MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIP ACTIONS	
1 NAME OR TITLE	INITIALS	CIRCULATE	
Chief, CE			
2 ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	COORDINATION	
Chief, OSC			
(also b6)		X	FILE
3 Chief, OCS			INFORMATION
		X	NECESSARY ACTION
4 In Div, in turn.			NOTE AND RETURN
			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

**REMARKS**

Remark re b1 running DAO cases is corroborated by German b6 CO of MAD VI, who gave same info to b6 in Munich 16 Dec at OCA annual Xmas dinner. b6 added that 2 of their "best" cases suddenly faded out along with the arrest of b1 employee.

b1 source(employee) b1 is personally well known by b6. He is evaluated as definitely "B".

**EXPEDITE**

FROM NAME OR TITLE	b6	DATE	3 Jan 62
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	1605	TELEPHONE	8479

DD FORM 109M 1 FEB 50 95

Replaces DA AGO Form 896, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

AGL (1) 11-60-47-19211

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HEADQUARTERS FIELD STATION IV  
66TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 108 US Forces

AEUC-OGE  
HE-320529

16 November 1961

SUBJECT: Gehlen Group

b1

(S)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th INTC Group  
ATTN: AEUC-OGE  
APO 154, US Forces

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) REFERENCE: Dalrir 1-9.
2. (U) FORWARDED: Three Agent Reports (5 pp), subject and file as above, dated 3 November 1961.

3. (S) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: a. Source A-IV is identified as

b1

b1

evaluated "C",

b1

b. Source B-IV is identified as

b1

b1

evaluated "C",

(D-586049).

c. Source C-IV is identified as

b1

b1

Freiham near Munich, evaluated "C",

b1

4. (S) REMARKS: a. Suggest that the files of Labor Service Headquarters, Heidelberg, be examined in order to determine complete identifying data on the personalities mentioned in the attached reports. It is further suggested that name traces be conducted on these individuals.

b. The attached reports are forwarded for your information only.

Incl  
as

b6

Commanding

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1616

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✓ - OUT

AGENT REPORT (SR 300-320-10)	
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT Gehlen Group b1 (c)	2. DATE SUBMITTED 3 November 1961 mah 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER HE 320 529
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED	
<p>On 25 October 1961, the working files of Field Station IV, 66th Intelligence Corps Group, APO 108, US Forces, were examined and revealed that during 1959 and 1960 Source A-IV reported the following information concerning b1 activities and recruitment within Labor Service unite in the area of Dachau (PU8048), German Federal Republic (GFR):</p> <p>In 1957, b6 b6 resigned his position as Chief of Personnel, 6934th Civilian Labor Group Center (CLG), Dachau, to accept employment with Gehlen. As of 1959, b6 was employed within the Personnel Section of Gehlen, in or around Munich (PU9135), GFR. Prior to his resignation, b6 was allegedly a contact man for Gehlen within Labor Service. b6 LSSN: b6 identifying data unknown, succeeded b6 as Gehlen contact man within the 6934th CLG Center. b6 was also Chief of Personnel for the 6934th CLG, and resigned in 1958 to accept employment with Gehlen.</p> <p>Through the efforts of b6 four members of Labor Service were recruited to work for Gehlen. b6 b6 were recruited from the 6934th CLG, Dachau. b6 b6 and b6 b6 were recruited from the 4028th CLG, Dachau. b6 b6 were allegedly employed by Gehlen in the capacity of couriers.</p> <p>Following b6 resignation from Labor Service, b6 b6 employed as Chief of the Administration Section, 6934th CLG Center, took over the position as Gehlen contact man. b6 allegedly recruited b6 b6 to work for Gehlen in 1960. Schroeter was assigned to the 6934th CLG Center as Personnel Specialist and terminated his position to work for Gehlen.</p> <p>In approximately 1957, b6 (nfi), terminated his position with the 4028th CLG, Dachau, to accept employment with Gehlen. He later appeared at Dachau on several occasions and was known to have maintained contact with b6 and b6 both assigned as drivers to the 4028th CLG. b6 was also in contact with</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1631</p>	
<p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Continued)</p>	
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT b6 66th INTC Gp	b6

DA FORM 341

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 57, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (I) 5-61-10M-03237

CONFIDENTIAL

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AGENT REPORT  
(SR 380-330-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Gehlen Group

b1

(c)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

3 November 1961

meh

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

XE 320 529

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

b6

b6 later told Source that b1 was employed by Gehlen. During the visits to Camp Dachau b6 was driving a DKW Kombi automobile with license number b6 place of birth unknown, also left the 4028th CLG in 1957, to accept a position with Gehlen, and allegedly was later engaged in recruiting personnel from Labor Service to work for Gehlen.

b6, place of birth unknown, resigned his position with the 4028th CLG in May 1958, to work for Gehlen. He later appeared at Camp Dachau driving a Mercedes automobile and was allegedly conducting pre-employment checks for Gehlen. Also in 1958, Martin Bloch, born 21 April 1907, in Diedendorf (noa), Germany, supervisor of the 4090th CLG, Freiam (PU7834), near Munich, GFR, resigned his position to accept employment with Gehlen. In June or July 1959, b6 resigned his position with the 4090th CLG, Freiam to work for Gehlen.

Personnel assigned to the 6934th CLG Center, Dachau, who are suspected by Source of working for Gehlen are: b6

b6

According to Source, some of the personnel who left Labor Service to work for Gehlen were given pre-employment interviews in Room 403, Fourth Floor, Museuminsel 1, Munich, in the office of b6 Telephone No. 24601-05, and received correspondence with return address of b6

Gehlen's recruitment among Labor Service personnel in Dachau was common knowledge in 1959 and 1960, and it was a standing joke among the personnel that when a person stated that he was going to work for the "Brauerer" (brewery), it meant that he had been recruited by Gehlen. The recruiting activities by Gehlen were known and carried the approval of the Commanding Officer, 111th Labor Supervision Center, b6 and his assistant, b6

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66th INTC Gp

b6

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 5-81-10M-83237

CONFIDENTIAL

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AGENT REPORT (SR 380-320-10)	
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT Gehlen Group b1 (c)	2. DATE SUBMITTED 3 November 1961 mah 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER XE 320 529
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED	
<p>On 25 October 1961, the working files of Field Station IV, 66th Intelligence Corps Group, APO 108, US Forces, were examined and revealed that on 10 June 1959, Source B-IV furnished the following names of personnel who had either resigned from Labor Service to work for Gehlen or intended to resign their positions to work for Gehlen.</p> <p><u>Martin Bloch, born 21 April 1907, in Diedendorf (nos), Germany, assigned to 4090th Civilian Labor Group, (CLG), Freilham (PU7834), near Munich (PU9135), German Federal Republic (GFR).</u></p> <p>b6 ISSN: b6 date and place of birth unknown, 6934th CLG Center, Dachau (PU8048), GFR.</p> <p>b6 Germany, assigned to the 6934th CLG Center, Dachau.</p> <p>b6 b6 6934th CLG Center, Dachau.</p> <p>b6 ISSN: b6 b6 place of birth unknown, 6934th CLG Center, Dachau.</p> <p>b6 6934th CLG Center, Dachau.</p> <p>b6 place of birth unknown, formerly assigned to the 4029th CLG, Dachau.</p> <p>b6 6934th CLG Center, Dachau.</p> <p>b6 6934th CLG Center, Dachau.</p> <p>b6 (pfi), formerly assigned to the 6934th CLG Center Dachau, as radio man.</p> <p>b6 6934th CLG Center, Dachau.</p> <p>b6</p>	
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE	
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT b6 66th INTC Gp 1633 b6 (Continued) 27	

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (I) 5-81-16M-83277

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AGENT REPORT (SR 380-320-10)	
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT Gehlen Group b1 (c)	2. DATE SUBMITTED 3 November 1961 mah
3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER XE 320 529	
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED left the 6934th CLG Center, Dachau, in June 1959, to work for Gehlen in Frankfurt (MA7754), GFR.	
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT b6 66th INTC Gp 1634 b6	

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WO AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 6-01-1534-03237

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AGENT REPORT (SR 300-320-10)	
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT Gehlen Group b1 (c)	2. DATE SUBMITTED 3 November 1961 mah
3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER XE 320 529	
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED <p>On 25 October 1961, the working files of Field Station IV, 66th Intelligence Corps Group, APO 108, US Forces, were examined and revealed that in December 1959, Source C-IV reported that the following members of Labor Service terminated their positions to accept employment with Gehlen:</p> <p>b6 terminated his position with the 4090th CIC, Freihem (PU7834), Germany, in October 1959, to accept employment with Gehlen.</p> <p>b6 unknown, terminated his position with the 4090th CIC, Freihem, in October 1959, to accept employment with Gehlen.</p> <p>CARDEN</p>	
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT b6 66th INTC Gp 1635 b6	

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47 WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 5-61-1651-83237

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XE 320 529

Behlen Gruppe

(8) ✓

HEADQUARTERS  
513TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 757 US FORCES

AEUMQ-SSS  
FILE NO:

6 March 1961

SUBJECT:

b1

(U) (C)

XE 320 529

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th MI Group  
ATTN: AEUC -CR  
APO 154, US Forces

1. (U) REFERENCE: DALRIR 1-9, D-8a(CI).

2. (U) FORWARDED: Agent Report, this Group, dated 1 March 1961, subject as above.

3. (U) REMARKS: Forwarded for your information.

This Document Has Been  
Classified  
Date MAY 10 1961 506

1 Incl  
AR dtd 1 Mar 61

b6

Chief, Security Branch

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY when sep-  
arated from classified information.

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on  
22 February 2002  
by USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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HEADQUARTERS FIELD STATION IV  
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
United States Army, Europe  
APO 108 US Forces

CIC FILE

AEUC-OLN: 274/47  
XB-320529

SUBJECT: [b1] (c)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th MI Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
ATTN: AEUC-OLN

1. (U) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 6/57, your headquarters, dated 20 June 1957.
2. (U) FORWARDED: Agent Report, Field Station IV, subject and file as above, dated 4 August 1960.

3. (c) CONTROL OF INFORMATION. [b1]

[b1]

4. (c) REMARKS:

a. Request a QR check be made [b1]

[b1]

b. DAD Munich has been furnished a copy of the attached report.

a. [b1]

[b1]

[b6]

Lt Col, AI (Arty)  
Commanding

Incl  
(c) AR, dtd 4 Aug 60

[b6] /js/MOG H 8398

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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No Record

AUG 15 1960

PN-21863

AUG 15 1960

14 60-1291

*Out com - sensitive class*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 April 1960

b1

DOSSIER 2

SUBJECT: [b1] (c)

FROM: [b6] Liaison Officer  
Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 66th MI Group

XE 320529

TO: Headquarters  
66th MI Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
ATTN: [b6]

1. (C) Reference is made to report this office, Subject: [b1]  
[b1] (C), dated 10 August 1959, file this office: [b1]  
[b1]
  2. (C) The following information was furnished by Herr [b6]  
Chief of the [b1] on 1 April 1960:
  3. (C) Tho [b1] is working the Rheinland-Pfalz from an interrogation head-  
quarters in Frankfurt (Main), Germany, [b6] Liaison Officer  
for Gehlen in the Rheinland-Pfalz, has invited [b6] for a one day trip to  
the center in Frankfurt, but [b6] has as of yet not had the necessary time  
for an inspection visit. Originally [b1] wanted to establish a headquarters for  
the Rheinland-Pfalz in Mainz, Germany, but lack of adequate housing in the city  
prevented this development. The real estate requirements are considerable because  
the that time planned headquarters for the Rheinland-Pfalz in Mainz would have  
had to have the capacity of housing 50 or 60 people at any given time.
    - a. For operational purposes the [b1] had divided the state of Rhein-  
land-Pfalz into two sectors;
    - b. There is another such interrogation center as mentioned in the  
above in Stuttgart, Germany;
- LIAISON OFFICER'S COMMENTS: In the subsequent discussion that followed it be-  
came apparent that [b6] was not always happy with his operational dealings  
with [b1]. Specifically he mentioned ADVENT as a typical example of a case  
initially turned down by [b1] turned over to CIC for development, and which is  
now yielding fine results. [b6] is aware, of course, that the [b1] has a

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

close operating relationship with AD but [b6] feels that the [b1] has "emancipated" itself now to the extent that DAD only gets the information that [b1] decides to give. Throughout this phase of the discussion [b6] created the impression that he would rather work with the Americans than with Gehlen, and this development represents a complete reversal of [b6] attitude to American intelligence, viz; from being generally negative and grudgingly cooperative, to friendly - and for [b6] - almost intimate rapport with the writer, and it is worth repeating that this current pro "CIC" frame of reference represents a signal victory for the liaison effort. At any rate, [b6] again reassured the writer that he will continue to completely cooperate with this Group and that, should the need arise, he would assist the operational needs of this Group in any direction and at any time.

[b6]

Liaison Officer  
Rheinland-Pfalz

[b1]



DECLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]  
DECLASSIFY ON: [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1653

100

<b>JOINT MESSAGE FORM</b>				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p style="font-size: 2em; margin: 0;">13</p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em; margin: 0;">DEC 11 3 13 PM 1959</p> </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <p style="font-size: 1.5em; margin: 0;">B-11/1453</p> </div> </div>					
PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO
ACTION ROUTINE		BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	DA
INFO		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		ORIGINAL	CONF
FROM: CO 66TH CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT GER					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO: RGN IV, MUNICH, GER FOR LO <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">b6</span>					<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 5px;"> CONF 7-7094 AEUC-LN for LO <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">b6</span> </div> <div style="margin-bottom: 5px;"> 1. (U) Ref your OM, subj: Intel Sources from JICs, dated 1 Dec 59, and msg B-1226 from <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">b6</span> G2. </div> <div> 2. (U) This Group's views and the position you may take at the next Central Commission Meeting are as outlined in para 6, cited ref. </div>
Classified <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b> by authority of <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; text-align: center; font-size: 2em; margin: 10px 0;">b6</div>					
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 4 February 2009 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R					
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE					
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 40%;"> SYMBOL AEUC-LN  TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)  <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">b6</span> VR  PHONE 8479  PAGE NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES 1  SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">CONFIDENTIAL</div> </div> <div style="width: 50%; text-align: center;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; font-size: 1.5em; margin: 0 auto;">b6</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; font-size: 1.2em; margin: 5px auto;">b6</div> <p>Chief, Liaison Division</p> </div> </div>					
DATE 11 MONTH YEAR		TIME 1325Z YEAR		1654	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G-2, USAREUR, Liaison Office  
OCA, U.S. Embassy, Box 105  
APO 80 US Forces

3 December 1959

b1

SUBJECT:

b1

Re: GEHLEN Organization - Stars & Stripes Article dated 30 Nov 59

TO : Commanding Officer,  
Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Forces  
Attn: Liaison Division

1. (U) Reference is made to your message Z-6827 and reply this office, I-455, concerning Subject.

2. (U) Forwarded herewith for your information and retention, the two (2) articles appearing in the 21 November 1959 and 28 November 1959 editions of the "Muenchner Illustrierte" concerning a DA operation conducted by Subject organization. In brief, the article concerns the activities of a one, Dr. Havlicek (apparently a fictitious name), a CSR National, who was pressured by the CIS into becoming an agent of that country and assigned the mission to penetrate Subject organization through contact with his uncle who had fled the CSR and maintained contact with the [b1]. While the article allegedly contains a certain amount of fiction, it also allegedly is a documentary supplied by GEHLEN to the press, a propaganda move to indicate cooperation with the press and also alert the West German population on the ever-increasing threat of hostile intelligence services.

3. (U) As mentioned in my message, I-455, the Stars & Stripes article of 30 November 1959, wherein it states that former General GEHLEN heads the three intelligence services, was incorrectly translated. The entire article was lifted from the attached two (2) series of articles on the GEHLEN Organization.

b6

Liaison Officer

C  
2-2-2-f  
dib/ss/Mehlem 3236

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b1

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4 February 2009  
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CO, 66th CIC Group, Attn: Liaison Division DATE: 1 December 1959

FROM : [b6] L/O, Bavaria

SUBJECT: Intelligence Sources from JICs

*Handwritten:* XE 320529  
2 DEC 1959

1. Reference TWX B-1226, from [b6] to C-2.

2. It is believed that the [b1] is making a concerted effort to limit US Intelligence in their attempts to obtain sources in the German Federal Republic. Since the [b1] has no access to sources in Berlin they feel that they should have a free rein in the CFR. The latest move on the part of the [b1] is to attempt to limit US Intelligence to the former US Zone. At the latest meeting of the Central Commission for JICs, [b6] of the [b1] stated that the [b1] had prior commitments with [b1] in their former zones and that the US could operate there only with the permission of the [b1]. This is a maneuver by the [b1] to restrict US Intelligence, since, in fact, the JIC, Stuttgart, was set up in April 1958, and services all of Württemberg-Baden which includes the former French Zone.

3. The [b1] proposal that they take one half of all operational leads developed in the JICs and that the Americans get the other half would result in the Army, Air Force and DAD being forced to divide up the remaining half.

4. The [b1] proposal that, in the former [b1] the Army, Air Force and DAD be represented by only one spokesman, and that all operational leads be divided three ways between the [b1] and US Intelligence. This would result in Army, Air Force and DAD dividing up only one third of the total leads.

5. The [b1] insists that no recruitment of sources is to take place in the JICs or Refugee Camps but that contact can be made at any other time.

6. According to [b6] G-2, USAREUR, the "Army stand" at the next meeting of the Central Commission will be as it was in the past, i.e. [b1]

b1

7. I would appreciate the views of Group on this matter so that I may voice an opinion at the next Central Commission meeting.

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P 011000Z  
FM LO OCA MEHLEM GER  
TO CO 66TH CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT GER  
DA GRNC  
BT

XE 340529

//~~SECRET~~// 1-455 // OPR FOR AEUC-LN FM AEUC-LB.  
REF UR Z-6827.

1. (U) STARS AND STRIPES ARTICLE OF 30 NOV CURR CONCERNING  
GEHLEN ORGN IS TAKE OFF FM ALLEGED DOCUMENTARY REPORT PUBLISHED IN  
TWO INSTALLMENTS OF "MUNCHNER ILLUSTRIERTE" MAGAZINE DTD 21 & 28  
NOV RESPECTIVELY BEING FWO YOUR HQ UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

2. (U) ENTIRE ARTICLE AND IN PARTICULAR, LAST PARA, COLUMN  
ONE AND BEGINNING COLUMN TWO OF STARS & STRIPES ARTICLE ON GEHLEN  
ORGN WHICH STATES HE HEADS THE FEO REP THREE SECRET SVC DEPTS,  
I.E., THE INFORMATION SVC, INTERIOR CE, AND MIL CE WAS APPARENTLY  
CFN 1-455 Z-6827 30 21&28

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UUFWZHI 02 PAGE TWO

LIFTED FM PAGE 15, 21 NOV CURR EDITION OF "MUNCHENER ILLUSTRIERTE" AND IS INCDRECT TRANSLATIDN. REF ARTICLE READS, "MITTEN UNTER UNS FUEHREN DER VON DEM EHEMALIGEN GENERAL AUFGEBAUTE b1

b1 UND DER MILITAERISCHE ABSCHIRM-DIENST EINEN UNSICHTBAREN KRIEG GEGEN ZWOELFtausend OESTLICHE AGENTEN". THIS SHDULD READ, b1 (NOT INF SVC) BUILT UP BY THE FDRMER GENERAL, THE AGCY FDR THE PRDTECTIDN OF THE CONSTITUTION (NOT INTERIDR CE) AND THE MIL SCTY SVC (NDT MIL CE) WAGE AND INVINSIBLE WAR VS 12,000 EASTERN AGENTS". THE ILLUSTRIERTE IN NDT TD BE CONSTRUED AS MEANING THAT GEHLEN HEADS ALL ABOVE AGCYS.

3. ~~4~~ DPN DF DFCL CONTACTS THIS OFC AND LD IS THAT GEHLEN SUPPLIED INFO OF TYPICAL CZECH INTELL OPN DIRECTED AGAINST GEHLEN DRGN TO WEST GER PRESS IN ORDER TD ENLIGHTEN WEST GER DN IMPDRTANCE HIS DRGN AND ALSO CREATE FAV ATMOSPHERE AND CDOPERATE WITH WEST GER PRESS RATHER THAN RECEIVE UNFAV PUBLICITY WHENEVER FLAP OCCURS. IN SHORT, A PRDPAGANDA PITCH

BT

CFM 15 21 12,000  
01/1015Z

NNNN

RECD 01 DEC 59/ U U F W Z 1036

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JOINT MESSAGE FORM

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PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	PRIORITY	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
INFO				X	DA	ORIG	

FROM:

CG 66 CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT GER

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: OCA LNO MEHLEM GER

SECRET Z6827

Gpr From AEUC-Ln for AEUC-LB

1. (C) SUBJ is Gshlen Organization.

2. (C) Ref article, Stars and Stripes, 30 Nov ourr., page 4 re SUBJ, desire your cmt on UFI stat Gshlen heads FRG's three secret svcs depts. Req your cmt after you have gently queried [b1] and [b1] as to possibls meaning and source of this info. It is permissible to call attn of [b1] to Stars and Stripes article in making your queriss. Opinions of FRG sso ofls, other than thoss of [b1] are desired to eval Stars and Stripes rept. Pub this article seems to give good oppor for breaching SUBJ to thoss ofls.

-----

MFR: Tbis hq xtremely interested in any consolidation of control over FRG security and intelligncs agencs.

DATE	TIME
30	1400Z
MONTH Nov	YEAR
	59

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SYMBOL

AEUC-LN XE 320 529

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PAGE NR. 1

NR. OF PAGES 1

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EXPER (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

b6

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Chief, Liaison Div

THIS DOCUMENT CLASSIFIED SECRET BY AUTHORITY OF b6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *YE 320529*  
*Perkins*

G-2, USAREUR, LIAISON OFFICE  
OCA, American Embassy  
APO 80 US Forces

b1

25 November 1959

SUBJECT: Liaison between Intelligence and Security Agencies  
of the Federal Republic of Germany (C)  
Re: FRO Security Seminar, COLOGNE, 25/26 November 1959.

TO : Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154

ATTN: Liaison Division (AEUC-LN)

(U)

1. (C) Reference is made to OM 6/57, Headquarters 66th  
CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. (C) This office has learned from reliable, ranking  
b1 contacts that all FRO Intelligence and Security agencies  
are to participate in a Security Seminar to be held in COLOGNE  
under the auspices of the Federal Interior Ministry on 25 and  
26 November 1959. The seminar will be held in private, well-  
guarded rooms rented for the purpose at the GURZENICH, a well  
known COLOGNE hall. About 140 persons are expected to attend.  
They will include representatives of the following agencies:

Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesinnenministerium) (BdI);

Office of the General Federal Attorney (Bundesanwaltschaft);

b1

Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz) (BGS);

Pass Control Service (Passkontrolldienst) (PKD);

State Ministries of the Interior (Landesinnenministerien) (LdI);

b1

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BC  
Liaison Division (AEUC-LN)  
Hq, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR

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b1

In addition, District Attorneys (Staatsanwaltschaften) and the Police Chiefs of major cities in the FRG have been invited to attend.

3. (U) The purpose of the seminar is to furnish concerned FRG agencies with a general orientation with respect to the organization and function of the principal FRG security and intelligence agencies and to permit opportunity for an exchange of views with respect to cooperation between these services and other agencies in the security field. The seminar will be opened by Federal Ministry State Secretary Ritter von LEX who will address the participants on the general subject of internal security and its several aspects.

4. (C) Following von LEX the following persons will speak on the subjects indicated below:

President

b1

b6

b1

b6

President Reinhard GENLEN,

b1

b6

b1 b6

b1

b6

- Communist Subversion and Illegal Communist Organization and Activity in the Federal Republic of Germany.

5. (C) In addition to addresses on the topics listed, the heads of the various agencies will also be given the opportunity of suggesting to one another and to representatives of the other participating organizations, ways and means in which cooperation between them might be improved in the interest of efficient handling of security cases. In this connection it is known that the [b1] will take the opportunity of talking extensively with representatives of police and prosecuting authorities, i.e. district attorneys, with a view toward improving cooperation between those agencies and the [b1] on security cases.

6. (U) COMMENT: The present seminar is a repetition of a similar seminar held some two years ago, although the participation in this instance seems to be on a broader basis. The

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reaction of various FRO security officials with whom I spoke after the last such seminar was favorable. They felt that it tended not only to improve liaison between them but had also lead to a better mutual understanding of the functions and problems of each organization and, consequently, a better coordination of their activities. The present seminar is designed to serve the same purpose.

T. C. HUGHES, Jr  
Liaison Officer

C  
5d(3)(e)-TCH-LF  
TCH/igg/Mahlen 3236

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PAGE TWO OF UUFWZHB 04L


WHETHER ARMY AND AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ATTEND MEETING OR IF IT WOULD BE STRICTLY BETWEEN [b1] AND SBU. (b3 Per CIA) BELIEVES THAT [b6] MAY DISCUSS THIS WITH GEN VAN NATTA. IT IS MY OPINION THAT [b1] WOULD NOT HAVE FURNISHED US WITH THE NAMES OF THEIR PERSONNEL TO ATTEND THE MEETING UNLESS THEY EXPECTED ARMY AND AIR FORCE TO PARTICIPATE.

2. (S) THE SUBJ OF THIS [b1] DOCUMENT IS "RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AGREEMENT REGARDING SHARING BY EOS (NORMALLY MEANS SBU, IN THIS CASE MAY MEAN ALL US AGENCIES) OF OPERATIONS LEADS IN THE FORMER AMERICAN ZONE". THE OPENING PARA, WHICH (b3 Per CIA) REQUESTED ARMY AND AIR FORCE IGNORE, STATES: THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENT IS REACHED BETWEEN EOS AND [b1] FOR THE FORMER AMERICAN ZONE IN ORDER THAT THE AUTHORIZED INTERESTS OF THE PARTNERS REGARDING OPERATIONAL LEADS IN THE GFR BE CONSIDERED AND OVERLAPPING OF INTERESTS IN THE UTILIZATION OF THE REFUGEE FLOW BE AVOIDED.

3. (U) TRANSLATION OF THE REST OF DOCUMENT FOLLOWS. "

A. THE BASIS FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF LEADS ARE SOURCES APPEARING AT BEFRAS KASSEL, STUTTGART, FRANKFURT, MUNICH AND NUERNBERG.

B. ALL SOURCES APPEARING AT THESE CENTERS ARE ALLOCATED FOR OPERATIONAL USE TO ONE OF THE PARTNERS (IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT) NONE

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PAGE THREE OF UUFWZHB 04L

MENT YET TO BE NEGOTIATED) AND REMAIN THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTNER, TO WHOM ORIGINALLY ALLOCATED, FOR ALL FURTHER OPERATIONAL USE. THEY CANNOT BE OPERATIONALLY USED BY THE OTHER PARTNER, UNLESS SPECIFIC PERMISSION IS GIVEN.

C. IN ORDER TO PERMIT A CAREFUL SELECTION OF REFUGEES ELIGIBLE FOR AN INVITATION BASED ON AVAILABLE DATA, PRIORITY FILES SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AT ALL BEFRAS REFLECTING THE CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF BOTH PARTNERS. THESE FILES SHALL BE CONSTANTLY SUPPLEMENTED AND CORRECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PARTNERS'S INSTRUCTIONS. REFUGEES ARE INVITED IF THE FILE AND AVAILABLE DATA INDICATE THAT THEY ARE OF INTEREST. A FINAL ASSIGNMENT OF SOURCE DOES NOT TAKE PLACE AT THIS TIME.

D. THE DISTRIBUTION CODE ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPH 2 IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO SOURCE WHO FOLLOW THE INVITATION. ALLOCATION OF SOURCES IS EFFECTED COMMENSURATE TO THE PARTNERS' INTEREST AND BASED ON THE RESULTS ON PRELIMINARY SCREENING. TO INSURE A JUST ALLOCATION IN REGARDS TO QUALITY THE PARTNERS, ROTATING CONTROL ON A DAILY OR WEEKLY BASIS, HAVE FIRST CALL ON SELECTION OF SOURCES APPEARING AT THE BEFRAS. (NOTE: ONE DAY OR WEEK US, ONE DAY OR WEEK b1).

E. ADJUSTMENT OF ALL QUESTIONS PERTINENT TO PROCEDURES AT THE CFN 2

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PAGE FOUR OF UUFWZHB 04L

CENTERS LIES WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE RESPECTIVE LOCAL COMMISSIONS. IN THESE CASES WHERE NO AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED THE FINAL DECISION WILL BE MADE BY THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMISSION. DEPENDING ON THE PARTICULAR CASE THE CENTRAL COMMISSION MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED BY OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL FROM EACH OF THE PARTNERS.

F. THIS AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES ONLY PROCUREMENT OF OPERATIONAL LEADS. BOTH PARTNERS SPECIFICALLY COMMIT THEMSELVES:

TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY ATTEMPTS TO RECRUIT SOURCES AT THE CENTERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COVERT INTELLIGENCE AND LIKEWISE TO AVOID DISCLOSURE OF ANY INTENTIONS THAT INVITED SOURCES ARE CONTEMPLATED FOR USE FOR COVERT PURPOSES AT A LATER TIME.

G. TO ASSURE THAT IN THE COURSE OF A SUBSEQUENT RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT FOR OPERATIONAL USE, SOURCES WILL NOT BECOME AWARE OF A CONNECTION BETWEEN THEIR EARLIER APPEARANCE AT THE BEFRA-- OR THE RESULT OF THE INTERVIEW-- AND THE RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT.

H. THIS AGREEMENT IS BINDING ON BOTH PARTNERS UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 1960. AT THAT TIME BOTH PARTNERS SHALL MEET AGAIN TO DISCUSS EXTENSION OF OR CHANGES TO THIS AGREEMENT.

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SECURITY

FROM:

CO 66 CIC OP BAD CANNSTATT GER

4. (S) Records, this Hq, reveal no info on [b6] however,  
[b6] was Subj of a [b1] screening req on behalf of the Ministry  
of Economics, 25 Jul 57.

5. (U) More info will fol.

MFR: Above transmits to G2 info received from Rgn IV.

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1 MAY 55

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AGL (1) 9-55-210M-16214

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD		DATE 29 Apr 59
PARTICIPANTS b6	SECTION or ORGANIZATION b6 66th CIC	LOCATION
SUBJECT OF CONVERSATION b1 and Gen Gehlen		
INFORMATION OBTAINED BY xx Personal Contact Telephone		TIME and DATE OCCURRED Evening 23 Apr 59

SYNOPSIS

(U) In a conversation with b1 b6 on evening of 23 April 1959 the following information concerning b1 and Gen Gehlen was learned:

1. (C) The G2 of the Bundeswehr has the authority to place collection requirements on b1. The b1 send these requirements through G2 to b1 given considerable information to the Bundeswehr.

2. (C) Gen Gehlen is a dedicated individual who has no personal ambitions and is perfectly happy in his present job and not one bit resentful of present Army officers nor does he have any special designs of working his way back into the Army.

3. (C) b1 has analysts and other specialists who serve five-year tours with b1 then come back to b1.

4. (C) The b1 is working very closely with General Wessel.

5. (C) Another item of interest, the b1 is the only German organization dealing in comm intelligence. The b1 deals with locating clandestine radios physically located in West Germany. The b1 has no comm intel responsibility.

1706

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C/In

M/R File

b6

TYPED NAME

Lt Col  
GRADE

Executive Officer  
SECTION

b6

SIGNATURE

WB FO 16 (L)  
20 APR 57

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REGION IV  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 108 US FORCES

10 AUG 1959

AEUC-OPCS 274/46 XE-320529

SUBJECT: b1 (C)

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
APO 154, US Forces  
ATTN: AEUC-OPCS

1. (U) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 6/57, dated 20 June 1957.
2. (U) FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Region IV, Subject and file as above, dated 10 August 1959.
3. (C) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source A-IV is b1 Operations Officer, Region IV, evaluated B, who obtained the information on or about 19 May 1959 through contact with Special Detachment USAREUR personnel. All other sources and evaluations are as stated in the body of the inclosed report. Preparing Agent for this report is b6

b6

1 Incl  
(U) (C) SOI dtd 10 Aug 59  
Tel: MoC Mil 8560 AP/npd

for Major, AI (SigC)  
Commanding

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Date 10 AUG 1959 Init 447

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

10 August 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

XE-320529

SUBJECT

b1

(c)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On or about 19 May 1959, a check conducted at the Munich Police Station Number 32, revealed that one [b6] resided at [b6]

[b6]

Source: A/S

(B-2)

2. Attempts to interview [b6] regarding another investigation, met with negative results. [b6] refused to talk to anyone from this office, and immediately after the attempt, personnel of Region IV were contacted by personnel of Special Detachment USAREUR, who stated that they had an interest in [b6] and that if Region IV desired information from [b6] they would obtain same and turn it over to Region IV.

Source: A-IV

(B-2)

3. The working files of Region IV were examined on 10 August 1959, and revealed no record of [b6].

Source: A/S

(B-2)

## GLOSSARY:

[b1]

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Date 18 AUG 1959 Init 447

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BY AUTHORITY OF CG, 66TH CIC GROUP  
DATE 27 APRIL 1959

CO, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR  
TO : Attn: Liaison Branch (AEUC-LN)  
APO 154, US Forces

FROM: T. C. Hughes, Jr., G2 USAREUR Liaison Office  
OCA, American Embassy, Box 105, APO 80

SUBJ: b1 (S)  
Re: Liaison and Cooperation with the b1 (S)

(U)

1. (C) Reference is made to sub-paragraphs 5d(3)(a) and 5d(3)(c) of OM 6/57, HQ, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. (S) b6 a first lieutenant in the Rumanian Securitate, defected from the GDR to West BERLIN in March 1959. He was turned over to the b1 by the b1. After initial interrogation by the b1 with regard to his knowledge of HUMIS operations in the Federal Republic, b6 was turned over by the b1 to the b1 for intensive interrogation as to his knowledge of HUMIS and possible operational exploitation. (Note: b6 has been the SUBJECT of previous reports from this office to the 66th CIC Group with regard to operational matters.)

3. (S) COMMENT: The foregoing is indicative of increasing cooperation between the b1 and the b1 in the CE field and of b1 observance of the b1 delimitations agreement, which provides that while the b1 is responsible for the investigation of espionage in the Federal Republic and defensive CE operations, the b1 is responsible for the penetration of foreign intelligence services and exploitation of sources toward this end.

C  
5d(3)(a)-TCH-f  
5d(3)(e)-TCH-f

TCH/km  
Telephone: MENLEM 3236  
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
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BY AUTHORITY OF 66th CIC GROUP  
DATE: 22 April 1959

TO : CO, Headquarters 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 154  
ATTN: Liaison Branch (AEUC-LN)

FROM : T.C. Hughes, Jr., O2 USAREUR Ln Off., OCA,  
American Embassy, APO 80

SUBJECT: b1 (C) (U)

Re: Conflict with the b1 (C)

1. (U) Reference is made to sub-paragraph 5d(3)(g) of OM 6/57, Headquarters 66th CIC Group, USAREUR.

2. (C) In the course of a recent conversation with a ranking b1 official it was learned that the b1 is producing an intelligence report for the use of the FRG Federal Chancellery and the FRG Foreign Office ("Auswaertiges Amt") in connection with the forthcoming Foreign Ministers Conference in GENEVA, Switzerland. The report is to contain information presently available to the b1 with regard to the government, governmental policies, government officials and political parties of the GDR.

3. (C) One portion of the report is to deal with the SED and with the policies and activity of the SED insofar as they affect the FRG. This portion of the report was submitted by the b1 to the b1 for comment.

4. (C) The b1 has taken offense at that portion of the report dealing with the SED and its so-called "west work" ("Westarbeit"), i.e. communist party operations into the Federal Republic, because, in the words of one b1 official, it presents a totally inaccurate and incorrect picture of the situation. In addition, the b1 feels that the b1 even though it did submit a draft of the report to the b1 is somewhat presumptuous in preparing a report on a field for which the b1 has primary responsibility.

5. (C) In an effort to dissuade the b1 from publishing the report in its present form, and to refrain from preparing reports, even in draft form, about fields of primary concern to the b1 b6 head of the b1 Left Wing Subversion Department, will visit b1 Headquarters in MUNICH/Pullach in the near future. b6 who is an expert on the SED and on illegal Communist organization and activity in the Federal Republic, will discuss with concerned b1 personnel the errors of the b1 draft report and will attempt to persuade the b1 to leave the preparation of reports on Communism in the FRG to the b1 in the future. He will suggest that if the b1 should find it necessary to include a section on Communism in the FRG in any b1 reports in the future it ought to request the b1 to prepare such material and furnish it to the b1 for the purpose.

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6. (C) COMMENT:

a. This is the second time in which the [b1] has aroused the ire of the [b1] under similar conditions. At the time of the Foreign Ministers Conference in BERLIN (was it 1956), the [b1] prepared a similar report which also contained a section on Communist activity in the FRG. The report was submitted by the [b1] to the Federal Chancellery without prior submission of even the portion dealing with the Communism in the FRG to the [b1] for comment. The [b1] got hold of a copy of it, however, and informed the Interior Ministry, which presumably informed the Chancellery, that the portion dealing with Communism in the FRG was inaccurate and misleading. This of course added more fuel to the antagonism even then existing between the [b1] and the [b1] and [b6] who at the time expressed his views on the poor quality of the [b1] report in a very positive manner, earned a good measure of the [b1] enmity.

b. This time the [b1] undoubtedly having profited from the nature of the reception given to its last report on Communism in the FRG, has exhibited more caution by submitting its draft of the report to the [b1] prior to publication. And the [b1] although incensed that the [b1] would prepare even a draft report on a field of primary concern to the [b1] will take the trouble of sending a [b1] representative to the [b1] to discuss the report, under instructions to do so in a tactful manner. This seems to be some indication that, however haltingly, the two services are at least beginning to communicate with one another when their interests coincide or overlap.

7. DOWNGRADING DATA: This document may be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL, Special Handling Required, Not releasable to Foreign Nationals, on 22 April 1962.

*CHughes*

C  
5d(3)(g)-TCH-f  
TCH/sz/Mehlen 3236

[b1]  
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1742

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE



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CONFIDENTIAL Y E 320529 T/S

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE: 14 April 1959

## PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Force Original Filed in DE-374520

## SUBJECT

b6

(U)

## CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A

USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B

FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D

UNRELIABLE . . . . . E

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

## OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1

PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2

POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3

DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4

IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

CARD

1. [b6] at an unknown location in Germany, present address Braunschweig 320PC09, Germany, street address unknown, was formerly employed as a guard by the 4028th Labor Service, Dechen 320PU84, Germany. [b6] joined that unit in approximately 1952 and left it in May 1956. [b6] left the labor service in order to accept employment with the Gehlen Organization [b1] in the Braunschweig area. [b6] is a childhood friend of SUBJECT and, after the death of SUBJECT's husband in 1955, dated her on a number of occasions in Munich 320PU93, Germany. [b6] was present in SUBJECT's apartment on one occasion during 1956 when a meeting of ten to fifteen persons from the KPD were holding a meeting there. After his departure from labor service, in approximately November 1956, [b6] made the statement that he had concealed all indication of his association with SUBJECT from the [b1]

Source: A-IV

(C-2)

2. An examination of the working files of Region IV revealed that SUBJECT is the widow of [b6] former Second Secretary of the KPD PV, and is residing in the same apartment at [b6] a known courier for the illegal KPD. In 1956, meetings of the KPD were held in SUBJECT's home.

Source: A/S

(B-2)

## GLOSSARY:

b1

KPD - Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany.

PV - Parteivorstand - Party Executive.

## DISTRIBUTION

1 - Hq, 66th CIC Gp, 1 - CS RGN IV EXCLUDED FROM DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

WD AGO FORM 568 1 JUN 47

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VI  
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 696 US FORCES

XE 320529

AEUC-SCCE; XE-320529

SUBJECT:

b1

(c)

MAR 9 1959

TO: Commanding Officer  
66th CIC Group  
APO 154, US Forces  
ATTN: AEUC-SCCS

1. (U) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 6/57.
2. (U) FORWARDED: Summary of Information, this region, subject and file as above, dated 26 February 1959.
3. (c) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: The information contained in the attached Summary of Information was collected and prepared by b6 this region, during the period b1

b1

4. (c) REMARKS:

a. Due to the extremely personal nature of the information and to the continuing relationship between b1 and DAD, it is suggested that dissemination of the inclosed information be restricted to CIC channels.

b. Collection of information concerning the above subject is a continuing requirement of this region and will be forwarded as received.

This Document Has Been  
Carded by C/R Section  
Date 11 Mar 1959  
b6  
Lt Col, AI (JRY)  
Commanding

1 Incl  
SOI subj as above dtd  
26 Feb 59 (c)

AVJ/opt/Nbg MIL 6421

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XXXX FORCES

FEB. 12 1959

AEUC-SCOE 274/46  
XE 320529

SUBJECT: [b1]

CIC FILE

TO: Commanding Officer  
Region X, 66th CIC Group  
APO 171, US Forces  
ATTN: AEUC-SCOE

1. (U) Reference is made to your letter, dated 12 January 1959, subject end file as above.

2. ~~(S)~~ The inclosures to the referenced letter, although dated, were found to be of interest. However, these reports are available to this Group through regular liaison channels. Hence, it is considered inadvisable to jeopardize the official relationship of this Group with [b1] and DAD by your obtaining similar material from your source in the future. Even though you are requested not to assume this unnecessary risk, you are not enjoined from continuing your normal liaison with [b6]

FOR THE COMMANDER:

This document classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By AAR: [b6] (INF)  
Hq 66th CIC Group Ch CE Dir

[b6]

Major, AI (OE)  
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8344  
EOM/HAP/ebc

REF: (S) [b1]

b1

1755

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL 1 JANUARY 1962  
CE-169-SI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

23 January 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

b1

Re: Finances (a)

XE 220529

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION  
OF SOURCE:COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

During the ten year period in which the present b1 b1 worked for the US Government as the so-called "Gehlen Group", there was a generally liberal policy in disbursement of confidential funds for payment of sources, operational expenses in connection with sources and per diem and personal reimbursements of agents themselves. This was particularly true in the early years of the organization when such payments to agents included a cigarette ration as well as a regular monetary salary. Confidential funds were also issued largely in the form of goods. However, now that the organization has become the b1 a part of the Federal Ministry of Interior, it is subjected to careful auditing by the Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Auditing Office), which requires valid receipts for all expenditures. This has resulted in embarrassment for b1 agents who must pickup receipts in restaurants and bars and risk possible compromise or loss of prestige in doing so. In some instances, it is possible for the agent to certify payment of a legitimate operational bill without actual presentation of the bill itself. This practice is frowned upon, however. Used train tickets for travel accomplished by an agent for operational reasons must be submitted for reimbursement. If the ticket has been lost or taken up upon leaving the station at the destination, the agent will not be reimbursed. Those fiscal policies are a source of considerable annoyance to operational personnel of the b1 and the increasingly severe conditions have resulted in the resignation, due to discontent, of at least one b1 agent.

Source: A-VI

C-3

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1 JUN 47~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

~~SECRET~~

STAFF COMMUNICATIONS

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

**ACTION COPY**  
 This record will be  
 disposed of in accordance with AR 345-210  
 CMB

ROUTINE

R 271215Z MAR 67

FM CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GER

TO DA WASH DC

BT

~~SECRET~~ (NOFORN) SX-2464

FOR ACSI-DSCC (b6) FROM AEAGB-PDN

SUBJECT: WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SER-

VICE (U) (S)

1. (S) FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FORWARDED TO ACSI FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN STUDY ON WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SECURITY SERVICES. CAS ONN, WHO PROVIDED THE ORIGINAL REPORT, RATES INFORMATION, DATED 15 MARCH 1967, AS PROBABLY TRUE.

2. (S) ACCORDING TO CAS, YOUNG STAFF MEMBERS ARE COMPLAINING BECAUSE THE CHIEF OF THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE (b1) REINGARD GELEN, HAS SURROUNDED HIMSELF WITH OLD FRIENDS FROM WORLD WAR II ORGANIZATION - FREMDE HEERE OST- AND CLOSE RELATIVES. THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS REPORTEDLY TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE CONVICTION OF (b1) VETERAN HEINZ FEHLFE FOR ESPIONAGE IN BEHALF OF SOVIET INTELLI-

GENCE. (S) (U)

3. (S) THIS FAVORITISM HAS PRECLUDED PROMOTION OF MANY MIDDLE-LEVEL OFFICERS, AND THERE HAS BEEN A DECIDED DROP IN MORALE AND EFFECTIVENESS. WD STAFF MEMBERS REPORTEDLY HAVE COMPLAINED TO WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENTARIANS CONCERNING BND MISMANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY. AFTER A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, CHANCELLERY STATE SECRETARY (b6) ADVISED CHANCELLOR (b6) OF THE PROBLEM AND THE LATTER SUMMONED GELEN TO BONN ON 15 MARCH 1967 FOR A DISCUSSION. OUTCOME OF THE MEETING IS UNKNOWN.

4. (S) AT THE SAME TIME, THE HEAD OF WEST GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (J-2) ADMIRAL (b6) HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO TAKE OVER ELEMENTS OF THE (b1) AND INCORPORATE THEM IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. REPORTEDLY, KIESINGER PLANS TO CHANGE (b1) MANAGEMENT AND STRUCTURE. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IS FINDING A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR GELEN, WHO WILL REACH THE RETIREMENT AGE OF 65 IN APRIL

THIS YEAR. NEITHER OF HIS DEPUTIES, (b6) NOR (b6) ARE SUFFICIENTLY WELL-ROUNDED, THE FORMER

DA IN 124787-

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

EEEEING A MANAGERIAL TYPE AND THE LATTER AN INTELLIGENCE EXPERT. IN THE PAST, GENERAL GERHARD WESSEL WAS CONSIDERED A LIKELY SUCCESSOR, BUT SINCE HIS ASSIGNMENT TO THE STANDING NATO GROUP IN WASHINGTON, HE HAS BEEN COMPLETELY OUT OF THE PICTURE. (C)

6.4) USAREUR COMMENT: INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS LEVEL INDICATES THAT GEHLEN HAS ALWAYS SURROUNDED HIMSELF WITH FREMDE HEERE OST PERSONNEL. FURTHERMORE, IF WESSEL BECOMES CHIEF OF THE [b1] HE WOULD LIKELY SUPPORT THE SAME CLIQUE SINCE HE WAS THE LAST CHIEF OF FREMDE HEERE OST. OVERAGE AND MISMANAGEMENT PROBLEMS INHERENT [b1] PERSONNEL PRACTICES ARE NOT THE ONLY PROBLEMS BOTHERING GEHLEN. HE IS PROBABLY TOO CONSERVATIVE TO UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT FLUID POLITICAL SITUATION IN WEST GERMANY,

PARTICULARLY THE NEW COALITION GOVERNMENT'S OVERTURES TO THE EAST. CP-1

BT

ACTION: ACSI  
DA IN 124787

PAGE 2

~~SECRET~~ 1773

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s): *(b)(3) PER CIA*

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Page(s) 1775-1785